r| t j
by
NICOLAI HARTMANN
Piofmor of Phihmphy, University of Berlin
TRANSLATED BY
STANTON COIT
{Authorized Version )
volume u
MORAL VALUES
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CONTENTS
PART II
THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
(AXIOLOGY OF MORALS)
Section I
GENERAL ASPECTS OF THE TABLE OF
VALUES
CHAPTER
L Tim Place of Moral Values Among Values in
General
(a) The Field of Ethical Inquiry
( h ) The Dependence of Moral upon Non-
Moral Values
(r) Other Kinds of Dependence
(d) Scheler’tt Attempt to Establish the Oppo-
site Theory
II. Moral Value and toe End of Action
(a) The Misunderstanding of Moral Values
in the Ethics of Ends
( b ) The Limits of the Ought-to-Do in the
Realm of Values
(r) The Limit within which Moral Values
may be Striven For
(d) The Relation of Striving to Attaining
(«) Limit to the Possibility of Actualizing
Moral Values
HI. Tim Gradation of Values
(a) The Methodological Difficulty in the
Principle of Gradation
(h) Consciousness of Value and Conscious-
ness of its Gradations
(c) “Higher” and “Lower/' their Meaning
axiologically Irreducible
( d ) The Multiple Dimensionality of the Realm
of Values
(e) Strength and Height of Values— Sin and
Fulfilment
CONTENTS
CHAPTER I* AC* l£
IV* Tim Criteria ok thi: Grape ok a Value 54
(a) Five Tests of Hunk in the Sonic of Values 54
(b) The K valuation of these Criteria 56
(r) Hildebrand's Theory of Valuatiomd
Response 57
(d) The Vnlutttioxuil Predicates of the Nicomn*
chenn Ethics 58
(tj Scheler’a Laws of Preference and the
Absoluteness of the Ideal Gradation 60
V. The Problem ok the Supreme Value 6$
(ci) Demand for a Unifying Ethical Principle 65
(b) The Unknowableness of the Content of
the "Good” 66
(<) Possible Types of Monism in the Given
Pluralism of Values 68
(d) The Monism of Ethics in the Pluralism
of Values 7t
Seethe U
THE MOST GENERAL ANTITHESES
VL The Antinomic ok Values 75
Of) Positive Opposition m a Peculiarity of the
Most Elementary Values 75
(h) Mora! Conflict and the Valuations!
Antinomies 76
(<*) The Dimensional System of Opposites
as m Ideal “Valuations! Space* 1 78
VIL Modal Oppositions 8t
(a) 'The Antinomy of Necessity ami Freedom 8*
(b) The Antinomy of the Real Iking and the
Non-being of Values 83
(e) Formulations and Conjugations of this
Antinomy 85
VIIL Relational Opposite* 87
(а) The Antinomy of the Carrier of Value 87
(б) The Antinomy of Activity and Inertia 89
(c) The Grade and the Range of the Type 91
(d) Harmony and Conflict 93
(a) Simplicity and Complexity 96
CONTENTS
*3
CHAPTER PACE
IX. Qualitative and Quantitative Oppositions 98
(a) Universality and Singularity 98
(b) The Synthesis in the Type tot
( c ) Comprehensiveness and Universality, In-
dividuality and the Individual 103
(d) The Contrast of the Collective Unity and
the Individual 106
0) The Antinomy in the Contrast of Quantity x xo
(/) The Limit of the Antinomy 1x3
(#) The Completely Antinomical Elements in
the Realm of Values and of Onto-
logical Reality 1x5
(h) Intermediate Members— -the Smaller Com-
munity and the Political Party 1x8
(0 Humanity and Nation *20
Section 111
THE VALUES WHICH CONDITION
CONTENTS
X. General Character op the Group xaj
(a) Concreteness and Fulness of Content 125
(b) The Relation of the One-sided Series to
the Antinomies 126
(e) The Second Supplementary Group 128
XI. Valuational Foundations in the Subject 13 x
(a) Life as a Value 13X
(b) Consciousness as a Value 134
(4 Activity as a Value 137
(d) Suffering as a Value 138
(e) Strength as a Value 142
(/) Freedom of the Will as a Value 143
(g) Foresight as a Value 147
(A) Purposive Efficacy as a Value 15 x
XI L Goons as Values 155
(<*) The Position of the Scale of Goods in the
General Ethical Scale 155
(b) Existence as a Basic Value 156
(<) Situation as a Value 158
(d) Power m a Value *S 9
CONTENTS
CUAFIPK I*A«m
(e) Happiness oa a Value * 6 o
(/) Mon* Special dimes of Goods 1 6»
(4?) The Limit of the Ethical Problem ('on*
earning the Scale of Goods 163
Section IV
FUNDAMENTAL MORAL VALUES
XIIL Moral Values in General 167
(a) The Connection between Moral Values
mid Freedom 167
(ft) The Fundamental Moral Values and the
Subordinate Groups 169
XIV. Tint Good *7*
(a) Goodness m a Fundamental Moral Value 171
(ft) tiulefimihility ami Partial Irrationality of
the (haul *74
(<) The Ambiguities Concerning Goodness 173
(d) Axiological Distance of the Good tram
the Conditioning Values of A* Hon 174
(e) The Teleology nl the Anti-Values and the
Idea of Satan % 76
(/) Goodness : the Pursuit of Values as Ends *79
(g) Intended Values and the Value of Inten-
tions in the Pursuit of Value 184
(ft) The Dependence of Goodness upon the
Seale of Values in respect of Material 184
(f) The G nidation in our Sense ot Height
and the “Order of the Heart 1 * 1H8
(k) Universality in the Ought- to- Be of Good-
nets *90
XV. Tint Noting s 9 a
(«) The Relation of Noble-mindedness to
Goodness* and of its Opposite to Badness 19a
(ft) The Relation of Nobility to Vitality as a
Value 193
(c) The Pursuit of the Uncommon as an End 195
(d) Selection of Values and Selection of Indi-
viduals (Arintology) 197
(e) Ethical Ascendency and the Morality of
the Group 198
(/) The Moral Characteristics of the Noble aot
Or) Discrimination and Co-ordination aoj
CONTENTS 15
CHAPTER
XVL Richness of Experience 205
(a) Relationship to Goodness and Nobility.
The Withdrawal of Teleology 205
(h) The Synthesis of Values in the Ethos of
Many-sidedness 206
(c) Breadth of Mind and its Relation to
Badness 208
XVII, Purity 211
(a) Contrast to Goodness and Many-sided-
ness an
( b ) Christianity and Antiquity, Purity as a
Basic Value 212
(c) Purity as a Moral Power 214
(d) The Forms in which Purity Appears zt 6
(<") Purity Irrecoverable when Lost 2x7
(jf) The Inner Dialectic of Purity and Many-
sidedness 21 9
(u) Purity and Freedom, Belief and Character zzi
Section V
SPECIAL MORAL VALUES
(FIRST CROUP)
XVIIL Tub Virtues in General 225
XIX. Justice 228
(a) Law, Equality and Personal Justice 228
(h) Doing Wrong and Suffering Wrong 229
(e) Justice as the Lowest and Most Elemen-
tary Moial Value 230
(</) Legality and Morality 232
(c) Law and Solidarity 234
XX. Wisdom 238
(#) The Ethical Meaning of and
Sapkntia 238
(b) The Socratic Ideal of Life 239
(r) Ethical Optimism and the Capacity for
Happiness 241
CONTENTS
CHAPTKK CALK
XXI. COUHAOt! £45
(a) Personal Commitment and Moral Adven-
ture 845
( b ) Moral Value and the Delight in Respon-
sibility *46
XXII. Self-Control 249
( a ) and fyKpdvm *49
(b) Obedience, Discipline, the Education of
Character *51
XXIII. The Aristotelian Virtues *53
(a) The Theory of the Golden Mean £53
(b) om^pnadnj in the Light of the /imrfnjj *57
(e) Liberality in Giving, Mildness, Magni-
ficence 358
(d) Ambition and Magnanimity 359
(e) Giving Each his Due aba
(/) The Sense of Shame *63
Section VI
SPECIAL MORAL VALUES
(second OKoni*)
XXIV. Brotherly Love 367
(«) Interest in the Welfare oi Others *67
(b) Positive Content* and Creative Spon-
taneity a68
(c) Antinomical Relation to Justice *70
(d) Resentment, False Live ami Pity 37#
(e) Emotional Transcendence of the Kphrr<
of Self 374
(/) The Apriorism and Metaphyaie oi
Brotherly Love £76
Of) The Autonomy of the Moral Value tn
Brotherly Love *78
XXV. Truthfulness and Uehuhitnhss a8i
(a) Truth and Truthfulness 281
(b) Valuational Conilicts between Truthful-
ness and the So-called "Necessary Lie" a8j
CONTENTS
17
CHAPTER PAGE
XXVI. Trustworthiness and Fidelity 386
(a) The Ability to Make Promises 286
(b) The Identity and Substance of the Moral
Person 287
0 ) The Ethos of Fidelity 288
XXVIL Trust and Faith 291
(a) Adventure, Courage and the Spiritual
Power of Trust 291
( b ) Blind Faith 292
( c ) Solidarity and the Educative Power of
Faith 293
( d ) Faith as a Factor in Friendship 296
(e) Optimism and Hope 296
XXVIII. Modesty, Humility, Aloofness 298
(a) The Ethos of the Upward Gaze 298
(b) Humility and Pride 299
(c) Keeping One’s Distance 301
XXIX. The Valuis of Social Intercourse 304
(a) The Moral Character of Conventionalities 304
(/;) Existing Customs 305
(r) Aristotle’s Virtues of Social Intercourse 307
Section VII
SPECIAL MORAL VALUES
(third group)
XXX. Love of the Remote 311
(а) The Limiting Values in the Ethical
Survey 311
(б) Effort as an Element in the Following
Virtues 31X
(c) The Platonic epcoq 314
( d ) The Human Outlook and Historical Soli-*
darity 315
(e) Love of the Nearest and Love of the
Remotest 317
ii
CONTENTS
x8
CttAl’TBR
{/) Justice and the Love of the Remotest 3*1
(g) The Formation of One's Ethical Ideal 333
(A) The Content of Prospective Ideals 335
(i) Love of tine Remotest, its Moral Character 338
XXXL Radiant Vnmm u*
(a) Spiritual Goods and the Personal Chat ac-
tor accordant with them 33a
(b) Imparting and Receiving* Virtue without
Sacrifice 334
(c) U A Useless Virtue* 1 335
(d) The Giving of Meaning to Life, Amhro-
podiey 338
XXXII. PimnoNAUTY 34*
(a) Relation to Individuality 34*
(b) The Real Being and the Weal Ethos of
Personality (Its Intelligible Character) 344
(<■) Subjective Universality and Objective
Individuality 346
(*/) Objective Universality and Individuality
in the PerHtmal Value 348
(e) The Law of Preference in the Individual
Ethos \ its Relation to the Order of Rank 340
(/) The Rank of Personality in the Seale <4
Moral Values 353
(ft) Two Kinds of G nidation in Personality 354
(A) Antinomic Relation to General Values and
the Conversion of the Categorical Im-
perative 355
(f) Genuine and Spurious Personality 3(11
(k) The Values of Personality, Discernible ami
Aprioristte 364
XXXIIL Personal Love 368
(а) Personal Being, the Fulfilment of its
Meaning 368
(б) I^ve, jts Distinctive Life and Value 370
(c) Love, its Strength and iti Will as Values 37a
(d) Beyond Happiness and Unhappiness 375
(e) Depth of Soul and Spiritual Communion 377
(/) Love as a Source of Knowledge 378
CONTENTS
*9
Section VIII
THE ORDER OF THE REALM OF VALUES
CHAPTER PAGE
XXXIV. The Lack op Systematic Structure 385
(a) Limits of Our Survey 385
(£>) Results Obtained Concerning the Scale
of Values 386
( c ) Types of Regularity in the Table of Values 389
XXXV. Stratification and the Foundational Relation 39a
(a) The Dialectical Law of Combination 39a
(&) The Implication of Disvalues and the Im-
plication of Values 393
(c) Stratification and its Laws 395
(d) The Laws of Stratification, the Limits of
their Validity 397
(e) The Absorption of the Conditioning Rela-
tion into Stratification 399
(/) The Relation between Ethical and iEsthe-
tic Values 403
(g) Consequences 405
XXXVI. Oppositional Relation and the Synthesis of
Values 407
(а) Five Types of Axiological Contrast 407
(б) Reduction of the Table of Contrasts 409
(tf) The Formal Relation between the Types
of Contrast and their Reciprocity 410
(d) The Antithetic of Disvalues and the
Theory of the ftcvdrrjQ 41 x
(e) The jueexir rjg as a Valuational Synthesis 414
(/) Application of the Synthetic Principle to
the Higher Moral Values . 418
(g) The Tyranny of Values and its Restriction
in the Synthesis 421:
(/*) The “Unity of Virtue.” Outlook upon the
Ideal System of Values 426
(t) The Antithetic of Values, its Removal to
the Disvalues 427
( k ) The Question as to the Genuineness of the
Valuational Antinomies 430
20
CONTENTS
CttAPTftK I'Att*
XXXVII, Till? COMW.FMEN FARY RELATfONRIItF 433
(a) Values* the Reciprocal Fulfilment of their
Meaning 433
(ft) Kxtensum of the Relational** p to the
Lower Value# 43*1
(r) The Independence of Stratification and of
the Conditioning Relation 437
(d) Connection with the Oppositional Relation 440
(e) The Inter-personal Synthesis of Values 441
XXXVI I L The Grade and the Strength of Values 444
(a) Gradation and Stratification 444
(ft) Height and Synthesis 445
(c) The Fundamental Catcgorial Law and
its Corollaries 446
(d) The Law of Strength 440
(r) The Meaning of Superior Strength in the
Sphere of Gooda-Values 453
(/) Smngth and Height in the Sphere of the
Moral Values 455
(#) The Twofold Aspect of Morality 457
(ft) 'The Antinomy in the Nature of the < food 450
(*) 'The Synthesis of the Two Ttcmf# oi
Preference, its an Ideal 460
XXXIX, Value and Valuatxonal Inhu i frknok 464
(et) Various Altitude# ot the Scale# hut the
Same SCeru»Pom< 464
(ft) The Relation of the Height# of the Value#
and the Depths of the Anti-Value# to
the Indiffcrence-Point 465
(c) The Absolutely Indifferent and the Almti*
lutely Valuable 468
(d) The Beginning and Had of the Realm of
Value# 471
Glossary of Greek Terms and Phrase#
473
PART II
THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
(AXIOLOGY OF MORALS)
Section I
GENERAL ASPECTS OF THE TABLE
OF VALUES
CHAPTER I (xxvi)*
THE PLACE OF MORAL VALUES AMONG VALUES
IN GENERAL
(a) The Field of Ethical Inquiry
It is not only ethics that treats of values. The term is con-
spicuous in economics and has its origin there. Economics is
the study of goods, in the first place of material, then of vital,
social and mental goods of every kind. To the latter are closely
related the values of moral, legal, political and artistic life.
Research in this field is still young and our survey casual and
unsystematic. There is a lack of comprehensive points of view;
and previous attempts to attain them have too often been marked
by a blind fumbling and uncertain groping.
So long as whole territories, like that of assthetics, in spite of
their dominant position, remain as good as unexplored, there is
no remedy. Our knowledge of the structure and order of values
is in a rudimentary stage. We can look out upon the whole
realm only through special groups of values which happen to
be accessible, but we cannot deductively determine particulars
from a general view of the whole.
There is little prospect of our attaining any authoritative
insight into moral values, as such, from the neighbouring
fields or from a general theory. On the contrary, the domain of
morality, as yet the most accessible among the more important
fields, must itself furnish us with points of departure into general
theory. In ethical research we cannot reckon upon guidance
from outside.
How moral values differ from other kinds has in part been
already explained (the two-sided relativity of persons)*, but it
* In this volume, Chapters I-XXXIX represent Chapters XXVI-
LXIV in the German edition, and the numbers in brackets (xxvi) arc
those of the chapters in that original.
* Cf. Chapter XV (d), (e), Vol. I.
84 the realm of ethical values
cannot be more fully shown until we make a special analysis
of single values. So much, however, is easily seen, that not all
values which arc ethically relevant, whether in the sense of
obligation or of participation, are on that account moral values.
The character of man is related to a multitude of values which
arc not moral in their nature. Moral conduct is always conduct
towards persons, but never except in connection with other
kinds of values and counter-values. From this point of view
there was some reason for including, as the ancients did, the
theory of goods under ethics.
In a certain sense one may say that everything, which exists,
somehow falls practically under the category of values, that
everything in the world, even the most remote and indifferent,
is in the perspective of ethics either of positive or negative
worth. The same universe, which in its totality underlies
ontological phenomena, belongs also in precisely the same
totality to ethical phenomena. It is no less a world of goods and
evils than of things and their relations. At least it is as radically
the former as it is the latter.
( b ) The Dependence of Mohai. upon Non-Mohaj. Vai.uss
This wider sphere, however, is not that of distinctively moral
values. These latter are affixed not to things and their relations,
but only to persons. Only acts of persons can he morally good
or bad. Nevertheless it is necessary to take the non-moral values
into consideration, even if not to study them in detail. Their
connection with the moral is not outward and not mtHifinble
or even negligible. It is essential, inward, material. Moral values
presuppose other goods and the specific quality and worth
belonging to them.
In fact, wherein would an honest man he superior to a thief,
if the things purloined were not somehow of value ? What one
man can steal, what another can treasure as a possession, is
not merely a thing but a good. Honesty, then, if it is a moral
value, necessarily presupposes the positive worth of material
MORAL VALUES AMONG VALUES IN GENERAL 25
goods. It is inherently dependent upon the latter. In the same
way, chivalry which secures an advantage to the weak rests upon
the worth of that advantage ; love for one’s neighbour, which
gives, or which takes upon itself another’s burden, assumes the
worth of the things given and of the relief from the burden;
not otherwise is veracity related to the worth (for the other
person) of the truth asserted. In all these cases the value of the
act is altogether different from that attributed to the external
good, whether this be some simple material possession or some
complex situation. And indeed the worth of an act is plainly
of a higher kind, the character of which is seen in this, that its
degree does not increase and decrease with the greatness of the
non-moral good, but according to a standard of a totally different
order. It nevertheless presupposes the value of goods not in
themselves moral, and without them it could not itself exist.
A relation therefore of dependence holds between the wider
and narrower spheres of values. It is an unequivocal, irre-
versible dependence of the higher upon the lower. But
the dependence is purely material, not axiological. The
lower is the stuff upon which the higher works; it is merely
the conditio sine qua non of the latter. In every other sense
the higher is independent of it; its specific quality, moral
goodness, is something entirely new, something which was
not represented in the lower value towards which it stands in
complete indifference.
It is precisely the existence of the material stuff provided
by the lower for the higher structural value, which makes this
dependence necessary. Where moral values and their opposites
appear in persons, there a world of positive goods must pre-
viously have been at hand, to which as objects of worth the
persons react. But the converse is not true. The existence of the
world of goods does not involve the emergence of a world of
morality and immorality. The basis of the latter is provided
only where a community of persons exists within one and the
same world of goods. The content of the moral world lies on
another plane; it is a structural novelty face to face with the
a6 THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUER
whole mass of values from other quarters. Hence the novelty of
its inherent quality. And indeed its pecularity— -both material
and axiological — subsists without prejudice to the fact that the
moral conduct of the persons touched by it has, mediately and
dependency, the character of a "good.”*
(r) Other Kinds of Dependence
This relation of higher and lower is not universal. It by no
means holds good for the whole realm of values that the higher
is conditioned by the lower. Such dependence prevails indeed
over a wide area, but not everywhere, and it is itself not always
structurally the same.
It is the tritest commonplace that, for instance, spiritual
values can blossom only where the elementary biological values
are attained, that the cultural form of a higher kind can grow
only in a soil of prosperity and welfare of a certain grade. Hut
the same cannot be affirmed concerning the value of pleasure
and comfort, or even of happiness, between these and culture
there exists no inner and necessary dependence, although the
former are lower in character than culture.
Between biological and spiritual values there is not the same
kind of dependence as between material goods and moral values.
The biological arc only the ontological presupposition of the
spiritual, that is to say, their actuality is a condition for the
realization of the latter; their existence is only a means, only a
building-stone, But their value-quality is not a material condi-
tion for spiritual qualities. Non-moral possessions, on the other
hand, are in their specific value-quality a condition for those
of personal conduct— without prejudice to the axiological inde-
pendence of the latter. Between the two there is only a relation
of a conditio sine qua non. But as regards the former the condi-
tion is merely external and ontological ; for the latter it is a
structural, an internally axiological, organic relation of value-
entities as such, a fusion of the lower into the higher; in short,
' Cf. Chapter XV <c), Vol. I.
MORAL VALUES AMONG VALUES IN GENERAL *7
a purely constitutional relationship of values, or, more correctly,
of the whole field of value as such, which is there before any
actualization of value and which is independent thereof.
( d ) Scheler’s Attempt to Establish the Opposite Theory
In place of the law that the higher fields rest upon the lower,
Scheler maintained that the lower are dependent upon the
higher . 1 According to him the lower can exist by right only in
so far as the higher, to -which they are related and in which they
find their significance, exist. As an illustration he takes the
relation between the value of the useful and that of the agreeable.
To be useful “for something” is of the essence of utility; a thing
cannot be useful in and of itself. Therefore, another, evidently a
higher value is the axiological condition of the useful.
Against this argument, which is in itself unobjectionable,
there is one thing to be said. Why must the basic value always
be the agreeable? Rather is utility the value of means as such,
and this is relative to an end already given. The end therefore
must have a value of its own ; but this need not necessarily be
that of the agreeable. A thing can very well be useful for life
and prosperity, for social and mental values of every kind. When
one in this sense widens Scheler’s theory it is undoubtedly, as
regards utility, well founded.
But then the question arises: Docs the same relation of
dependence hold in the case of other orders of value? Is it
true that biological values are based upon spiritual values, or
that these rest upon some highest religious value ? It is true
that life gains a decidedly higher significance from spiritual
values. But that fact is simply due to their place in the scale
of values itself. May one, on the other hand, go so far as to say
that the value of life would lapse, xf it were not linked up with
that of spiritual existence, in which the consciousness of bio-
logical value is enclosed?
That would in truth deny the value peculiar to life itself;
* Scheler, Der Fonmtimm in dtr Ethik, second edition, p. gz ff.
*8 THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
and the gravity of the moral crime involved in the destruction
of mere life— even where there are scarcely any spiritual values
worth mentioning— would be absolutely incomprehensible. It
is likewise in contradiction to our sense of value and especially
to our moral sense, when one makes the spiritual values (includ-
ing the moral worth of action) dependent upon some absolute
other-worldly value of a religious nature. The characteristic
feature of spiritual values— for example, the aesthetic — is their
self-evident autonomy, their perfect self-sufficiency and their
independence of all wider perspectives.
The same holds good of moral values. To found them upon
a higher value is evidently mere metaphysical speculation, con-
ceived as a support for religio-philosophical theses which as
such do not throw any light upon aesthetic or ethical reality.
This entire notion that the lower depends upon the higher is at
bottom a teleological prejudice; as a universal formula, it
would read; lower structures are always dependent upon higher
ones as ends, for the sake of which they exist and in which
alone they find significance.
Such a teleological law would presuppose a thorough-going
teleological gradation of values and a teleological structure of
the realm of values, and would affirm something not only alto-
gether unvcrifiable, but something winch goes counter to those
catcgorial laws of dependence which are violated in meta-
physical personalism.*
Against this it must be maintained that all grades of
values, genuine in their own right, possess their peculiar
autonomy, which can be diminished by no kind of dependence
upon anything above. The whole meaning of the realm of
values, so far as it is a world of ideal self-maintaining entities,
stands or falls with this foundation-principle. But especially is
it the spiritual values, even down to their ultimate details,
which by their constitution reveal this autonomy. What is
beautiful is beautiful for its own sake; what is comical is
comical in itself ; what is noble or lovable is noble or lovable
1 Of. Chapter XXV, Vo!, i.
MORAL VALUES AMONG VALUES IN GENERAL a 9
intrinsically. All reference back to something else for the sake
of which it is what it is, is fantastic speculation.
The citation of utility is therefore the worst imaginable. For
in itself utility is not a value on its own account. By its very
nature it can only be the value of a means to something valuable
in itself.
Of an entirely different kind is the basing of the higher value
upon the lower, as it is here set forth. It implies for the higher
values no surrender of their autonomy; for it does not touch
the valuational character of the latter, but throughout attaches
only to some specific structural elements of their contents, so
far as these already must have such a character of their own.
The higher value is never conditioned completely by the lower.
Its dependence is not axiological, not to mention teleological,
but only material or, as in most cases, only modal. It gives us
indeed a certain insight into the realm of value, but it by no
means applies to the whole range.
Dependencies naturally can very well exist in a kingdom of
autonomous entities; only they must not he total and constitu-
tional dependencies, for such would destroy the autonomy of
the members. On the other hand, the basing, axiologically and
teleologically, of the lower upon the higher constitutes a total
and essential dependence of the quality of worth as such. The
basing of the higher upon the lower materially is, on the con-
trary, only a partial dependence of particular structural elements.
CHAPTER II (xxvii)
MORAL VALUE AND THE END OF ACTION
(«) Tub Misunderstanding or Moral Values
in thk Ethics or Ends
Besides all its methodological consequences, our theory of
dependence leads us to a still more important point of view, one
which is decisive even for the understanding of moral acts.
The Kantian ethics shows the meaning of moral principles
solely in their character of Ought. The commandment, the
imperative, the claim upon man, was the moral law. If this
idea were applied to values, the meaning of morality would
needs begin and end in this, that man’s will would have to be
directed to moral values as the highest ends. He alone would be
the morally good man who in all his actions sought to be morally
good, who spoke the truth in order to be truthful, who loved
in order to be loving, who practised magnanimity so as to be
magnanimous. The Kantian rigorism speaks out pointedly and
universally: only that action has moral worth which is done
“for the sake of the law" ; it is not enough that it be in accordance
with the law, the law must further be the single motive and its
fulfilment the final end.
That this rigid rigorism leads to preposterous reaultB is
evident and has often been shown. But here we arc concerned
not directly with it, for it is only an outgrowth of the ethics
of ends. What shall we say of the ethics of ends? Is it true that
moral values constitute the supreme ends of moral action, of
that action whose vstluational quality they produce? Is it true
that the morally good man ultimately lias himself in view,
himself distinguished by the value of his action, that in his aim
by anticipation he sees his own picture in a mirror— the
picture of himself as he ought to be? Is the picturing of oneself
in the looking-glass the meaning of goodness, love, magnanimity,
straightforwardness ?
MORAL VALUE AND THE END OF ACTION 31
That is an evident falsification of the facts contained in a
moral act. The end of straightforwardness is not to be straight-
forward oneself, but that the man to whom one speaks may
learn the truth ; likewise the object of the high-minded or loving
man is not to be high-minded or loving, but that the other
person upon whom the gift or the gladness is bestowed may
have the gift or the gladness. A man gives of course from love,
but not for the sake of love. He is concerned not at all with his
own moral being, but with the being of the other person, and
indeed by no means only with that other person’s moral, but
with his whole, existence, bodily as well as mental, that is to
say, with his actual situations whatever they are, so far as they
have value for him. But these situations are valuable for him in
so far as they embrace goods. The knowledge of a truth is as
much a good— or surely is at least so regarded — as the gift
bestowed or the gladness occasioned.
Herein is shown, in its bearing upon conduct, the significance
of basing the moral values upon the non-moral. An act is of
course morally valuable through its end, but not in so far as the
content of the end is the moral worth of the act, and not simply
in so far as it has goods as its content, but in so far as its content
is a definite relation of goods to persons.
The end of an act is a situational value ; its moral quality,
on the contrary, is an actional and thereby personal value.
Moral qualities characterize a person’s conduct, but not the
object of the intention in which his conduct subsists. According
to Scheler’s phrase, they appear “on the back of the deed,” but
not in the goal it aims at. The ethics of ends involves a funda-
mental misunderstanding of moral values, in its false identifica-
tion of these with the value of the situation striven for.
( b ) The Limits of the Ought-to-Do in the Realm of Values
At first glance it seems to follow that moral values are not at
all determinant factors in the moral conduct of persons, in
effort, volition, precept and action.
3* THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
This inference would be a great mistake. What we call
conscience, that clearer or obscurer inward self-knowledge (con-
scieniia) concerning the worth or worthlessness of our own con-
duct, is by no means merely the condemnation after the deed,
winch one generally understands by it, but is equally an anticipa-
tory prohibitive factor which is determinant, at least negatively,
by its barring out of that which is immoral. It therefore works, at
least selectively, in the choice of ends. And as there is necessarily
an Either-Qr in the polar opposition of value and anti-value,
this formally negative inrush into reality is after all positive.
Situational values, the actualization of which is alone the
concern of effort, volition and outward conduct, are always
subjected to a selection through the moral feeling— and in
proportion to the mass and strength of the latter. This type of
worth, when it is decisive, has a positive character, even where
no effect is produced hut an abstention from doing. In morality
even a leaving-undone is a deed. The situation from which a
person acts always bears the character of a challenge to him to
make a decision. The mere shrinking from a sin is always a
positive decision.
Another weighty question arises here. If the morality of an
act never coincides with the content of the thing aimed at,
does it not follow that moral values as such cannot he actualized
at all? Can a striving, a volition, be directed towards them?
And finally, if this must be denied, is there any sense at all in
speaking of the Ought of these values? Is not every proper
Ought limited to situational values, that is, to the disposal of
goods in relation to persons? In a word, is man condemned to
concentrate his efforts solely upon the lower kinds of value
and not to strive for the finest and distinctively moral kind ?
This question has more than one meaning. If it refers to
realization it means one thing, if to striving, another, if to the
Ought, still another ; and it is to be answered differently accord-
ing to the meaning.
As regards the Ought, the question does not apply to the
pure Ought-to-Bc of values, whether ideal or actual. The
MORAL VALUE AND THE END OF ACTION 33
morally Good ought to be ; and, since it can only be a quality
of moral acts in which the reality of other values is involved,
this means that this valuational intention of the acts should be
so constituted, or the contents so selected, that the moral
qualities inhere in the acts. That is by no means contrary to
common sense. Likewise, where the intention does not accord
with this requirement, the act necessarily will not be as it
ought to be; the Ought-to-Be therefore will be something
actual. This also does not contradict what was said above;
“Ought-to-Be-so” does not mean: one ought “to strive” to
be so.
It is quite otherwise with the Ought-to-Do, with the demand,
directed to the person, to aim in the act itself at the unfulfilled
value, in one’s own person to have in view its realization.
Here is the limit of the ethics of the Ought; for here evidently
arises a contradiction to the law that the moral worth of a
deed cannot at the same time be the value aimed at as the end
in view. It is the Ought-to-Do which cannot be directed upon
moral values. So at least it appears provisionally, but even
this proposition must be qualified.
In any case it holds true in general that the ethics of Ought
-whereby is always meant primarily Ought-to-Do — attaches
not to the moral values of persons but to the lower grades,
to situational values, and, in so far as these refer to goods, to
the values of goods.
But thus much must be maintained, that the limit of the
Ought-to-Do is not the limit of the Ought in general. The
imperative character therefore of moral commandments, which
arc concerned with conduct as such, is not affected by this
limit; still less is the imperativeness of moral prohibitions
impaired, for instance those of the Decalogue, the positive
and edifying sense of which shines through their outwardly
negative form.
34
THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
(c) The Limit within which Moral Values
may be Striven For
Since the Qught-to-Do is valid only where at least a possibility
of effort corresponds to it in the person concerned, the limit
of the Ought-to-Do turns out to be at the same time the limit
of rational endeavour. What is true of endeavour holds good
also of the Will, of resolution, design, decision, indeed of the
objectively intentional contents of the disposition itself. That
cannot of course mean that every Will to be morally good is a
foolish or impossible volition. It means only that the volition
in a morally good action is not a willing to be good, but the
willing of another good, and of a good in another sense, namely,
of a situation which in itself is good.
Now the question is: Does this limitation really signify
what Seheler’a ethics* infers from it, that every direction of a
will or action towaids the moral values of conduct clashes with
the moral character of this Will ?
If one replies in the affirmative, it follows that attainability
by effort must decrease with the height of the value, and that
personal values, which as specifically moral arc the highest,
cannot be striven for. Effort here * - o, for it finds its absolute
boundary this side of the moral values.
Personalism supports this theory by the proposition that a
person as such, with all that pertains to him (his acts and
qualities), can never in essence be objective — a proposition
(as was shown in our criticism of personalism) which rests
upon a misunderstanding of the categorial relation between
subject and person. 'Phis sort of argument we may here regard
as disposed of. Metaphysically there is nothing in the constitu-
tion of a personality to prevent it and its acts from being aimed
at as an object either of knowing or striving.
Nevertheless the other proposition remains true, that in
striving, values of situations and not of personality are com-
monly intended, that the higher a value is, the less it is striven
* Hchekr, 5*7 f.
MORAL VALUE AND THE END OF ACTION 3S
for, and that striving reaches its natural minimum in regard
to the personal values which are the highest. Yet it does not
follow from this, that the minimum ever equals zero or that
personal values cannot at all be practically striven for.
The reason of such a diminution in effort is not due to the
nature of personality and its acts, but singly and solely to the
nature of moral values, namely, to the fact that they are not
those of the contents striven for but are the qualities of the
striving itself. What actually constitutes the limit to striving
is an entirely different relation: the necessary non-identity
between value and value — namely, between that of an act and
that of the contents striven for in the act. But that the object
of an act cannot be a structure of the same order, that is, not an
act, not an attitude, not a striving intention — whether of oneself
or of another person — 'this is not at all involved in the facts of
the relation concerned. Consequently it does not follow that
qualities of acts of the same rank cannot be intended. For it is
not at all implied that with reference to any given action it is
necessarily the same quality of value which must be in the
intended object and in the morality which is realized in the doer
— and that alone is excluded according to the laws of value.
In fact, how could there be such a thing as moral education
— whether of oneself or another — if there were no striving to
be morally good ! It is by no means necessary to think here of
pcdagogically defective means — exhortation, instruction or one’s
own conscious example. There are many methods and means,
and even if they should one and all be double-edged, the
significance of their aiming at moral goodness remains valid
beyond all doubt.
The defectiveness of the means is only a question as to
success; but the strenuous intention stands to success in no
assignable relation. In itself the capability of being striven for
remains; it is a fact, a demonstrable phenomenon of the
moral life.
Of course it is only a limiting phenomenon and it has therein
its limit ; that is to say, one may not universalize the ability to
3 6 THIS REALM OF ETHICAL VALUER
strive for moral values, one may not conclude that in all moral
effort moral values arc the thing striven for. Nothing of the sort
follows from this phenomenon. But one must not refuse to
an educator, to a father or to anyone who feels himself
morally responsible for others, the right to take moral values
as a goal. In like manner one may not refuse this right to the
morally mature man in regard to himself or others. On the
contrary, it is evident that in such striving the highest point of
moral conduct may be discerned, despite the danger of mirror-
ing oneself (which is always at hand). The reverse aide of this
phenomenon is the universal joint responsibility of each for
each and for all, and especially for their moral being as such — a
responsibility which Scheler thrusts into the centre of ethics,
but which with him nevertheless floats in the air. Along with
this there is, for instance, the consciousness of one’s own moral
example, good or bad, which everyone unavoidably gives in all
his behaviour. From the same moral tendency arises the shrink-
ing from giving a had example, as also the desire, not incom-
patible with a becoming modesty, to give a good example.
Only a man who subjects moral phenomena to an arbitrary
choice under the influence of preconceived metaphysical
theories, can deny this group of phenomena. Either to deny
them or to generalize them is to falsify the facts.
Now these phenomena conti adiet metaphysical personalism
—or rather this personalism contradicts them and thereby
destroys itself— but they do not contradict the law of the non-
identity of the value striven for and the value of the striving.
Rather is the non-identity preserved in them perfectly. Even
where the end of the endeavour is really the moral worth of a
personality (one’s own or another’s), it is never the same as
the moral worth of the endeavour. If, for instance, the trend of
an educator is toward magnanimity or self-sacrifice in the
pupil, this tendency is not on that account to he called cither
magnanimous or self-sacrificing. Just as little is it a tendency
to be honest or straightforward, when the aim is honesty and
straightforwardness. Rather there is attached to it another
MORAL VALUE AND THE END OF ACTION 37
moral value, which may be difficult enough to name precisely,
but which without a name is plainly enough seen as a moral
value. Perhaps it is a specific quality, not further analysable —
the conscious willingness to be responsible for the moral being
of another person; perhaps also it may be subsumed under
“wisdom” (somewhat in the sense of the ancient aoj>la) or
under love — be it personal or universal. At least no one will
challenge the moral worth of moral solicitude for another.
But so much is clear: it is something else than what is aimed
at in this solicitude.
There are many other proofs of this circumstance. One of
the most cogent is the relation between pattern and imitation.
To imitate means to emulate a marked type of moral being,
that is, to strive to be like the pattern. And as it is here a
matter of indifference whether the pattern be a real person or
only an ideal, there is connected herewith a long chain of
further phenomena which all show the same kind of striving
directed to moral values as such. Under this head come the
gradations of ideal ethical forms— so far at least as the ideals
do not remain mere idle dreams but react determinantly upon
one’s own or another’s conduct. But in all such cases the moral
worth of the emulation is clearly something else than that of
the ideal emulated.
This complex fact is in no wise contradicted by the law that
moral values, and the values aimed at in volition, effort and
action, are not identical. On the contrary, one can draw from
this the lesson that it is not to the point to describe the value
aimed at as a situational value. It can be also a personal value —
at least in limiting cases. Here the object pursued is conduct,
and indeed the moral conduct of a person. Yet this likewise
must not by any means be generalized. It still remains a limiting
ease; commonly the values striven for are situational values.
In spite of everything, a characterization of effort, will and
conduct would be too narrow, which considered only the
realization of situations ps the object of intention. On principle
one must include personal values — a clear proof that personal
38 THE REALM OP ETHICAL VALUES
Being and personal value are not less objective than the existence
and value of things.
Taken universally, the proposition that moral values cannot
be striven for is false. The truth contained in it ia simply the
difference between an intended value and the value of the
intention. From this it follows that the limit of attainability
by effort does not lie upon the boundary line between situational
value and moral value, but plainly very much higher. Whether
all moral values should be included in the sphere of things
that can be striven for is not to be decided on general grounds.
The real impossibility of striving would first manifest itself
where the value of the thing striven for coincided with that
of the striving. But whether this circumstance ever actually
occurs is not to be settled before the values themselves have
been analysed.
All the same it is very possible that there arc some moral
values which, in accordance with the nature of their contents,
do not permit of being aimed at, not to mention of being
realized— one simply has tfiem or does not have them. Here
one naturally thinks of the rich group of values peculiar to
individual personality. But to explain why this exclusive relation
to endeavour is characteristic of them, and why with them
attainability by effort reaches an absolute limit, belongs to
another group of questions.
( d ) The Relation of Striving to Attaining
It is otherwise with the actualization of moral values. At first
glance one would think that it was in a more unfavourable
position than striving; much can be striven for, which cannot
be attained; but what can be attained, so it is thought, must
at least be capable of being striven for. Then the limit of
attainability would need to be placed lower in the realm of
values than that of the possibility of being striven for. We might
accordingly think this limit would correspond with the dividing
line between moral and situational values. Only the latter, then,
MORAL VALUE AND THE END OF ACTION 39
would be attainable, while the former would also be capable
generally of being striven for.
The implicit presupposition in this is that attainment by
striving is the same as attainment in general, that the latter is
conditioned by striving, but that striving is not conditioned by
attainability. This is evidently a false assumption. Valuable
things can come into being without any intention being directed
towards them. Actualization does not need to be willed, pur-
posed or pursued as an end. Goods and valuable situations
come into existence without the assistance of someone willing
them; they come either in a “natural” way or as the result of
human action, but without their being the conscious goal of
the action. Even the evil Will can bring forth good, against its
own purpose. What becomes real is an affair of success; but
success stands in no determined relation to purpose.
It follows that through actions much can be attained which
was not striven for in them. The realization of a value therefore
is not conditioned by its being striven for, also not by its
capability of being striven for. 1 The sphere of what may be
realized is not confined to what may be striven for. And the
limit of what may be striven for is definitely not a limit pre-
established in what may be realized.
If one remembers this in connection with moral values, one
sees that their actualization in man is not conditioned at all by
their being striven for. Here, too, there is more scope for
actualization than for striving; and this fact is highly significant
for the moral Being of a person. For moral values can be striven
for (as we have seen) within narrow bounds only. Were they also
realizable only to so small a degree, a man would be practically
' On the other hand, the possibility of being striven ior is not neces-
sarily conditioned by attainability. Otherwise there would be no such
thing as an ineffectual striving. Realizability and endeavour stand in
no fixed relation to each other, but they are not on that account
indifferent to eaeh other. Striving is constitutionally directed to
realization, but the prevision of the one who strives is limited. His
knowledge of attainability is not commensurate with the actual possi-
bilities of realization.
THE REALM OP ETHICAL VALUES
40
debarred from almost all moral worth. In other words, if in his
own Being a person could actualize values only through striving
after them, he would be almost entirely incapable of attaining
them.
Obviously this contradicts the facts of the moral life. Itt
every just dealing, in all loving behaviour, in every good-will,
a person actualizes true moral values in his own being. His
intentions, however, are in no way directed toward these values,
nor toward his own moral estate, but, outwards, toward the
existence of others, or, more exactly, toward the circumstances
which concern them.
Such is the nature of a man's moral worth that without aiming
at it and by entire preoccupation with what is outside himself,
he none the less actualizes it.* In general the proposition holds
good that the more the intention of acts is directed outwards,
the richer become the moral values in the innermost Being
of the agent.
The paradox in this proposition is rooted in the essence of
values themselves and especially in the dependence of moral
upon situational values. As the moral value is that of the act
itself, and therefore cannot appear in the object aimed at but
only in the act as its own quality, so the actualization of the
moral worth necessarily depends not upon aiming at it but
upon aiming at situational values. Yet, as all intention presses
towards the actualization of the thing striven for, there are
necessarily two levels in all striving, willing and doing, in all
practical conduct. The one is striven for, the other is not
intended but simply takes place and it takes place whether
the intended actualization is attained or not. U 'or the moral
worth of an act does not depend on the success of the act, but
on the direction of its intention.' The unintended actualization
of a moral value therefore docs not first appear after the situa-
tion is actualized but arises in the mere intention, in the striving
itself. One may therefore very well say that a person actualizes
his own moral value "in” his striving, even "through” his
* This formulation is given in agreement with Scheler, p, 538,
MORAL VALUE AND THE END OF ACTION 41
striving. But rightly understood, he does not actualize it either
through the actualization of the thing striven for or through
the striving for his own moral value, but only through striving
for other values (generally not moral), upon which the moral
values are based.
This fundamental relation not only adheres to the particular
striving, willing and doing, but, mutatis mutandis , generally to
all acts which particularly aim at values, to every disposition,
to all the behaviour of a person, even to that which seems
purely inactive. For irrespective of differences in form, the
whole practical conduct of a person moves, directly or indirectly,
from a given position intentionally towards situational values.
The manifestation of this depends upon actualizing the thing
intended, not on the intention itself. But the actualization of
what was not intended (the moral value) does not depend
upon the actualization of the thing aimed at but on the inten-
tion as such. Something else than that which was intended is
realized through the mere intention as such.
(e) Limit to the Possibility of Actualizing Moral Values
It might seem from this as though unintended actualization
had no limits, or at least no fundamental ones rising out of its
relationship to the values. Here we must of course disregard
the manifold empirical and external limitations to fulfilment
in any individual case.
But in fact this is not so. Other obstacles than the intention
can stand in the way of fulfilment.
Some goods by their very nature can never become actual,
because actualization itself even unintended— cannot be
directed towards them, or because there is a process that
moves away from them, but none that moves towards them.
There are goods which one may indeed lose when one has
them, but cannot gain when one has never had them, or has
lost them. Of this kind are youth, ingenuousness, harmlessness;
and closely related to these are certain forms of happiness,
48 THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
such as a cheerful disposition, healthy light-hcartcdness, also
—up to a point— beauty, charm, natural grace and many
related things. On the other hand, the fact that one may to a
certain extent cultivate anti develop fortunate gifts, plays a
subordinate part™ at least within a single human life; and, in
the case of the first-mentioned examples, even this possibility
does not exist at all.
In the realm of moral values also it is quite possible that there
should be materials of such a nature, that realization could not
be directed toward them. First of all one calls to mind those
same values of individual personality, of which it was said that
they could not be striven for. But the limit of what can be
striven for is not the same as the limit of that which can be
actualized. Nor do they coincide. The values of personality
cannot be striven after, for this reason, among others, that,
while they may indeed be felt, their structure can scarcely be
grasped and an effort cannot be directed specifically towards
them. But this is not necessary for their realization, because
they do not need to be striven for. A person whose individual
moral Idea is a power in him, actualizes it incidentally in all
his dealings, no matter what he may be intentionally trying to
bring about. He steadily builds, so to speak, out of his own
distinctive moral Being, in so far as in all his strivings and
dealings the intended situational values, besides being selected
according to general moral standards, are also selected by the
unique norms of his personal ethos. But he docs not need to
have a valuational consciousness of this building process, nor
any consciousness at all. In short, the values of individuality
are realized in exactly the same way as all other personal values:
not by aiming at them but in striving after other, outer, values,
Actualization, then, meets with no limit in the medium of
the values of personality, But there is quite another group of
moral values which are highly individual, yet the substance
of which cannot be actualized, only because their structure
forbids and not because their position is axiologically higher
in the scale of values. The representative examples of this
MORAL VALUE AND THE END OF ACTION 43
group are innocence and purity. They stand in exactly the
same position as do youth, ingenuousness and harmlessness
among goods; the last two, by the way, stand on the border
between moral values and goods. Innocence and purity one
may lose, but cannot retrieve if they are once lost. A person may
yearn to have them back, but there is no circumstance either
willed or unwilled under which they can be regained. They
come to men only as gifts from heaven — be it from nature
with the first entrance into human life, when one is still a
stranger to all moral conflict, or as a real gift of grace from the
Godhead, through a sin and an atoning act, as the faith of the
pious always hopes. But in neither case is the realization
brought about through the conduct of the person, not even in
the sense in which the unintended is actualized.
The group of values which arc at the limit of attainability
increases considerably, if one takes into account not attainability
in general but that of any given individual. Thus for the coward
by nature courage is utterly unattainable ; in its place a sub-
stitute can at beat be installed through reflection, self-control
and habit, a kind of inner discipline. Likewise it is morally
impossible for the phlegmatic and indolent to become energetic
and ambitious, for the passive to become active, the tyrannical
at heart truly sensitive, the servile and undignified knightly
and proud. On all sides attainability finds in such cases its
limitations independently of what can be striven for. Each
one can realize in himself only what lies within the range of
his individual ethos. Not every moral claim, however universal
in itself, can he applied to everybody.
There is, then, a limit to what can be realized, as much as
there is a limit to what can be striven for and what ought to be
done. But it is a different limit and is differently conditioned.
It lies in the essence of certain values — whether absolute or
relative to a special human ethos — whilst the limit of what can
be striven for lies in the essence of striving, which, when
directed towards moral values, stands in its own way.
CHAPTER 111 (mm)
THE GRADATION OF VALUES
(<i) The Methodological Difficulty in the Principle of
Gradation
We have spoken continually of higher and lower values. The
thought of a gradation in the realm of values has been tacitly
presupposed.
To this no objection can be taken, for it is impossible to
construct any interrelation of values without making this pre-
supposition. But the right to do this is not on that account
proved, nor is its meaning made clear. Now it would also be a
false demand to wish to fix a gradation before the values have
been elaborated; evidently a grading can be given only after
there has been a more exact analysis —so far at least as this
is possible. But the principle of gradation itself demands an
exposition precedent to the analysis, even if it be merely to
settle why only the phenomenology of specific values can furnish
a sketch of a scale of value.
The methodological difficulty here consists in this, that one
can bring the manifoldness of values not otherwise to view
than in a series, and that the tendency arises quite of itself to
suggest, at least generally, a gradation in such a scries. The
relation of interdependence between the two classes of value by
its importance alone involves such a tendency.
If in the order of rank it were a question only as to the general
relation of goods to personal values, our decision would be
relatively simple and would from the first permit of being
deduced. But the question is not concerning this alone. It
refers to a thorough articulation of the ethical realm of value,
not only of the realm of things and their reactions, but also of
that of persons and their behaviour. And here one cannot
otherwise proceed than by implicitly presupposing the grada-
tion which can first come to light in the course of the analysis.
45
THE GRADATION OF VALUES
Even this subsequent result is to be understood only am
grano salis. Even the detailed analysis at best does not achieve
a really thorough ranking of values. One must not forget that
we stand at the beginnings of our inquiry, and that no proper
and special investigations have been made. Accordingly one may
not expect assured results. All that can be shown is the exis-
tence of certain more or less evidently connected groups, which
cluster about single dominant and fundamental values, but the
positions of these relatively to one another cannot by any
means be shown to be permanently connected. The type as
such is indeed clear, but from it no unifying principle of grada-
tion can be drawn, let alone a principle wherewith to fill out
the gaps between the groups.
The whole method is still in a state of seeking and groping.
We may not speak of an a priori view. The fragments, which
arc becoming visible, of an incontrovertible, consistent and
unified scale arc evidently accidental merely, conditioned by
the human attitude and by temporary partiality.
Wc must try to grasp the values where and how we can.
For one group the leading point of view is a “systematic” one,
inhering in the general nature of value and the Ought; for
another it is drawn from the historically accidental development
of the ethos; for a third it is in direct opposition to such a
development and is conceived in contrast to it. It is evident
that unity in such a case is lacking. Nevertheless, no one of
these disparate points of view may be neglected. They are our
given landmarks.
Thus our procedure must necessarily he of a loose and
tentative character. Wc must see whether or not this method
leads to a more strictly unifying point of view.
( b ) Consciousness of Value and Consciousness of its
Gradations
Wc* must not on account of this unfortunate condition of the
problem fail to appreciate how important, even how central,
THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALDES
46
the question is which we are here considering. Without know-
ledge of their relationships to one another all knowledge of
values themselves remains abstract. In all ethical situations,
however, manifold values participate at the same time; and for
the man who is confronted with the situation the task is to
determine his conduct from his consciousness of the situation
— a consciousness which weighs value against value. His feeling
for values, therefore, can really guide him only when there is at
the same time a feeling of their relative rank. Naturally this
feeling must be primal, not attained first through reflection.
Immediately with the feeling for the value there must be a
feeling for its place in the scale.
It is in the nature of human volition that it never is directed
towards anything contrary to value as such. That was the
never-to-be-forgotten meaning of the Socratic ethics: no one
does evil for evil’s sake, it is always a good (something valuable),
which hovers before him. We have shown how Christian ethics
brings into consideration another determining factor, which in
human nature goes counter to the knowledge of the good,
the factor of weakness, the being under the spell of lower
powers.
But is the confusion in human craving hereby explained?
The difficulty is just this : how can weakness, how can feeling,
divert the will from the valuable, if the very nature of the will
is to be able to turn only to the valuable ? The confusion cannot
be due to the fact that the will or craving is drawn to what is
opposed to value as such and on its own account. This kind of
swerving does not exist in man. A satamc being may be able
to will evil for evil’s sake. But man is not a satanic being; his
craving is always unequivocally for the positive side of the
series of values, the side to which the good in a wide sense is
bound.
The answer must run otherwise: even the will which is
diverted by feeling moves towards values, only it moves towards
lower ones. It is diverted through outward, through morally
indifferent, goods; in it there is a failure to select according
THE GRADATION OF VALUES
47
to the higher, that is, the moral values. And even where this
selection is not lacking in it, where perhaps a higher feeling
of value whispers its claim, there it is overborne by the insistent
strength of the lower values.
The solution of the problem is thereby found in the relative
rank of values. In every concrete situation through the mere
juxtaposition of persons interested in the same goods a con-
dition is so given, that every act, even every inner attitude,
falls at the same time under moral points of view. And these
are the higher points of view. Their surrender to the individual’s
self-interest m the goods is moral confusion. For this is pre-
cisely the peculiarity of moral values, that they come forward
with a claim of more unconditional validity, and allow an
interest m the lower values only within the limits of their own
preservation by the person. The consciousness of their being
higher is utterly decisive. Every morally selective consciousness
of values is necessarily a consciousness of the scale of values.
( c ) “Higher” and “Lower,” their Meaning axiologically
Irreducible
If one keeps this general situation in mind, one can scarcely
doubt that behind moral conflict, as the situations of life produce
it in various forms, there always stands the opposition of value
against value in some form, not the opposition of value against
anti-value.
The conflict has not the form of a logically contradictory
alternative, but always that of an opposition which is positive
(in the valuational sense) on both sides. Over against this, on
the other hand, stands the fact, that the real conduct of a
person cannot possibly decide at the same time for both sides
of the opposition; of the two values at stake it can pursue only
one and must violate the other. The decision of the will there-
fore cannot escape from treating the axiologically contrary
opposition as if it were a contradictory one. Herein lie the
absolute bounds of every human decision of the will. Every-
48 THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
thing which a man can do is confined to the tendency to give a
preference to one value over another, and indeed a preference
to which the value objectively has a claim. The scope of what
one can do is wide enough to embrace the fulness of every
moral For and Against. But within this boundary every positive
decision depends on a question of valuational preference, of
height in a scale, and it is a function of the consciousness of an
order of precedence.
What is exactly the meaning of “higher” and “lower” in this
order of precedence causes no difficulty to the sense of values,
but it is scarcely to be given with conceptual strictness. The
scale of valuational height constitutes a dimension sui generis.
It is in no way to be traced back to dimensions of valuational
variability which are otherwise articulated. This causes it to
be Utterly indefinable. It is, for example, wrong to see a foot-
hold for the degree of value in the categorial structure of the
valuational contents, perhaps in the opposition between simpli-
city and complexity. Even if it should be proved that in general
the higher axiological position belongs to the more highly
complex structure, one could educe no principle therefrom.
For numerous individual cases manifest the opposite.
The common mistake which one meets lies in the other
direction: men think they recognize the highest in the most
comprehensive values, the lowest in the most specific (the
individual values). But undeniably the most general have the
simplest, the most specific have the most complex material
structure. What misleads one here is primarily the analogy of
logical concepts; in the place of the axiological relation of
degrees of value, one substitutes, without noticing it, the rela-
tion of structural dependence in the sense of formal subsump-
tion. There is naturally also in the realm of values a logical
dependence; the more general and elementary values present
themselves actually again and again as the structural elements
of the more complex. But the latter are not on that account
lower; they are for the most part precisely the higher. That
dependence, therefore, without prejudice to its existence in the
THE GRADATION OF VALUES 49
realm of value, is in any case no measure of rank in the scale
of values.
Many types of philosophical ethics, however, have committed
this mistake, of seeing the relation of valuational rank in the
material relation of subsumption. Here belong all the theories
which search for an ultimate fundamental value from which
all lower ones can be traced. A logical relation of deduction
unintentionally haunts such a tracing; we even surrender to
the belief that in this way a system of ethical values can be
derived. But even in this, we ar$. yearning for an ultimate
oneness of value. For example, in Kant’s doctrine of the
categorical imperative such a thought unmistakably lies hidden;
for the unity of the moral law meant the universal standard of
all possible “maxims.” It is not to be wondered at that Kant’s
successors in the ethics of Ought — pre-eminently Fichte— were
victims of the same suggestion as to the possibility of subsuming
all values under a principle. But even in Plato’s Idea of the
Good there already lurked something of this prejudice. It was
otherwise, however, with Aristotle and Hegel, whose teleological
metaphysics, conversely, always sees the structurally more
complex form in the higher telos. Here, however, the standard
of height is by no means autonomously axiological.
Despite all the failures of such a construction, the tendency
to be misled by the analogy to a system of concepts continues
unabated. Philosophy seems unable to escape from casting
the valuational system (so far as it attains thereto) into the
form of a system of valuational concepts. The latter kind of
system cannot be changed. For this reason, that prejudice
can never be successfully coped with by mere criticism,
but only by the introduction of a positive outlook, otherwise
conditioned.
Now such an outlook, as already said, cannot be arbitrarily
set up, but must be derived from progressive analysis of value
itself. Here, however, the presupposition is that the phenomena
of the sensing of the values which are to be analysed— -that
sense being the single assured landmark which we have —
So THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
contain implicitly in themselves the total phenomenon of a
scale of values.
( d ) The Multiple Dimensionality of the Realm of
Values
A further prejudice which slips into the thought of an ordered
gradation is the notion of a simple valuational scale which
ascends in a single series.
Such a single dimensionality would be an advantage from the
point of view of a survey. But this advantage — which would
exist only “for us” — should make one hesitate. For instance,
how does it agree with the relation of subsumption, which
unquestionably exists in the realm of values (even if it does not
concern their degree)? This relation presupposes the co-ordina-
tion of the commonly subsumed values. Besides, the mere
co-existence of two heterogeneous orders of relationship in one
realm (that of higher and lower and that of subsumption) would
alone be enough to convince anyone of the fact of a plural
dimensional order.
But there are other and stronger proofs of this fact. In the
first place it is clear to anyone who has gained insight into the
valuational realm, that the manifoldness of values is top great
to embrace in a linear arrangement the intervals corresponding
to the differences of content. The values would need to overflow
continually into one another, which by no means corresponds
to their actual and often very abrupt articulation, that is, to
their difference given in the sense of value.
But in the second place, it is evident that the qualitative
difference of values as such, which varies with their contents,
signifies something quite other than a different valuational
grade, and that consequently there is no necessity that values
differing in content should have totally different rank in the
kale. Rather does it issue unquestionably from the hetero-
geneity of valuational grade and of valuational structure, that
both can quite well vary independently of each other, and that
THE GRADATION OF VALUES 51
different valuational materials may be of the same valuational
grade.
Hence it follows that “perpendicularly” to the scale of
valuational rank, a relation of co-ordination among the different
values exists upon the same level. At least on principle nothing
stands in the way of such a relation. That does not in the least
interfere with the thoroughgoing fixed co-ordination of every
value on a given level. The order of gradation is thereby
simply shown to be at the same time differentiated “laterally.”
But this means that the system of. values has more than one
dimension, and that only one' of its dimensions is»ihat of higher
and lower.
This view does not here allow of being more exactly proved
through phenomena. Proofs can first be given in the special
analysis of values. There are valuational groups within which
differences of higher and lower level can scarcely be pointed out,
or which stand in no relation to very striking d ifferences of
content. In the domain of goods this fact is moreover very well
known. “Who has the choice, he has the torment,” is the content
of a popular saying; axiologically expressed the thought is:
two totally different goods can very well be of equal value. The
same is without further ado to be expected of the moral values ;
and, 'within the limits of human opinion, which is not mathe-
matically exact, it also can be proved to be there for the scale
of values.
The significance of this phenomenon, again, is of great
importance. For it is easy to see that where values of the same
grade are at stake in one and the same situation, so that the
doer can be just only to one of them, there the moral conflict
must become a conflict of values.
( e ) Strength and Height of Values — Sin and Fulfilment
Closely alhed is the error of thinking that the higher the grade
of a value the more unconditional its validity, in a word, the
nearer its proximity to absoluteness. In that case a lower value
S3 THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
would, in comparison, be more contingent, more conditional.
This is a confusion of thought. If values in general have an
ideal existence in themselves, their validity is throughout of
an absolute kind, incapable of being relative in any way.
Validity Cannot in this respect be graduated.
This conception finds apparent support in the fact that the
Ought-to-Be of moral values is more unconditioned than that
of goods ; the realization of a goods-value can never, for example,
justify its claim against a moral value, but vice versa. Only
here one forgets two things. In the first place, the Ought-to-Be
of a value is not identical with its validity, with the existence of
the value of the content itself. Where the importance of the
Ought-to-Be is graduated in many ways, .the value of the
specific matter can still be unconditionally absolute. But in the
second place, the relation of^goods to moral Values k of a
unique kind — a material relation of dependence sui generis —
which by no means allows of being universalized, and in any
case does not reappear within both classes of value. The
gradation of higher and lower, on the other hand, permeates
uninterruptedly the whole series of values. It is therefore at all
events a different relation.
There is nevertheless an aspect of the order of rank which is
related to this conception : the aspect of the strength, or of the
power, in some manner or other, to determine one’s judgment
of values. In this respect, values, including among them those
that are moral, are of very different quality.
Difference of strength, however, is not difference of rank.
It might rather be affirmed that the two kinds of gradation are
opposed to each other: the higher value may be precisely the
weaker, the lower the stronger. Within certain limits this
indirect proportionality of height and strength may well agree ;
the higher values are generally for the most part the more
complex structures, the lower are the more elemental. But in
strength the elemental is always the superior. In this point
therefore there would be a return of the fundamental categorial
law in the domain of value— the law that the lower categories
THE GRADATION OF VALUES
53
are the stronger and more independent, while the weaker and
more conditioned are the higher and more complex. Onto-
logically this law is manifest in the graduated relation of the
categories. But we do not shut our eyes to the stratification of
values. Values are not categories of existence, and their relation
is not discernible in concrete reality.
One may easily be convinced that in general the reverse
relation holds between height and strength. To sin against a
lower value is in general more grievous than to sin against a
higher; but the fulfilment of a higher is morally more valuable
than that of a lower. Murder is held to be the most grievous
crime, but respect for another’s life is not on that account the
highest moral state — not to be compared with friendship, love,
trustworthiness. Property is an incomparably lower value than
personal benevolence, but none the less a violation of property
(theft) is much more reprehensible than mere malevolence. A
sm against the lower values is blameworthy, is dishonourable,
excites indignation, but their fulfilment reaches only the level
of propriety, •without rising higher. The violation, on the other
hand, of the higher values has indeed the character of a moral
defect, but has nothing degrading in it, while the realization
of these values can have something exalting in it, something
liberating, indeed inspiring.
There is no gainsaying this phenomenon, taken in such
generality. What follows from it is a question by itself. Thus
much in it can be seen with certainty, that height of value is
something different from strength of value. But if one should
wish to conclude further, that in this an indirect measure of the
height of a value is furnished, one would at least be walking on
insecure ground. For the categorial law is exactly fulfilled in
the categories only. For values it holds but approximately; still
holding distinctly with the larger differences of grade, it fades
away and finally fails altogether before the finer discriminations
of rank. And these latter are alone of importance. The relative
level of roughly conceived extremes is evident to everyone.
CHAPTER IV (xxix)
THE CRITERIA OF THE GRADE OF A VALUE
( a ) Five Tests of Rank in the Scale of Values
Involved in the question of rank is the question as to the
possibility of knowing the rank. This is part of the general
problem concerning the knowledge of values, and partakes of
its difficulties.
Are there any criteria of the height of a value? And what
are these? As there is a consciousness of height, as well as of
value in general, we cannot escape the assumption that some
distinguishing mark is present. But this might be deeply
hidden in the feeling for values and remain inaccessible to
any analysis.
Scheler made a deliberate attempt to elaborate a system of
distinguishing marks. 1 It is not based upon the ethical values
as such in their relation to one another, but upon the whole
realm, in which differences of height are naturally greater and
more conspicuous. But that of itself would not exclude the
transference of the criteria to the inwardly ethical differences
of gradation. These marks must therefore be examined.
i. Values are relatively higher the more enduring they are;
one might rather say, the more timeless they are. Not the
durability of the carrier is meant (for perishability increases
rather than diminishes with the height), but the super-tem-
porality of the value-quality itself. Pleasantness is bound to
the persistence of a given sensibility, goods to that of a given
situation. Spiritual values have a hold superior to everything
empirical ; they persist above the transitoriness of disposition
and situation. Moral values do not stand or fall with the act
in which they inhere; love has meaning only sub specie quadam
atemi.
1 Scheler, op. cit., p. 88 fF.
THE CRITERIA OF THE GRADE OF A VALUE ss
2. Values are so much the higher, the less the quality of
their carrier increases with its extension and decreases with
its division. Material goods admit of being shared among
persons only in as much as we divide them. Their value for
the individual diminishes progressively with each division.
Spiritual values are not in themselves capable of being divided;
they are indifferent to the number of those participating in
them. That the social conflict of interests depends upon
material goods and not on spiritual, rests not in the nature of
the interest directed towards them (not, as it were, in the
greater intensity of this), but in the nature of the values.
Material goods separate the persons who share them; spiritual
goods unite men in a common possession. That moral values
in a pre-eminent sense are unifying and scorn all distribution
is self-evident. Their mode of Being is a Being for all and
each, just because their self-existence is not relative to anyone’s
participation in them.
3. In the third place Scheler introduces the above-men-
tioned 1 relation of dependence. If the lower values are based
upon the higher, such dependence is naturally a distinguishing
mark of rank. Even in so far as this relation is shown to be
wrongly conceived, and instead of it the opposite holds good,®
the principle that dependence is a mark of height retains its
force. The basic material value is, then, as the more self-
sufficient and independent, at the same time the lower and
more elementary, while the value which is dependent is the
higher.
4. There exists an essential relation between height and the
“depth of satisfaction” which accompanies the consciousness
of fulfilment of value. The satisfaction in material goods may
be ever so intense, but it still remains spiritually superficial;
satisfaction in the enjoyment of art may be ever so elusive, but
it still remains a deep experience. The “depth” of satisfaction
has nothing to do with its strength. The whole quality of the
emotional tone differs according to the height of the value
* Cf. Chapter I (c), Vol. II. * Ibid. (a).
56 THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
experienced; and in this gradation the inwardness, the identi-
fication with one’s selfhood, is the characteristic feature. One’s
central spiritual nature reacts to the highest values. The
meaning of stoical indifference in regard to outward fortune
and misfortune is the inward concentration, the quiet imper-
turbable life in the depth of feeling for the highest values.
Indifference to lower values is only the reverse side of this
fundamental attitude.
5. Finally, an indication of worth-level consists in the degree
of relativity to some specific value-sense. Values of pleasure
and enjoyment have meaning only for a sensuously emotional
disposition, biological values only for an organic sensitiveness ;
but moral values do not thus preserve their significance simply
for a moral disposition ; they are self-subsistent personal quali-
ties with no relativity to the value-sense of anyone. As values
of another sphere they are “absolute” in another sense. And
accordingly in the feeling for values there exists an immediate
consciousness of this absoluteness, however obscure; and,
although it may only be felt, it is a consciousness in which the
higher autonomy of these manifests itself.
( b ) The Evaluation of these Criteria
One thing is perfectly clear : If anyone wished quite seriously
to determine the grade by such distinguishing marks, he would
not get beyond the most general outlines. Each one of these
criteria is enough to show that moral are higher than biological
values. But this is quite evident without any of them : it does
not need them. The finer differences of grade within.the great
groups do not become visible in this way. For them the criteria
are altogether too crude, the indication of value-level is merely
summary. For ethics everything depends upon a finer dis-
crimination within the classes and groups. Such tests are of
no use to it. For all moral values proper, super-temporality,
indivisibility, dependence and axiological absoluteness are one
and the saiqe; these four features evidently constitute marks
THE CRITERIA OF THE GRADE OF A VALUE 57
common to the whole class. Depth of satisfaction is the test
most likely to help in further discrimination. For example, if
one reviews a series of such values as honesty, truthfulness,
goodwill to all and self-sacrifice, an increasing depth of inner
assent seems to accompany the review. Depth, then, might be
a point of attachment.
One plainly notes, however, that it is not simply depth of
satisfaction which comes into consideration. The kind of satis-
faction varies qualitatively also. The sense of values reacts in
£f totally different way to different values, and this differentia-
tion penetrates much farther into specific qualities than do the
other distinguishing marks.
By way of these qualitative discriminations a much finer
perception of gradations can be attained.
(c) Hildebrand’s Theory of Valuational Response
Dietrich von Hildebrand’s theory of specific response furnishes
an easy approach to an investigation of this kind. 1
For each value there is one, and only one, attitude corre-
sponding to its nature, only one emotional reaction, the
response'suited to it. No one can find one and the same thing
both “very neat” and “inspiring.” The latter may apply to a
great work of art, the former to a witty remark. The appro-
priateness of a specific response to a specific value can by no
means be transposed at will. Who finds an inspiring thing
“neat” shows merely that he has not understood; his response
is not only out of place ; it has in truth no meaning. The con-
nection between a mental attitude and a value is something
fixed in the nature of things. And, indeed, this constant uni-
formity holds in regard to negative as well as to positive values;
also to every disvalue a specific kind of attitude corresponds,
both as regards quantity and quality.
This law, correctly understood, would undoubtedly furnish
1 D. von Hildebrand, Die Idee der sitthchen Handlung, Jahrbuch f.
Philos , u. phdn. Forschung, III, 1916, p. 162 ff. „
THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
58
us with a basis for the phenomenology of grades in a scale of
values, and not only for the larger intervals in a whole group,
but for the finer and often imponderable gradations of moral
values among themselves. Still the variety of response is
extraordinarily great, and is by no means exhausted within
the narrow limits of spoken language. The shades of value,
for which there are no names, must be described somehow
by circumlocutions. Hildebrand himself has not elaborated his
thought in this direction. But it must permit of being done.
Here is a definite task in ethical investigation which needs
developing.
(d) The Valuational Predicates of the Nicomachean
Ethics
It is an interesting fact that this task finds an illustration in
antiquity — in the Nicomachean Ethics.
The series of “virtues” which Aristotle develops is not
meant as a variety of equal worth, but is evidently graduated
according to rank in a moral scale, although the sequence in
which they are cited only corresponds partly. A plain indica-
tion of this gradation is the differentiation of the valuational
predicates, which Aristotle applies to the single virtues. Without
forcing, one can arrange them in an ascending series :*
Not bad— worthy of praise (imuverdv) ; beautiful (ko\ 6 v) ;
worthy of honour (riprjrdv) ; lovable (^tAjwrdv) ; admirable
(6avpacrr6v) ; siiperb (paKapurriv).
The corresponding series of negative predicates is: —
Defective (17/10 prt)p,4vov); not beautiful (pf) xaX6v) ; blame-
worthy (ifiexrov) ; disgraceful (iirovetStcrrov) ; hateful (piarjrov).
Each series is further differentiated by an abundance of finer
shades. Behind these predicates, as the words show, is hidden
a graduated series, quantitative and qualitative, of acts which
‘ See M. v. Kohoutek, Die Differenzierung des dvdpc&mvov dyaddi>,
eine Studie zur Werttafel der Nikomachhchen Ethik, Marburg, 19*3
(not in prints, p. 21 ff. and 184.
THE CRITERIA OF THE GRADE OF A VALUE 59
assign or withhold values: to praise— to blame, to love— to
hate, to honour — to defame, to admire — to scorn, to treasure
— to despise. Here is unmistakably a double gradation of emo-
tional reactions, that is, of valuational responses.
What makes Aristotle’s procedure especially instructive is
the circumstance that his differentiation of grades concerns
not only general outlines but finer shades among moral values
in the narrower sense. It gives the attitudes (!£«?) of the
person himself, of which the valuational height is distinguished.
We may regard Aristotle’s discriminations as only more or
less felicitous; a first historical attempt cannot be perfect. But
that does not matter. The Nicomachean table of values is by
no means exhaustive ; yet the attempt is a model for us. For
in so far as the problem can be surveyed to-day, there is no
other possible way of finding out the differences in the scale
of values. Difference of response and the difference of predi-
cates which runs parallel with it constitute the only means of
access. And, we may add, the only natural access. If we look
more closely to the efforts of ethical investigators, we find that,
where they approach the problem of grade — and most of them
do this in one form or another — they unintentionally pursue
the method adopted by Aristotle. In many cases, of course,
there is direct historical dependence upon him. .
The problem deepens, as soon as we inquire into the inner
ground of this phenomenon and into the justification for this
procedure. The predicates and the responses are ultimately
only outward manifestations of an existing inner connection
between grade and the kind of valuational feeling. It is not
otherwise possible ; there must be a primal feeling of difference
of rank, which corresponds with the types of response. And,
indeed, this must be as original as the feeling itself, which
discriminates qualitatively. In other words, the feeling of
relation of height among values must adhere to the primal
feeling for value in such a way that when two values are given
the height of each is given. Indeed, it follows that a conscious-
ness limited to one single value is only an abstraction, and
6o
THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
that in all concrete feeling the sense of height in a scale of
values is primary.
This would not imply by any means that the whole scale
were known beforehand, but only that certain members were
known together, or only a certain section of them. All dis-
cernment directed to a focus would then be drawn from the
background of a continuum of grades discerned at the same
time, even though partially. The complete absence of reflection
in the responses to grade gives support to this interpretation.
If we consider that in all the concrete situations of life a decisive
preference is made between value and value — for a bad act
is directed to values, only to lower ones — this inference cannot
be avoided.
. (c) Scheler’s Laws of Preference and the Absoluteness
of the Ideal Gradation
From this circumstance there follows not the presentation but
the objective existence of gradation. In all, even the most
unsophisticated, discernment of values, the presentation of a
relative height, although seen only in a section, proves that
there is a fixed, pervading gradation of rank, which is in-
separable from the essence of values and has the same mode
of existence as they, the same ideal self-existence. It is as
little in the power of man to change this gradation, as it is in
*his power to gainsay the character of a discerned value. That
in certain phenomena, as for instance in resentment, such a
gainsaying takes place, does not overthrow the fundamental
fact ; here the point in question is the doing of violence to the
sense of value itself, the habitual untruthfulness, manifested
as a falsification in the evil conscience of the resentful man.
The absoluteness of the ideal self-existent gradation does
not at ail mean a corresponding and equally ideal conscious-
ness of the gradation. Precisely on this point the limitation of
all human consciousness of values is characteristic. If we
further consider what in this case limitation exactly means, it
THE CRITERIA OF THE GRADE OF A VALUE 61
becomes plain that the historically and individually variable
notion of the gradation, for instance, its subjective relativity,
in no way contradicts its objective absoluteness. From the limi-
tation it follows that the gradational relations also are discerned
only in a fragmentary way, and that, at any given time, what
is accounted higher within the discerned fragment is seen to
be higher. With a wider outlook it can be discovered to be
lower in the scale. That the criticism, which is passed upon
a subjectively valid gradation, is generally a thoughtful begin-
ning, implies the existence of an objective independent grada-
tion. The historical relativity of valuational appreciations is not
a disproof, but on the contrary a confirmation, of its existence.
Scheler’s ethics was the first to bring out this fundamental
discrimination. He also pointed out the significance of "prefer-
ence” in the finding out of the relation between the human
consciousness of values and their self-existent scale.
A “preference,” as a basic type of the acts which show the
height of a value, is by no means found only in decisions of
the will, but in all judgments as to values, in all taking of
sides. It is not an act of judgment upon values, but is a primary
element in the immediate sensing of them. All differentiation
in valuational answers and predicates rests upon it, and at the
same time upon its inherence in the feeling for values. This
thought can be entirely detached from the five distinguishing
marks of gradation which were discussed above, although it is
true that in them also there are evidences of the laws of prefer-
ence. Only they are not exhaustive for the phenomenon of
preference. It goes farther, even to the finer and finest differ-
ences of grade. Whether there be a possibility of bringing into
the light of philosophical consciousness the essence of this
concealed and irreducible function in the objectively dis-
cerned categorial structures, must remain highly question-
able. For ethics the important point is not so much this as
the assurance of the existence of such a function. But the
assurance needed to be in fact given in some such way as
Scheler has done in terms of the phenomenon.
6a THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
The central point here is not so much the relation of prefer-
ence to height of value, as the difference, fixed by all such
relations, between the thing related and that with which it
is connected. For this perception of the height is clearly not
exhausted in the fact that there is a preference; it never coin-
cides with that. “For even if the height of a value is given in
the preference, the height is nevertheless a relation inhering
in the nature of the values concerned. Therefore the gradation
of values is itself something absolutely invariable, while in
history the rules of preferences are variable (a variation which
differs greatly with the perception of new values).” 1
Equally evident is it that the act of preference is not limited
to cases where a number of values is given explicitly. There
is also a mere suggestion of the related value in a specific
consciousness of a direction upwards or downwards, which
from the beginning accompanies the discernment of a special
value. Likewise in preference the fact can be present that “here a
higher value exists than the one sensed” — and, indeed, without
this higher value itself being in the content of the feeling.*
Herein we have the confirmation of what was suggested
above as to the ground of Aristotle’s procedure, namely, that
every concrete sense of value is primarily related to a scale
of values, and that a strictly isolated, specifically focussed
discernment of one value exists only in abstracto. Every living
valuational feeling comes under laws of preference, which on
their side are embedded in the order of valuational essences;
there is throughout no specific sense of values, but one that
is complex and relational. And this relationality of feeling does
not resolve itself into any haphazard relations — primary or
derived — of the realm of values, not into any formally sub-
sumptive relation, not into the stages of absoluteness and de-
pendence, not ipto the relations of basis and superstructure,
whether of contents or of mode, or of any other kind — which
may all be given limitlessly in the domain of values — but
precisely into the relation of higher and lower as such. We
* Scheler, p. 8s f. * Ibid.
THE CRITERIA OF THE GRADE OF A VALUE 63
might call these laws of preference, which are unerringly
dominant in the depth of feeling for values and which resist
outer influence, the “axiological perception of heights.” It is
the perception of an ideal scale sui generis, which cannot be
compared with any other and which in extent coincides with
no other.
Scheler rightly applies to this perception of height Pascal’s
phrase ordre du caeur. Closely related to it is Hemsterhuis’s
concept of an organe morale. And with still greater justifica-
tion perhaps the strict meaning of the word “Vernunft” might
be applied to it, in so far as in it is found the clairaudience of
an inner “vemehmen.” What here is discriminated to the
finest degree is the system of intervals between intelligible
tones, the chords of which make up the harmony of the ideal
self-existent sphere.
Finally, with overpowering certainty it follows that there
can be no derivation of any kind for the scale of values. That
in it a supreme unifying principle may prevail is not to be
denied, but we may deny that it can be known as such, and
that it can be known before the discernment of specific values.
Yet this would be required for every kind of derivation from a
principle.
Our discernment of value is not based upon the unified
structure of the sphere, but exclusively upon its contents in
detail and upon the particular relation of these. In the pheno-
menon of preference we have an accompanying knowledge
of the relative height of the value; but this accompanying
knowledge has not the form of a criterion; it is not an ever-
ready standard of unity by which we can measure and test.
The phenomenon of preference is itself not apprehensible
without a momentary deepening, a devotion and a most atten-
tive listening. It is fleeting, it can be injured by rough handling,
it wants to be lovingly and carefully hearkened to in its faintest
whispers. Only thus to the attentive and patient does it reveal
its secret — the ideal scale of values, to which it is the witness
in man.
64 the realm of ethical values
This circumstance no human need of unity and no philo-
sophical need of system can change. We must accept it, con-
sciously make it our own, and seek to discover by it as much
of the scale of values as it is willing to disclose. That is the
reason why the scale of values must remain for us necessarily
fragmentary — a piece-work to a still higher degree than the
philosophical knowledge of value.
CHAPTER V (xxx)
THE PROBLEM OF THE SUPREME VALUE
( a ) Demand for a Unifying Ethical Principle
Now if all positive morality rests upon genuine discernment,
and if all discernment of values is itself an aprioristic percep-
tion of valuational essences, the historical relativity of morals
cannot rest upon that of values, but only upon that of dis-
cernment. Every current morality is acquainted only with
certain values, or even only with one, which it then emphasizes,
in order to relate everything else to it. Every current morality,
therefore, has a substance of truth in it, however one-sided
it may be. For a fragment of true valuational knowledge is in
every one of them, however much each seems to contradict
the others.
It becomes a task for ethics to resolve such contradictions
— so far as they may be resolved — that is, so far as they are
not due to an original antinomic in values themselves. So far
as the latter is the case, ethics must not attempt synthesis ; but
it cannot 'disregard the demand for a unified survey. This
belongs to its verjr nature. It must also select its point of view
according to the phenomena, not the phenomena according to
its point of view, even at the risk of comprehensibility. It
must concede validity even to the incomprehensible; it must
allow contradictories to coexist. For under all circumstances
one thing must be kept open: scope for all ethical phenomena;
therefore scope for all current moralities.
Hence it appears that in its principles ethics must always
allow for an incurable pluralism as regards contents. But then
not only does its own unity become very questionable, but
also that of practical guidance in human life. Could it lie in
the nature of ethics to prove that to be illusory which one
rightly expects of it: the unity of the moral claim? An Ought
Ethics — II E
66 THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
has meaning only if it is unequivocal and does not annul itself
by an inner contradiction — that is, it has meaning for a striving
to which prescriptively or selectively it points the way. Striving
must have unity, otherwise it disintegrates and destroys itself.
A man cannot walk in two directions at the same time. No one
can serve two masters.
Hence it is evident why every current morality has the form
of a monism. It cannot be otherwise without making itself
equivocal. Where no unifying principle presents itself, current
morality forces such a principle upon the diversity of discerned
values. It seizes hold of one single, clearly discerned value and
sets it up above the rest, and subordinates them to it. Hence
arise one-sidedness, narrowness, vulnerability, indeed the
partial falsification of the scale of values. The transitoriness of
every current morality is not so much a consequence of a
restricted view of values, as of arbitrariness in regard to a
unifying principle.
( b ) The Unknowableness of the Content of the “Good”
Obscurely conscious of the weakness of such a procedure,
philosophical ethics has not seldom pursued the opposite
course, in order to attain the required unity. If none of the
discernible values is supreme, one must assume and postulate
a supreme value over them all, and in contrast to all of them;
one must unequivocally describe it as unknown, but on account
of its mere position of superiority allow it to gain currency.
Such is the Platonic “Idea of the Good,” the peculiarity
of which is that it lacks all distinctive marks, that in content
it remains simply indefinite. What man cannot discern may
for all that exist m itself. In this sense one cannot deny that
Plato’s thought is justifiable.
The disadvantage in it is simply that the idea of the supreme
value remains empty for our sense of values. With such a
principle nothing but a postulate is set up; no valuational
insight is gained. If we recall that the task of ethics is to dis-
THE PROBLEM OF THE SUPREME VALUE 67
close what the good is, we see that in this way the task is in
no wise advanced. The principle gives no hint as to the direc-
tion in which the good is even to be looked for: the variety
of possibilities, which existed without the principle, continues
unreduced with the principle. Complete anarchy reigns . 1
This situation is characteristic for the problem. It is agreed
that somehow the good is the central ethical value; but that
settles nothing. And nothing in the realm of values is more
concealed than just this central principle, which is assumed
by all morality as self-evident, but which in truth is everywhere
differently understood. It was Plotinus who gave the formula
for this situation : the good is “beyond the power of thought.”
But that means: the good is irrational.
Neither of the two ways which can be pursued leads to the
goal. What remains for the investigation of values to do ? Must
it permit the open pluralism to continue, with the risk of
surrendering the actuality of the Ought and the unity of
striving? Or is there some commanding view of unity, which
is conceivable, whatever the facts are as regards content ?
At the same time the question arises : In what sense is the
problem actual? If it exists only as a philosophical question
of system, it is not important ; but if it is a practical question
as to the conduct of lift itself, it has quite another import.
The latter, however, would be the case only in so far as a
plurality without a unifying value must be self-contradictory.
But that cannot be unconditionally asserted. Much rather is it
possible that a systematic co-ordination of diverse values could
exist without culminating in one supreme point. In the domain
of existential categories it is not otherwise. Even there the
ultimate which can be discerned is not a single ruling principle,
but a>‘whole stratum of principles, each one of which is self-
1 With all this it should not be overlooked that Plato’s “Idea of the
Good” receives a certain definite content from the four virtues, over
which it presides. But this definiteness is not its own, but that of
the virtues, and exists without it. The unifying principle in fact adds
nothing. It is different with the metaphysical, cosmic meaning of
the “Idea of the Good.” But that again is not an ethical meaning.
68
THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
dependent and conditions the others. We should accordingly
expect the same in the realm of values, even if other grounds
did not suggest it.
Now, in fact, it is impossible to set forth a single supreme
value, as regards content ; and in so far as the morality of all
times has understood by the “good” a unifying value, this
“good” has not been a discerned and full valuational sub-
stance, but an empty concept. To give it a general content is,
of course, easy enough, for in it all the special values of the
whole realm have somehow a place, and they touch upon it
with a certain right. But such a bestowing of content is one-
sided. The further one looks into this situation, so much the
more does one become convinced by it, that in the obscure
concept of the “good” somehow a universal relativity within
the whole sphere must lie concealed, and perhaps, indeed, a
principle of its structure, an order and an organic law.
This is confirmed from another side. For if one looks at the
final discernible elements of value, one becomes easily con-
vinced, that a unifying value lying beyond them can neither be
seen nor inferred from them, but that the connection of these
valuational grQups is conceivable and evident. Unity of system,
then, might still be existent. Unity of system is plainly in no
wise dependent upon the focal unity, the one value, that was
sought.
(c) Possible Types of Monism in the Given Pluralism
of Values
We must free ourselves from the deep-seated prejudice which
in all departments gives a preference to monism. In the domain
of theory as well as of practice all monisms are of a purely
constructive nature. They spring from a logical craving for
unity, not from the constitution of the phenomena. In this
way the doctrine of the categories has always suffered the most
serious damage. The doctrine of value runs the same risk,
unless it will profit by the damage done in other fields of
THE PROBLEM OF THE SUPREME VALUE 69
thought. Naturally we must search for unity, since, in case it
exists, it must be disclosed. But the customary assumption of
unity is an entirely different matter. On this point what was
said above holds good here in a higher degree : in the domain
of values nothing can be anticipated, deduced, or proved uni-
versally; we must follow the phenomena of the valuational
consciousness step by step. And at the very best the compre-
hensive unity could only be the keystone.
All that can be done, prior to any analysis of values, is a
discussion of the question itself. First, the question whether
there exists a supreme value must be separated from the
question whether it could be discerned in case it existed. If the
latter is to be negatived, the former could always be affirmed.
But, secondly, the question arises : in what general direction
should one seek for the supreme value, in case there is such a
thing? Here there are at least two possibilities. It could lie
in the direction of the simplest and most elementary values,
and indeed be capable of being exhibited beyond the last , but
it could also he in the opposite direction, in that of the most
complex and concrete, and be recognizable beyond these. In
the first case, by the supreme value is meant the 'strongest and
most elementary (also the most general), but in the second, the
axiologically highest. **
These two cases are not manufactured in alstracto. All
historical moralities clearly show either the one or the other
type of search for unity. The ethics of pleasure, of happiness,
of self-preservation, the Kantian ethics of universality, Fichte’s
doctrine of activity, seek for the supreme value in the sense
of the most elementary and general. In the opposite direction,
the morality of justice, of love for one’s neighbour, of universal
love, of personality, seeks for the axiologically highest value.
That there are also mixed types, indeed that even those named
are mixed, does not affect the matter. Both directions have a
certain justification. For even the most elementary value has
the position of the greatest range of validity and control; but
the most complex and most limited in range of validity has the
70 THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
position of the highest standard. It might come about that
the two unifying values of opposite type would co-exist in
the same realm. As such they would not exclude each other.
The monism sought for would thereby be again at the mercy
of a primal dualism, which would no more satisfy the need for
unity than the existing pluralism has satisfied it.
j. But even here the possibilities are not exhausted. For ulti-
mately the question is whether the desired unity of values
must after all be a value, whether it could not consist of a
highest principle which was not a valuational principle. Even
this question cannot be decided beforehand. Just as the principle
of motion need not itself be a motion, of life not itself life, just
as the principles of knowledge are evidently far from being
knowledge, so the universally ruling principle of the domain of
value could very well be something else than a value.
This thought has most to say for itself, so far as the problem
is at all debatable a priori. At all events it meets the fact that
our sense of values is bound to their fixed gradation. For if
there should be a thorough harmony in the gradational order
(even if it were inaccessible to thought), it would have the
form of a unifying principle of the sphere, of a system of
values. But such a principle would merely determine the cate-
gorial structure of the sphere; it would not constitute the
quality as such of the values embraced by it.
We need not think of the connection of such a principle
with values, as necessarily rent by a chasm. It might be that
the quality of values would diminish in the direction of the
simplest content, and would perhaps, farther on, beyond the
limit of visibility vanish altogether. Then the “supreme value”
as the limiting value of this evanescence would no longer be a
value, it would be axiologically the lower limit of the realm
of values. This meets the circumstance that the most general
oppositions of value in fact exhibit only a very pale quality,
so that we can detect the quality only from the more concrete
values . 1 But even this thought justifies no inferences,
1 C£. the following section.
THE PROBLEM OF THE SUPREME VALUE 71
( d ) The Monism of Ethics in the Pluralism of Values
Ethics must leave these problems unsolved. But because it
cannot solve them, it must so adapt its own attitude as to
leave the above mentioned possibilities open. It must reserve
a place for a supreme value, and indeed in both the directions
which come in question. At the same time it must not be
influenced thereby in its analysis of values. That is possible
only if the investigator never forgets how sporadic every view
of values is, and how fragmentary in the most favourable
circumstance every table of values, which can be constructed,
must remain.
But more positive than this tendency is that towards a unity
of scale of values. Although we do not know any supreme
unified value, still the multiplicity of values must be joined
together. Their unitary quality as such is a guarantee for that.
Our view of them must be based upon their relations to one
another: the relations of subsumption and foundation, of
kinship and discrepancy, of structure and content, of height
and interpenetration of the spheres of validity. It must allow
for oppositions and conflicts as well as for harmonies-at the
risk of coming upon valuational antinomies which for the sense
of value remain insoluble. “The desired unity must not become
a postulate of harmony: such a postulate would deny anti-
nomies (perhaps genuine), and thereby miss a problem which
exists in the phenomena. It must not commit itself to a monism
of value in the given multiplicity of morals; but it must hold
by a monism of ethics m the multiplicity of values. For such
a monism leaves the question open, whether the unity of the
whole is a value or some other principle. An ideal table of
values then must be unitary and absolute, above the manifold-
ness of the historical scale of values.
Hegel’s thought, that in every philosophical system there is
a portion of eternal truth, and that it is the task of philosophy
to gather these fragments of one absolute truth into an ideal
system, must be fruitful, mutatis mutandis, for ethics. In
7 a THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
this search of unity, the ideal system of values must also
hover before us as the task of possible and historical
systems, and that, regardless of how near or how far we
may be from the goal. To overcome “isms” is here a
conceivable task.
Section II
THE MOST GENERAL ANTITHESES
CHAPTER VI (xxxi)
THE ANTINOMIC OP VALUES
( a ) Positive Opposition as a Peculiarity of the Most
Elementary Values
There is a group of values which the analysis of value and
the Ought has already disclosed. It exceeds other discernible
groups in elementariness and generality. The reverse side
of this is its poverty of content and the low grade of its
value. It is not on this account perhaps the “first” in the
sense of being the most elementary, but is only the first
that can be known ; still more elementary ones may very well
lie beyond them. These elements, which are contained in all
the higher values, appear to the observation of the investigator
to be on the boundary of his domain. They, therefore, show
only a minimum of contents ; they are scarcely perceptible to
the sense of value. As regards discemibility, they are values
m a state of evanescence. For the difficulty of all valuations!
analysis is this : only the content ever properly allows of being
described, indeed even of being named; the character and
quality do not admit of being recaptured. As for the contents,
we can only induce the valuational feeling to set itself upon
them, entering where every denotation fails. But if the feeling
also fails, if it does not allow itself to be induced or set up, every
effort to render the values visible is in vain. Now, with a mini-
mum of procurable content, this group of values shows a
correspondingly pale, a scarcely perceptible, quality. That is
the reason there is need of approaching by way of the cate-
gorial factors.
This group has also the peculiarity that in it not simply the
relation of the polar series of values, in which only a disvalue
stands over against a value, holds, but also another kind of
opposition: that of value against value. To be sure, there exist
76 THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
here the corresponding disvalues also, and in so far the general
law of bipolarity is not interrupted. But it plays here a merely
subordinate r61e. The distinguishing mark of this group is,
that along with the relation of positive and negative the opposi-
tion of positive to positive subsists. This, of course, occasionally
occurs elsewhere. But here it comes universally to the fore-
ground. On this account we have here a sphere of positive
opposites. And the dimensions between the opposites are
throughout positive continuities, in which no neutral point is
passed through, no negative part of the series continues the
positive. And all the more special qualities, which inhere in
these dimensional continua, are exclusively positive values,
and thus are no disvalues. The corresponding disvalues are
harboured in just such purely negative devaluations! dimen-
sions. The sphej-e of these values has an antinomic character,
which for ethics is a deeply significant fact.
(6) Moral Conflict and the Valuational Antinomies
It was shown above 1 how in life there is, besides the conflict
between moral and anti-moral impulses (between duty and
inclination), also a conflict between moral and moral. The
structure of the former is not purely ethical in the inward
sense; that of the latter touches the essence of ethical situa-
tions proper. Where in any situation value stands over against
value, there no guiltless escape is possible. For a man cannot
abstain from making a decision. He must choose either so or
so, and even to do nothing is a positive decision. He may stay
where he was, but he must choose at any cost. In the real
world a man is continually confronted with the necessity of
settling conflicts of value, of so deciding that he can be answer-
able for his obligation. It is his destiny not to be able to escape
the obligation.
This constitution of the moral conflict cannot be discovered
simply from the very general oppositions between values and
1 Chapter XXII (c), Vol. I.
77
THE ANTINOMIC OF VALUES
values, which are here considered. In them there is only a
first reverberation of this difficult problem. Later, when we
consider the oppositions in detail, it will become more distinct.
Also the contrasting structure of these values is not all equally
marked everywhere. Yet already we see the root of the conflict.
And to have that before our eyes from the beginning is im-
portant for all that follows.
In general, oppositions between values have not necessarily
the character of contradictions. They also need not be primary
conflicts existing in the ideal realm. But even where value and
value do not antagonize each other, the concrete situations
bring it about, that only one can be fulfilled and the other
must be violated. In practice, then, the values clash. For
instance, whoever places personal regard above law, gives
preference to love and violates justice, although in themselves
justice and love do not exclude each other. Here the conflict
first arises with the situation in the connection of the valua-
tional contrast. The situation is a constituent element in the
conflict.
Now so far as the oppositions are genuine antinomies, the
antagonism is between the values themselves. In themselves
these antinomies are insoluble. The antinomic character of the
most general opposites, however, varies greatly. Some are
almost in agreement, others are far apart and show no tendency
to coalesce. In regard to these latter, the unifying tendency of
the rational consciousness becomes most effective. Perhaps a
solution of the discrepancy lies in a higher valuational region,
of which we have no comprehension. It is also conceivable
that, without absolute unity, the diversities, continued beyond
the limit of cognition, may converge.
Then the antinomic character of opposites would be due
only to consciousness (to the sensing of values), and our limita-
tions would be the cause of our inability to reconcile them.
But it is also possible that the system, pursued further, would
not converge or would even diverge, and, if our vision could
transcend its limit, must manifest ever bolder discrepancies.
78 THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
In this case we should not be dealing with antinomies of
“reason,” but with antinomies of the ideal self-existent itself.
The realm of values would then contain the antithesis in
itself, and in the antinomies of the most generally discernible
values we should have proof of the categorial structure of the
whole sphere.
As we otherwise know little enough of this structure, such a
proof would be of the greatest value in our investigation. As
to-day the investigation is only beginning, little would be
gained by it. We could draw no inferences from it.
But here it must never be forgotten that there is another
way of settling valuational conflicts, that they are settled by
men in each case in every actual situation (however full of
conflict it be). Men cannot do otherwise' than make decisions
from case to case, according to their scale of values- sad their
sense of the degree to which the various values enter into
their consciousness of a situation. However biased or wrong
their decisions may be, they nevertheless are and remain
decisions, and indeed axiological decisions. But this means that
from case to case there are new attempts to put an end to
conflicts.
( c ) The Dimensional System of Opposites as an Ideal
“Valuational Space”
Now, valuational opposites, like the great categorial oppo-
sites of Being, constitute a system of possible diversities, with
more than one dimension. Each contrast is in itself a dimen-
sion, and indeed a completely positive continuum. As the
more special values fall at the same time into different dimen-
sions, it is clear that these penetrate one another, cross and
constitute a dimensional system. Thus in the realm of values
there is something like an ideal positional system of possible
values, a sort of intelligible space. In it the specific values have
Their intelligible places.
One might feel tempted, from this point of view, to under-
THE ANTINOMIC OF VALUES
79
take an a priori derivation of values; a general law seems to
be conceivable, and such a law is the condition for any possible
derivation. But here one forgets that in definiteness of content
this law is far from equal to filling the empty spaces — -just as
little as the law of mathematical space is adequate for the
material filling of it. There exists nothing but a certain struc-
ture, which, indeed, if filled from some other quarter, is deter-
minant for concrete values. An anticipation of the content is
not to be thought of.
We shall, indeed, find later on that even concrete discern-
ment, directed upon individual values, is very far from being
able to fill all the places <5f valuational space. What this falling
short of discernible values in their manifoldness, as compared
with what might be expected a priori, signifies, is a question
by itself. Perhaps it is possible that what is here felt is only the
limit of human perception, that in the ideal self-existent realm
the whole valuational space is filled and- that only the narrow-
ness of our sense of values prevents us from discerning the
fulness. But it is possible and quite conceivable, that even in
the ideal self-existent realm not all intelligible places are filled,
indeed that they are perhaps as indifferent to such fulness as
the places of physical space are as to jvhether they be filled
or not.
To this ever-present possibility corresponds the -chasm
which divides any group of opposites from the nearest dis-
cernible group, from any group of concrete values. We are far
removed from any continuous survey of the valuational realm;
the discernible groups constitute only accidental sections, and
how far the distance between the groups can be known — that
is, how far the discontinuity is due to ourselves and how far
to the values — cannot be judged from the structure of what is
really discernible.
As was said, the analysis of value and the Ought furnishes
the occasion for the development of the opposites. It is evident
that many essential features, disclosed by this analysis, have
themselves a valuational character — although with some it is
8o
THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
very slight. The last of the contrasts (the quantitative) un-
doubtedly shows a different aspect. It is only half within the
group of opposites, and only its evidently oppositional struc-
ture betrays that it belongs to the group. It is possible that in
it we have already a limiting member.
Further, it is not without interest to note, that the tradi-
tional viewpoint of the ontological realm of categories-*-quan-
"tity, quality, relation, modality— reappears unsought in the
contrasted pairs, although with a different degree^of distinct-
ness.*That might, of course, be only an external pressure of
customary forms of thought. On this account no great impor-
tance should be attributed to the reappearance.. It corresponds
only to the contents, not to values .themselves. The mere
correspondence is also only a symptom.. On the threshold of
the realm of values theaneagreness of the valuational quality,
the approximation to the categorial form, is not an accident.
CHAPTER VII (xxxxi)
MODAL OPPOSITIONS
(a) The Antinomy of Necessity and Freedom ,
Our modal analysis of the Ought has shown that a kind of
necessity inheres iq-the mode of existence peculiar to what
ought to bg — therefore - peculiar to values. This necessity,
u n like tjie ontologicaj, subsists independently of possibility.
Hence values afe not dependent upon the real realm of Being
and Not-being. It is a xiecessity which is “absolute” (literally:
detached), free, bound to nothing outside of itself . 1
Now this absolute necessity, so far aS it pertains to value as
such, is itself a value. In comparison with Being of any other
kind, it gives to the Ideal Being of values that sublimity; that
elevation above the relative, that inviolable subsistence beyond
Being and Not-being, for which language has no name, and
in which the authority of these principles inheres, “in strength
and dignity rising above existence,” to use the phrase coined
by Plato for the Idea of the Good. It is this necessity also whidh 4
lends to values their very characteristic universality as regards
validity — they being valid for every case, even f$r those Which
violate them — a universality which holds even In the specialisa-
tion, the individuality, of content (where only one case comes
into consideration) and which perdures unabated, rigorous, in-
accessible to every compromise, even in the tragedy of life’s
conflicts. »
The moral sense, while it bows before this incorruptible
power, looks up to it as to the object of highest veneration,
and rises inwardly to it, while its greates? pride is nothing
more than identification with it. This participation is its
superiority to the neutral demeanour of impersonal Entities.
Kant gave the deepest expression to the feeling for the absolute**
1 Cf Chapter XXIII (c)-(e), Voi I.
F
Ethics— IX
8a THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
necessity of the Ought in his glorification of duty: respect for
the moral law was regarded by him as the pre-eminent dis-
tinction of a rational bdng. If Jby such a being we mean one
who discerns values, his expression is exactly fitting. The
rigid one-sidedness of Kant’s attitude towards values should
not blind us to the import of this matter. The value which
He here discerned was rightly esteemed.
In this sense the necessity of the Ought-to-Be itself is
rightly held' to be a value of the most elementary kind. And
this is confirmed by man’s consciousness in his seeking and
looking out for values as yet undiscemed. It is the search for
an ever new and absolute necessity of a higher kind.
And this worth of necessity has its counterpart in the value
of freedom^It is the freedom which these values, even in their
absolute necessity, allow to that being who in his sense of
value participates in them. A person who is acquainted with
their necessity is none the less not constrained by it. This
personal freedom is not the “freedom of necessity’ 1 itself; but
is dependent upon it. Were that necessity tied to possibility,
it would be equivalent to ontological necessity, and the person
would thereby be coerced, as by a natural law. Participation in
it would then not be something sublime and a mark of dis-
tinction; it would not lift man out of the series of natural
beings. It is precisely the absence of compulsion on the part
of the Ought which is a value ; and indeed for a moral being
it is a fundamental value. Acts to which moral value adheres
are only made possible through the absence of power on the
part of the unconditional necessity of the Ought.
This situation is paradoxical enough. Precisely that which
is a kind of deficiency in the mode " of existence peculiar to
values, the inability to determine the actual directly, the wide-
reaching inconsistency of reality and of human conduct with
them, is as a moral phenomenon, of infinite value. This power-
lessness of- values conditions the attitude of the personal
subject in the world, as that factor which mediates their
actualization in real existence. Hence it is only those acts in
MODAL OPPOSITIONS
83
which the subject commits himself to the realization of what
ought to be, that are the bearers, of the higher and moral
values. And if this commitment did not exist, there would be
nothing in the whole world to which the highest, the moral,
values could be attached.
This freedom, therefore, which that necessity peculiar to
values allows to the subject, is itself an elementary value. It 4s
— and this is the antinomic feature in it — a value, although it
is set over against that necessity; which is likewise an elementary
value and limits this modally. One may say that here the
antinomic relation of these two values, their reciprocal balance,
their self-limitsEtion, is itself valuable.' For in this relation of
suspense between them is rooted the position of the person,
together with all the values of which the person thereby
becomes the bearer.
( b ) The Antinomy of the Real Being and the Non-Being
of Values
Parallel to this first antinomy, but not coincident with it,
stands a second, equally fundamental. It is of the essence of
the Ought to force itself onward into reality. That its contents
are in part real does not alter the situation. In ethical actuality
values are only in part real; they stand between Being and
Non-being. Upon this intermediate position a double relation
depends.
• It Is clear that the reality of a value, whenever and wherever
it appears, is itself valuable — and indeed irrespective of how it
has come into existence. Likewise it is clear that the non-
actuality of a value is a disvalue. As a consequence it follows
directly that the actualization of a value is at the same time
itself valuable, but that the annihilation of one is contrary to
value. These four propositions hold good also for disvalues,
with the opposite designations: the reality and the realiza-
tion of disvalues are contrary to value, the non-actuality and
the annihilation of disvalues are valuable.
THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
84
These propositions hold good not only for* complete reality
and unreality but also for every advance thereto. This is
especially so as regards realization: the tendency to approach
reality is valuable. As the act of a person, such a tendency is a
carrier of a moral value, a value higher than that which is
intended. But as a real process it signifies — according to the
teleological form of its'advance through the means to the* end —
the conferring of value upon what was in itself alien or in-
different. The providing of means for the actualization of a
value is a giving of value to what is valueless. But the worth
of this relationship, controlling the whole sphere of valuational
teleology, is the worth of the real existence of values in general.
In antithesis to |his stands an equally fundamental value.
The non-reality of values also has a value. This becomes per-
ceptible, as soon as we consider that active, intended realiza-
tion is only possible where a value is non-exis ten t, just as, on
the other side, it is the active, intended actualization,,^ which
the higher, the moral, type attains actuality. This means that
the reality of the highest values would be altogether impossible,
if all valuational situations were real. |But since the real exis-
tence of the highest values has also the highest value of actuality,
it is evident that the unreality of values which might be in-
tended — whether they be situational or in limiting cases moral
— is itself for the moral being of the person a basic value.
To resolve this antinomy is impossible. It lies in the very
nature of the metaphysical situation, which’is given as a relation
between, on the one side, the sphere of values and that of
existence and, on the other, between the value intended and
that of the intention. The paradox of this subtle antithesis is
a fundamental feature of the ethical “phenomenon. The two
contrasted values are of course united in the value of the
intended actualization. But the unification is not in principle
a synthesis which could meet the antinomy. For viewed from
the value of the real existence of values the realization is only
a subordinate element, the value of a means-. The value of a
process, from this point of view, inheres only in the goal, in
MODAL OPPOSITIONS
«5
the resultant; it* ri§es or falls in rank with the grade of the
reality aimed at. It is otherwise, when one views the same
realization from th^ Value of the unreality of values. Here the
actualization as such, the act, the greatness of the commitment
is valuable, and indeed without regard to the attainment or
non-attainment of the result. The value of the reality of the
result as such is not annulled; rather does it remain the basis
of the actional value. But this is of another kind, incomparably
higher than that; and it varies in its axiological rank by no
means proportionately to the actual valu^wjiicjj appears in
the ysult. Here another standard sets in,* which annuls that
dependence. The actualization (although only intended)' has
the standard of its grade wholly in itself in contrast to the
actuality of the intended values. The greatness of the commit-
ment is only one of these standards.
Hence the antinomy is not even here resolved. It returns
intensified in the phenomenon of actualization; indeed, it
inheres in it and constitutes its axiological ambiguity. This is
to be taken in the literal sense. It is a double emphasis upon
one and the same thing; it is a selection which in itself is
two-sided, and involves a polar contrast. To try to solve it
would mean a radical misunderstanding of the problem. We
should need to deny the double relation.
,(c) Formulations ■ and Conjugations of this Antinomy
Under all circumstances the antinomy itself is rightly regarded
as genuine. One can most easily bring it home to the sense of
value if, abandoning the more exact but difficult modal ter-
minology, one formulates it in the following manner. Actualiza-
tion is only possible by virtue of the Non-being of that content
the Being of which is valuable, and toward the existence of
which it is directed. In so far, therefore, as a value proper
inheres in the actualization as such, this involves a deprecia-
tion of the value being actualized in it. Axiologically the
realization of values is self-contradictory. Like every process
86 THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
limited to a goal, it leads to its own nullification. But thereby
it deprives the higher value, which adhered to it as such, of
reality.
A whole series of values can be subsumed under the two
fundamental values of this antinomy. And the antinomy
always reappears in them, although of course with very different
degrees of sharpness. The wide cleavage between the valua-
tional regions to which they* belong, proves the dominating
position of the fundamental values. Thus the value of a mere
Ought-to-be. in something not completed stands in opposition
to the value of completion; thus a value peculiar to the living
tension towards something unattained — indeed to a certain
degree the value in the inability to attain — stands in opposition
to the value of success and attainment. For the energj^ the
tension stands and falls with the unattainability. Attail$B£nt
and attainability themselves further display a twofold Sxio-
logical aspect: both have value as well as disvalue. And the
same cleavage reappears in the whole of ethically intentional
acts. Activity, striving, willing and whatever is like these, are
doubly bound, like actualization of which they are the inten-
tional forms. They are valuable for the sake of the goal and
at the same time for their own sake. But the realities of both
values which attach to them are never in harmony — irrespective
of the relation of dependence prevailing between them. The
reality of the one excludes that of the other. This exclusion
of each other nevertheless does not annul the two-sided
character of the value.
But these more special values are no longer properly modal.
They belong to a more concrete stratum and must be especi-
ally considered in connection with it. There, of course, the
discussion will no longer be concerned with their antinomic
character. This shows itself distinctly only in the most general
elements of value. But it can entirely disappear only in the
most concrete valuational fulness.
CHAPTER VIII (xxxiii)
RELATIONAL OPPOSITES
(a) The Antinomy of the Carrier of Value
To every carrier of possible values as such is attached a value.
The carrier is the condition of the reality of that value of which
it is the carrier. Its quality follows from the value^of the reality
of values.
But in all ethically fulfilled actuality the carrier is not angle
nor of one kind but, in agreement with the duality of the
valuational classes which are at stake, it is itself cleft in two.
The intended value has not the same earner as the value of the
intention. The former adheres to the object ; the latter to the
subject of the intention. The object and subject of one and
the same intention — whether it be a striving or a mere dis-
position — are both in the same way carriers. This is the root
of the opposition between subject and object. Both are carriers,
but of different values.
In itself this contrast is far from being an antagonism.
But antagonism sets in, as soon as subject and object coin-
cide as carriers.
It occurs in this way. As regards the moral values, the
subject assumes the position of substance. As the only carrier
of their entire diversity he is a kind of ethical value, not in the
sense of the highest, but of the basic value which carries.
Yet he is at the same time drawn into the matter of the situa-
tional values which can be striven for, because the latter have
as content participation of persons in goods. If I do good, it
is to “someone” ; if evil, that also applies to someone — whether
a person or a community, whether it be direct or indirect, makes
no difference. This dativus ethicus accompanies all human
conduct, and is a constituent in the value or disvalue of the
conduct. The disposition before every action or volition in-
THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
8 »
evitably concerns someone. Thereby the subject, as a matter
of course, is drawn into the value of the intended object (the
situation), and is himself an object of the intention.
That it does not contradict the nature of a personal subject
to become an object has already been discussed in our criticism
of personalism. There it became evident how fundamental for
the whole field of ethical reality the objectification of the
person is. Otherwise intention could not be directed to persons.
Their disposition and striving would be ethically irrelevant.
Mere action upon things is not conduct, a disposition towards
things or their relations is not disposition in the moral sense.
The personal subject as an object is the condition of moral
behaviour; and his substantial value as the subject of possible
acts (for only as such is he personal) is drawn into the general
value of what is objectively to be striven for.
The same thing can be seen from another side. Everything
valuable, even the morally valuable, is, in so far as there is
a consciousness of it, an object of worth for this conscious-
ness. Now as the highest values are those of the personal
subject, these also must appear as objects. And within the
limits of what can be striven for, they must also be the objects
of the acts of that subject to whose acts they apply. The per-
sonal subject is in this sense at the same time an object having
worth, and indeed an object of acts pre-eminently moral. Only
in the moral value of the currerftly ihoral intention itself does
this kind of intentionality and objectivity find its boundary.
But this boundary allows wide scope. If it did not, all moral
work in itself and all such as referred tQ personal subjects
would be illusory. *
It is a peculiarity of ethics, that in a double sense the object
of intention is an intending subject. Moral values allow of being
intended — if at all — only in their natural and particular carrier,
the person. When this direction extends widely, as in the
ethical formation of ideals and in concrete life under the vision
of ideals, then it is immediately evident. But a life under
definite ideals is at bottom the essence and the function of
RELATIONAL OPPOSITES 89
every current morality in the total construction of ethical
reality.
The antinomic factor in this relation finds expression in the
fact that the values of objects and subjects none the less clearly
stand in contrast to each other; thus it was in the ancient
division into goods and virtues. That the former are realized in
the effect, the latter in the disposition, separates them. But in
so far as the effect attaches to subjects who are capable of dis-
position and is meant for them, and on the other hand indeed
a decided commitment can be the matter of the effect, the
limit is transposed and the two classes of value overlap. It is
not only that virtues presuppose goods, but that virtues are
themselves the highest goods. This is the meaning of the
ancient doctrine that virtue is the “highest good.”
( b ) The Antinomy of Activity and Inertia
The opposition between tendency and tenacity, activity and
inertia, is closely connected with the second modal antinomy,
but from another side. This opposition finds scope within the
class of moral values, but it reappears in distorted form among
goods-values.
Our categorial analysis showed that the capacity to tend
towards something constitutes an essential factor of that
entity which alone can grasp and actualize a positive Ought-to-
Be. Activity, for its part, therefore converts a subject into a
person. The question concerns activity in every form, even
in the mere inner direction towards something, as an object
beyond oneself, which is to be realized. The value of activity
is a value of preoccupation as such with something beyond
oneself, of self-transcendence, or to speak categorially, the
self-transcendence of the moral substance — even when the
aims can exist only in the substance as such — and, indeed,
so far as the transcendence is not instigated from without
but is an original self-movement, a first starting of something
new, a trp&rov kivovv. In a certain sense, of course, every
go THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
value is in itself a first mover. But again also it is not; from
itself it cannot set the real in motion. A second and equally
original power must come to its aid. This is the activity of the
personal subject. The real tendency can issue from it only.
If one thinks of this activity as a personal form of existence,
charged with value and intensified unlimitedly, as Fichte in
his youth regarded the moral being of man as issuing wholly
in activity, the active entity is completely disintegrated by its
own activity. The pouring forth in activity would needs dis-
solve and destroy the active entity itself. And in fact it was
Fichte’s opinion that “absolute activity” is without any sub-
stratum, and must be lost in the “infinite object” (that which
ought to be).
This self-dissolution may be a result of pure activity, but
it cannot be the meaning of a person, in so far as he is at the
same time a carrier of moral values. As regards the tendency
of self-abandonment, it is not simply the natural entity in man
with its ontological weight which is set up; for the natural
entity is neither a person nor a moral carrier of value. There
must also be in the moral nature of the person something
which holds the tendency in the scales, a moral being, an
obstacle to all tendency, a self-poise of the ethical substance ;
not a passive substratum which would be only amorphous
material, but a counter-tendency peculiar to the substantial
character of the person, a tendency towards self-preservation
and persistence, a peculiar moral force of inertia. The identity
of a person in all his outgoing beyond himself is just as deep
a moral requirement as the outgoing itself. We are therefore
justified m setting up a value of inertia over against that of
activity. It is the value of ethical Being as compared with that
of intention. Realized values are indeed not less valuable,
because they are not something that positively ought to be.
But in every person, at all times, values are real, even without
any addition. This ethical Being sets limits to tendency; it
furnishes inner resistance to onrushing advance. Its fixity in
itself and amidst excitations is its moral self-preservation.
RELATIONAL OPPOSITES
9i
All forward movement rises upon something stable. If this
is lacking, the weight of substance is lacking; the movement
is not a movement of something, but of nothing; hence it is
no movement. The power of inertness is the counterweight
of ethical Being against the Ought, its check upon the restless-
ness of tendency. This inertness is not passivity — that would
cripple activity — , it is not ethical inertness (that would be a
disvalue), but it is the ontological inertness of ethical substance,
the stability of actual valuational content in the stream of
activity, the conservative counter-tendency of ethical Being.
In this sense it is a value, and indeed the value of potency, not
different from that of activity.
The opposition between activity and inertness becomes
sharper, if one bears in mind that all activity of a personal
subject, at the same time with its outward direction, is also
turned back inward upon the person. Striving may spend itself
on the object; what is realized in the striving, however, is,
besides the object, always something different in the subject,
his moral value or disvalue. This reflex effect of acts is anchored
in the basic relation of values. The subject cannot escape from
it. But if it be true that in all activity the moral content of the
subject is itself changed, the persistence of this content is
essential. It is in itself a value, regardless of that of the activity.
(c) The Grade and the Range of the Type
In every structure which is a possible carrier of diverse values
a valuational enhancement is conceivable in two different
directions : as a one-sided augmentation of a single value (or of
a few which are closely related) and as a many-sided adjust-
ment of various values at the same time. Both kinds of enhance-
ment as such are of value. But materially they are opposed to
each other, and the further progress of either in one and the
same carrier excludes the other.
In the former case we have to do with a rectilineal develop-
ment towards one value. In the life of peoples and their morality.
9 *
THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
which is always one-sided, this is generally the case. The
strength of this tendency lies in the height of the development
of the type which is aimed at in it. One-sided advance naturally
comes much nearer to its ideal than a many-sided tendency —
with the same access of moral strength. Everything great and
decisive in history has needed to rest on the efficient energy
of a one-sided enhancement. The unity of the direction in
which all energy is led brings about the unfoldment of the
ethical substance beyond itself (whether it be that of a person
or of a tribal union); it is that which has power to transcend
its own existence. But in a pre-eminent sense this is a con-
structive, creative factor in man, which leads even to the sacri-
fice of his own substance, to its transformation into something
else.
In such a cultivation of one value (or of a narrow group)
we may see the fulfilment of the value of activity; and although
here it is not a matter of activity as such, yet the value of the
height of the type lies materially in the same direction. Trans-
cendence beyond itself and the attainment of the ideal show the
same type of value.
In the second case an adjustment takes place in favour of all
the values concerned. Here the ethical being of the person
develops more towards richness of content and extension. No
single value dominates, the height of the type is projected on
to the second plane, in favour of its inward diversity and en-
richment. It has given way to the value of extension. In place
of a transformation of the substance into something else, there
is here a development of the substance within itself. Such a
growth can take place, only where the valuational enhancement
is distributed among all the original tendencies. Here inner
breadth of synthesis is aimed at, instead of efficiency of energy.
The development of the person (or community) is directed
to itself— to its inner destination so far as this is prefigured in
the fulness of its possibilities.
This development towards extension also is creative; it is a
constructive unification of all accessible contents, even of the
RELATIONAL OPPOSITES
93
most diverse, in the unity of a valuational type. Hence the
axiological breadth of the type. Everything of value is here
caught up into this unity and saved. Instead of a sacrifice and
abrogation of the substance for something else we have abro-
gation, unlimited as regards tendency, of all else in favour of
the substance.
( d ) Harmony and Conflict
The oppositional dimension of harmony and conflict is in
another direction. Such harmony — agreement with oneself— in
every structure in which it occurs is a value, needs no exposi-
tion. A personality, a co-operative group of persons, a com-
munity, a development, a human life, may be harmonious
Harmony is always an immediately perceived value, the matter
of which is in the static condition of the structure. If it mounts
towards completeness, it approaches the value of perfection.
It haunted Aristotle in the “Teleiosis,” in which he saw the
axiological meaning of eudaemonia. It is evidently akin to the
value of breadth of type, although it signifies another element
in the same phenomenon. For its content is not the inner
breadth but the inner consonance throughout the whole range
of diversities.
It is only when viewed from the outside that harmony seems
to be a value of poise and stationariness. A structure may very
well have movement in itself; it can show an interplay of various
powers. What it depends on is only a symmetry of adjustments,
a synthetic binding of the inner powers into one another, an
absorption of all surplus, a repose of the whole within itself.
It is a valuational unity, but the structure of its material is a
thoroughly unified manifold. It is only as a whole that this
structure is static. The factors in it may be as dynamic as is
ever possible. But the unity arises from the fact that the poise
of the whole ontologically as well as axiologically dominates the
forces within the factors.
But in all ethical actuality, and indeed even within the same
94 THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
structure, this poise is met by an outside force which at the
sqm * time lays claim to domination, and is independently
marked as a value. In every tendency, in every outward-
going, this force is present; it partakes of the type of the value.
But at bottom it is something else than an activity. It is the
inherent unrest of the opposition, the moving principle of
conflict.
What Heraclitus called the cosmic “war” and regarded as
the “father and king” of all things, exists also in ethical actuality ;
the element of restlessness and of “flux” which carries all
things, that inexhaustible productivity of new and ever new
relations, situations and demands, with their endlessly new
co nfli cts and puzzles. This it is which constitutes the infimte-
ness of content in ethical Being, its wealth, its eternal freshness
and abundance. It is no exaggeration to speak in this sense of
conflict as a value. In the domain of knowledge, problems as
values, although paler and more restricted, correspond to it.
As in knowledge a problem is a basic value, although it
is the opposite of insight, so in ethical life conflict is basic,
although it means incompleteness, disharmony, indeed a lack
of indubitable value.
Conflict is that from which decision, intention, action are
born; but the values of intention are the ethical ones. Conflict
is that which keeps discernment and the feeling of value alive
and opens up new vistas. In discord the sense of value, feeling
itself restricted, presses on to escape. Moral life is, in general,
life in the midst of conflicts ; jt is concentration upon them, a
constructive solution of them through the commitment of the
person; and all ignoring of it is a sin, an irrevocable injury
to ethical Being — even to that of one’s own personality.
In this way evety situation in life is of value. It is the material
of all good that is distinctively ethical. For him to whom it is
“given” it is the opportunity for creative shaping; indeed,
the possibility of all definite conduct. The man is drawn into
it and is a member of it; for every situation is built up of
ethically intended conduct of persons. And again it is at the
RELATIONAL OPPOSITES
95
same time given to him as the object of possible comprehen-
sion, participation, mental attitude and productive activity; to
the person as the subject it remains as an object, as that which
he is called upon to grapple with. Human life consists in a
flux of situations, and these are each presented to the man for
a time only and irrevocably. And because life is made up of
them they are the valuational foundation of man’s existence.
Primarily there exists between harmony and conflict only a
contrast, not an antinomy proper. The proof is that concord
pertains only t» a whole as a collection of elements, but the
elements may very well be in antagonism, when they are not
held in check.
But that is changed, if we look at the actual conflicts that can
be found in a situation. In so far as they require a person to
meet an emergency beyond himself, equilibrium and harmony
issue from them. This requirement is of value, no less than
the harmony which has come about. Thus an antinomy is, of
course, produced. And it becomes the more acute when one
bears in mind that in ethical reality these two tendencies always
confront each other, each trying to get the upper hand. From
every harmonious equipoise new conflicts shoot forth; and
precisely these conflicts, in> that they demand solution, entail
new forms of harmony. The perpetual tendency to conflict,
beyond any existent harmony, is confronted by the equally
perpetual tendency of harmony to embrace, absorb and resolve
the conflict. Tendency to co-operation and tendency to dis-
ruption, statics and dynamics, continually compete, they con-
stitute an unstable equilibrium of a higher order. It is an
equilibrium, which is always just as much an instability, and
therefore at the same time a dynamic of a higher order, in the
forms of which the life of ethical actuality is unrolled, foil of
changes and yet bound into a unity.
Whether to this purely ontological synthesis of valuational
materials there corresponds an axiological synthesis, cannot be
definitely settled. Absolutely certain is only the antithesis of
the two values.
96 THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
(e) Simplicity and Complexity
Within every kind of harmony or conflict there arises the
opposition of simplicity and internal multiplicity. This also
is a valuational contrast, and indeed between two types of unity.
Herein it differs from the previous opposition. There unity in
general stood over against discrepancy. But here undifferentiated
unity stands in opposition to the differentiated unity which
contains the manifold within itself.
That both bear the mark of a distinctive value is easily seen.
Simplicity signifies an inner solidity, an innate unity of struc-
ture, a primitiveness and a primitive totality. But in personality
this is what we call “being straight,” it is absolute directness,
undividedness, spontaneity, common sense. Its outward sign is
quiet collectedness, an absence of vacillation. In content it
belongs to the same valuational group as simple-mindedness,
innocence and purity. It is, however, not necessarily unmoved
by conflicts in the way characteristic of the latter. In a conflict
which is felt, there is also such a thing as serenity of conduct;
one can be straightforward even to the point of questionable
one-sidedness, which may involve serious wrong. Directness
of conduct, the making straight for a goal, is none the less, as
such, of value. Conflict with another value does not put an end
to its own.
But to avoid injuring any value, to survey carefully various
aspects, is on the other side no less important. A many-sided
interest, however, implies a many-sidedness of personality.
And this is the opposite of simplicity. It is ethical complexity
itself, or, as one might say, the complexity of the ethos. In
distinction from solid, naturally-grown unity there appears
another, a secondary, cultivated unity, and indeed this claims
to be the higher form. It is the unity of a many-sided develop-
, ment and of the inner unfoldment of the person.
In the direction of this value lies a widening of appreciation
for diversity of situation, even for conflict as such, a conscious
participation in the manifoldness of life’s values, a capacity to
RELATIONAL OPPOSITES
97
commit oneself to the unique and unprecedented, even the
astonishing, an intensified flair for undiscovered values in life
generally — be it a mere participation and paying of attention,
or a taking of the initiative required at the moment, and a
constructive effort to master the situation.
There is no need of proof for the fact that the exploitation
of values and the transformation of life — and not merely one’s
own — in the valuational direction can attain quite another
greatness than that of simplicity and straightforwardness ; nor
does the fact need proof that herein is a witness to the unique
value of complexity in all moral life. Still this is clearly different
from that of “breadth” of type, as well as from that of con-
flict and harmony; for here the material greatness of partici-
pation in values is itself the determining factor, not harmony
nor discrepancy, also not contrast to specifically directed
striving. It is openness of mind to every form of value, purely
as such, irrespective of possible effort and of the worth of
harmony. In the axiological sense complexity in itself is a
mode of fulfilment, of ripeness, of attainment of height.
Ethics— II
CHAPTER IX (xxxiv)
QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE OPPOSITIONS
(a) Universality and Singularity
There is a wide-spread notion that values are generally
universal. If by this is meant only that the value of anything
must appeal to every person capable of discriminating, the
notion is correct and is inapplicable only to persons who are
value-blind or have renounced the capacity to discriminate.
But it is not merely such tubjective validity which is meant,
but something objective: the validity of any value for every
possible earner of value.
In this sense universality is by no means a mark of all values.
Goods and situational values can be so specialized, tKSt there
may be only one instance which comes under consideration.
Of this kind are the majority of the spiritual values which
inhere in things and relations, for example, the value of the
house where one was born, of one’s home, of anything made
sacred by one’s personal experience, of a souvenir, a relic;
but the chief example is the value of the specific experience
itself, as well as of the situations which constitute the content
of the experience.
The same is true in the sphere of personal values, and here
the individuation is far more emphatically marked. For the
moral being of a person consists of his valuational capital, and
what is his personally is not his mere existence. Persons are
not transferable and are irrecoverable; what one is to me, no
other can be — this is the verdict of every finer personal
attachment. In short, there are possessions as individual as
are the things of which there is only one of their kind ; there are
values which have individuality.
The peculiarity— by no means self-evident — is this, that
the categorial opposition of universality and singleness, which
QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE OPPOSITIONS 99
in this way reappears in the realm of values, has the character
of a valuational opposition. In it both sides are charged with
value. And, indeed, this contrast is not quantitative, as one
might think, but qualitative. The significance inheres not in
the extent but in the content, not in the number of cases but
in the agreement or the difference.
In this sense the value of universality is “qualitative.” The
likeness, the common constitution — or, to use the formal
expression — the identity of the distinctive mgfk, is the valuable
thing. That the value lies in this can be seen in the idea of
justice, which is based wholly upon the value of the equality
of all persons before the law. A common claim, and a common
duty, the same opportunity and the same burden — this is not
merely an opportunistic modus vivendi ; it corresponds also to
a primal demand of the Ought, so that it has meaning, and
everybody understands when we say: However different men
may be, there are certain basic relations of life, in respect to
which men ought to be equal ; here every individual advantage
has its limit. In these things the same judgment ought to be
passed upon all; and the same conscience ought to be in all.
The equality of the valuational norm which stands above
empirical inequality is, as such, of value. In these matters no
one may have a private conscience and no one a private
judgment; thereby he would make an exception for his own
person, and would violate the equality.
In the categorical imperative Kant has given formal expres-
sion to this idea. He has related equality inwardly to the
direction and disposition (the maxim) of the intention itself:
that mental attitude is good of which I can will that it be the
disposition of all. The meaning of “good” is thus, of course,
restricted to one single value. But this one value at least thereby
receives the most definite expression. It is the value of objective
universality binding upon all — and, indeed, binding upon all, <
not as subjects of possible judgment, but as carriers of possible
values, as carriers of moral values.
In the same way individuality, the opposite of this value.
xoo
THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
is also “qualitative.” The same persons, whose ideal equality
before the law is of value, are in actuality unequal, and indeed
not only in their nature, but also in their moral being. But,
again, this inequality is itself valuable. Indeed, it is easy to see
that this value penetrates deeper into the essence of the person
than that of equality. The equality that ought to be can only
touch the outward station in life; if one wants to apply it to
the inner essence of the person, there arises the demand for
a universal uniformity of the ethos itself, which plainly contra-
dicts the sense of value. An ethically uniform humanity would
in general actualize only one value, or a few narrowly related
to one another, and, indeed, these would be not the highest
and most fruitful ; they would be developed to the neglect of
the possible fulness of the realm of values, in a one-sided
intensification without concrete unfoldment. The unique
formation, the ethical Being sui generis of each person as an
individuality, peremptorily opposes regular uniformity in the
external structures of life. The axiological individuality and
uniqueness of the ethos in each person are, as such, of value;
in these is rooted all moral diversity. Clearly the value of
equality is limited by that of inequality, the common duty and
the common claim by that of the special duty and the special
claim, such as only the one person can have and only on account
of his uniqueness. And however different the deep layers of
the human ethos may be, in which the two opposed values
claim supremacy, there exists, nevertheless, in all the situations
of life a medial line, at which they touch and clash antinomically
in their Ought-to-be. Here man is confronted with a conflict
and he cannot avoid settling it.
Persons are not the only carriers of valuational individuality
It reappears in units of a higher order, in communities of every
kind, where the circumstance that these possess personality of
v a lower order only, does no injury to the individualization in
quality and specific value. Just as little is the value of indi-
viduality in such structures brought into question by the fact
that analogous structures, with the same position and of the
QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE OPPOSITIONS ioi
same kind, preserve their value (for instance, in the basic
values of international law). Notwithstanding this fact, the
value of individuality has its special and inexhaustibly fruitful
field in every other ethical entity, however fleeting or constant
it may be.
Here we have the special value of the particular situation,
the uniqueness and irretrievableness of every situation which
opens itself to experience and activity, the diversities of which
bring about the wealth of human life. Of course there is a
certain uniformity of situation, a conformity to type, and in
so far circumstances bear a mark of universality; but here, if
anywhere, it is conceivable that every application of a scheme
is due to an overlooking of what is properly essential. For
analogy and all generalization refer to the surface, they do not
force their way into the fulness of ethical actuality. The more
differentiated and individualized the sensing of the permanent
in a situation, so much the deeper and closer to the essential
is the participation in its abundance. All generalization is as
such purely schematization, impoverishment, indeed a sin
against the fulness of values that is given. And every deeper
insight, every appreciation and evaluation, as well as all special
transformation of the state of things, is ethical treasure, moral
enhancement, axiological unfoldment and fulfilment.'
We can see here why all ethical casuistry goes wrong from
the beginning. Its defect is not that it allows room for a variety
of situations, but that it pretends to do so and yet cannot.
For no finite human intelligence can anticipate the indi-
vidualized fulness of real situations. Casuistry lies in a dead
rut, because it thinks to evolve from a principle and to discuss
what only the unfalsified fulness of real life, and no other
power on earth, is in a position to unroll. It is sunk in schema-
tism, it is an abortion of the letter, which kills.
( b ) The Synthesis in the Type
Between the two extremes, the universal and the individual,
lie the specific degrees in manifold gradation. It would be
102
TEE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
quite false to assume that the extreme alone is of value, and
that the whole continuum of intermediate grades is indifferent.
On the contrary, in this polarity, if anywhere, it can be seen
that in all positive contrasts the whole valuational dimension
between the extremes is throughout positively axiological,
that is, that every point in it possesses positive value. From the
logical relation of extent and content, which is here the basic
categorial structure, this does not by any means follow. It is
a law wholly peculiar to the realm of values, which is manifested
here, in contrast to the differently ordered law of the relation
of value to disvalue.
The value of the specific does not justify casuistry or any
other form of bad generalization of what is in itself individual,
just as it has nothing to do with relaxed or obscurely discerned
generality. On the contrary, there are structures of a specific
kind, which according to their own autonomic mode of exis-
tence stand between universality and individuality, or, to speak
more exactly, which can stand between them at various heights.
Of this sort is the typical. It resembles the general in that it
shows distinguishing marks common to many individuals, and
compared with them has the character of universality. But it
resembles the individual in that it has other types near it and,
compared with them, manifests the character of an individual.
It shares in both, only in different directions. Structurally it is
a synthesis. And that is why it axiologically also presents a
synthesis. It shares in the value of both extremes. The synthesis
reveals a new value of its own, the value of the type.
There are type-values of every kind, by no means merely
ethical. There are biological values of race types, as well as
those of an aesthetic nature, which accompany these. But some
also are moral. To the historian this is a well-known fact;
there is the moral type— let us say of the Athenian and the
Spartan, the Roman and the German. In the perspective of
history these can be easily recognized as real type-values.
But a contemporary also knows the same phenomenon within
his own world. And even if he can seldom describe with
QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE OPPOSITIONS 103
precision wherein the valuational structure of the type consists,
his spontaneous sense of value is, nevertheless, sharp enough.
It is easier to see what is typical in contemporaries of a foreign
nation and to gauge it morally (whether with approval or
disapproval) than to see what is individual or universally
human. Indeed, an obscure but strong conviction as to one’s
own type-value accompanies any genuine national conscious-
ness. And we meet with the same phenomenon all the way
from the large and historically fruitful sense of community
down to the narrow and narrowest local and family pride.
The excesses of such consciousness, bordering occasionally on
the comic, must not blind us to the fundamental ethical fact:
the ideal self-existence of all these moral values inherent in
types. The axiological variety in the communal forms of
ethical reality is essentially conditioned by the extraordinary
diversity of stratified type-values, by the way they overlap and
cut into one another. In the actual world every individual is
a possible carrier at the same time of the most general and
the most individual values, and thereby also of the whole
scale of intermediate values.
A synthesis of the contrasted extremes occurs therefore in
the value of the typical. But the antinomy of universality and
individuality is not on that account done away with. The
synthesis is not of such a kind that it draws the extremes into
itself. It has only the character of an intermediate member,
of a link; the extremes remain contrary to each other. In the
typical the universal does not become individual, nor the
individual universal ; and the value of the one does not, as such,
approximate to that of the other. They remain- outside the
synthesis, and the artificial bringing of them into the value of
the typical is a compromise.
( c ) Comprehensiveness and Universality, Individuality
and the Individual
The contrast between all and the individual is closely related
to that between universality and individuality, and yet is quite
104
THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
different and is independent. This is a quantitative opposition,
as can be seen in the categorial attitude of comprehensiveness
to universality and of the individual to the individualized.
And as the quantitative contrast is of especially decisive sig-
nificance for the placing of concrete values, we must begin with
an analysis of this categorial relation.
That universality cannot exist without the totality of all
the instances is an analytic proposition. It is just as evident,
although not an analytic proposition, that the embracing of
instances at least presupposes the universality of a distinguishing
mark which characterizes the instances as belonging together.
But only in this sense.
Apart from this they mean different things and appear
independently of each other. Universality is complete likeness
of the cases, but comprehensiveness is the bringing of them
together into a larger unity. The former is a qualitative agree-
ment without respect to the concrete connection of the cases;
the latter is the quantitative and numerical binding of the cases
in their concrete natural relation, without respect to likeness
or unlikeness, even in spite of unlikeness. Comprehensiveness
is concrete inclusiveness, not comparative but total unity, the
higher whole, the integration of the instances; the specific
nature and the individuality of the cases are drawn into it.
Totality does not need to obliterate unlikeness as such ; diversity
is compatible with it. The difference shows itself most sharply
,jf we consider that comprehensiveness, as a higher order,
ate not indicate universality but numerical singularity and
qualitative distinctiveness. For it is that form, the essence of
which is to hawe near it nothing of the same kind. As soon as
something of the same kind appears, the categorial meaning
of comprehensiveness absorbs it. Totality, strictly understood,
is that which is in itself the only one, the great singular, which
does not allow itself to be generalized.
The same categorial relation reappears in the two-sided
counter-members. Individuality certainly always exists only in
an individual, presupposing it. This is an analytical proposi-
QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE OPPOSITIONS 105
tion. Equally evident is it, even if not an analytical implication
of the concept, that an individual must necessarily have at
least a minimum of individuality, even if it be only the single-
ness of its place in space and time. In this thinnest meaning
everything real is individual, down to the most attenuated of
things or events.
But only in this sense, and only so far as it reaches, do
individual and individuality coincide. Beyond this they signify
something very different. Individuality is the singularity of the
case; the individual on the other hand is the case itself,
independently of whether there be other cases similarly or
dissimilarly constituted. An individual remains the individual,
even if qualitatively it allows itself to be merged into generalities.
Its naked categorial existence is indifferent to the uniformity
and schematism of the general, as well as to the height of the
qualitative individuation. It is not a counterpart of the universal,
but of the collective unit; it is the numerically one, the single
entity as such. It is that ontologically singular, the essence of
which does not exclude the plural (like that of comprehensive-
ness), but does for ever remain in opposition to the plural as
such. This is not contradicted by the fact that it appears
always as one along with others, and that all real plurality is
necessarily a plurality of individuals. The other individuals are
not repetitions of the one, but are likewise original single
entities, and are ontologically essential singulars. But their
plurality proves most conclusively that being an individual
does not mean individuality, that is, the being the only one of
its kind. For the being an individual is as such common to
them all, it is their fundamental likeness, their universal mark.
Thus arises the paradox, that the whole as such is in the
strict sense a singular and something individual, but the
individual as such is in the strict sense a something that is
general, and as regards all individuation of content is indifferent.
It is this which radically distinguishes quantitative correlation
from qualitative.
io6 THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
( d ) The Contrast of the Collective Unity and the
Individual
For ethics this categorial connection of the two correlations
(in itself purely ontological) is decisive. In the realm of values
the radical separation reappears as a difference in the axiological
dimensions of contrast.
There is a specific value in totality, and it is independent
of the likeness or diversity of. the members. And there is a
specific value peculiar to the individual, which is independent
of that inherent in its qualitative degree of individuation. That
in ethical reality both dimensions often appear so closely
related to each other, that at times the individual and indi-
viduality appear indissolubly bound together, that we can no
longer keep them distinctly apart, must never obscure their
essential difference.
The quantitative opposition preserves its axiological colouring
through the fact that the unity, of which the singleness,
plurality and totality are here under consideration, is the
personal entity, the bearer of moral acts and their values.
The ethical individual is the person — with all his characteristic
functions, as a subject as well as an object of intentional acts,
as a value-discerning and value-carrying being. But the ethical
totality is the totality of persons — including their reciprocal
objectivity to one another and the diversity of all the acts which
bind them together or separate them.
According to the ancient conception, which reappears in
most of the ethical classicists, the really great moral problems
concern the existence of the collective unity (of the legal,
social, civic community). The commonalty leads a life on a
larger scale than that of individuals ; in this way it is the carrier
of greater aims and values, in comparison with which those
of individuals must take a secondary place. Empirical com-
munities of such a kind are indeed never, strictly speaking,
totalities; the idea of humanity stands far removed beyond
them. But such limitations are not willed, they do not inhere
QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE OPPOSITIONS 107
in the idea of the commonalty; the tendency to expansion is
rather a characteristic of every community. In so far we must
recognize in every communal ethics, without depreciating it,
the fundamental tendency towards comprehensiveness as a
value. It is the substance of all ethical values on the grand
scale — all the way from simple legal arrangements up to the
highest cultural ideals; comprehensiveness is the idea of the
universal carrier of these values, and in so tar the value df
the moral carrier is transferced.to it. 1
The collective being is the bearer of values on the grand
scale ; whether it is also of a higher order is another question —
it depends upon the height of the value that is borne. The
collective being is the substance, in which alone distant goals,
far-seeing human enterprises, can be pursued. And in so far
as the individual can co-operate in these enterprises, when at
times he consciously enters into their service (and does not
simply allow himself to be used as a means towards them by
social organizers), he subordinates himself and his private ends
to the enterprises, he recognizes their superiority and con-
sciously converts himself into a means; in some cases he
sacrifices his personal existence for them. He adjusts his life
as a member organically to some grand process which passes
beyond him into the future, into the life of the communal
being in which he participates only by contributing, not by
receiving.
This self-sacrifice — and no one would deny that it is morally
of value — is full of meaning only on the supposition that there
really exist values, enterprises and goals which cannot be
actualized except in the community as such and in it as the
bearer of values. Only then may we speak of the exaltation of
man through the conferring of value upon the commonalty.
Nor can there be any serious doubt concerning the existence
of such values. Social organization of every kind and degree
is a distinctive value, it is a form, the realization of which,
even in the most one-sided distortion, is of worth, because its
* Cf. Chapter VIII (a), Vol. II
168 THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
annihilation would mean a setting free of private egoism.
Whether these values are the highest is quite another question ;
and still another concerns the limits of realizability. Yet the
existence of the values is independent of their height in the
ideal scale as well as of the degree to which they can be realized.
But the value of the individual is easy to discern; and again
and again it has called forth opposition to the classic morality
of the communal being. For the community is never the
carrier of full humanity. In the complete categorial sense of
the word, it is not a personality. Personality implies a subject,
a consciousness, with the fulness of act and content peculiar
to it. Only an individual possesses that. If behind the com-
munity there were a super-individual subject which as such
could be the bearer of the same acts and actional values as the
individual subject can be, or if there were a still higher one,
the case would of course be different; likewise it would be
different if there were such a thing as personality without
subjectivity.
But neither of these notions fits the fact. Subject and person
stand in a definite categorial relation of dependence; the
higher form, the person, is conditioned by the lower, the
subject. But it is precisely the phenomenon of the community
which forbids our hypostasizing a subject of a higher order;
all the personality of a community is a borrowed personality,
transferred to it from the individual. A collective person has
personality only of a lower order. 1
This view harmonizes with the fact that precisely the highest
values that can be realized in a community are not properly
communal, but are those of individuals. The legal and con-
stitutional order, public arrangements of every kind, of course,
inhere in the commonalty and not in the single individual;
the latter only has a share in them, producing and profiting by
them. But even as values such forms are not the highest, for
they are not moral values. The communal sentiment, on the
^Compare the criticism of Personalism in Chapter XXV (c) and (d),
QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE OPPOSITIONS 109
other hand, is a moral value; so is the civic and political
disposition which ripens such fruits. But this disposition is
that of individuals, the community as such has no mental
attitudes. The renowned civic virtue of the Roman is a value
which accrues to the advantage of his republic as a goods-
value (for every virtue has in it the reverse side of being a good
for someone); but as a moral value, that is, as a value of a
higher order, it inheres in individuals. As in a vision, the
transformation and the salvation of the community hover
before the individual as his ends; he aims at the situational
values peculiar to the commonalty. But the morality of his
intention is something different from the value of what he
intends, as is the case with all moral conduct. On the back of
his act, of his effort, appears the value of the higher order —
it is actualized by his striving, although not intended. In
reality it attaches only to him. While the individual gives
himself up to the community, he actualizes in himself the
higher values. This is the moral meaning of “sacrifice” for the
people and for one’s country.
This relation between the values of the individual and the
community is in no way reversible, or even displaceable.
It is embedded in the rigid law that moral values are based
upon situational values. What irritates one is only the circum-
stance that the situational values — in this case those of the
commonalty — are the ones that are striven for. Thus upon a
superficial observation it may appear as if they were the higher
values, as compared with those of the individual. It is in the
sacrifice of the individual for the community that this appear-
ance reaches its highest point, for to yield the higher in favour
of the lower would be senseless. One forgets that it is precisely
in sacrificing his existence that a person actualizes in himself
the supreme value, that therefore in offering up himself he
preserves and enhances his Being axiologically and perfects
himself morally. The object for which the sacrifice is made
must, of course, stand higher than that which is sacrificed.
But the moral value of the sacrifice is not that of the thing
no
THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
sacrificed; it is then by no means surrendered, but even
actualized in the surrender. It is decidedly higher as compared
with the worth of that for which the sacrifice is made; indeed
it is the highest of all values.
If one keeps this point in mind and remembers also that
what constitutes the standard of actional value is not the
height of the thing striven for but the person’s greatness of
mental attitude, one cannot fail to understand that it is the
values of the individual, which in axiological height transcend
those of the commonalty. But then it is also clear that, as a
carrier of values, the individual himself has higher worth than
the community, and that individualistic ethics has a deeply
founded right to precedence over a purely social and therefore
one-sided ethics.
The claim of communal morality will not on this account be
contested; it discloses the highest ends that can be striven for.
But the highest values capable of being actualized cannot be
those of the community. Purely communal ethics would be
an ethics of ends merely, and would run into the danger of
becoming an ethics of success.
( e ) The Antinomy in the Contrast of Quantity
The valuational opposition between the collective unit and the
individual is in itself not antinomic in character. Each side
has a certain axiological superiority. The collective unit is a
structure on the grand scale, its values are macrocosmic;
those of the individual, on the other hand, are moral. But the
superiority of the one is not of the same kind as that of the
other; they are therefore compatible.
Yet in ethical reality each shows itself to be tyr anni cal.
Each claims to be the sole authority and aims to subordinate
the other to itself.
From the standpoint of the collective unit the individual is
in itself a meaningless, ephemeral structure; in the life of the
collective unit innumerable beings of the same kind come and
QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE OPPOSITIONS in
go. They exist for nothing else than to carry this “higher” life
of the whole, to reproduce it and to enhance it. From this point
of view any single individual can be ignored. He is merely
material for “higher” forms. The collective unit, not the
individual, is the substratum of history, only its process and
only its goals are historically of significance; and the individual
rises to historical greatness only in so far as he sets this process
in motion, somehow grasps these goals in vision, advances
them, or even hinders them. His significance then is bor-
rowed from that of the collective unit, and is entirely bound
by it. Even in the case of great personalities the individual is
always there only for the sake of the collective unit.
Indeed, the sole mastery of the collective unit extends still
farther. The community tolerates only those individuals who in
their conduct conform to its ends; it rejects those that are of
no use, stamps them as criminals, puts them out of existence,
or lenders them harmless by its jurisdiction which is directed
to the life of the whole. Its authority meets the individual as *
a force, as a restraint upon liberty of action, but the individual
accommodates himself to this force; he even takes the lead in
it, he re-establishes it by voluntary subjection to the “higher”
ends of the whole. Thereby he recognizes the inferiority of his
own worth to that of the community.
This openly sanctioned attitude — it is in general the natural
one among young and vigorous peoples — then finds expression
in popular metaphysical theories, according to which the
division of mankind into separate persons is a subordinate
fact, individuation (the j lepurfios ) is a mark of imperfection,
and there rests upon man the fulfilment of no higher destiny
than to merge again into the common substance by devotion
to the “whole.”
This racial, tribal, social ethics, which reaches back to
pre-historic, patriarchal times, is confronted by the growing
self-consciousness of the individual with the simple reflection :
How can I commit myself to ends which are not my own?
They must at least be also my own ends. Only an individual
I IZ
THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
can set up and pursue ends; but he can do that only if he xs
interested in them and sees in them some value for himself.
The community must therefore respect the ends of the
individual, it must be so organized that it is unmistakably a
means to his ends. He must see himself confirmed in it,
otherwise he cannot avoid disavowing it.
History corroborates this view. No community can maintain
itself which is not based upon the common interest of the
separate persons concerned. But then our thesis is converted
into its antithesis: the individual does not exist for the sake
of the collective unit, but the collective unit for the individual.
The community is nothing but the modus vivendi of the
individuals; for an organization, a structure of the common
life, is needed by the individual for his own private life.
Withodt the private life of the individual and without any
value of his own the community were meaningless.
The culminating point of this individualism is that the
* individual just as unscrupulously credits himself with the
worth and claim of the existing community, as the com-
munity credits itself with the worth and claim of the individual.
And just as the community tolerates only those who serve it,
so the individual tolerates only that community which in its
organization and trend serves him. He rejects the collective
unit which is of no use, opposes it, overthrows it. For him the
community is only a means to his own life and his own ends.
In this attitude of mind the individual finds himself ob-
jectively strengthened, far beyond the limits of his natural
egoism, by the reflection that human greatness is never with
the crowd but is always and necessarily an affair of individuals.
The conception of great individuals, in the sense of their value
to the community, fails to understand the domination of moral
values over the community. It is absurd to think that the great
exist only for the sake of the small and insignificant, and ought
to merge themselves in the struggle for material ends. Their
superiority to the crowd is axiological, it can therefore be
understood only in the sense of higher standards than the
QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE OPPOSITIONS 113
common ones. It is the great individuals who first give light
and splendour to the life of the community, who open up a
higher order of value which spreads to the rest, singly and
collectively. It is they in whom significance is alive, whereby
the community attains significance. Their image dominates
and survives even in history, after the community has long
been extinct. For them therefore, to speak axiologically, the
collective unit exists. Not from it is their value borrowed, but
from them that of the community is derived.
(/) The Limit of the Antinomy
That in this antinomy the thesis and antithesis are each one-
sided is quite plain. Socialism and individualism — each strictly
understood in the sense of the above contrast, which cor-
responds with customary speech only approximately — are
typical “isms” : the kernel of truth in each is justified, but it
cannot be universalized. Both theories commit the error of'
abstraction, of isolating a value, in a way which m concrete
life never occurs. For either value to assume supremacy over
the other is usurpation.
In communal ethics the error lies on the surface. The collec-
tive pnit itself, taken by itself, exists only in abstraction.
Apart from individuals it has no being. It exists only in them,
for it consists of them. It must therefore grant to the individual
his mode of existence and his own worth, it must recognize
him and in his independence respect him. It must do this not
only because otherwise the individual sets himself above it,
but because otherwise it annuls itself. The whole must assert
the existence of its constituent parts; but their existence is
simply their independence as against the whole. For its own
sake, therefore, the community must recognize what, in its
structural constitution, it has denied; the axiological self-
existence of the individual.
There is no similar dialectic of the “whole” in any onto-
logical totality. The relation of valuational contrasts first
Bthta, — II 11
THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
1 14
introduces it. An individual is not simply a “part.” As a
building-stone in the whole he is, nevertheless, a higher forma-
tion, a person in the full sense — which a collective unit can
never be. And in so far as here the relation of means to ends
prevails, the means transcends the end. In being a means for
the collective unit (a lower order of carrier) the individual is
at the same time a carrier of a higher order, and in so far an
end in himself. The teleology of the “part” remains independent
of the teleology of the “whole,” although it is a reversal of the
latter. The whole cannot fulfil itself as an end in itself, in so far
as it does not at the same moment constitute itself a means
to the part.
But the same thing is met with in individualism. Here also
a false claim is made. The individual, taken by himself, is only
an abstraction. He has no self-existence isolated from the
collective unit. A separate isolated person is nowhere found.
The separate man exists only in a community, he is entirely
bound by it, as by a larger and infinitely stronger structure.
He is born into it, draws from it the common goods — by
inheritance, innumerable adaptations, education — he gradually
falls into the conventional forms of life, which he did not
produce, he gains a place in the communal being, in discipline
and culture, in the conception of life and the universe, in the
“objective mind.” Even the man who later isolates himself,
the anchorite, Robinson Crusoe, on his island, brings all these
possessions with him and for a long time nourishes his life
upon them. He rests with all his humanity upon the actualized
values of the community. And everything of shape or value
which he by himself brings forth, is already latent in those
communal values. At the most he lifts himself but a little
above them. Even such advance is made only within the limits
of what is attainable from the actualized communal values in
general. Ordinarily this is little enough. And even when it is
much, as with the “great individual,” he never loses from
under his feet the common basis. Where this is lost, it is to his
own detriment.
QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE OPPOSITIONS 115
The individual must needs acknowledge the value peculiar
to the collective unit; he cannot otherwise advance a step.
It is precisely when he learns to understand himself as a final
end, that he must also respect the collective unit as an end
in itself, and adapt himself as a means to its macrocosmic
teleology. Even the teleology of the individual turns dialectically
against itself. It can achieve only by self-conquest.
But thereby in content it coincides with the collective
teleology, which shows the same return upon itself. Of course
not as regards the end, but certainly as regards the process.
There are not, therefore, two different teleologies, which
compete with each other ; there is only one. Seen from either
side, it is the same teleological reciprocity of individual and
community. But this means that the two are connected not
only ontologically but also axiologically. Within the valuational
contrast there is a correlation, in which the union of the members
is always stronger than their discrepancy. Herein the anti-
nomical element in the quantitative aspect of the opposition
undoubtedly finds its limit.
This is not a solution of the antinomy, rather might one call
it an intensification; for the less soluble the oppositions are,
the harder do they collide with each other in ethical actuality.
Rather to the antinomic relation as such there is an inner
limit, inherent in the materials themselves and independent of
every radical solution. But perhaps here the axiological unity
of the valuational continuum finds expression, for it reaches
to the two extremes. And herein is contained a reference to the
direction of the concrete tasks of life, before which man is
placed by this antinomy.
( g ) The Completely Antinomical Elements in the Realm
of Values and of Ontological Reality
This unification of values within the quantitative antinomy
reaches even to the qualitative opposite, in which as such it
does not exist in itself. The collective unit has an interest not
n6 THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
only in the individual as its member, but also in the degree of
his individualization. The more the single persons differ from
one another, the richer in values becomes the whole of the
community.
The common life is not a function of uniformity; its structure
is a unity of differences. For all the wider enterprises of the
social structure the prerequisite is the development of indi-
viduals in native gift, understanding and efficiency. For com-
munal tasks the functions of the members must be of many
kinds. There can be no schematization of them, it is in their
diversity that they fit into the organic unity of the common
process and aim. In contrast to this the necessary uniformity
constitutes only a sort of basis, a conditio sine qua non.
Likewise for his own sake the individual has an interest not
only in the collective unit as a concrete entity, but in every-
thing which conditions it. However little his life can be absorbed
in the uniformity of the elementary conditions of existence,
nevertheless it must consent to these. The height of his qualita-
tive individuation, in which his life culminates, must acknow-
ledge and must by all means preserve the foundation of equal
claim and equal duty, even where his life rises high above
it. Indeed, it continues to be a unique value, even where it
causes conflict. And exactly on this account it means conflict.
If the higher value could abolish the lower, if the individual
in his elevation above the average could place himself without
conflict above the demands of equality, the alternatives between
which he has to choose freely would not, as regards his real
conduct, continue to exist. But this conflict not only continues,
it is the fundamental form of most of the human conflicts, at
least it is contained in them as an element.
The individual and the collective unit, just as much as
individuality and universality, are fundamentally different
directions or regions of value which subsist independently of
each other and none the less are materially most closely inter-
woven in concrete life. Both antinomies run, unresolved,
throughout the entire realm of values and on that account are
QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE OPPOSITIONS 117
drawn into the axiological structure of all the concrete situations
of life.
Everywhere values divide into those of the community and
those of the individual, and even in many otherwise harmonious
materials they constitute opposed sides. The same specific
material — let us say, honesty, steadfastness, energy, obedience,
trustworthiness — may have a totally different value according
as it inheres in a collective or an individual unit. Indeed, what
in the one instance is valuable may very well in the other be
indifferent or opposed to value. This double significance of
many specific values (and especially the moral ones) should not
be obliterated by any artificial cancellation. It is characteristic
of the realm of values itself.
That a similar significance of general structural elements
adheres to other pairs of opposites, the modal and the relational,
so far as they do not have in themselves a tendency to cancella-
tion, needs no proof. But for the philosophical completion of
the valuational realm the double contrast of quantity and
quality has an instructive significance. In it the general structural
character of contrasts is perceptible in a unique way. No other
pair of opposites has determined our conscious concepts, even
to the setting of its stamp upon their terminology, so authori-
tatively as this. And in the diversities of positive morals no type
of opposites is so consciously and simply developed in history
as that of social and individual ethics.
But the task of the moral life, and with it that of philosophical
ethics, consists, in spite of this fact, of a synthesis of the two
points of view. The resting of each of these two carriers, the
individual and the collective unit, upon the other, is by no
means, as we have shown, a valuational synthesis. There is here
no question of a radical universal solution, seeing that the
unity of values is not discernible. But from moment to moment
concrete life none the less yearns for permanent solutions.
Every new situation confronts a man with a new decision and
he can never escape from this necessity. But the task is an
endless one, because unceasingly new, on account of the
THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
ix8
qualitative infinitude of situational diversities. And this again
is of value for the complete development of the moral life.
For the great extent of the conflict furnishes the strongest
inner stimulus to human productivity, commitment and
acceptance of responsibility. It challenges the utmost spon-
taneity and the greatest creative energy of man. The ever new
attempts at mastery move forward over the ever unmastered
expanse.
( h ) Intermediate Members — the Smaller Community and
the Political Party
Just as between qualitative opposites, so between the collective
and the individual unit there appear intermediate members,
variously graded : the smaller association — the group, the con-
gregation, every sort of fellowship with a common interest,
the family, and so on. It unites the characteristics of the
extremes. As a comprehensive union of individuals it is a col-
lective unit and at the same time, being among other societies
of a similar order, it is an individual. Strictly taken, even the
nation and the State, as empirical and limited structures, have
their place here and are not absolute collective units.
Again, the intermediate member displays a value of its own,
which in part has the quality of a synthesis, although of course
without mastering the antinomy. For the individual there is in
the narrower community the value of collectivity. His work in
it and for it goes in that direction. The smallest group has
entirely the inner structure of collectivity, the same kind of
existence and life; indeed, the same way of setting itself in
opposition to the individual. He sees himself in it as an alien
value. But in national life the people throughout play the part
of an individual. Likewise every State is an individual with the
characteristic values of such and is capable of higher combina-
tions with other individuals of the same order. The federation,
the united State, the league of States, even the Idea of aworld-
State, which in the history of nations is always alive and is
QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE OPPOSITIONS 119
often striven for— these all lie in the same direction. Every
State has an individual life, which moves according to its own
laws, laws which cannot be transferred and for any other State
would be unnatural. These are not by any means merely the
“positive laws” which touch only the surface of the distinctive
life. For every community acts as a person and bears responsi-
bility, like one, towards foreign communities as well as towards
its own members. Nor can its own moral life be reduced to
any positive or ideal law.
Here, of course, it is not to be forgotten, that ultimately in
the State consciousness, foresight, action,, guilt, fall to indi-
viduals. There is no proper communal subject. At best the
guilt is that of all (generally, in fact, only of some) ; but this
does not make a person of the community. The representation
of the communal consciousness (which is missing) through a
single consciousness set into a leading position, is imperfect
enough. No empirical person stands on the height of the
required communal consciousness. And even if one stood
intellectually on this height, he could not do so morally. No
individual can so put behind him his individual interests that
he can devote himself absolutely to those of the community
and be nothing but its representative.
From this point of view we see why it is ethically wise for
the subordinate groups in an empirical community to represent
independently their own special interest, at the risk of their
being in conflict with one another. If a community had an
adequate personal consciousness, this would not be necessary;
such a consciousness would possess a valuational sense for every
justifiable interest. But under the circumstances the independent
action of groups in the community is necessary. A political
“party” has ethical meaning, because it represents a valuational
trend in the communal life itself, which is active in many of
its members. The strength of a party is the positive value which
guides its interest; its weakness is its inevitable one-sidedness,
involved in the championship of only one value. The presump-
tion in making the one value all dominant is in itself a usurps-
xao
THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
tion. But party violence is likewise a sin against this value.
Conflict in political life is a necessity, it inheres in the living
orderliness of a community. For it is a positive conflict of
values and as such is itself of value. But the means by which
the contest is carried on may be bad. Typical is the wide-
spread obsession that the conflict is not one of value against
value, but of value against disvalue. All disdain and calumnia-
tion between parties issue from this obsession. No one will
believe that the opposite party also sees values and is striving
for them; it is charged with what is humanly impossible and
preposterous — the will to do evil for its own sake. There have
been times in the historical life of nations, when this immorality
of the political intelligence was a disease and made mutual
understanding impossible. In such times the life of the com-
munity seems undermined ; in unrestrained abandon it consumes
its own vital energies. But there is a morality of political life,
the health and strength of the State depend upon it: the
unfalsified, disciplined sensing of the right in an adversary’s
contention and the inevitable diversity of interests themselves.
The meaning of this morality is that as citizens the members of
a party must stand above the party conflicts. (*)
(*) Humanity and Nation
A glance at this state of things shows clearly how far the limited
empirical community — whether of a higher or lower order —
is a properly ethical reality. But it can also be shown in a
general way.
Strict collectivity cannot be actualized. It is an Idea.
Even the individuality of a person is not commonly actual,
it is deeply hidden and is yet to be discovered in its own
proper value. The concrete sphere of ethical reality is the
empirical community, which has grown up naturally or even
been produced historically. In it, not in the collective unit in
the strict sense, blossoms the variety of all the values into which
the individual grows through birth and development by
QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE OPPOSITIONS 121
participation: such values as the biological type, language,
customs, mental trends, civilization. There is no one language
of humanity nor a single civilization ; there are only specific,
national languages and civilizations. Compared with these
embodiments of the most concrete and abounding values,
whatever is universally human is attenuated enough, and
ultimately the Idea of humanity as a collective unit is
profoundly unreal.
Connected with this is the fact that the values peculiar to
a race or people should never be entirely merged into the
levelling Idea of humanity. They are and they remain individual
and as such show a relation to the general collectivity similar
to that of the individual to his national community. Indeed,
they stand in contrast to the values of humanity ; but the bond
and the connection are stronger than the tension of opposing
forces. In spite of antagonism the nations require one another,
to supplement the deficiencies of each. Even the Idea of
humanity can as little do without national individuality as a
State could dispense with the personal individuality of its
members. Variety and independent differentiation are not less
essential for the development of mankind and its ethos than is
the perspective of over-arching unity. For not only are disposi-
tion, spiritual type, morality, poetry, art and ideal discipline
necessarily specific, with a national individuality, inimitable
by foreigners, but there is also a national calling, a specific
task towards the whole of humanity as such and for its sake,
a task which only a definitely organized people with special
gifts and with a unique position in the total process of history
can fulfil.
Herein lies the purpose of nations, their inner determination,
their Idea single and incomparable. Like the Idea of the
individual, it exists independently of the degree to which, as
its carrier, a people fulfils, actualizes or even comprehends it.
Like every axiological ideal, it is never merged into identity
with its carrier. A people can also miss its inner determina-
tion, its specific values, its world-task. It can give itself up to
122
THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
foreign ideals, it can be diverted from its own course by over-
powering influences, it can allow itself to be spiritually violated.
History furnishes many a sad example of such an occurrence.
But it is a tragic spectacle, when something goes to ruin which
was possible only once and only in the life of one people. For
nations do not repeat themselves any more than personal
types. Conversely, it is something great and sublime in the
drama of history, when such an inner destiny fulfils itself.
For it is the achieved values of peoples which alone outlive
them and which as spiritual heritages continue their work
after the nations themselves have fallen into ruin.
Section III
THE VALUES WHICH CONDITION
CONTENTS
CHAPTER X (xxxv)
GENERAL CHARACTER OF THE GROUP
( a ) Concreteness and Fulness of Content
In content the realm of values is an interrelated variety of
materials, and perhaps is even in all its dimensions an unbroken
continuum. But we are not able to see it as a continuum. We
see only single groups, between which whole portions of the
intelligible space remain unfilled. The narrowness of our
vision does not allow it to be otherwise. The connections, no
doubt, are manifested in the recurrence of elementary factors
in the more complex materials. But they permit of no inference
as to the filling in of the gaps. In every single group which is
discernible there is a new and differently formed point of view,
with a different clue and a different context. Thus from the
outset heterogeneity necessarily strikes the mind.
This is the case with the fundamental values which con-
dition contents. They are a section, just as the contrasts are,
and never a complete one. The connecting members are
lacking. Many assumptions might perhaps be made in regard
to them, but the assumptions are not confirmed in our sensing
of values. So we are obliged, throughout the whole methodo-
logical difficulty, to allow the fact of discontinuity to stand.
From it as such we cannot decide whether we are confronted
here with an inherent irrationality of the intermediate members
or only with temporary ignorance on our part, as if something
were beyond us. We must accept the task of pressing forward
into the unknown spaces, a task which is perhaps possible
from both sides.
As compared with the former group of values the new one
is characterized by a far greater abundance of content; the
almost formal emptiness of the valuational contrast, which
feeling detects only with difficulty, here entirely disappears.
THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
126
Here are contents which anyone easily sees to be values.
They come into much more intimate contact with our
intuition. This is due to the existential form of that
structure, in the organization of which they are constitutive
factors.
The valuational antitheses were discovered in the categorial
analysis of value and of the Ought; hence their abstractness.
The values which condition contents are laid bare by an
analysis of that structure which, in the sphere of actuality,
only a positive Ought-to-be is in a position to grasp, and to
transmute into actuality, and which thereby sets up a mediation
between the ideal sphere of values and the real sphere of
existence . 1 That this structure, with everything which essentially
pertains to it, must itself be of value follows from its mediatory
function. Its main features, therefore, must necessarily con-
stitute valuational material. And as this structure is exactly
the same personal subject (man), who alone can be a carrier of
moral values, it is clear that these elements inherent in his
nature must be for all moral values the condition determining
their contents. The latter inhere in those acts which rest on
that constitutional essence and in which, therefore, the con-
ditioning values are already realized. In this sense — and only
in this — do the fundamental values in the constitutional essence
of the person condition the contents and prove vital for the
manifestation of moral values. And likewise they are for the
same reason highly concrete and directly accessible to discern-
ment, and not by way of reflection. For m its constitutive
ethical elements the nature of a personal subject is something
concretely discerned.
( b ) The Relation of the One-sided Series to the Antinomies
The peculiarity of this group is that positive oppositions have
ceased and have given place to more complex relations. No
longer does value stand against value, but throughout only
« Cf. Chapter XIX, Vol. I.
GENERAL CHARACTER OF THE GROUP 127
against disvalue. The positive opposites are lacking, and even
when they do put in an appearance their antinomical charac-
teristic is absent. In place of it there is merely a contradictory
relation. This, indeed, is not a new thing, for the positive
opposites also have disvalues opposed to them and to their*
polar system corresponds a similar polar system of disvalues.
But here the disvalues have a different axiological impor-
tance, because they are not concealed by any positive
contrary structure. And for all higher values this feature
is dominant.
The axiological dimensions, which appear here, are therefore
one-sided series. Between their extremes they embrace a
continuum only one half of which is positive; the other half
is negative. The line binding value and disvalue is always
clearly an ascending one from the negative, over the indifference-
point, to the positive.
This unambiguous relation between value and disvalue,
from which conflict is absent, is characteristic of all the wider
and more concrete values of goods, situations and persons.
The strict separation of these latter from one another is not
yet carried out on the plane of the basic values. Here general
inner situations stand close to acts, with a strain in them that
is already clearly moral. In certain cases distinctive marks of
both classes of values can be clearly discriminated and yet are
inseparably joined. But it may be generally said that in the
whole senes goods and situations are predominant among the
categorially lower materials, but that they diminish towards
the higher, while conversely the moral values increase m the
same relation and finally attain complete predominance.
Herein the transitional position of the group comes clearly
into evidence. In regard to valuational height this series shows
an ever ascending curve, even if at some points in the inter-
mediate members it is less evident. But under all circum-
stances it is important to distinguish most carefully this rise
of the valuation level itself within the whole group of values
from the advancing participation in value of the carrying
128 THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
structure (the personal subject) within each separate dimension
of value and disvalue.
On another side the group as a whole has in it the conflict
of opposites. The elements of these reappear in it and as
such extend into it not otherwise than into the higher
strata of values. And where the antagonism between them
can be discerned, it is just as insurmountable here as it
is there.
But only in a very external sense can one speak, in regard to
these values, of their being determined in content by opposi-
tions. They somehow always fall into the general scheme of
one or another opposition, they take definite “places” in
valuational “space” and within certain limits permit of being
subsumed under these. Here we may therefore very well
acknowledge a stratification. But it does not constitute the
essence of the group. The opposites combine m many ways,
but never from such combination can the new material, still
less its peculiar value, be discovered Accordingly, we could
not speak of derivation, even if we could survey the whole
series of the intermediate members between both groups.
In every new value hides a new content which gives it its
peculiar quality. To it the axiological essence adheres.
(c) The Second Supplementary Group
Along with this group of fundamental values which adheres to
the personal subject as such there exists a second series which
also conditions the content of moral values, but does so in a
different way, namely, by furnishing a material basis. It does
not adhere to the personal subject and cannot be discovered
by an analysis of the subject.
Ethical actuality is not constructed out of the essential
features of man only. Rather are these themselves more widely
embedded ontologically in universal structures of existence.
And the latter exhibit those valuational qualities which as
contents are drawn into the matter of moral values. They are
GENERAL CHARACTER OF THE GROUP 129
conditions in a more external sense. Their main axiological
feature is that of objectivity of value.
This second series differs therefore from the first and more
fundamental, referred to under the head: the “antinomy of the
carrier of values .” 1 As a whole then it is differently articulated.
It begins with very general existential structures, in so far as
these furnish a basis for personal and actional values-; and,
rising to more specific matenals, it terminates in the un limited
diversify "of goods values. Jit ascends therefore in the opposite
direction to that ofthe first series, to the other lower class of
values, which in itself is of course highly enough differentiated.
Within the whole ethical space it constitutes that section to
which the realm of goods belongs. Here the whole of this
region with its variegated specializations does not concern us,
but, once more, only the most fundamental, only those which
in a pre-eminent way provide a basis, those which are materially
decisive for the general axiological problem of human nature
in the world and its morally relevant place therein.
But the common element which binds this second series to
the first is this, that in the realm of values the two-sidedness
of the one is parallel to that of the other. Not only are both
series conditioning factors, but they show the same attitude
towards the sets of valuational opposites. In them also the
contrasts reappear, and likewise only as subordinate elements
which deprive the contents of none of their mdependence.
Here also the distinctively positive opposition vanishes and
gives place to a simple relation of value and disvalue; here,
as in the other series, clearly ascending continuities prevail,
one half with negative signs. And in the same way a conflict
occasionally breaks out, which then extends to the opposition
of actional values, in so far as the acts are directed to objective
values.
Finally there is a still more intimate connection in the
point from which both senes issue. In the lowest types of
both there is a close intimacy, without sharp lines of demarca-
* Cf. Chapter VIII (a), Vol. II.
1
Ethics— II
130 THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALDES
tion; it is only with the increasing complexity and height of
the contents of both that the series diverge, while, in the one,
the character of actional and personal value becomes distinctively
evident and, in the other, that of the situational value intended
in the act. For the extent of the valuational differences in the
ethical life generally, this divergence is of decisive signifiranra.
CHAPTER XI (xxxvi)
VALUATIONAL FOUNDATIONS IN THE SUBJECT
(a) Life as a Value
In the first series the most elementary value is that of life.
By this is not meant the value of the form and existence of
every thing alive, out of all relation to the ethos, but only the
much narrower value of life as the ontological basis of the
subject, and thereby indirectly also of the moral being and
value-carrier, the person. We are acquainted with moral beings
only as resting upon a biological basis, only in connection
with an organism as a physical carrier. And all higher develop-
ment of spiritually moral power is conditioned by the develop-
ment of the life which carries it; it not only stands and falls
with the life, but also grows with it.
In this sense vitality, vital strength, the degree of life in
man, is a value proper. It is the value of that side of his being
by which he is deeply rooted m nature and is himself a natural
entity. The footing of the natural being in him is as such of
value; it is his secret of Antaeus, his hold on existence, without
which he would, with all his spirituality, float in the air; it is
the source from which all his unconsumed strength is drawn.
Here is the earthly weight which holds him down and which
he must overcome at every step upward; but here also is the
root which sustains spiritual life until it reaches its highest
elevation, and with which that life dies when its sustenance
has all been consumed.
Over against this value, death stands, as a disvalue. It is
not only an annihilation of physical life, but with it also of the
spiritual and personal. The unique grievousness of this dis-
value becomes evident from the seriousness of murder, the
moral sin against life. But also every injury to life and every
weakness of it bear the same stamp of the elemental anti-
THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
13*
value of death: the vital downfall, decay, degeneration. There
is serious peril to life in every mental attitude that is hostile
to it, in all excessive cultivation and physical weakness, in the
suppression of the primal instincts, and consequently in the
symptomatic, disintegrating pessimism of those who are
sickbed over and unfit for life.
The value of a life that is sound at core peremptorily demands
an ethical approval of whatever is natural and instinctive and a
reverent preservation and fostering of the inner primal good
which has grown naturally In ancient times man felt this
reverence; this ethical attitude found its classic expression in
the view that everything natural is innocent and beautiful.
The unnatural of every kind, perversity, diseased instincts, are
repulsive to it. The individual is built upon the health of the
emotional life, the community upon the health of the racial
instincts. Even the communal body is rooted m the same
biological soil; where the social instinct degenerates, there
nation and community are doomed to destruction, with all
their higher values.
We may also of course overestimate the value of life. In
the ethics of the ancients is found a conception of the soul
as a vital organism, and of the “good” as the “healthy,” as that
which is “wholesome for the soul.” Not only with Epicurus
and the Stoics is this thought current, the Platonic ethics
also is familiar with it, and by no means merely as an analogy.
In this way, health in general becomes the “highest good”;
and although it is not simply that of the body, nevertheless it
is an unjustifiable extension of biological value beyond its
limits, a false analogy between soul and body, an ethical
naturalism.
But the reverse of this is a more serious error — ethical
anti-naturalism, the failure to appreciate and the attempt to
oppose the natural. Many ethical theories have committed this
mistake. Ordinarily the desires are called in question. In them,
it is believed, can be seen something of inferior value, which
lures men to evil. In so far as they belong to the “nature” of
VALUATIONAL FOUNDATIONS IN THE SUBJECT 133
man, it is thought necessary to explain the natural as evil.
Thus arises an attack upon the affections, the tendency to
exterminate them entirely, and not only to control them.
This is the tendency of asceticism, to kill all craving and
pleasure; it is outspoken hostility to the natural and to the
value of vitality.
One can see how such tendencies could spring up on the
soil of Christian thought, where all value was carried over
into the world beyond; here the renunciation of the flesh
and of the sinfulness of nature is made a principle. On the
other hand, it is astonishing that Stoicism, which sees the
meaning of all morally good conduct in “conformity to nature,”
should take the same path. But the contradiction is only
apparent. To the Stoic “nature” means something different:
not what ordinary language calls the natural, but a metaphysi-
cally ideal conformity to reason. “Desire,” however, is held
by him to be something in man which is rebellious against
the Logos and in this sense is “against nature” (to irapa
<f>vmv). Thus it comes about, that in Stoicism two apparently
contrary tendencies go hand in hand, ethical naturalism and
ethical anti-naturalism. In truth both rest upon the same
misunderstanding of value, and nothing but the ambiguity in
the concept of nature conceals the source of the error.
Moderate reflection discovered early, that in the natural
affections and desires there lies hidden a profoundly significant
adaptation to ends, and that their destruction is the destruction
of life. However much morality may demand a higher valua-
tional point of view and a control of impulse by it, the preserva-
tion of the natural still remains a value proper. Indeed,
precisely upon man as a moral being falls the task of con-
serving life’s value and the whole fulness of its phenomena;
and so much the more, because he can destroy life, but cannot
at will bring it back.
Herein lies the peculiarity of this value : life was not created
by man, but it exists, it is real, and it is given to him — it is
laid into his hands, as it were,, and is entrusted to his care.
134
THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
He can seize hold on it and with love can lead it to its height.
On its foundation he can even evolve something higher than
it, he can guide its process to aims of quite another kind.
In this tendency natural value passes over into moral value.
( b ) Consciousness as a Value
The animal nature in man is confronted by a value in him
which is superior to animality. It begms with consciousness.
The unconsciousness of the animal is a dull, obscure life, a
blind happening. Above this dark background in man rises the
'‘light” of consciousness, the seeing, the knowing life. This is
not without qualification to be set on a level with the life of
the spirit; the latter possesses a deep stratum of a peculiar
kind, different from that of vitality and nevertheless similarly
unconscious. Consciousness as a value reaches of course into
this depth of the subject. Out of this depth arises the fulness
of experience, in so far as it is not conditioned from outside;
in it is the world of the emotions, out of it springs the evaluating
tendency and attitude of mind, the disposition. Consciousness
proper is only a superficial stratum of the soul. Nevertheless,
the peculiar emphasis belonging to value is upon consciousness.
For only what comes into its light is the spiritual property of
man. What remains closed in the depth of the ego he passes
by without noticing, however much it may be the kernel of
what is most his own. To live without participation in oneself,
without being there ‘‘for oneself” (to use Hegel’s words), is the
fate of everything that is unconscious.
By consciousness we must not of course mean simply
knowledge by the understanding. There are other forms of
experience which reach deeper, to which indeed potentially
the whole inner world of the life of the soul stands open.
Inward beholding of this kind, qualitatively differentiated
feeling, however non-logical it may be, is a consciousness of
equal value and is full of content; it isa form of comprehension,
although not transmutable into the language of concepts.
VALUATldNAL FOUNDATIONS IN THE SUBJECT 135
But the worth of consciousness rises with the degree of its
development, or — what is practically the same thing — with the
depth of its penetration, with the extent of its participation.
And not only participation in one’s own spiritual being. It rises
also with the extent and fulness of the outward existence which
it mirrors in itself. For exactly the same consciousness in the
outward direction is the mirror of the world; and the greater
the circle it reflects, so much the more is the function of
consciousness fulfilled in the unconscious world. It is that
form in the „world, to exist “for” which gives a glimmer of
meaning to everything real, a meaning which cannot come
from the real itself, which is alien to its mode of existence.*
The actual merely as such, has — m Hegel’s phrase — no/'being
for itself.” But to be “for” another is well within its possibility.
It depends only upon whether this other for whom it could be,
exists in its sphere, that is, in the realm of the actual and
exists itself as an actual thing. Now consciousness is this other.
In being known, comprehended and experienced, one actuality
comes to be “for” another. To the knower the self-existent
becomes an “object.” Consciousness, as the reflection of what
is in itself, as that unique form in which there is a knowing
participation in another existent and a representation of it,
means the inclusion of something, existing merely in itself,
an inclusion within a higher connection of meaning which is
built above the ontological connection. In this interpreta-
tion, consciousness is actually the miracle of the bestowal of
meaning.
It is the foundation of spiritual being. Its value is the basis
of the spiritual values. But this rises in the scale, in so far as
there is a consciousness not only of existence but of value.
The key to this second dimension of participation is the
emotional sense of valug, and, above that, valuational discern-
ment applied to the diversity of materials. A second realm of
the self-existent is here opened to the subject. But his participa-
tion in it does not remain a mere discernment, it carries the
discerned essences as standards, into the world of actuality.
136 the realm of ethical values
Thereby arises another way of comprehending Being, the
comprehension of its worth, participation in its value.
Here is achieved a new and deeper metaphysical definition
of man. He is the “measure of things” (according to Prota-
goras), their standard of value. He is the one who evaluates.
We must not misunderstand this in the sense of any kind of
valuational subjectivism Man’s “valuing” is not a conferring
of values. He does not give them, they are given to him, whether
they be ideal or actualized values. But they exist, in the first
place, in so far as they present themselves realized in actuality,
“for him” as the one who feels and understands them; and,
secondly, the whole class of goods-situations is relative to him.
Goods are not valuable m themselves, but “for him.” And in
this sense we must of course speak of a kind of conferring of
value: by means of himself, as the point of reference, an
appraisement of what in itself is neutral. The appraisement is
mediated “through him ”
This second, higher kind of participation in the actual is the
one which in practice is decisive. In it is consummated the
valuational character of consciousness. Not alone the compre-
hending of things is rooted m it, but man’s whole comprehen-
sion of life, including his attitude in reaction to eveiything.
All circumstances which confront him, all situations into
which he falls, come under his judgments as to value and
thereby attain for him sense, meaning, importance. Every
consciousness of a situation is at the same time a complex
consciousness of values, even if they be not comprehended as
such. The axiological dimensions of the actual are super-
imposed upon the ontological dimensions. By man’s penetration
into their depth his participation in the valuable things of life
increases; and at the same time the mass of values itself
increases. For this participation itself is of value, it is one of
life’s treasures.
Man can no more create consciousness than he can life
itself. But he can enhance its energy and heighten its worth
not as with life through other values which thrive upon it,
VALUATIONAL FOUNDATIONS IN THE SUBJECT 137
but through the value peculiar to consciousness. Consciousness
is to an extreme degree plastic. And here is opened an outlook
upon a series of more specific values, like education, training,
every kind of mental cultivation; these are enterprises for
consciousness in consciousness itself. They require con-
structive work by it upon itself. But such work carries a value
of a different kind, an actional value.
(c) Activity as a Value
T* *
Man’s moral being, personality, is built upon consciousness,
as this is upon life. It is self-evident that personality as such#
is a distinctive value, and higher than consciousness or life.
But as its structure is complex and all its constituent elements
have again their own character, its total value is a complex
one. It is worth while to analyse it. The following six values
are its chief factors : the last is a summary of them.
Beyond mere participation in Being, activity stands forth
prominently as the first factor in personality. To it adhere
moral values and disvalues in a pre-eminent degree and most
unmistakably. In considering contrasts we have already met
with activity as a value ; inertness stood in contrast as a positive
opposite, in thte mere sense of persistence. Here the case is
different; mere non-activity, passivity, stands over against
activity. This is inertness in another sense: not ontological
but ethical inertia, standing still, stagnation, indifference to
values and ends, m short, negative inertness, as a disvalue.
This gives to activity also a different, a more special, meaning.
Not the restlessness of tendency in general is here meant but
commitment, the living mobility of the ethos in seizing the
initiative and giving one’s adherence, even where it does not
issue in overt action. It manifests itself even in the evaluating
of a situation, in the consciousness of a situation it becomes
an inner act. It is the opposite of all purely passive existence,
and is the most perceptible feature of the moral constitution.
Activity is not at all a mere means to the higher values
THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
138
which it aims at. Man himself, as a creative worker and as
perhaps the ultimate and highest object, is included among
the aims of his creative work. In the widest perspective, the
personal subject with his actional powers appears as his own
“infinite object,” although of course not in his own person . 1
Finally, activity generates itself again; it brings itself forth
augmented. In this sense it is a Self-value, without regard to
its object. And in this way Fichte identified it with the good;
he held inertness to be simply the bad. That is, no doubt, an
exaggeration of the value of activity. But it is not so para-
doxical as it seems at first glance. For with Fichte not every
action is genuine activity. It is not merely natural instinctive
tendency; for that is nothing but a surrender to the stream
of existence, a passive submission to compulsion, inertia.
Only that which aims at what is beyond the existent, only
that which pursues an Ought-to-Be, is activity. Then, of
course, to be morally “good” inheres in the essence of activity.
Yet ethical activism is an exaggeration. For we cannot
invert the sentence and say that there is nothing in the nature
of the morally good except activity. Whether the circle of
self-reproduction is completed in activity or not — and axio-
logically at least it is not necessarily so — nevertheless the great
store of moral values, such as love, purity, sincerity, faithfulness,
personality, remains outside and is by no means exhausted
in activity. In such a violent simplification special materials
must be completely robbed of their peculiar quality. Yet it
remains true that, in general, activity as such is a value in
itself, and that even the superior moral values of personality
more or less participate in it.
( d ) Suffering as a Value
Besides inertness, another opposite — suffering — stands in
contrast to activity, and indeed as a value, even if the contrast
be only outward and figurative.
« Cf. Chapter VIII (a), Vol. II.
VALUATIONAL FOUNDATIONS IN THE SUBJECT 139
There is a special value in suffering. It was unknown to
the ancients ; and later also it remained alien to rationalistic and
eudasmonistic ethics. For from the point of view of hedonism
suffering belongs to pain and is an evil. Christianity takes a
different attitude towards it, although not on purely ethical
grounds. It distinctly recognizes the elevating and liberating
effect of suffering and does not regard it as a weakness, but rather
as the setting free of a deeply inward and mysterious power.
One need not here think immediately of its purging and
transforming powers, the existence of which is undeniable.
They are morally differentiated phenomena which do not
depend on suffering alone, but simply receive an impetus -
from it. The value of suffering itself, on the other hand, is
more elementary. A glance at the corresponding disvalue
may prove instructive on this point. This is the incapacity to
suffer, the impossibility of bearing grief and misfortune,
collapse under its weight, an inner succumbing, a s inkin g, the
lowering of the human being, a brittleness and inner inelasticity.
When a dire misfortune has passed away, it leaves the man
who is incapable of suffering broken, morally warped, dis-
figured, weakened: he can no longer stand up, he has been
damaged in his fundamental worth. For him suffering is, in
fact, only a disvalue. On the other hand, one who has a capacity
for suffering is strengthened in it. His power of endurance,
his humanity, his moral Being, grows under it. His suffering is
of value, for his reaction is the reverse of that of the fragile
and desponding man. It is the positive, assertive reaction of
the man under the burden of adverse fate, under the external
power against which his own activity cannot prevail.
For even where activity is denied to one and is lamed,
where nothing apparently remains but to submit passively,
a deeper power of the moral nature in place of ordinary activity
is released, a power which at other times is closed, but which
now, having been freed, takes up the struggle for moral
existence. Suffering is the energy-test of a moral being, the
load-test of his elasticity. Not only is there no prostration, but
i 4 o THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
suffering also leads to no mere resistance or endurance or
moral self-assertion; there is much rather an actual libera-
tion, an awakening of a deeper moral power — a might of a
higher order, as compared with that of activity. For exactly
when all activity is destroyed, then strength sets in, the positive
ability to suffer.
Naturally everyone has his own limit, as regards the capacity
to bear suffering. For each there is an excess which goes
beyond his power of endurance and oppresses him. There is
therefore for each a limit to the value of suffering ; beyond it
suffering becomes a disvalue. That is the ugly feature about
it, it becomes the opposite of a value ; and the point where it
changes is not objectively in the amount of suffering, but
subjectively in the strength of the man to bear it. Within the
limit — and indeed the nearer to it, so much the more —
suffering means the awakening of his innermost moral nature,
the unlocking of the depths of his being, the liberation of
his noblest energies. Whoever has been tested in suffering
is tempered steel — for him nothmg is too difficult; moral
capacity is at the same time stored up in him; he is like a
steel spring which returns to its original strength, or, according
to Nietzsche’s analogy, he is like the strung bow, which waits
for the arrow. He is in fact the man who is raised to a higher
moral power.
This potency does not spend itself only in active energy.
It enters into the still depth of ethical feeling and understanding.
Great pain also opens the deep places, in a way the untried
person does not dream of. And not only the depths of one’s
own heart, but of the hearts of others, even the depths of the
general life with its inexhaustible richness of opportunity. One’s
whole attitude towards life is changed. The gaze of the un-
burdened man falls only upon the sparkling surface; the man
matured in suffering sees the same situations and conflicts,
the same aspirations and struggles, but he sees below the
surface; in another way he shares the life of others, his outlook
is broadened and sharpened. Suffering has lent to him the
VALUATIONAL FOUNDATIONS IN THE SUBJECT 141
capacity to see values which before were hidden from him.
Perhaps it is not too much to say that suffering is the special
teacher of the consciousness of values. This statement would
be fully confirmed, if it be true that discernment advances with
the situations and conflicts that are given and lived through.
For a living situation reveals its constituent values only to a
person standing in it and gazing into it with penetrating
observation.
If with his suffering a man purchases the highest values,
the thought of a will to suffer has nothing absurd in it. There
is such a will. Whoever assumes great burdens must necessarily
have it. It is nothing unusual for a man to want to suffer for
the sake of a high goal, of an idea, for the sake of the communal
life. But the will to suffer for love’s sake, or rather for a person
who is loved, is deeper still. This is by no means a merely
external or inevitable taking of the risk of suffering, where it
is unavoidable. In suffering for a person there is a puzzling
and yet unmistakable depth of participation, a communion
with him, which for inward depth has no equal. A mother
loves her child not the less on account of the suffering which
it brings her, but the more ; and for nothing in the world would
she allow herself to be robbed of this. It is her inmost interest
in the child and is independent of all response, of all gratitude
or ingratitude. In this way “to suffer for His name’s sake”
hovered before the first Christians as the highest participation
in the person of Jesus.
To the greater potency, elevation and ennobling of per-
sonality through suffering there corresponds — as one might
have expected — an enhancement of the capacity for happiness.
For with suffering the appreciation of happiness deepens.
The moral greatness of a tested character is far removed from
all anxiety to flee from pain and hardship, from petty fear and
worry. The quiet, firm nature of the tried soul does not crave
for pleasure and happiness. He does not care for it. And just
for that reason — according to the law of happiness — it comes
to him.
THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
142
( e ) Strength as a Value
Moral strength is not identical with activity; passivity also
can be strong, as well in steadfastness and perseverance as in
the endurance of pain. Strength is something which stands
behind activity and suffering and both of these grow out of it.
Even an active nature can be weak, can allow itself to be
diverted and confused, just as a passive nature can be strong
and remain inflexible.
The special value of strength is, of course, most evident in
will, determination and resolution; for here it can be seen in
the execution of plans. A weak will, even when it is well
directed and in its tendency constructive, is morally of a lower
value, even abject, independently of the value or disvalue of
its aim. Agility alone does not signify; perseverance in aim,
the overcoming of opposition, even a thriving under it, con-
stitute the value of will as mere will (without respect to its end).
But the same holds good of all inner intention which does not
come outwardly to manifestation. In just the same way there
is also a strength of disposition, of love and of hate, a strength
of conviction; just as there is a strength of belief, whatever
may be the object of it. The phrase “to remove mountains”
may be metaphorical, but it is a closely fitting metaphor.
And not only as regards faith.
Strength of will, furthermore, is something different from
freedom of will. A strong will can be unfree, wholly deter-
mined by something outside itself. But, equally, a free will
can be weak. Fichte’s ethics, chiefly renowned in regard to
freedom and strength, effaced this difference; with him the
two values merge into a third, that of activity. Against this
view we must bear in mind that freedom concerns the basis
of determination and is its origin, while activity is the tendency
as such; but strength is the dynamic power. Its value lies, on
the one hand, in the force of the determination itself and, as it
were, in the weight of the resolution as such ; it is in so far a
ruling power. But, even in the reverse sense, it has a value of
VALUATIONAL FOUNDATIONS IN THE SUBJECT 143
its own, as a serving energy. The moral value of an action
does not increase generally with the height of the object
intended in it, any more than with its success, but with the
degree of the commitment to it ; and it attains its highest point
when the whole personality without reserve is surrendered to
the thing striven for.
This value of strength culminates in that of sacrifice. The
peculiar quality of it is here augmented, in that sacrifice does
not become morally inferior through the inferiority of the
thing for which it is made. He who struggles heroically for
a bad object may be to blame that he does so at all, but in
itself his bravery would be no different in the service of a
good cause. And if anyone should say that it was worthy of a
better cause, he would thereby attest its inherent worth.
In the direction of this value lies that of moral consecutive-
ness, of fidelity, energy, even of work and efficiency, of every
kind of service.
(/) Freedom of the Will as a Value
A person differs from all other kinds of Being especially in
this, that he is not compelled to carry out the determination
which he receives from the principles (the values) that hold
good for him, but retains the power either to comply with them
or to oppose them. This peculiar dignity has always been
described as freedom of the will. This is not the same as the
freedom which the pure Ought-to-Be of values allows him;
the latter is in itself a special value for the personal being, but
not one which would subsist in him (as carrier). To this
negative free play of values there must correspond another,
a positive power of determination in the person himself;
without it there would be an indeterminism and at the same
time an ineffectuality of values, and there would never be any
determination by the will at all.
4 will which is not determined by a principle as such,
must at least be itself able to determine the principle. For if
144
THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
it cannot do that, all connection between reality and the realm
of values is lacking, and the values rest powerless in their
ideal Beyond, without laying hold on life. But the essence of
the personal subject is that he breaks through the Yonder of
values, that in emotion he takes hold of them, can commit
himself to them and transform them into reality. This con-
stitutes in him a special power of positive decision. And the
positive sense of freedom as the ultimate factor in decision
is the counterpart of that merely negative freedom which
values grant to him. Consequently the valuational quality
of man’s real freedom is something different, entirely new,
adhering to the personal subject as such, however much it
may be conditioned metaphysically in its scope . 1
Together with the values of consciousness, activity and
strength, there also appears the unprecedented value of
volitional freedom of the will, personal self-determination in
directing the aim of actions morally intentional. This value is
quite independent of the much disputed “problem of the
freedom of the will” ; in that problem the question is whether
there is or is not a freedom; here the question is only in regard
to its value. This is an ideal form, like all other values ; that is,
it exists even though there be no carrier of it in reality, and
even if there should actually be no real will that was free.
Even then the valuable is only unreal, but is none the less
valuable. In the strict sense, then, no moral entity would
exist. But a moral entity, whether real or not, is of value.
Therefore freedom also is valuable.
Freedom is the rising of initiative above the blind happenings
of the world. As such this is a value; it lifts man out of the
connections of nature in which he is rooted, it allows him to
tear himself away, to rise into the “second realm.” Lack of
freedom is total determination from outside, the serfdom of
man under the universal course of events. The profound
struggle of human thought to attain a metaphysical proof of
freedom of the will is a witness to its worth. However desperate
1 Cf. Chapter VII (a), Vol. II.
VALUATIONAL FOUNDATIONS IN THE SUBJECT i 4 £
the problem may look, however violently all psychological
theories deny it, man cannot and dare not permit himself to
be robbed of it. He struggles with all his might to retain his
belief in it. He has even a deep consciousness that he is
free. He feels that, even if he be not free, he ought to
be. For he ought to be a moral being, a person. The will
to be unfree, or even to renounce without a struggle the
consciousness of freedom, would be a renunciation of his
selfhood.
But this same will to freedom exists in a much concreter
form, in the midst of the ethical fulness of life. There is the
strongest evidence of it where one might least expect it: where
responsibility and guilt fall upon the free person, while one
who was not free would stand guiltless and untroubled. There
is a will to responsibility, even to guilt as regards one's own
conduct; there is a repugnance to the presumption of exculpa-
tion, as implying a repudiation of guilt. It is not as if one
wanted guilt as such — one would be glad not to have it. But
once we are laden with it, we cannot allow it to be taken away,
without denying our selfhood. A guilty man has a right to
carry his guilt. He must refuse deliverance from without.
To retain his guilt is valuable for him despite its oppressive
load ; it signifies for him the retention of his personality, the
preservation and recognition of his freedom. With his guilt
he would lose a greater moral good: his manhood. In taking
upon himself his own deed and his guilt, in asserting his
responsibility, in his sincere willingness to carry it, there is a
moral pride in the free deed which speaks out ; it is the majestic
right to manhood, the foundation upon which all moral Being
and Non-being rest. To surrender it is moral meanness,
betokening incapacity to be free. He who pardons a guilty
person, compromises him spiritually. He denies his account-
ability. The presumption in washing away guilt, in discharging
it, the admission of “mitigating circumstances,” is at bottom
a moral disfranchisement and a degradation of the man. That
one who is threatened with severe punishment may very well
Ethics— II K
*46 THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
want to be absolved, implies nothing against this axiological
position; it is simply his weakness, his moral abasement, his
lack of moral pride, of freedom, responsibility and human
dignity. To him unaccountability and disfranchisement are
preferable to the consequence of freedom, the merited punish-
ment. But no one will justify this, although he may humanly
understand it.
That a conflict of values inheres in the concept of guilt is
not to be overlooked. Guilt is and remains a disvalue in man;
no one, so long as he is guiltless, could wish for it. But the
astonishing thing is that when a man has once burdened
himself with it and bears it, it gains the character of a value
which contradicts the value of innocence. It is not that the
latter would thereby be nullified; it continues to exist, in spite
of the value of guilt. Here, in one and the same moral per-
ception, there are denial and affirmation of the value of guilt,
a will to be rid of it and an acceptance of it (a will to have it),
a will to responsibility and a yearning to be delivered from it.
Each is profoundly justifiable.
Behind all this stand the denial and the affirmation of
freedom. How far these two can be reconciled with each
other, how far they exclude each other, is a different question.
It may be that a man cannot bear the degree of freedom which
has fallen to him ; it is this which places responsibility upon him.
And possibly it is his inner destiny, to be obliged finally once
more to renounce his freedom — and with it his manhood,
because he has not grown to the greatness of the gift. Just as
riches and power can become a curse to a man of weak charac-
ter, so the greatest of inner goods, freedom, can become a
curse to a morally small and weak man who has not grown to it.
It seems, accordingly, that there is a danger point in the value
of freedom, that even freedom is a value to man only up to
a certain limit and beyond that becomes a disvalue. Like
suffering, freedom presupposes in its carrier an ability to
carry it, and in so far as this ability is limited the amount of
freedom which the individual carries must also be a limited
VALUATIONAL FOUNDATIONS IN THE SUBJECT 147
one. That this amount can increase with the moral growth of
the person, need not be cLsputed. But a limit always exists
beyond which freedom would morally oppress him.
The yearning for deliverance from guilt is a sign of inner
bankruptcy. Religion builds its scheme of salvation upon this
bankruptcy, upon moral insolvency. Salvation, in fact, dis-
franchises man; it exacts of him the renunciation of his
freedom. The result is a sharply pointed antinomy between
ethics and religion, that is, between freedom and salvation.
This antinomy is far more fundamental and far less capable
of solution than that between guilt and innocence. For behind
the value of guilt stands that of freedom, and this is in itself
no opponent of innocence. Freedom and salvation from guilt,
however, cannot be reconciled, at least not as values; for
deliverance from guilt involves the renunciation of freedom.
It is, however, not for ethics, but for the philosophy of religion,
to solve this antinomy — and whether the philosophy of religion
can solve it depends upon whether to do so comes within the
range of possibility. Ethics knows of no deliverance from
guilt. Only religion speaks of it. And upon it alone falls the
metaphysical burden of the consequences.
(g) Foresight as a Value
Man’s consciousness, merely as such, is not practical. Even
activity does not alone make it so. It first becomes so when
his capacity to look forward in time, to see the future, to
prepare for it beforehand, raises it above the mere reflection
of the actual. Mythology has brought this to picturesque
expression in the form of Prometheus. His mere name bespeaks
“the forward thinker,’’ just as his counterpart, Epimetheus,
tells of the backward-looking thinker. The first man is forward-
looking. His becoming man is theft from the divinity. And
although the myth knows to inform us only of the stealing of
fire, it clearly means that something else is stolen, divine
prevision {-npovoia). Providence is the attribute of godhead.
148 THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
The ethos of man is his pride, his raising of himself against
the divinity, his assumption of its attribute.
Foresight is the intuitive vision m man; in its highest power,
it is prophecy. Prevision makes him move forward, conscious
of his goal. Man does not live in the present alone. He belongs
to the future. And the future belongs to him — within the
limit of his prevision. Indeed, to speak exactly, the future is
the only thing which practically does belong to him. The past
stands eternally still and is not to be changed. Nor is the present
to be changed any more than the past, it already has its irre-
vocable determination in itself. Only that which has not yet
entered into the present, that which is coming to us — for this
is the meaning of the word “Zukunftig” — can be guided,
can be influenced.
All activity, every striving, moves necessarily towards the
future. A consciousness to which the future were closed would
be condemned to inactivity. It is man’s foresight which opens
to him his only possible field of action, the future. Here is
the key to all his capacity for action. The ability to anticipate
breaks through the spell of the present, transfixes the brazen
bound of the actual, the temporal flow of which never forestalls
the course of time. Thought forestalls, it is timeless, although
it is the thought of a real subject who is bound within time.
Thought lifts the veil which is spread over the future. And
however imperfect prevision may be, only through it are
there preparation and execution of something willed.
The opposite of foresight is the thought that holds fast to
the present and the finished, that is struck with blindness to
what is not actual, the unforeboding push in the stream of
events, the dull sinking of oneself in the moment, to which
only a backward look and regret remain (jxerdvoia and
(lerandXeca instead of zrpowta and im/xe Aeta). Nothing is more
indicative of the value of anticipation than man’s ceaseless
striving to foresee, his struggle and anxiety to know beforehand.
From the narrowest outlook of the man absorbed in winning
his daily bread to that of the statesman who keeps in mind the
VALUATIONAL FOUNDATIONS IN THE SUBJECT 149
distant development of the future, this striving is essentially
one and the same. The only difference is in the extent of the
perspective. Even in private life we speak of short-sighted and
far-sighted behaviour; when we speak of precaution and
improvidence, our language implies the same valuational
judgment.
This judgment is so much the more urgent, because man’s
outlook is so essentially limited and even within its limits is so
uncertain. It does not deserve the name of knowledge. The
future, so long as it is future, does not permit of being made
into an object; of all that is real only the present is given as
an object. The past must already be viewed at second-hand —
by the “traces” which it has left behind. But in the present
the future has no equally impressive witness, none comparable
to the “traces” of the past. The network of the conditions
from which it arises indeed precedes it; and through them it
may be anticipated. For the course of events is uniform. But
this network is wide and no human eye can survey it. Man
grasps only single threads; exactly where it is of practical
import — as regards the future — his knowledge is for ever
piecemeal. An intuitive understanding might perhaps discern
directly what does not yet exist. But, in this sense, man has no
intuitive understanding. In theoretical calculation in advance
(for instance, in regard to the movements of the stars), where
a simple calculable uniformity prevails, he is far-sighted
enough; but he is short-sighted and uncertain of himself
within the actual sphere which touches him and his life.
Here the veil of the future hangs thick before his eyes, and
even the richest experience of life gives only a faint glimmer
of certainty. But all this does not derogate from the value of
foresight. Even the faintest glimmer of light which falls upon
what is coming, is of inestimable value. And the Idea of perfect
divine providence confirms this value.
Nevertheless, as a value, prevision also has a limit; it has
a danger-point in it. In the Cassandra myth this is clearly
brought out. Cassandra sees the destiny coming, without being
ISO THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
able to avert it; the prophetic vision poisons her life; for her
the divine gift becomes a curse; she envies the happy ones
who are struck with blindness and can at least spend unem-
bittered the short span that still remains to them. Is the myth
right? Is the gift of prevision a disvalue? If Cassandra could
convince the unforeboding, it would be of supreme value,
it would avert disaster. What then makes it full of disaster?
In the Homeric world fate is overpowering, Moira is un-
avertible. What must happen is predetermined by divine
council, man cannot escape. His foresight is powerless; there-
fore it is a fatal gift. Blindness to the future is itself decreed.
The seer is condemned to passive vision of what is approaching.
He has indeed the one attribute of divinity, prevision, but
not the other, predetermination. He cannot prevent the thing
he sees; for him to defy fate is also of no use. Such is the
conception of the ancients. Even Laius does not ward off the
curse of the Labdakides, although he believes the oracle and
exposes the son. Heimarmene is stronger, she finds means of
achievement. Philosophically expressed: in a world wholly
determined teleologically, where all that happens is irrevocably
decided beforehand and allows no place for man’s predetermina-
tion, prevision is in fact an evil. But it is different in a world
that is determined causally. Causal determination permits
itself to be changed, it is not fettered to the final stages of its
process, nor is it imprisoned in the immutable, One single
thread, in the network of the causal interlacement, added
spontaneously by man, is in a position to transform the whole.
In a world determined teleologically the future is as fixed as
the past and the present; in a world determined causally, the
destination is not closed, it stands open, at least in principle,
to the initiative of man. In such a world — and ours is such 1 —
the gift of prevision is a value.
And still a danger-point continues to exist in prevision as a
value. It is the kernel of truth hidden in the myth of Cassandra.
If man knew everything which lies before him, he could not
* Cf. Chapter XXI (c), (d), Vol. I.
VALUATIONAL FOUNDATIONS IN THE SUBJECT 151
endure it; with such knowledge life would exceed his moral
strength. For to guide and avert everything is far from being
within his power. Also in this respect man is intermediate
between divinity and beast. By his prevision he lifts himself
above the blindly living creature, but even such foresight he
could not bear in its fulness. He can live only by having a
certain strain in him of irresponsibility and light-heartedness;
the full attribute of divinity would overwhelm him. And
accordingly the full measure of what is of value in itself becomes
for him a disvalue.
Finally, in view of this double-sided risk of danger, we may
see an astonishing adaptation to ends in the moral condition
of man: he has approximately that measure of prevision only
which he can bear, and without that he would not be man.
He stands on the dividing line between providence and im-
prudence. In both directions he can degenerate — into the
frivolity of the short-sighted, troubled about nothing, as well
as into the crippling pessimism of one who knows and under-
stands too much.
( h ) Purposive Efficacy as a Value
That which, beyond freedom and prevision, rounds out the
measure of personality, is man’s purposive efficacy, his
teleology.
After the preceding exposition, little more need be added
concerning the value of this fundamental factor in every
tendential act It is the finish and crown of all the partial
factors, and it is also the culmination of their valuational
qualities. Man is the only being in which we find the power
of teleology. And in it lies his qualitative superiority over
every real thing that is otherwise constructed; to it is due his
position of power in the world.
To all the three stages (or strata) of the finalistic nexus
the value of his teleology adheres : it adheres to the capacity
to set up ends, to prefigure contents as goals before their
THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
152
actualization in the course of events; to the capacity to find
out means for their realization and to use them; and to the
not inferior capacity, with the help of these to guide the real
process of events toward the goal which was marked out
beforehand. This threefold exercise of power in the midst of
the broad causal stream of blind events — without interrupting
the continuum of the stream and yet as an alien body — this it is
which constitutes the unique position of the human being in
the world, this it is which enables him to actualize values
which without his help would remain unreal. Through this
position of power he has — in addition to his inner freedom of
will — the outward freedom, that of motion and efficacy in the
stream of events. He can enlist the natural forces into his
service, with their help he can even steer upon occasion against
the current.
The teleology of man is his second attribute of divinity;
it is foreordination, predestination. Inwardly his conduct is
different from the action of other powers; but outwardly,
as a process, it shows the same form of temporal action as
everything real, in that it brings to actuality something that
was predetermined. Here the natural processes, in so far as
man can introduce them into his purposive activity, are linked
to values. Man does not create the processes; but he turns
them to his own ends. He thereby predestinates their course.
To the causal determinants he adds a finalistic determinant.
His prevision renders him capable of this. Thus he fulfils his
metaphysical r 61 e of mediator between the realm of values and
reality. But at the same time he becomes thereby the bearer
of moral values. For it is to acts distinguished by such teleology
that the qualities good and bad pertain. And this applies not
only to conduct and action proper, but also to every type of
inner tendential action, even to the general attitude, disposition
and commitment towards life and the surrounding world.
For here also in tendency lies the direction towards the telos,
and in fact all conduct issues from inner disposition. All
intention which is directed to value already contains a factor
VALUATIONAL FOUNDATIONS IN THE SUBJECT 153
of predestination. In it are rooted positive decisions, and these
are directed by ends.
But, like man’s freedom and foresight, his predeter-
mination may be excessive; he cannot bear it in full
measure. Foresight, at least leaves his responsibility un-
burdened; predetermination involves him in responsibility.
This is the meaning of predetermination: That he who
practises it has guilt or credit for everything which it brings
about. Unbounded purposive activity means unbounded
responsibility, responsibility for everything. Guilt falls upon
him who has power. The idea of God as the being who pre-
destinates everything is the idea of an unlimited responsibility,
at the same time also the idea of an unlimited capacity for being
responsible. The moral strength to endure is here thought of
as raised even to the infinite. Man is not such a being. The
degree of responsibility which he can bear is narrowly limited;
and in real life, when it is exceeded, he collapses under the
burden and gives up in despair; then he no longer acknow-
ledges his purposive initiative but looks about for release.
The second attribute of divinity he can endure to the full extent
still less than the first. The former threatened his happiness,
the latter his moral being. In this connection also he is midway
between divinity and beast. His peculiar predetermination
lifts him high above creatures that are bound to nature; but he
can live only with a low degree of predetermination; in this
also he needs release from burden. An excess of power falls
upon him like a crushing load.
And here also he is anxious to be limited. Indeed, the limits
of his predetermination are perhaps still narrower than those
of his prevision. Many powers, which in the course of the world
he can very well foresee for a considerable distance, escape
from his initiative entirely. At best he can control them by
submitting to them. Here, however, there does not prevail an
equally fitting balance, as in the limitation of his prevision.
It may be affirmed that man approximately possesses the degree
of predetermination which he can bear. In general his capacity
154
THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
for responsibility (his moral endurance) is smaller than his
power to control events. Accordingly in human life it is not
a rare phenomenon, that someone may not be able afterwards
to carry the guilt with which he loads himself. For this reason
there are moral wrecks, who can no lqnger stand upright;
there are the morally stunned, in whom the stupefaction is
itself a function of the secret fear of being found out and called
to account — a doubtful self-protection against their own
conscience and against despair.
Predestination is the most powerful, but also the most
dangerous, of the gifts which man has received. For him it is
a value only within the limits of his strength of endurance.
Beyond that it is a disvalue. But the whole practical life of
man is step by step a playing with this dangerous gift; of course
it is not an idle play, but necessitated, inevitable. For in it
man has no freedom; so long as he breathes, he cannot with-
draw from the game. Only how he shall play the game, how
he shall use the gift, is within his power. And it happens that
the gift, the more he is conscious of the power which is in his
hands, leads him astray, lures him to ever higher stakes.
But in this frenzy he does not become aware of the limits of
his strength, until after he has overstepped them and the
game is lost for him.
CHAPTER XII (xxxvii)
GOODS AS VALUES
( a ) The Position of the Scale of Goods in the General
Ethical Scale
Among the ancients the conception was dominant that the
ethical values in general come within the scale of goods.
Hence the inclusion of “virtue” under goods, as the “highest
good.” This view allows little scope for the special character
of actional values. Nevertheless, it has held its own unweakened
in popular morality, and in many theories of modem times
(for instance, in Schleiermacher’s moral doctrine) it has re-
established itself. Directly opposed to it stands the Kantian
ethics of duty; and whoever holds with Kant the conviction
that only disposition and will can be good or bad, is inclined
from the start to exclude the doctrine of goods altogether
from ethics.
Both extremes go too far. Goods belong to material and
situational values, which as objects to be striven for constitute
the basis of actional values. They are not moral, but they are
morally relevant. Man’s doing as he pleases with them is the
sphere of moral goodness and badness. Accordingly they
indisputably deserve their place in the ethical scale of values,
although it be a subordinate one.
As regards their sphere they are related to the values just dis-
cussed, in so far as these also condition moral values and
besides manifest a distinct strain of goods-value. Life, con-
sciousness, freedom, foresight are inner goods. In the whole
series the character of the “good” in the value of life still
occupies the foreground, but it continually becomes less
prominent, until in predetermination it has almost entirely
vanished in comparison with actional value. In the lowest
member of this series, life, the group of goods-values begins
THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
156
immediately; but it then withdraws, giving place to more
complex materials always further removed from it, until it
falls into the wide region of the variegated hedonistic goods,
finishing in a characteristic opposition to them. The two
series therefore diverge, materially and axiologically. In
valuational height the members of the first are throughout
superior to those of the second, and with the divergence this
superiority also becomes more pronounced.
In the exposition that follows, only certain chief types from
the second series are set forth. A real analysis of the goods
scale, together with the inner relations of its grades, is a task
by itself, for which there is no room here. If the height of the
moral value of striving were proportionate to that of the
situation striven for, the concrete ethics of value would need
to begin with an exact analysis of the scale of goods. But
evidently such a proportion does not exist. The sacrifice of a
material possession can be morally more valuable than the
wisest ethical advice, if this does not demand any sacrifice on
the part of him who gives it. Moral value rises not with the
height of the intended object, but with the amount staked.
For this reason the gradations in the values of goods are
relatively alien to ethics, however much the values themselves
form the foundation.
( b ) Existence as a Basic Value
The goods-values proper differ from those of the first series
in this, that they do not attach to a subject, although they are
values “for” a subject. They attach to an object, to an existent,
to the surrounding world. Now it is clear that the general
situation, in which a living, conscious, active subject is placed,
together with everything that can serve the ends of his life,
implies a value. This exists independently of whether or how far
it is felt by the subject to be of value. Its content embraces the
natural conditions of life, beginning with the earth, with water,
air and light, up to the special sources of nourishment and
GOODS AS VALUES
157
well-being. A whole system of values is included in the
general concept of the environment. If any one of these ele-
mental goods of nature be temporarily withdrawn, immedi-
ately its value, usually unnoticed, rushes overwhelmingly into
consciousness.
But there is a richly organized mass of values at hand, not
only for a man’s mere life and its needs, but also for his moral
bemg, for his activity, freedom and creative enterprise. This
world is so constructed fundamentally, that a free and end-
pursuing agent finds scope in it. One may cite as a chief
feature of this valuational constitution of the world the causal
structure of the order prevailing in it. If the world were just
as completely determined teleologically as it is causally, there
would on that account be no scope in it; the activity and
teleology of a person would be excluded, his freedom would
be an illusion, his power of foresight ominous, unbearable.
But if the same world were entirely undetermined, if it were
neither causally nor finalistically ordered, or even if it were
but partly coherent in its interdependencies, in the sense of
partial indeterminism, prevision would then be impossible.
Freedom and inward strength would indeed be boundless,
but also incapable of outward effectiveness. Purposive efficacy
in man would be as completely cut off at the root, as it would
be in a finalistic world. Every actualization through means to
ends (the third member of the finalistic nexus) presupposes
the causal structure of the world; as a real occurrence it itself
has the form of the causal process. If a definite complex has
not a distinctly definite and necessary effect, there is no specific
means to a specific end. The finalistic nexus in human conduct
has, therefore, as its categorial presupposition the causal
nexus of the world. And hence the latter is a basic and actual
value for the existence of personality. For the moral qualities
attach to the teleology of acts directed to values.
In the valuational scale accordingly this basic value of the
cosmic structure — regardless of its merely secondary and
external goods-character — has a strictly complementary posi-
i S 8 THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
tion to the inner basic values: activity, strength, freedom,
foresight and predetermination. Without its reality these are
not really possible. As regards content they have their universal
condition in it. Here we see clearly the intimate connection
between the two valuational series.
(c) Situation as a Value
Within the general situation of man occur the various specific
situations. We noted their highly individualized quality when
we were speaking of valuational opposites . 1 But their value
does not rest simply upon their individualization. Independent
of type and singularity of circumstance it consists chiefly in
the fact that situations first bring a man face to face with his
tasks, challenge him to commit himself and hold him to his
decisions. They are his field of action, indeed the material basis
of his moral life in general, in so far as the basis is an external
one. Their variety constitutes the rich contents of his existence.
The multiplicity of interests which cross and recross in the
situations is the key to his sense of values. But the new con-
sciousness of value is always absorbed in the novelty of the
conflict. No logical combination, however, and no fantasy
grasps the depth and abundance of the living situations. Man
grows morally with his understanding of the depth of ethical
reality and with appreciative participation in it, even when he
does not himself stand in the situation nor act creatively in it.
Its value differentiates itself for him even down to the most
fleeting changes of the moment.
But besides this we may speak of a still higher significance
of the same material. There are human connections which
take on the character of approximately lasting duration.
Personal life is full of them, all the way from economic and
utilitarian fellowship up to the deepest spiritual love and
friendship. Such relationships have each a distinctive quality,
they manifest a kind of life of their own, which is not identical
* Cf. Chapter IX (a), Vol. II.
GOODS AS VALUES
159
with that of the participating persons ; in content it is some-
thing different and m moral attributes may rise high above
that of the persons. As a power also it can become stronger
than they, it can so outgrow them that the situation lifts the
persons, upon whom it rests, into a higher moral existence,
raising them above themselves. Who has not met this in real
life, can find it in fiction. A highly significant conflict of a
dramatic nature can be played between persons inherently
insignificant. Its value — not the aesthetic but the ethical — is
objective; it exists as much for those who do not participate
in it as for those who do. But the distinctive life of such situa-
tions is thoroughly real and takes its course for a period, like
the life of an individual. It has its hour of birth, its growth,
height, decline and dissolution. All the deeper human relation-
ships show something of this mode of existence. They likewise
show the same valuational type, varying, of course, indefinitely.
Every human situation is a piece of ethical existence. In this
fuller sense the totality of situations constitutes the substance
of moral reality.
( d ) Power as a Value
What is everywhere equally striking in the multiplicity of
situations is one’s power to guide them, to mould them to
one’s own desire. Here the question does not concern the
determining values in this desire, but the power — outward or
inward — to gratify it. In the sense of being able, of controlling,
power is wholly a distinct value; it is desired for its own sake,
not simply as a means to other values, the realization of which
depends upon it. The will to power — which Nietzsche rightly
placed above the will to life — is an impulse sui generis in human
life, although certainly not the only one, as Nietzsche would
have it.
And it is an interesting fact that there exists the same' kink
in power, as a typical goods-value, as in freedom, foresight and
predetermination. These also are powers, although inward,
personal, and actional. It is a commonplace bit of worldly
i6o THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
wisdom, that a position of great power confuses one’s intelli-
gence, and warps the judgment. Power takes hold of a man like
a fit of giddiness, it draws him to its own limits, it shows openly
a tendency to destroy him morally; to the inner danger of
power which lies in the gift of predetermination is here added
the outward one due to failing powers of resistance . 1 Man can
bear only a certain measure of outward power; beyond that it
becomes for him a disvalue, an infliction. This axiological
limiting phenomenon accompanies every degree and kind of
growth in power, from the easily aroused activity of the
physically strong man to the madness of a despot. Powerlessness
still remains a disvalue ; but the goods-value of outward power
is for man as limited as the actional value of inner power
(of freedom and efficacy of will) — a further proof of the kinship
of goods-values with actional values.
(e) Happiness as a Value
Happiness, the most popular of the goods-values, which so
often passes for the value of values, may in any case be classed
along with power, to which it is materially related.
A twofold meaning adheres to happiness; objectively it is
favourableness of circumstances, of destiny (etirvxia), but
subjectively the enjoyment of favour, appreciative participa-
tion in it (euSai/Ltovta). In the first sense happiness is nothing
but a situational value; into its domain fall the agreeable,
what is wanted, attainment, success, “happy accident.” In the
second sense it stands nearer to actional values; it is an inner
goods-value, but purely neutral, without initiative directed to
a goal, or even without intention, that is, without any moral
quality. It includes pleasure, satisfaction, joy, blessedness —
and between these an extremely varied scale of spiritual states
in the manner of participation in values. The highest stages
in the scale are near to moral values ; and in this circumstance
lies the attraction of eudaemonism as a theory of life. In it
* Chapter XI (h), Vol. II.
GOODS AS VALUES
161
outer and inner happiness exist relatively in independence of
each other. The feeling of happiness is not a function of the
goods of fortune but of a special capacity for feeling. And
upon this fact is based the meaning of ancient eudsemonism,
which detaches the inner disposition of the happy from outward
fortune.
In another connection we have already spoken of the very
peculiar dialectic of the striving for happiness (as the external
good), which stands in the way of its own true goal (happiness
as an inward good). 1 But this ambiguity does not derogate
from the value of happiness ; it attacks only the value of striving
for happiness. The value of happiness is itself just as inde-
pendent of the possibility of its being attained by striving, as
are the moral values, although the reason as regards the latter
be a different one. In this respect it evidently stands a step
nearer to the moral values than do other goods.
On another side it is plainly nearer to the basic values which
are attached to a subject ; happiness as a value is also not without
its dangers. It is a commonplace that anyone who is spoiled
by happiness becomes shallow. It is as if the proximity and
obtrusiveness of many goods drove the higher values out of the
field of vision. A man can bear only a limited measure of
happiness without sinking morally; even in happiness there
lurks a hidden disvalue. Indeed, in no other value is this
limiting phenomenon so paradoxical as in happiness. Perfect
happiness is the commonest of all valuational ideals Even a
seriously minded man, one who is by no means bent on gaining
hedonistic goods, cannot easily rid himself of this ideal.
Nevertheless, it is not free from objection ; it does not take the
nature of the human constitution into account, for our nature
cannot without damage suffer the exclusive cultivation of one
value. It morally refuses the extreme of happiness as well as
other extremes.
This is related to the fact that happiness as a value stands
in clear opposition to suffering as a value (notwithstanding
1 Chapter X (/), VoL I
L
Ethics — II
1 62
THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
the opposition between suffering and activity), to a value,
therefore, which for its part has the same kink in it. Precisely
what happiness lacks, suffering furnishes, the deepening and
tempering of the man, the sharpening of his perception of
value. Surely not all happiness can on this account be called
superficial; there is a deep and level happiness. But this latter
does not exclude suffering and perhaps does not exist without
a strain of it. It stands at the boundary of another order of
feeling.
But all theories are entirely wrong, which, because of a more
or less hazy consciousness of this boundary, would altogether
deny to happiness a value of its own. Philosophical attacks
upon eudaemonism have often reached such a blind “rigorism.”
This is a violation of the sense of values, and indeed of the
moral sense. Important moral values are based upon the
goods-value of happiness. To see this, one needs only to
remember what it means to make a man happy; and likewise
what it means to destroy anyone’s happiness. Here everyone
becomes acutely aware of high moral value and of disvalue.
Certainly actional values of this kind are different from that
of happiness itself ; but they are based upon it. If one deprived
it of all value, as fanatics of the ethics of duty wish to do,
it would be absurd to see moral goodness and selflessness in
the loving attempt to make people happy.
(/) More Special Classes of Goods
The values which have been specified are only the most general
types which appear in goods. Under them a variegated diversity
of situational and mental goods is brought together. Separate
ones share in more than one of the general types. The value
of existence is indeed common to them all; but not less so is
that of the special situation, and again, in another way that of
happiness. Only a shade less general is, perhaps, that of power.
But ordinarily one of these stands more in the foreground than
the others.
GOODS AS VALDES
163
Within the fundamental types one can distinguish more
special classes. The lowest and most elementary is that
of material goods — with their peculiarly exclusive mode of
existence for a particular person: possession and property.
The latter, strictly understood, as compared with mere out-
ward possession, implies an inalienable right to possession.
Wealth and poverty are here the extremes — wrongly inter-
preted by rigorism (for example, that of the Stoics) as without
value.
The steps in communal life, from the family up to the idea
of mankind, constitute a wider class of goods.
Allied to these is the class of structural elements in them
all: law, well-being, traffic, language, knowledge, education
and all mental goods. To this class belong “free association”;
likewise what Schleiermacher called self-revelation, the
language of the heart, of the feelings, which does not resort
to words but expresses itself in spontaneous symbols of
mimicry, or rhythm, indeed of the whole bearing, and which
has its truth and untruth, as much as the spoken word.
And, again, there is besides a class of goods which rest
upon the morally valuable conduct of one’s fellow-men — for a
goods-value attaches to all good conduct . 1 Of this kind is the
good reputation which a man enjoys, honour which is paid
to one, trust which is bestowed upon one, friendship or love
which is offered. As to the goods-quality of these values we
must not be deceived by the name which language uses for the
acts and actional values upon which they rest. The disposition
of another has its moral value for itself; but for him to whom
it is directed it has the value of a good. He is the recipient of it.
( g ) The Limit of the Ethical Problem Concerning the
Scale of Goods
The interest of ethics in goods is a limited one. It goes only
so far as the dependence between them and the moral values
1 Cf. Chapter XV (e), Vol. I.
THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
164
reaches. As this involves no dependence of the grades of the
two sides, the order of the rank of the goods is almost a matter
of indifference for that of the moral values. Only the kind of
dependence is at all of importance. The essential thing is
therefore to know when the condition is to be found. What
we must know is what should count as a good.
Here it may be said comprehensively that in the sphere of
things, in relations and in the personal milieu which fill up
the life of a man, there is scarcely anything that would be
absolutely indifferent to him. Everything has for him its
axiological colouring, be it positive or negative. In the
enumerated classes of goods only values proper are touched
upon. Much in life does not directly fall under them, but
under the means related to them, under the dependent goods
which are not on their own account striven for, but for the
sake of some other value. The general type of means is the
“useful.”
In this many-sided permeation of human life with shades
'bf value and disvalue, it can be understood that every step
a person takes in the common life with others is a distribution
of goods among persons, even where they know nothing about it.
But this distribution is exactly that, the moral qualities of
which are involved in conduct, in willing and in disposition.
For whether the distribution is made merely in tendency, or
whether in actuality, is a matter of indifference, both as regards
the inclusion of the goods and the moral value of the distribution.
It is therefore in the whole extent of concrete diversity
that goods-values are the basis of the moral good and bad
in man.
Section IV
FUNDAMENTAL
VALUES
MORAL
CHAPTER XIII (xxxvm)
MORAL VALUES IN GENERAL-
( a ) The Connection between Moral Values and Freedom
The narrower realm of strictly moral values, upon which we
now enter, is, as was shown, that of acts and persons. But this
characteristic of the carriers does not suffice to define the class
precisely. Activity, strength and endurance are also values of
acts and therefore of persons; the same is true of freedom,
foresight and purposive activity. There are even aesthetic and
perhaps many other actional values of persons. But none of
these are moral, however closely connected. In fact anyone
who understands their value, knows that good and evil have to'
do with something else.
Just as little does the way in which they are based on other
values, as was explained above, suffice for a definition of the
nature of moral values. From it one understands that value of
intention is different from intended value. But wherein this
difference consists remains uncertain. It is not evident why
actions and persons through participation in these values do
not simply become goods, as it were inner goods of a higher
order. If the whole difference between the two classes — except-
ing difference in the bearers — were that the one stands higher
in the scale than the other, it would necessarily follow that the
bearers of moral values would be simply goods of a higher order.
Such, however, is not the fact. Or rather, this higher order of
goods also exists ; persons are goods for one another and just
because of their moral quality; to his fellow-citizen the just
man is a good of a higher order, likewise the friend to his
friend. But to be a good in this way presupposes the morality
of the person. It cannot therefore constitute it. The goods-
value depends upon the moral value. For the person has the
moral value in himself, in his purely inward, secret disposition,
1 68
THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
independently of whether he becomes a good to anybody.
The goods-value on the contrary is necessarily “for somebody.”
The mere place in the scale of values, then, does not constitute
the difference. Rather does the difference of position m the scale
rest on some other difference. And this other difference is not
one of degree, but is absolute, one of principle, of quality.
What then is the outstanding feature at this dividing line
between values ? What is the specific mark of ethical qualities
in behaviour, will and disposition?
One grasps it most easily through the contrast involved in
the case of the corresponding anti-values. Moral badness is
not simply a person’s mistake or deficiency, but his fault, his
transgression, his culpability. It is charged against him, he is
subject to censure, condemnation, disdain, abhorrence. A person
is held responsible for his moral anti-value, he is regarded as
Its author, in whose power it lay to conduct himself differently.
He is answerable. This is something which can never be said
p£ situations and things which are opposed to value, of mis-
mrtunes of any kind. In these matters there is no question of
imputation, responsibility or guilt.
Strictly analogous is the relation to the positive opposites,
moral goodness is imputed in the same way as moral badness ;
it wins acknowledgment, approbation, admiration, reverence.
He who meets his responsibility receives credit for doing so.
No such treatment is apportioned to things and situations that
are valuable.
The outstanding point of difference between the two classes
concerns the relation of moral values to freedom. Whatever of
value and anti-value is brought about by a being who is free,
in virtue of his freedom, that is, in so far as he could have done
otherwise, can be imputed to him; its value or disvalue is his
own. On this fact alone depend responsibility, accountability,
guilt and merit. Only a free being is capable of being good or
bad.
Speaking in general, the specific mark of moral values is not
their height in the scale nor the fact that they are based upon
MORAL VALUES IN GENERAL
169
other values, but their connection with freedom. This is the
reason for their general superiority to things and situations in
the scale of values.
We cannot confine freedom to cases of actual conscious
decisions, resolutions and purposes. Moral conduct does not
for the most part manifest these forms of activity at all. We
know that freedom is playing its part, not by considering whether
the person could have acted or willed otherwise, but solely
through our valuational judgment, through our sensing of
moral values which proclaims unmistakably the responsibility
of the person, even down to the most impalpable shades of his
behaviour. That which is decisive in the conduct of a person
need by no means rest upon a resolution made consciously at
the time ; it can emanate from his whole moral make-up, from a
comparatively permanent basic attitude. What counts, then,
is the total disposition itself. To it accordingly adheres the*
fault, the responsibility or merit.
( b ) The Fundamental Moral Values and the Subordinate
Groups
In examining moral values the difficulties we encounter are
just the opposite of those which beset us in examining the
first groups of values. Whilst there the material was relatively,
easy to describe but the valuational quality was somewhat
unfamiliar to our natural feeling, here our sense of values
readily bears witness on the whole to moral qualities (naturally,
with exceptions) , but the materials become harder to compre-
hend, the higher they are. That is especially the case as regards
goodness; everyone knows dimly what kind of value is meant,
everyone knows also quite definitely how to distinguish it from
other values, but he does not therefore know what it consists in.
In dealing with moral values the procedure is therefore
necessarily different. No categorial analysis here points the
way. Instead there is the historico-empirical approach to them
— in the details of the positive moral codes, in the diversity of
THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
170
which is mirrored a considerable part of the manifold moral
values. Certainly this procedure is full of gaps — according to
its nature, like everything which arises out of the empirically
contingent— and ignores, moreover, the more general, more
elemental values (those that are fundamentally moral). But the
more it deals with the concrete and special, the more abundant
is the gain. Completeness, however, is out of the question; one
can only try to win the greatest possible range of vision. The
historical connections will be shown in specific instances.
At the base of all moral values lies a fundamental group, m
which the “good” forms the core. To it belong clearly nobility,
richness of experience and purity, and perhaps others which
cannot be determined a priori. What characterizes these values
is that they are common to many very different feds of
behaviour and in no way characterize one special kind only.
"On these general values turns the basic problem of this whole
class of values.
The next three groups — one can with some historic justifica-
-tion call them the groups of the “virtues” — should not be
taken strictly as groups. Their unity is definitely not rigid or
necessary. Thus the first group includes especially the values of
the ancient moral system, the second that of the Christian
sphere of culture, and the last without a further selective
principle brings together the values which were lacking in the
first two, in so far as they have become accessible to our
modem perception. That a connected picture emerges, despite
the sporadic character of the method and arrangement, must be
due to the nature of the realm of values itself, which together
with its separate parts always reveals something of its connected-
ness. But what can here be felt remains, as regards content,
below the threshold of philosophical formulation.
CHAPTER XIV (xxxk)
THE GOOD
( a ) Goodness as a Fundamental Moral Value
That goodness is the fundamental moral value is not disputed.
The systems of morality which differ most in content are at
one in this, that they are all concerned with moral value in
itself and as such. Then “good” and “morally valuable” are
one and the same.
That there is something correct in this interpretation of
goodness, no one would wish to deny. But it is another question,
what exactly is gained by it. It might have seemed to be illu-
minating, so long as we believed in one single “highest” value
on which the others are all dependent. But that belief becomes
illusory, as soon as it is seen that the notion of a unifying value
is ambiguous, that, for instance, it can refer to the most funda-
mental, the most elementary, as well as to the axiologically
highest or even to the richest in material content. It will at the
*same time be seen how none of these meanings apply to good-
ness, and how in it there is a unique relation to other values,
which is quite different and structurally more complex. But
the singleness of meaning vanishes entirely, when one considers
the intelligible fact of the plurality of values and the axiological
autonomy of the separate materials. The consequence of this
fact is that we see that the “unifying value” itself, even if it
should exist in one of the possible directions, still remains
unknown, possibly irrational, but anyhow beyond the limit of
our view of values. The content of goodness, then, is not given
in this conception of its nature.
Nevertheless all recognized moral systems speak of the good
as of something known. By it they always mean only one certain,
special value, which they hold to be the only one and the highest.
And according as they regard pleasure, happiness, collective
THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
172
unity, justice, love and so on, to be the good, the various types
of morality are distinguished . 1 Even this diversity itself shows
that in reality none of these values is the good. But if, like
Plato, one sets over against such limitations of content an “Idea
of the Good” and places it above the virtues, even then one does
not get a definition of its content. The “Idea” remains empty.
The Leibnizian concept of perfection comes perhaps a little
nearer to the goal. But even it shows only the barest outline
of a possible content.
Finally, this conception of the good as the fundamental value
dram it too much into line with special conditioning values,
for instance, with activity, freedom and purposive action. The
correlation of goodness with these is a blunder, not only
because the distinctive character of morality is thereby lost,
but also because these conditioning values show a reciprocal
dependence; they require and presuppose one another, they
are involved in a Platonic interlacing. But goodness is unique,
, it does not permit of being classified in this way. One might
sooner expect its constituent factors to exhibit among them-
selves a similar relation of interlacing. The good might very
well contain a whole system of values.
(b) Indefinability and Partial Irrationality of the Good
One must conclude that the good is not definable — neither
directly, per genus et differentiam, nor indirectly. Strictly speak-
ing, all values are indefinable ; one can at most present their
material clearly and unambiguously; the special character of
a value as such, the specific quality, one must always leave to
the living sense of values to find out. But as the sense responds
specifically to each specific content, the quality of the value is
thereby inseparably fused with the material. In the case of the
good even this indirect definition is denied to us; we do not
have access to its material.
Nor do we gain any light from the fact that many of the
* Cf. Chapter V (a), Vol. II.
THE GOOD
173
simpler elements of value are united in the good and are
included as elements in its contents. The good is clearly not
exhausted in them. In fact the character of “moral” value
remains quite untouched thereby. The good has evidently a
something new in it over and above all combinations of its
constituent parts, and it is just on this fact that the question
turns. But the new is not accessible as regards content. The
usual methods all prove too simple in this case. The nature of
the good — however obvious its character may appear to the
feeling for values — is highly complex as regards material.
Therein lies its partial irrationality.
It is important to make this state of affairs quite clear to
oneself. Precisely here, in the centre of ethics, all methods
fail, as regards content. This confirms what has already been
made clear in another connection: we do not yet know what
good is. Neither positive morality nor philosophic ethics knows
it. We have first to seek it. Moreover, we have yet to find the
path which this investigation should take.
(c) The Ambiguities Concerning Goodness
To begin with, the meaning of moral goodness can be outlined
negatively by limiting it: that is, it is possible to say what the
good is not.
One has here to remember that the ambiguities in regard
to the “Good” have been at the root of most appalling historical
mistakes. The good is not “good for something,” not the useful,
not a valuational means. The notion that it could be treated as
such is the mistake of Utilitarianism. But just as little is it good
“for somebody” ; it is not a “good” amongst goods, not even
the highest or the sum of all. To have taken it for this is die
historical error of all Eudaemonistic theories, even of those which
are altruistically coloured. Such is the fundamental error of the
Stoic ethics. The good, understood as the “highest good,”
falsifies the meaning of moral value throughout, apart from
setting it in the sphere of goods. A “highest good” is some-
THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
174
tilin g comparative, but moral value is quite evidently no com-
parative, but is clearly of the positive degree. It is not the
enhancement of something, not even to the superlative degree.
Instead, it is precisely the something itself which is no doubt
capable of enhancement to an ideal extreme. As such the
apurrov, of which the ancients spoke, is not the moral good
at all. The superlative is just what is superfluous. Not the
degree, not the intensity or the completeness constitutes the
good as such, but the valuational quality itself, the degree or
completion of which is in question.
That moral goodness, apart from all this, may nevertheless
be the “highest good” is quite possible— it is in the nature of
moral values that they are also, incidentally, goods-values. But
that is hardly the concern of ethics. For nothing can be deduced
therefrom concerning the essential nature of the gdod as the
fundamental moral value.
( d ) Axiological Distance of the Good from the
Conditioning Values of Action
The gulf thus formed between the good and all the values which
have been mentioned so far corresponds to the fact that moral
values are connected with freedom, that the phenomena of
imputation, responsibility, guilt and merit, are inseparably
bound up with moral values. The good is a unique value in a
sense different from that in which the personal values inherent
in the subject are unique, although most of these also are
actional. It is the first value which appears “on the back of an
act”; the first which attaches to a disposition of the mind.
The superiority of its grade is greatly underestimated, when
— as often happens — we place it on a level with vitality. Even
consciousness, action, suffering, strength, freedom and so on,
rise above mere life and its sphere. In order of worth this whole
unified, ascending series lies between the value of life and the
good, and to each one of the series corresponds a group of
values. But between the highest member of the series and the
THE GOOD
*75
good opens yet another hiatus, which breaks the series by a
fundamental heterogeneity: those valuational materials make
up the personal being in his character, as depicted, which is
still not moral. They must all be realized to some extent in
an entity, if it is to be capable at all of goodness and badness.
In this capability consists the ethical nature of a person. But
thereby the person is still neither good nor bad. After complete
realization of these values a person still stands on this side of
good and bad; the real crisis still confronts him.
Those values therefore can just as well drive him into
immorality. Indeed, only a being who is fully grounded in
these values is capable of badness, just as only such a being is
capable of goodness. Baldly expressed, even the ability to be
bad is a high value, which embraces all the preceding ones —
and it is exactly the same value as the ability to be good. But
hereby it becomes clear that goodness itself is, over and above
that, another and completely different value; but badness is
yet another danger, equally unlike the lesser anti-values.
Exposure to this danger is the natural reverse side of the
ability to be good. It belongs to the fundamental nature of
moral Being. It is identical with dependence on freedom.
To this axiological gulf corresponds the old metaphysical
conception of the good as a primordial power in human life.
The dynamic conception of evil has been still more rigorously
carried out. The bad too is represented as a metaphysical
primordial power; and both powers struggle for mankind, each
tries to drive him into its territory. Religious thought has
personified these powers: God and the devil contend for the
human soul, damnation and grace stand open to him, and both
have vast powers of attraction. No doubt the real ethical
problem suffers under this form of representation. The two
powers confront the moral consciousness, not outside of it but
within it, as its own potentialities. But the powers exist. The
question where they exist is identical with the question as to
the nature of the good.
176
THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
(e) The Teleology of the Anti- Values and the
Idea of Satan
#>
In face of the impossibility of defining the content of goodness
directly, there remains open to ethics but one way of achieving
a description, and that is by an analysis of the relation of
goodness to other values. This ,is most likely to succeed
if we glance back over the senes of the prerequisite actional
values.
This series culminates in purposive activity. As regards
content, the latter holds the whole series together, embraces
the lesser values as factors in itself. It shows personal Being
at the height of its development. It is a sum of values. Yet
purposive activity lacks the most important essential of com-
plete worth which it can have : the goal itself towards which it is
directed is still undetermined; the direction of the tendency is
not determined by purposive activity itself and cannot arise
out of its nature; it is open to and waits for another kind of
determination. Teleology is in itself nothing but the categorial
form of the tendency. It is therefore — in principle at least —
indifferent to the axiological level of its content. Purposive
activity is indifferent to the value or anti-value of its own
purpose. That is essential for it, as it is for man. Otherwise
man as a teleological being could not have freedom, could
not be an entity capable of goodness as well as of badness.
But then he would not be a moral being, he would be incapable
of responsibility and accountability. Capacity to be bad belongs
necessarily to the capacity for goodness. An animal cannot
be bad.
The same holds true of the other factors which are involved
m purposive activity, of action, strength, freedom and fore-
sight. It is to be seen most clearly in the case of freedom. There
is no freedom to be good, which would not be at the same time
a freedom to be bad. In short, it inheres in the nature of all
those acts, which are themselves valuable, that they can be
directed equally towards something of value or something
THE GOOD
*77
contrary to it. The intended values or anti-values are on that
account far from constituting the moral worth or worthlessness
of these factors. Yet the worth or worthlessness stands in a
relation of dependence upon the intended values. Goodness
and badness form then a second layer of axiological qualities
on the very same actions which presuppose the value of action,
freedom, strength, and so on, as already actualized. The latter
value is independent of the direction and purpose of the acts;
goodness and badness, on the contrary, emerge only with
the specific determination of direction. The moral value
of the intention depends on the value and disvalue of what
is intended.
There arises then the question: is there such a thing as a
teleology of badness? Is not man so created that he must always
desire something positive, and can never for its own sake desire
anything negative, anything contrary to value? This must
certainly be admitted. No one does wrong for the sake of the
wrong; something positively valuable always hovers before
him. This view has not been seriously challenged since Socrates.
He who plots injury to another, does not desire the other’s
harm, but his own advantage ; and no one would deny that this
is a value. But that does not tell us much. He who destroys
another’s happiness for his own gain is as much to blame as
one would be who willed the unhappiness for its own sake.
Not all valuable things are of equal value. And the standard of
moral goodness indicates exactly the boundary between worthy
and unworthy intentions. But that reveals another side to
goodness, with which we shall have to deal. For the moment
what matters is only that there should be a pursuit of evil ends
at all, irrespective of whether they be absolute or relative,
whether they be directed towards anti-values, as such, or only
towards the lower values, thus violating far higher ones. But
that human teleology can very well be turned towards what is
less worthy, even towards what is contrary to value — even if
not for its own sake — is beyond question.
Apart, however, from this question concerning mankind, it
Ethics — 11 3Vf
178 THE REALM OP ETHICAL VALUES
must be said that an absolute teleology of anti-values is not
in itself an absurdity. If man is not capable of it, that is not
because of the nature of teleology but solely because of the
nature of man. In this connection, however, the latter is not
under discussion but only the nature of teleology. Now this
certainly is not confined to values as ends. Its categorial
nature is exhausted in the capacity to take unreal circumstances
as ends and to actualize them. In this is involved no relation at
all to the value or anti-value of these circumstances. This
in no way diminishes the value of purposive activity as such.
Still it remains true that, had man in his feeling for values no
other link with them but this, he would be perfectly capable of
an absolute teleology of the bad.
Were this not so, the ancient idea of Satan would be absurd.
That is clearly not the case, or it could not have been imagined
and have held its place in religious thought. But however
thinkable, metaphysically, the personification as such may be,
axiologically as regards content it is unthinkable. The idea of
Satan is that of a being who pursues anti-values for their own
sake. He does the very thing which a man cannot do, he does
the bad for the sake of the bad; his nature is axiologically
destructive, annihilating. He is the pursuit of evil personified.
Should he — as subtle interpreters have often maintained — be
himself the dupe and, without willing it, create the good, that
would only prove his weakness over against the strength of
God, but it would not imply a lack of harmony within his
nature. His will would still have the categorial form of the
teleology of evil, just the same.
Now the lesson to be learned from the idea of Satan is this:
anti-values as such are not bad, but the attitude towards them.
This, however, is always at the same time an attitude towards
positive values. What constitutes the existence of evil in the
world is not that disvalues ideally exist, or even that the anti-
values actually emerge in the world, but that some actualizing
power in the world is directed towards these things. Such a
power can only take the form of purposive activity; indeed it
THE GOOD
179
takes this form necessarily even where it exists only in a
tendency or disposition. It does so, irrespective of whether the
actualizing power, as with Satan, pursues what is “as such”
contrary to value, or in a blinded way, as with man, under an
illusion of its worth.
Hence it follows that evil is neither the ideal Being of dis-
values nor the real existence of what is contrary to value, but
only the pursuit of anti-values as ends in the real world.
(/) Goodness: the Pursuit of Values as Ends
And hence it follows further that goodness is neither the ideal
Being or concept of values, nor simply their actual existence,
but only the pursuit of them as ends in the real world.
Pursuit of values as ends is in itself valuable, and indeed in a
sense different from and higher than the mere power of pur-
posive action in general. The attitude of a purposive Being to
values is the only thing which as such is good or bad. Neither
in the intended situation, then, nor in the categorial form of
the intention — however valuable this may be — lies the substance
of goodness and badness, but in the relation of the latter to
the former. And this is why it is impossible to give a satisfactory
definition of the content of the good. It would involve, as its
presupposition, the whole material diversity of values as well
as the categorial diversity of actions.
Now we can see how the conceptual definition would need
to shape itself, if thought could embrace this two-fold diversity.
The worth of an end is not given with that of purposive activity,
it must be added as a new factor. The directional determination
of an intention is identical with the content of the purpose.
Therefore the value or anti-value of this content is necessarily
a new axiological factor, which is superior to purposive activity
as such. The more the latter is intensified, that is, the stronger
and more compelling the purposive action, the greater the
weight of the new factor, the inflowing determination of concrete
purpose. For the greater also is the strength to actualize the
i8o THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
content of the purpose. If the content is of value, the moral
value of the act rises with the increasing value of the purposive-
ness ; but if the goal is not of value, the moral value of the act
sinks, as purposiveness rises in value. But that means that the
greater the actional potency (valuable in itself), so much the
greater is not only its goodness but also its badness. This also
can be seen projected on a large scale in the idea of Satan : were
Satan impotent, of less teleological drive, he would not be the
dreaded lord of this world ; just the greatness and strength of
his pursuit of his ends convert him into absolute evil. But this
strength in itself is anything but evil. It is the same as it would
be if in the service of the good. In all striving towards positive
values the increase in the basic activity means then an increase
in goodness, but in all striving towards negative values an
increase in evil.
Here now, if anywhere, we must be able to grasp how utterly
different goodness is from all previous values. Purposive action,
the highest point of all activity, indicates at the same time the
greatest scope for morality and immorality. This is the reverse
side of freedom. There is no compulsion to goodness. Possibility
of goodness is also, to the same degree, possibility of badness.
The greatest power is also the greatest danger. It belongs to
the nature of man to stand in this danger. The danger is itself
the foundation of his ethos. Through it he is a moral being. To
him is given this power, the teleology of tendency, of striving, of
committing himself— not absolutely, it is true, but in principle.
The gift cuts both ways. It can become a curse to him, as it can
a blessing. This is the cryptic meaning of the danger-point in
those actional values, which constitute the power of moral
being. Man bears his danger in himself, in the creative force
which he is. To be suspended thus, with both vistas continually
before one, to be menaced from the depths within, and to be
a menace to others, through one’s own highest and noblest
capacity, this is what it is to be a moral creature, to be a man.
Dangers outside themselves are also common to other creatures.
But it is only man who has his danger in himself, and indeed
THE GOOD 181
at the very heart of his finest inner gift. He must be on guard
against himself, must struggle against himself. The life of a
moral being is a journey along the edge of an abyss. Every
retreat from the abyss is an abandonment of moral being, an
approach to a second abyss. A narrow ridge between the two is
the path for the morally good. He must not sink into evil, but
must retain the capacity for evil. For without it there exists no
capacity for goodness. And on this everything depends.
Goodness is the first value in which such deep inner diffi-
culties are involved. Therein are most strikingly revealed’the
uniqueness and the novelty of the whole class of values which
now emerge, and of which goodness is the basis. One describes
it as a kind of dialectic of moral values, that here the modal
antinomies reappear ; and not in such a way that the thesis of
one value is the antithesis of another, but always in such a
way that both depend on one and the same value. Thus it is
true of goodness that its necessity (its absolute Ought-to-Be) is
of value equally with the freedom which it permits to mankind,
with the opportunity it allows for badness. In just the same way
there is value in its reality (where it is actualized in an act) as
well as in its non-actualization, for this latter is the opportunity
for badness. This inner antithesis of the valuational factors
is essential to goodness, and equally — although in very different
degrees — to all moral values. It is the inevitable reverse side of
that connection with freedom, which is the hall-mark of the
whole class.
The new element in goodness, if one accepts it as the con-
version of values into ends, is then not so simple as it might
appear at first sight. It is that wherein the indifference of
purposive action to the value of its content ceases and gives
place to fixed direction and definite value. Yet that indifference
to value must not be completely surrendered. Else being good
would at once supersede the capacity for goodness, thus blocking
its own path. For with indifference the capacity for badness
would vanish.
THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
182
( g ) Intended Values and the Value of Intentions
IN THE PURUITS OF VALUE
It is then quite right, although ambiguous, to describe goodness
and moral values in general as actional values. Activity, strength,
freedom and purposive effort are also actional values. Goodness
is such in another sense. It is not attached to acts (and those
the same acts) as such, but only in so far as they have a definite
quality. And that quality lies in the intended value. Goodness
and, with it, all moral values are values of the intention of the
act, not values of the act itself. But the quality of the intention,
which is the point at issue, depends on its own content, on the
intended value.
Nevertheless goodness does not inhere in the intended values.
These are and remain situational values, and cannot through
any power on earth, not even through being intended, be turned
into anything else. Goodness does not spread from the intention
to the thing intended; but vice versa, the value of the thing
aimed at only conditions (is the basis of) the goodness. The
thing aimed at is not on this account itself morally good.
The intentional value of a purposive act depends on the
character of its intention. In the expression, “the pursuit of
values as ends,” it is not the value of the intention but only
the intended values which are referred to. But exactly on this
account the expression defines, as regards content, value of the
intention. The intention is the material of goodness as it is
of the intentional value of the act. The material of the intended
value, on the other hand, is comparatively irrelevant. Granted
that happiness is in no way the “highest good,” yet to destroy
someone’s happiness is bad, while to foster and advance it is
morally good. It is only the intentional fostering of it, not the
happiness of the other, which is “good.”
Two aspects of this relationship of dependence now become
clear.
In the first place, one sees that there are not two but three
different classes of value involved, which here come together,
THE GOOD
183
merge organically into one another, and form a distinct stratum
of values: (1) the intended situational values, (2) the values of
the intending acts, as such, and (3) the qualitative value of the
intention. The first two condition and are pre-supposed in the
last, but they condition it in very different degree. Only the
situational value is materially basic, it alone gives to the inten-
tion its direction and determines its quality. The value of the
act as such has nothing to do with the content and direction
of the intention, and therefore does not affect its quality. Its
material is only the potency of the act as such, but this is a
potency for good and evil equally. Upon the intended situational
value alone, then, depends the alternative between goodness
and badness. What depends upon the value of the act itself is
the height in the scale of goodness or the degree of badness.
This does not mean that the alternative between goodness and
badness and their respective intensities is conditioned solely by
these two factors. To the former must be added the diversity of
situational values, and to the latter the differentiation in the
special moral values.
Secondly, the greatness of the difference which separates
the intended value from the value of the intention is here for
the first time made evident. The ambiguities of the term
“goodness” have repeatedly succeeded in obscuring this
difference. If we say that someone does good, we imply thereby
both that (1) what he does is good and that (2) he is good in
doing what he does. Language objectifies the goodness of the
person, and at the same time renders subjective the goodness
of the thing done. It reduces the two classes of value to one
level. Moral good is indeed founded upon the situational value,
and this relationship finds expression in our formula, the
conversion of values into ends. But the value of the moral good
is not that of the intended situation nor comparable to it ; indeed
it does not even stand in any demonstrable relationship to the
intended situation in the scale of values. In fact between it and
the situational values on which it rests must be inserted the
actional potency itself. Only with this does the degree of the
1 84 THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
moral worth rise and fall — but also correspondingly the
obliquity of the moral worthlessness. This is something which
the formula “the teleology of values” does not adequately
express, but which must nevertheless be understood by it.
(A) The Dependence of Goodness upon the Scale of Values
in respect of Material
The meaning of goodness, at which we have arrived, now
branches out farther. Were there only one value, then in saying
that goodness is the pursuit of it we should have said all that
was necessary. But since we have to do with a diversity of
values which may be aimed at, goodness is also a thing of
manifold branches.
In the first place, within each series of values the direction
towards disvalue is “evil,” while that towards value is “good.”
But this difference would not at all apply to man, who is not a
Satanic bemg and cannot aim at negative value as such, were
it not that the diversity of values and participation in them
introduce conflict. The acceptance of one value may involve
the rejection of another; the former may be right, the latter
wrong. This phenomenon is more striking, where there is a
question of material goods. It is in the nature of these to be of
value only to those who can enjoy the use of them, others
being excluded from a share. Every situation which brings
such an acquisition at the same time necessarily involves a
corresponding exclusion. If then the possession is a good and
the deprivation an evil, the act which aims at possession
(whether for oneself or another), and which in so far might be
altogether good, may very well at the same time be bad, in so
far as it involves the intended exclusion of another. The conflict
of interests in society would alone suffice, therefore, to hold
open the path of evil to man, and to insure to him the freedom
and capacity for both good and evil, although he be a creature
who is ever aiming at positive values only.
But this is only a minor matter. The significance of goodness
THE GOOD
185
becomes infinitely more serious and varied, if one takes into
account the diversity of the values themselves. This diversity,
as has been shown, has several dimensions. The groups are
differentiated according to universality and particularity, sim-
plicity and complexity, according to strength and weakness of
determination, according to the carrier of the value, whether
it be an individuality or a collective unit, and so on — not to
mention dependence as regards content or the resting of one
value upon another. Goodness is indifferent to all these various
gradations. On the other hand, it is intimately connected with
the difference of rank amongst values.
All the concrete situations of life are such that several values
are involved in them at the same time. But the intention of the
person who stands in the situation cannot as a rule be directed
towards all at once. It is essential to choose one (or a few) and
to pass over the others. Now 'within such a constellation of
values, goodness is always the turning towards the higher value,
evil a turning towards the lower .''Goodness does not require of
us the denial of the lower value (for instance, our own advantage
or happiness) — that would be a misinterpretation of our feeling
for values and would lead to resentment — but it does require
the surrender of the lower in favour of a higher (for instance,
another’s right or welfare). Goodness, as the value of the
intention in an act, consists materially in preferring the higher,
while evil consists in preferring the lower. It is quite consistent
with the nature of goodness to discern and appreciate the lower.
The honest man knows the value of another’s property, and
as such he respects it. And only on this presupposition is his
respect for it real honesty. Only then is it a real preference for a
higher value.
This case is typical of all ethical situations. There exists
absolutely no situation in which value simply stands over
against disvalue; there is always value against value. And
interest in the lower is not only ethically justifiable — perhaps
because it is natural — but it is also morally essential in the
choice of the higher. The greater the renunciation involved in
1 86 THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
choosing the higher and the greater the triumph over “natural”
desire or interest, the more completely does the character of
moral goodness reveal itself in the choice.
Preference for the axiologically higher to the lower — despite
personal interest, and even in face of much stronger interest
in the lower — is the second general and positive aspect of good-
ness. It accompanies the pursuit of values as ends or rather is
contained in the pursuit and passes beyond it. If we wanted
to express both aspects at once, we could say: Goodness is
the conversion of the higher value into an end.
It would be a complete misunderstanding to interpret this
analysis as if it were intellectual. Anyone who can conceive of
preference only as a logically explicit form of judgment is
naturally not in a position to avoid the misunderstanding. The
good man does not spend time in weighing and choosing; his
feeling for values guides him surely, even in axiologically
complicated predicaments. The conflicting values need not
appear as such to him; he does not resort primarily to delibera-
tion. None the less his decision for the one value and against
the other has the weight of a deliberate preference on principle.
How this is possible, is the innermost secret of the feeling for
values. But the fact that such decisions exist — perfectly
spontaneous and unreflective — shows that the appraisement of
values consists not only in a recognition of the content and the
nature of its value, but also in a recognition of its status and
comparative worth.
Goodness consists then in selecting values, according to their
relative height, from among the diversity which is always met
within any given circumstance; a selection therefore which
cannot be made semel vita or purely theoretically, once and for
all, but must be made anew each time from the very foundation,
out of an ever-living sense of value; there can be no diagram to
assist us in this, no help from precepts or rules of life; it is
selection not by way of contemplative deliberation, but through
the intuitive element in our impulse towards the higher: an
element which is always already generated in our actions
THE GOOD
187
(dispositions, desires and behaviour) or, on the other hand, is
sometimes lacking. The selection of values according to their
real worth is inherent in the pursuit itself of values as ends and
guides it as regards content. Strictly speaking, it is implied in
the very nature of valuational teleology. For the higher value is
simply the more valuable, that which is worth more, compared
with which the lower is insipid. In pursuing values we must
necessarily aim at that which is most purely valuable.
On superficial consideration one might see in this a contradic-
tion of the earlier statement that the worth of the intention is
independent of the worth of the intended value on which it
rests. This statement of course still holds good. The moral
value of love bestowed does not rise or sink with the situation a l
value aimed at in a labour of love. But it turns instantly into
moral chsvalue, if in a given situation a less valuable service
is rendered, instead of one which is fully recognized to be
perfectly possible and greater. Such a choice is really a pursuit
of the lower value, whether the lower value is bound up with
one’s own advantage or comfort or any other pressing considera-
tion. The absolute worth of the thing aimed at does not deter-
mine the value of the intention, for we cannot at will transfer
ourselves into a more agreeable situation in search of greater
values; we are always strictly confined to the values which are
offered in a given situation. On the other hand, the relative
worth of the intended value, from among the situational values
actually offered, is vitally important in determining the moral
worth of a particular line of conduct arising out of a particular
situation. Thus in pursuing the higher value we in no way
deny the indifference of moral value to the status of the intended
value on which it rests.
But despite the apparent simplicity of the formula, the
demand which is implied in the pursuit of the higher is very
complex. The whole scale of values is presupposed in it. This
scale is the objective order of preference which alone can guide
our subjective choice in a concrete situation. And this is the
decisive reason why it is impossible to give an unambiguous
1 88
THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
account of the content of goodness. For that content embraces
the whole table of values, including the principle on which they
are arranged, but neither the table nor the principle is ever
given in its entirety. And for this very reason the content of
goodness varies from case to case and must remain undetermined
in our conception of it. One can never lay one’s finger on it and
say with absolute universality: this or this is goodness. It is
always this and yet it is also not. But that which is universal
and applicable to all cases, that which can really be demonstrated
as to the nature of goodness, is not a certain content, but simply
the relation of the actional value of the intention to the axio-
logically graded contents in general.
Here the problem of the gradational order for the first time
becomes real. Misplaced philosophical eagerness does not
invent it. It is the most real of all problems; man takes no
step in life — at least not as a moral being — without becoming
cognizant of it. We have already in another connection seen
reason to believe that such an ideal and unalterable scale exists.
But it does not follow that the scale has been presented in its
clarity and totality to our human sense of values. ''Man can
always have but a segment before his eyes; and, since he lacks
the perspective of the whole, he may be subject to errors even
within the segment. ^It is to be expected, then, that every
gradation of values being discerned and dimly felt, has an
element of subjectivity in it and should always be counted as
only an approximation to the objective scale itself. The multi-
plicity of moral codes, and the variety of things which have been
considered to be the “highest value,” are historical evidence
of this fact. (*)
(*) The Gradation in our Sense of Height and the “Order
of the Heart”
But thus much can be said for certain: the rudiments of an
absolute scale of values are contained in all moral feeling for
values. It is clear even to a very primitive moral sense, that
THE GOOD
189
honourableness takes precedence of outward advantage, that
doing one’s duty goes before pleasure. The same holds good as
a whole of the more obvious gradations in the scale, for instance,
in the general preference for moral worth before goods-values.
In any case, so far as a feeling for the values themselves reaches,
a sense of their relative importance usually accompanies it. The
closer the values are in grade, the less clearly can we discern the
order of their precedence. Thus the inner situation approaches
a conflict of values, which actually exists objectively only where
values of equal rank stand over against each other.
Despite all the deficiency in our awareness of the gradational
order, there are evidences at hand of a sense of valuational
height. In fact, there is an astonishing infallibility, a strength
of conviction in the sense of relative grade, which is enough
to justify the old belief in a “moral organ” (Hemsterhuis), an
“order of the heart” or even a “logic of the heart” (Pascal,
Scheler). It is a unique kind of order, with its own laws, which
cannot be proved intellectually, but which equally scorns every
intellectual argument brought against it. This is well enough
known in the phenomenon of conscience, as in the unerring
imputation of guilt, in the sense of responsibility and in the
consciousness of guilt, but no less in the infallibility of the
prohibitive shrinking from a deed beforehand.
Certainly this sense of grade varies, both in scope and dis-
crimination, exactly as does the sense of each value. There is
also such a thing as blindness to the rank of a value, just as there
is blindness to material things, and there is perhaps even a
perverted or a quite dead valuational sense. But this is no
objection to the certainty and real apriority of the sense of rank,
where and in so far as it is present. Exactly the same is true of
all genuine apriority; its universal validity is independent of
how many people have the insight ; and even if only one, or no
one, actually has it, the fact remains that whoever is capable of
it, necessarily has it just as it is in itself and not otherwise.
_ “Goodness,” as the controlling moral “order of the heart”
hidden in man, is not simply the objective order of values, but
THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
190
is the decisive r 61 e which this order — so far as it is revealed in
the sense of values— plays in the disposition, will and behaviour.
The ideal gradation of values is in this respect only the pre-
supposition, the metaphysical condition of the possibility of
moral goodness. But the “order of the heart,” as a real sense
of the comparative worth of values and as a power giving
direction to the pursuit of them — or, if one prefers, as the
hidden system of the laws of preference in the acts themselves
— is the narrower and specific basis of moral goodness in man,
as well as of the value in the intention of his acts.
( k ) Universality in the Ought-to-Be of Goodness
Goodness is distinguished from all actional values which are
not intentional, in that a person does not find it in himself,
but must first create it out of nothing. This does not mean that
he is radically bad; no doctrine of original sin can be based
upon it. Man, as the product of conditions, is neither good nor
bad, however much disposition, upbringing and milieu may
smooth or make difficult the way to moral goodness. He can
only become one or the other, in so far as he enters the conflicts
of- life and makes decisions in their midst. Moral goodness is
realized in him only as the value of rightly directed behaviour.
In this sense everyone builds entirely his own moral being —
for good or bad. The orientation of our whole personal
life according to the scale of values is the objective ideal of
goodness.
Thus it is that goodness forms a kind of fundamental moral
claim, which is made upon everybody. The Ought-to-Be in
man is strictly universal. Heroism and moral greatness cannot
be demanded for everybody; but it is demanded that, within the
limits of their ethos, all men shall be good. Goodness leaves
unlimited scope for special moral values, for values which are
by no means materially completed in mere goodness. It is only
a minimum as regards definite content, but on that account a
maximum as regards the extent of its claim. All special moral
THE GOOD
191
values (virtues) are good. But over and above that, each one
of them is also a something more.
This universality of the claim of goodness characterizes it as
essentially a universal value. It is by no means on that account
a collective value. The communal and the individual good form
rather specializations of value within it, which emerge ade-
quately differentiated in connection with the more special
moral value.^In content the meaning of goodness over-arches
that conflict between the collective unit and the individual.
Both have equal weight as regards goodness. But it is different
with die universality and individuality of the claim itself.
Goodness is a strictly universal claim; that lies in the nature
of the basic moral value. Nor is this contradicted by the fact
that the content of goodness varies not only from person to
person but also from situation to situation. Indeed, as a principle,
its content remains indefinite. Together with the supreme
universality of its claim, it is capable of the highest and most
unlimited individuation. But the individuation belongs no
longer to its own material, but to that of the special moral
values.
CHAPTER XV (xl)
THE NOBLE
(a) The Relation of Noble-mindedness to Goodness, and
of its Opposite to Badness
Can any fundamental moral value be placed axiologically side
by side with goodness, or even in contrast to it ? In any case it
cannot be of equal generality, else it would have to be included
under goodness. But there is no question as to something equally
general. Nobility coincides neither in content nor extent with
goodness; it is neither an intensification nor a specialization
of it, but something specifically new. The word of course
expresses its character but feebly; it is only a makeshift, in as
much as language does not reflect the delicate shades of
valuational distinction.
The opposite of the noble is the common. This latter is far
from being identical with badness. It is not reprehensible at
all in the same way ; it is merely the inferior and as such perhaps
contemptible; it is the attitude of mind which turns to the
inferior but not to what is in itself bad. Of course m its extreme
degree it is also extreme badness, it is meanness. But a mind is
noble which is directed towards the high, the ideal, and is
detached from everything trivial and secondary (even where
one’s own interests are concerned). Nobility of character is
what language designates as magnanimity, generosity, large-
heartedness, high-mindedness, because there is no word for it
except such one-sided figurative expressions. Goodness can also
be commonplace. There is such a thing as hackneyed virtue,
ignoble contentment, narrow-minded virtue and righteousness.
Certainly one would be perverting the meaning of goodness, if
one tried to characterize it as such a habit of mind. But it
cannot be denied that it gives scope for such failings and that
the worthlessness of hackneyed virtue is by no means badness.
Conversely, within certain limits, that which is bad can also
THE NOBLE
193
be noble. Wrath, hatred, revenge are definitely bad in them-
selves; disdain and ambition come at least very close to badness.
But who would deny that there is a noble wrath, hatred and
ambition, a noble disdain, indeed even a noble revenge ? This is
as certain as the very common fact that there is ignoble revenge,
petty wrath, low hatred and ambition. Here clearly we have a
second and different way of valuing the same act over and above
the first and basic one. It furnishes unmistakable evidence of a
unique valuational antithesis between noble and common, inde-
pendent of and beyond that between good and bad.
Nobility is not everyone’s concern as goodness is. It is
“uncommon”; it is always and necessarily common to few.
As a claim it is not directed to all, at least not immediately
and not in the same way, but only to those who are already in
some way morally outstanding; it separates its chosen ones,
raises them up — not according to human estimation but
according to their own ethical being, their own moral greatness
or strength. For its demand is itself uncommon; more properly
speaking, it is the demand which the uncommon makes. Of
itself it casts off the narrow and petty. Goodness is a strictly
universal value; on that account it can well be common.
Nobility is pre-eminent as a value which distinguishes between
man and man, and indeed even in the ethos itself, in the funda-
mental disposition. Its opposite is the usual, the ordinary, the
well-worn track, m so far as upon it goodness as well as badness
can be found. By its very nature the noble is not everybody’s
concern. It divides men — not indeed according to birth and
social status, but according to their innermost disposition,
according to the ethical claim itself It divides even the good
into the noble and the not noble. It consists in nothing but
an aristocracy of disposition.
( b ) The Relation of Nobility to Vitality as a Value
A radical misunderstanding must here be avoided. The axio-
logical dimension of the noble and the common — in sharp
Ethtcs-~-II
194
THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
contrast to that of goodness and badness — belongs by no
means to the class of moral values alone. Rather does.it charac-
terize the whole realm of values, even the non-ethical. It is
best known in the domain of the biological values; but it
extends also down into the inorganic realm and upwards into
that of mind. One speaks rightly of precious metals and stones,
of noble aesthetic line, form or figure. Everywhere the pure
cultivation of a certain quality is noble, but impurity, impover-
ishment of type, the paralysing effect of compromise is ignoble.
This is most clear in the sphere of the living organism.
Here the noble is the culmination of the type, the thorough-
bred, the genuine. Also in man there is a biological value of
nobility; in him also purity of racial type is a special quality, as
well of the body as of the mind. As the former does not coincide
at all with vitality in general, so the latter is not identical with
the moral type. Now it is here that one might see oneself
tempted to strike nobility out of the series of ethical values
altogether. Scheler, for instance, took this step in his doctrine
of the “valuational modalities.” With him not only did nobility
count exclusively as a vitalistic value, but actually as the
fundamental value of the biological sphere. The result is a
double confusion.
In the first place this sphere is itself thereby unduly
restricted. There are biological values which can in no way
be classified as noble. To these belongs well-being — properly
a whole region of values — which Scheler explicitly counts
amongst the noble. This alone would suffice to wreck his
scheme; every undistorted sense of value would far sooner
count it as amongst common things; this is a sure sign that
the sphere of vital qualities does not resolve itself into the
contrast between the noble and common but is of more than
one dimension. For there is no doubt that well-being is a
genuine life-value.
In the second place, under this biological view other classes
of nobleness do not receive adequate recognition, especially the
spiritual kinds ; quite clearly the aesthetic and ethical. Also in
THE NOBLE
*95
these there are unquestionably a noble and a common, in
addition to other qualities which characterize them, such as
beauty and ugliness, goodness and badness.
Here only the ethical realm concerns us. How nobility of
character, magnanimity, high-mindedness, could resolve them-
selves into biological qualities of breed is at least not apparent.
But if one means to reserve the word “noble” for biological
values — which is linguistically arbitrary, since the word is
clearly not only capable of moral application but is actually
coined out of it — then one must look about for another word,
which denotes the analogous tone of value in the moral sphere.
The word as such is naturally of no account. But that there is
an analogous series of values in the region of morality cannot
be brought in question. With this reservation, we may allow
the word “noble” — which is certainly rather ambiguous — to be
retained, on the understanding that only the morally noble
is meant.
(c) The Pursuit of the Uncommon as an End
Nobility shares with goodness the trend towards value, also the
dependence upon the gradational order of values — in every way
it presupposes goodness. But it brings with it a special attitude
of its own in the selecting of values. What is common to all, as
a moral claim, counts with it as secondary; it looks out for
something else which ought to be, something divergent which
in content surpasses the good common to all. It is therefore not
the pursuit of values in general, but only of certain ones; nor
is it always the pursuit of higher values (within the given
situation), therefore not merely the devotion to the discerned
and felt scale of values. Instead, it selects afresh from among
the given values and does so according to a new and special
standard of preference: it aims only at values which are not
common at all — which are uncommon not only as regards
achievement, but even as regards claim; it aims at uncommon
values, of which the very claim'does not hold good for all, and
THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
196
which tend to raise a man above the level of common goodness
(whatever the height of its actualization).
This tendency does not necessarily gainsay that which is
directed towards valuational height. The realm of values has
other dimensions besides that of height; it has also a width
spreading at right angles to height, in which various and
co-ordinated values stand side by side on the same level. In
the realm of values every grade is a whole plane ; and the mani-
fold, which is grasped by feeling at any time, is always only a
section within that plane. As regards every accepted morality,
the search for what has not yet been grasped by it, is a thoroughly
justified tendency. And selection according to height gives
unlimited scope for selection of a different order. But, ulti-
mately, even in the upward direction of height there is some-
thing higher than what is grasped by the prevailing view, and
to this also the searching glance of nobility is directed. Progress,
therefore, in selecting values, even within the range of goodness,
is itself a function of the noble. For nobility of character is the
pursuit of the uncommon.
The exceptional inheres in the essence of the noble Of course
every recognized body of values has a tendency to draw the
ethos of the many after it; therefore, to become universal,
even as a moral claim, that is, common. But as soon as it has
become general, it is no longer noble but simply common
goodness. Then some new body of values becomes the noble.
The content of nobility changes, although its direction towards
the uncommon remains the same. In the historic process of the
displacement of values, the essence of nobility is the perpetual
anticipation, the searching and testing, the moving forward
which transforms the ethos of an epoch. Its content at any
given moment must therefore be the moral claim of the uncom-
mon. Without the noble the process must needs stagnate and
— since to stand still is an impossibility — become retrogressive.
On the grand scale, nobility is the onward striving life of
the historical ethos ; in the individual, it is the spirit of the
pioneer.
THE NOBLE
* 91
( d ) Selection of Values and Selection of Individuals
(Aristology)
The noble must then be the exclusive; it chooses the special —
and in this sense the “aristocratic” — as much in contrast to
the mass of people as to the multitude of values which are in
vogue at the time. In both these directions it implies selection.
It is choice of individuals according to values and at the same
time choice of values according to preference — a preferred
direction in the realm of values. The two kinds of selection are
closely related to each other. Selection of individuals if not
according to value is pointless and valueless ; it is presumption,
vain pre-eminence; but selection of values without selection of
individuals means ineffectuality m real life. Genuine superiority
involves the heaviest obligation. But even it is utterly impotent
if it does not derive efficiency from the co-operation of the few
who are of the same mind. At the same time true superiority
always exhibits forcefulness. Where that is lacking, it becomes
an idle game.
In this connection, too, nobility must be axiologically equated
with goodness plus something new. Its trend is not indivi-
dualistic. Simply because it goes beyond the common standards,
it does not aim at the individual as such, but only at the excep-
tional, the type or the group of those who are aiming at the *
same value. And even this is not a finality m the noble. It is
only its way of actualizing itself, its starting point in ethical
reality.
It sets itself against the tendency to flock like sheep and
against all mass-production. Differences of level in the indi-
vidual ethos are essential to nobility. They offer it support. It
does not abolish the good any more than the common possession
of the good; but from amongst good people it picks out those
who from its new point of view are “the best,” just as it ranges
what is in its sense the “best” (aptcnov) above what is simply
good (ayadoy). The noble thus restores the discrimination
which the good discards. In this it is justified, for detachment
i 9 8 the realm of ethical values
from ordinary goodness gives pre-eminence to the noble. Herein
at the same time nobility becomes dependent upon goodness, it
becomes relative to goodness as'the basic value. But in all
selection of individuals the discriminative point of view of the
“ariston” never is the same as that of an “aristocracy” — as
usually understood. For it is not interested in rulership (the
Kparetv of the apurroi), but only in selection and moral Being
itself. One might therefore speak of “aristology” in this
connection and that only in reference to the guiding values
themselves.
In this sense ethical leadership and control follow of their
own accord. The higher type of moral claims, and therewith
of man himself, stands over against commonplace goodness.
Thus the tendency of the noble is first to create the axiologically
superior type, the ideal of man. All idealistic education is
forward-looking. But it is only capable of efficiency in life, if at
the same time it gains a real following — at least in a group of
individuals. Without this the ethos of the wider group dies out.
It sinks to a lower level, for stagnation is decline.
As regards its content, the higher development of the human
type always depends upon the actual tendency (not perhaps the
conscious aims) of the noble. It necessarily clashes with the
interest of those who are accounted “good,” and is always to
some extent aloof from the community at large and stands in
open opposition to the universality of their standards. An
improvement in the standard is made possible by concentration
of energy upon a narrower sphere. Hence the necessary remote-
ness of the selecting group from the general public.
( e ) Ethical Ascendency and the Morality of the Group
In nobility man possesses the power of freeing his own
development, the unfoldment of his type, from mere accident,
from blind necessity, and, by foresight, of prescribing the ends
to be pursued; at the same time he possesses the still higher
power of working efficiently towards these apprehended goals.
THE NOBLE
199
These assertions sound audacious, if one takes them in a
literal and intellectual sense — as though men needed only to
have certain views concerning values, in order, with them as
ideals, to guide the real historic process. This is of course not
true. No sophisticated “superman” can lead mankind to higher
levels, not to mention the extremely limited power, particularly
in such matters, of human foresight and predetermination.
The power of the ethos in man does not take on the form of
deliberate reflection and choice. Still the consciousness which
seeks and turns towards values is the guiding factor even here.
Not a conceiving or understanding, but a clairvoyant discern-
ment, a conscious emotional rapport with the transcendent
powers of the genuine self-subsisting ideal, is the moving
principle. The ascending trend, which has its root here, is
nevertheless on this account a genuinely foreseeing and morally
creative advance in contrast to all naturalistic evolution, which
moves merely towards the biological value of the fittest to
survive. In the natural life-process man goes on quite blindly
according to natural laws ; in his adaptation to ends he only seems
to be purposive in his activity. Here, on the other hand, is
purposive activity foreseeingly directed, guided, drawn towards
perceived values; here is a thin and perhaps weak, but not
on that account less significant, thread of historical teleology
within the colossal web of blind necessity — necessity with its
determinant strands, indifferent to ends (and not alone those
of the causal nexus). It is not at all necessary to attribute an
extraordinarily revolutionizing power to this weak element of
genuine predetermination in the spiritual life of an age. Its
power and its moral worth are to be seen not so much in its
results as in its ethically real existence and in the high axiological
quality of such determination as issues from it.
In this we can see, more plainly than in anything previously
said, how nobility of character differs from the sphere of
biological values. The creative powers in it are themselves
fundamentally different, even if they work themselves out in the
same dimension of reality, in the temporal line of the develop-
200
THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
ment of a type. In fact, these powers clearly fall within the one
common reality, forming, as it were, a superstructure upon the
powers of the biological process, whereby the tendencies of a
higher development, directed towards values, find characteristic
scope above the tendencies of the lower development prompted
by nature, a scope which the higher determination always finds
above the lower.
The moral ascent of man never proceeds historically from
the wide-spread multitude and does not actualize itself directly
through them, but always at first through a narrow group of
pioneers. This pioneering is the path-finding r61e of the noble
in the life and creation of the commonwealth. The many are
strongly conservative, they hold hard and fast to what they have
grasped. The noble does not immediately trail this ballast with
him in his advance ; he quietly leaves it behind him and hastens
forward untrammelled as the champion of the human ethos.
Thus arises the isolation of the group, even its antagonism to the
community. The isolation is not intentional, it is inevitable.
But in it the moral purpose of the group is as little fulfilled
as is the meaning of nobility. In isolation there is no fulfilment;
eventually whatever is really achieved contributes anew to the
good of the community. The group transforms the multitude
into its own likeness, draws it to itself. Drawing after is different
from trailing with. Different forces are at work here. In embryo,
every spiritual movement is weak, it needs a chance to find
itself and must have freedom of movement. But once it is
strengthened and matured, it moves the heaviest mass. Herein
lies the law of nobility and at the same time its right to segrega-
tion and selection.
In the history of the ethos nobility takes the place of the
revolutionary tendency Not out of dissatisfaction is its revolu-
tion born, but out of the fulness and progressive readiness for
change in the outlook upon values. In nobility lies the tendency
to an ever-renewed grasping of values. But this tendency is
perpetual, just because the group of the noble is continually
drawing the many after it. For that is why all values which
THE NOBLE
SOI
are vividly conceived show a tendency to become common.
But as soon as a mass of values has become common, it has
forthwith ceased to be the substance of the noble. And the
noble passes over it to some new contents. The noble is always
laying hold upon the untried and uncommon.
(/) The Moral Characteristics of the Noble
In harmony with this incessant reaching forward, which is the
fundamental attitude of the noble, is a whole group of further
characteristics, which, strictly taken, constitute yet another
variety of values and avouch the rich content of this basic value.
The noble man hates all compromise as to values, even those
that are wise and beneficent. His salvation lies in another
direction, in the exclusive fostering of the value which he thinks
should be preferred — even at the expense of all others. It is
the same with nobility of a lower order (for example, with
biological nobility in regard to race) ; but it is really true only
of moral nobility. All admixture of alien tendencies with regard
to values is common, is a deformity, a diminution of personality
and of its free action, as it is in the life of the community. To
the noble all half-measures are despicable. Singleness and
absolute integrity are his taste, even at the risk of one-sidedness,
ruthlessness and violation of values. Where his own purpose
demands it, he does not shrink from responsibility and blame.
The weight of both fall only on his own person, and to him
that is of no importance.
Native to the noble is a wide outlook, the grand style in the
inner life and work, even under outwardly narrow circumstances.
With him response to everything great and for its own sake
goes without saying. His aim always rises above all individuals —
and not only above himself. In the same way it passes beyond
any given community. The noble man is the sworn enemy of all
that is narrow and petty He lives above the commonplace
and morally insignificant. He is raised above misjudgments and
pretensions. He does not strike back, where he cannot respect
202 THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
his opponent. He wants even his enemy to be of his own kind.
But he knows how to honour an opponent of equal calibre and
sees himself honoured in him. His bearing and his intensified
sensitiveness arise from an inner immunity to everything that
is mean.
The free, unbounded devotion to what is great accords with
a capacity for genuine enthusiasm, for real absorption in an
enterprise, not only an ability to make sacrifices but even a
delight in doing so. The joy of devotion is the knightly virtue
of the morally strong. And on that again rests the strong man’s
power over others, the ability to carry them with him, to make
them capable of nobility. It is the power of his ethos itself,
the kindling example of the pioneer.
The magnanimity of the noble penetrates everything, even
what is in itself most trifling. It selects not only ends, but
even ways and means. The noble man spurns low means,
which do not seem to him justified by the end, but which drag
it down and dishonour it. Here again he can make no compro-
mise, he remains true to himself in the selection of means.
This is at the same time the drawback in his ethos, his inner
handicap, his weakness. He is defenceless against baser forces,
which shrink from nothing. Against the peculiar strength of
the common he has no armour; he can battle only with his
peers, and contend only in great things, not m small. To the
common pretensions he is unresponsive; but his very aversion
or his noble indignation is a no less effective weapon. He
succumbs, where the base fall upon him by stealth. He has
more in common with a noble enemy than with an ignoble
friend.
Where this ethos arrives at self-consciousness, it becomes
noble pride. The noble man must rely on himself; his concep-
tion of honour is severe, elevated and wholly inconceivable by
commonplace men. Yet he is not absorbed in self-respect and
self-esteem, his attention is not turned upon himself. To the
noble another’s unwavering commitment to what is honourable
and worthy is as easy to understand as his own. With him good
THE NOBLE
203
taste in personal intercourse is not conventionality but his own
sensitive respect for the nobleness in everyone. He keeps his
distance, is not pushing, but modest in pride. Obtrusiveness
and boastfulness seem to him equally common. Even in sym-
pathy and love he is sensitive in approach, from regard for
the other’s individuality. His respect for others is thus a pure,
happy and even joyful recognition. In this way he is capable
of unenvious reverence for the morally superior, of admiration
without jealousy.
He admires only what is above him. From what is below him
he looks away — not intentionally nor out of disdain, but because
his purview is occupied with other things. The noble man lives
in what he can admire. If he wished to drag it down and tread
upon it as the envious do, he would need to drag himself
down.
( g ) Discrimination and Co-ordination
There is a whole galaxy of values in the moral disposition
of a noble nature. These all appear “on the back” of his purpose
and by no means are the same as the values he pursues. The
latter vary with the historical changes of the ethos ; inevitably
the objects aimed at by the noble are never for long the same,
because they tend to become common. But the finer moial
shades of the intention itself remain the same. They belong to the
forward-looking attitude as such and are independent of their
momentary content.
If one is inclined to protest against our proposition that this
complex of moral values is not to be included under goodness,
since they are in a pre-eminent sense morally good, no objection
can be offered. In a certain sense all moral values remain within
the circumference of the good. This can undoubtedly be asserted
of the noble. But one must not therefore ignore the fact that
here a more special value, more definite in content and at the
same time narrower in its range, emerges. And this requires
special delineation. It is also no mere accident that the content
THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
304
of nobility is definable in quite other terms than that of goodness.
The same of course holds true even of all the other more special
moral values. If one tried to ignore this, one would be denying
the rich variety of moral values in general.
In the case of all other moral values this is more evident
than with the noble. For it is too near to goodness. The new
feature, which distinguishes it, looks too much like the original.
But the difficulty does not release one from the philosophic
task of making the distinction and granting its validity so far
as it holds good. To ignore dividing lines is without exception
the commonest fault in our treatment of values. Only by means
of the sharpest differentiation can one succeed in making ideal
contents discernible. The emphasis must be on the distinctions,
in order to grasp the diversity. The feeling for values is not
lacking in power to reconcile and co-ordinate
CHAPTER XVI (xli)
RICHNESS OF EXPERIENCE *
(a) Relationship to Goodness and Nobility. The With-
drawal of Teleology
Besides goodness itself and nobility, we may count among
moral values richness of experience and purity, which are both
admittedly more specialized and show greater definiteness of
content; but yet they fall short of being virtues in the proper
sense and — like goodness and nobility — are presupposed in the
virtues.
An interesting feature of both is the distinct reappearance in
them of positive valuational contrasts. This of itself shows,
what is otherwise confirmed, that together they constitute a
narrower group of values. But a similar set of opposites links
richness of experience with nobility. To this double antithesis
is due the axiological position of richness of experience be-
tween nobility and purity. The relation to goodness, on the
other hand, is essentially the same in all three.
The strength of nobility lies in its concentration upon pre-
ferred values. Its weakness is its one-sidedness. The pursuit
of the uncommon cannot include the pursuit of all values. But
this inclusion of all — within the limits of human possibility —
is at the same time a task and also a distinctive value. And there
is a tendency in the human ethos, which makes for this inclusive-
ness, for all-round breadth and diversity. In its concreteness
it is related to breadth of type, to harmony, to conflict and
complexity, while nobility is allied to elevation of type, to unity
and simplicity.
This tendency, as a basic moral disposition, has fulness of ex-
perience as its value. The task, which it imposes, is the unifica-
tion of diversities and of the antagonisms observable at any given
time. From this point of view, not unity of effort is the highest
ao6 THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
concern, but many-sidedness and diversity of interest, all-
round participation in values as an ideal, the ethical exploitation
of life which understands and embraces everything, and with
this also axiological richness of content and development of
personality, ethical greatness in the sense of spacious capacity
for everything that is in itself valuable, positive breadth of
valuational judgment. Its opposite is the disvalue of moral and
emotional narrowness, inability to participate in values and
appreciate them, the blinding simplification of life, the con-
demnation and misjudgment of the actual realm of values,
inner impoverishment and shrinkage of the ethos.
In so far as every moral attitude — at least in tendency — has
to do with the pursuit of values, fulness of life, in comparison
with goodness and nobility, has to do not with the pursuit of
the higher or the uncommon, but of all values, in so far as they
are known. But that is an impossibility. Striving must be towards
one goal or it dissipates itself. Hence it happens that in the
ethos of inclusiveness pursuit as a factor falls into the back-
ground. Its place is taken by an inward attitude of many-sided
openness, of participation and appreciation. Of course one may
speak here also of a purely inward teleology of commitment,
of interest, of participation even. And in fact this would neces-
sarily be inseparable from many-sidedness. But the actuality
of this tendency wanes with increasing breadth of content.
In the same sense one may say that here also the importance
of the order of rank fades. Even the lower values come into their
own in the ethos of inclusiveness. The valuational fulness of the
real, like that of the ideal realm, extends in every direction.
Here the domination by the order of rank and by the higher
values finds its counterpoise.
( b ) The Synthesis of Values in the Ethos of Many-sidedness
Inclusiveness is a general axiological synthesis of human life.
The high degree of the interweaving of factors constitutes the
new element in it. Of course the extent of the diversities must
RICHNESS OF EXPERIENCE
207
not destroy the unity. But the unity itself is synthetic, something
constructed, an organic combination. With the extent of the
contents the unit must expand. The objective fulness itself —
and every experience adds something — imposes uppn the person
an ever-new task of synthesis.
In this objective sense we may express the principle of the
fulness of life as the greatest unity of the greatest diversity.
In other fields also this principle holds good, for example, in
the aesthetic realm. But in our field it is a principle of the ethical
attitude of the individual and of the concrete organization of
life. The rudiments of values are everywhere; each one makes
a demand on the individual and at the same time imposes
obligations upon his understanding, his power of initiative
and executive ability. Every experience is full of values; but
not everyone is in a position to appreciate what he is privileged
to experience. One’s ethos must have fed upon the fruit which
has fallen into one’s lap. Ordinarily men refuse life’s fulness,
they ignore the riches in themselves and the world. Yet to the
moral nature belongs the synthetic unity of the ethos itself as a
fundamental condition of its existence.
Man is never morally completed. With his moral growth he
constructs himself; even without intending it, he makes himself
the object of actualization. He achieves his own synthesis in his
preoccupation with the manifold values of life, by increase of
understanding and participation. In evaluating the world — and
the more objective the process is, so much the better — he
succeeds in transforming his own unique, irrevocable life into
a general harmony, a real symphony of values.
What applies to the individual person, applies mutatis
mutandis to all ethical Being. The relationships among men
permit of the same valuational synthesis. Every situation mani-
fests germs of values, each one of which can be appraised
after its own kind; neglected it can become stunted. Even in
this connection man is, in part, responsible creator of existence,
into whose hand all riches are given ; he is, in part, fashioner of
the ethical reality in which he lives. And it is the same with the
208
THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
synthesis of ethical ideals. Even here, in his prospective vision,
the abundant diversity is of value. The ideals of morally narrow
and poverty-stricken men are themselves narrow and poverty-
stricken ideals. And finally it is not otherwise in the building
up of the community; here also reappear the diversity and the
demand for a valuational synthesis. The only difference is that
here the synthesis is made above and beyond the ethos of the
individual. Here man sees himself to be a building-stone in a
larger structure.
(c) Breadth of Mind and its Relation to Badness
The ethos of many-sidedness presupposes mental breadth,
space for everything. This is of especial significance in respect
to moral conflict. Conflict widens as well as deepens a man.
Precisely in it and while standing in the midst of it a man
becomes conscious of life’s richness of content. From this point
of view conflict is seen to be pre-eminently positive and valuable.
To shrink from conflict, to avoid it, is moral shortsightedness.
There must be room even for tragic conflict, from which there
is no escape without guilt. Especially in it the ethos is widened.
Whoever is incapable of conflict is incapable of tragedy. He is
morally blighted who in life’s earnest conflict is cursed with the
sense of the comic; he bears the stamp of the tragi-comedian.
From this it becomes clear that in one point fulness of life is
the exact opposite of nobleness: it is not exclusive, and not only
does not bar out lower values but also within certain limits not
even what is directly opposed to value. From the point of view
of inclusiveness there adheres in fact a value to every content of
the moral life, even to strife, suffering, misfortune, fruitless
striving, cares and yearnings, to yielding as well as to over-
coming, indeed to failure, deficiency, wrong-doing and the
burden of guilt. Here there is no question as to the value of
suffering or of freedom (which are also deeply involved); but
rather is there still another pure concrete value in all this —
we might call it width of experience or richness of the moral
RICHNESS OF EXPERIENCE
209
life. For the morally narrow man everything ultimately becomes
worthless, even what is in itself of value. For the open-hearted
man, on the contrary, everything is valuable, even what in itself
is contrary thereto. There is certainly no other way to ethical
maturity and expansion than through the conflicts of life itself,
through “moral experience” — even experience of wrong-doing,
and this perhaps most of all. Here is the absolute limit of the
principle that virtue can be taught. No one can hand over to
another his moral experience with its inner meaning which he
has lived through and suffered. All the lessons which can be
drawn from it and told to another are empty, unless one has
had the experience itself ; and the lessons sound like moralizing.
The living and intertwined situations, with their mass of
ethical conflicts, are the only thing which really discipline
morally, open, train and widen the valuational vision and thus
disclose the fulness of life. In this way it is of value to have
» gone through, to have been overcome, and to have failed.
'Although so familiar a fact, this is certainly a paradox and
is not without its danger-point. But it is true. Here is certainly
manifested a deeper valuational conflict with the good; it is a
genuine, indisputable antinomy. The pursuit of a higher value
has its limit in the intrinsic value of the lower. Not as if the
pursuit of ends were here directed to the lower as such; in the
ethos of inclusiveness the pursuit of ends has entered upon the
second stage. And precisely where there is no striving but yet a
gaining by participation, the differently organized relationship
to values in general reveals to a certain degree an intrinsic
worth in what teleologically is the contrary of value. And this
relationship is not to be understood as if the evil needed first
to justify itself for the sake of variety of experience; rather does
it become justified through the value of inclusiveness, at least
in so far as in contents it is a part of life’s fulness and is not
simply negative and disruptive. It is not as though the bad
became good. It is a quite differently dimensioned quality,
which is here superimposed upon goodness and badness. Just
this is the new feature here, and we learn from fulness of life
Ethua—U * o
210
THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
that, precisely in the higher moral sphere, there exists a point
of view from which everything that is ethically actual has
ultimately a side that is of value. Ethics needs no metaphysical
theodicy. In itself— in fully diversified unity as a value — ethics
has an anthropodicy, the axiological justification of man in his
imperfection.
The passion of this value is that of an all-sided optimism.
Only we must be on our guard against interpreting this
optimism eudaemonistically. On principle it is beyond happiness
and unhappiness.
Ethical actuality is richer than all human phantasy, than
dream and fiction. To live apathetically from moment, to
moment amid the abundance, is nothing short of sin. The
narrowness of a man’s participating sense of value makes him
pdbr. It is because of his prejudice, his blindness, that he does
not see the abundance, in the midst of which he stands. The
ethos of openness to all values is the tendency to do inward
justice to life, to win from it its greatness. Its passion springs
from reverence for the unbounded abundance of the things
that are of worth, it is knowledge filled with gratitude ;%id,
where knowledge fails, it is the presentiment that the values of
existence are inexhaustible. Whoever lives in this attitude, by
him every restriction of experience is recognized as super-
ficiality, dullness, barrenness, a waste of life and, when it
degenerates into a pose, as an unworthy renunciation, a petty
pessimism, a moral ingratitude.
CHAPTER XVII (xlii)
PURITY
(a) Contrast to Goodness and Many-sidedness
As a value, purity is more akin to goodness than many-sidedness
is. One has often been inclined, especially when morality has
been dominated by religious sentiments, to see in purity the
„ whole meaning of moral goodness. But that is going too far.
Unquestionably purity is also “good,” just as its opposite, sin,
pollution, defilement (piaapx), is bad. But it is not only much
more restricted, it is also qualitatively different. The meaning
of goodness is entirely positive, that of purity — as the word
itself implies — is negative as regards the intended content; it
means untainted by evil. Here the pursuit of values, even of the
higher ones, is confronted by the non-pursuit of disvalues,
especially of those that are lower and elemental. He is pure
whom no desire leads astray, no temptation allures. His ethos
consists of an inner tendency turned away from disvalues
altogether and as such.
But "the contrast of purity to many-sidedness is much more
striding than its contrast to goodness, with which it is in
harmony. Between it and many-sidedness there exists a distinct
antinomy. The ethos of the latter opens itself to everything and
esteems of positive worth even what is contrary to value. But
purity bars out everything which is in conflict with any value.
It is isolation as regards evil, untaintedness and immunity. A
lack of moral experience is here of value. Experience, in pro-
portion as it is rich in content, must have already come into
contact with everything; and something of everything must
have adhered to the person. The man of experience has passed
through conflicts ; his eyes have been opened — yet at the price of
innocence. From the point of view of purity, however, guilt is
the greatest of evils, innocence the highest good. For there is no
212
THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
question of innocence as conquest over guilt, but only as the
original state before any guilt, the state of not having been
tempted, the virtue of the child, which has no merit in it and
yet is a moral quality of the highest worth.
Ignorance, simplicity, childishness, have here a positive
worth. They constitute sancta simplicitas. The morally complex
character is uncertain; it is caught in the struggle for life, it
does not easily walk in the straight path. To purity belongs
the moral phenomenon of ingenuousness, steadiness and
immediate perception of the right way — a sort of moral instinct
whereby one turns away from evil without any proper know-
ledge of good and evil. This phenomenon is often met with
among the morally unripe, or among those who are just at the
t h r eshold of maturity, in so far as they are unspoilt and unper-
vdked. It reveals a fulness of fine, even the finest, shades of
value, which the understanding cannot grasp but can only have
an intimation of. It would mar them to bring them under fixed
concepts. Our capacity to appraise values here shows itself to
be infinitely more discriminating than the rude logic of thought.
The simplicity, straightforwardness, guilelessness of the pure
possess, fop the man standing in the midst of his diversified
experiences and burdened by them, something convincing,
irresistible and redemptive. Although he is aware of the
spiritual poverty of the pure, still in the midst of his riches he
longs for it.
(6) Christianity and Antiquity. Purity as a Basic Value
Purity of heart is the primal Christian virtue. With it mental
riches pass as an evil. Blessed are they who are poor in spirit.
Blessedness is the ethos of the child. Of such is the kingdom
of heaven ; to be such is the yearning of the sinner.
Surely such an ethics of conversion is radically one-sided —
without raising the question whether for any man a return to
innocence be possible. Yet the basic value is correctly estimated.
With this estimate Christian ethics opened up new roads, with
PURITY
213
this more than with its commandment in regard to loving one’s
neighbour. Not only did ancient ethics not know the value of
purity in this sense, but by the greatest representatives of
philosophy it was consciously set aside. Aristotle denied to the
child capacity for happiness; yet in happiness he saw moral
fulfilment, the reXeuoms of goodness, a synthesis of the
virtues. Insight lies in this : only he who is set in the midst of
moral conflict can show virtue or its opposite. Now if virtue
consists in bipyeia alone, this is indisputable. But if there be
an ethos in an attitude of mind which is anterior to all conflict
and in contrast to all energy, then the peculiar value of such an
attitude is overlooked in the ancient ethics . 1
Like goodness and nobleness, purity also is the basis of a
series of well-known moral values. In the same direction lie
sincerity, frankness, openness. These are natural to one who' is
morally unspoiled in sensitiveness. One who is pure has nothing
to conceal; to him concealment, secretiveness, is alien. He
willingly lets others know; the shame of the guilty is lacking
in him. He needs no covering, no mask; his nudity is not
nakedness.
The same is true of his directness in conduct. He takes hold
of an enterprise without reflection, he makes straight for the
matter in hand. He lacks both the occasion and the worldly
wisdom for subterfuge. He does not need to mislead others.
But it is not his fault that to the man of the world he is in his
ultimate nature unaccountable and incomprehensible and is in
fact misleading; it is due to the worldly man’s incapacity to be
straightforward and clear-sighted. Whoever attributes ingenu-
ousness to no one, must, when he really meets with it, inevitably
mistake it for something else ; his own calculating and intricate
nature prevents him from understanding simplicity. But the
pure can understand the pure, without any difficulty.
1 Cf. Aristotle, Eth. Ntc., 1100a, p. i ff.
214
THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
( c ) Purity as a Moral Power
To the pure-minded man distrust is as alien as is every crooked
way. He believes in the good in man, he trusts in the right and
in the good cause, he is optimistic in a childlike way. He holds
fast this faith against all appearances and especially where he
does not understand motives and tendencies. He cannot compre-
hend the gnawing ethical pessimism which imputes evil to
everyone. He does not avert his glance from known evil — for
the valuational judgment of the pure mind is clear; but, as his
own conscience is easy and free, is without compromise and
without self-torture, and as his own capacity for happiness and
his right to it rest on this, he attributes the same to others. And,
despite all its naivete, his trustfulness is a power, the greatness
of which he is unaware of, in proportion as he really possesses it.
As the impure mind has an evil influence and infects with
evil, so the pure mind has an influence for good. In this respect
pure-mindedness, despite its originally negative character,
shows itself to be an eminently positive and creative energy in
life. Nothing perhaps works so powerfully, so convincingly, for
good, and so transforms others in their innermost character,
as the mere presence of a pure-minded person who pursues
the right undisturbed, just as he sees and understands it in his
simplicity. Precisely in his obliviousness to evil, in his failure to
understand it and to react to it, he becomes a symbol and
attracts the fallen and the morally prostrate. In this — and by no
means in the very doubtful superiority of the mature man — lies
the charm of association with a child, the assuaging and
liberating effect of childhood upon the experienced and worldly-
wise man — the education of the grown-up person through the
child.
This power is the secret of purity, its veritable mystery.
Innocence does not resist evil, simply because it does not see
it, or, seemg, does not understand and believe. Outwardly it is
defenceless. And yet it is clad in a coat of mail and is equipped
as no other type of ethos is. Its failure to defend itself is not a
PURITY
315
weakness. It is the guilty man who is powerless against it. He
never feels his weakness more acutely than when he encounters
the glance of the pure-minded who does not see the evil in him
and, even in seeing, cannot believe it. In that the pure-minded
man reacts to him, as if he himself were pure, the guilty sees
himself denied in his innermost being, sees himself judged,
cast out — as no conscious judgment could censure and condemn.
By its nature evil shuns the light. It shrinks from the glance
of the pure, hides from it, keeps away from it. It cannot tolerate
the transparency of the innocent. The ethos of the pure draws
a charmed circle about itself, which extends into the busy
human world beyond ; and whoever with only a faint spark of
moral perception enters into the circle, falls under its spell. The
existence of the pure in heart is the power of goodness, moving ,
about unconsciously but palpably; it is the power of goodness
become flesh; in it the otherwise merely ideal power of the
realm of values possesses reality, although it is not of this world
and although it is felt by those who experience it in themselves
to be not of this world. This is no metaphor, nor is it a poetical
exaggeration. It may be true that many are not acquainted with
this phenomenon. That proves nothing against it, it still remains
a real phenomenon. Whoever is acquainted with it is held by
it from within. On a great scale it may of course be rare enough ;
but in a small way it is met at every step by anyone who has not
become quite insensitive to it. The great example is pictured
over-poweringlybythe Gospels in the figure of Jesus — and indeed
not in its divinity, but precisely in its humanity. At the sight
of Jesus, by his mere word, shrewd calculation and subtlety are
silenced. Here certainly the spiritual superiority of the person
supplements the Idea itself; but behind it is still something
else which gives support to it, the moral pre-eminence of purity
of heart. And not solitary in the grey past does the one great
example stand as a legend ; ever again arise great representatives
of this ethos, filled with its spirit. In a modem setting one finds
it in many of Dostoiewski’s characters , 1 most convincingly in
1 Alexei Karamasow is also a beautiful example of this.
2l6
THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
his book The Idiot. Palpable as an atmosphere is the precinct of
purity; no one can withdraw himself from it; but the power
which it exercises does not lie in the word or deed of the one
who is pure but entirely in his mere moral existence. He who is
pure does not actualize ; his ethos is not a pursuit of ends. He is
only himself a monition, a wandering conscience for the impure
mind; this he is, without on his part judging or condemning.
For when baser passions, hate, envy, injured dignity, resent-
ment, encounter purity, it is always as if there came from out
its inmost nature those words before which all condemnation
is silenced : He who is without sin, let him cast the first stone.
Perfect purity borders on holiness. Although holiness is not
an ethical value and is not adapted to human measurement, it
has always been revered as such in the great types of purity.
Aloofness, “existence for itself,” comes into the foreground here.
Hence the gleam of other-worldliness in this ideal.
( d ) The Forms in which Purity Appears
The ethos of purity extends throughout all the grades of human
conduct as well as over all kinds of acts. And everywhere it has
its own special impress. As purity of deed, it is the perfectly
straightforward way of acting, the absence of all cunning and of
all concealment of one’s true aim behind plausible aims. As
purity of word, it is the frankness which admits of no double
meaning, ambiguity, veiling or offensiveness. Deeper still is
purity of thought, the simple presentation of fact, unpre-
meditated objectivity, absence of masked motives and ulterior
purposes.
But at the centre of all this stands purity of disposition —
single-mindedness in love and hate, in admiration and contempt,
in good-will and anger. In this sense that attitude which is
not transparent is impure, is involved and complicated with
cross-currents in the treatment of other persons — such as
envious admiration, jealous or suspicious love, suppressed or
impotent rage and, above all, the dark corrupting dregs of
PURITY
217
resentment. To purity in this sense belongs the recoil from all
secret, unavowed cravings which lurk in the background of one’s
own nature, as well as revulsion against suppressed complexes,
such as false shame in love or admiration, which is moral
cowardice in disguise. The pure-minded man confesses freely
his own real feelings, not only to himself but also, when occasion
arises, to others. He does not stop to reflect how his attitude
may be regarded by others or what sort of a light it may throw
upon himself. He does not assume a pose foreign to his own true
state of mind. This on the contrary forces its way through and
fills his whole nature. His inward attitude harmonizes with his
outward, his unconscious with his conscious.
In the same way we may speak of purity of will ; it is whole-
hearted and unbounded surrender to the end in view. As regards
the pure-minded man, we all feel certain that his real nature is
expressed in his pursuits. Whoever has a sense for such things,
may always rely upon it. Hence the pure-minded man is the
one who is perfectly trustworthy, even without having the
special intention of justifying the trust bestowed.
The same characteristic reappears on the lower level of
impulsive and instinctive life. The pure man is not the one
who has no desires, but the one in whom they preserve their
unperverted nature and beauty. To him both suppression and
misuse are equally impure. Sensitiveness, chastity, modesty,
constitute purity in the sphere of the senses. To the innocent
man they are as natural as the sensuous impulse itself; with
their loss his natural purity is corrupted.
( e ) Purity Irrecoverable when Lost
A peculiarity of purity and of all the more specialized shades of
value which are related to it, is that it can neither be striven
for nor actualized. One may yearn for it, may waste away in
desire of it; but one can neither make it the goal and content
of one’s pursuit, nor actualize it in one’s own nature quite apart
from any direct aim. The latter is the usual way in which all
2x8 THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
moral values become actual, but the former is at least in general
possible . 1
The reason for this is not to be found in the nature of striving
and of actualization, but in the nature of purity itself. It is a
constitutional pecularity of its material. This is fundamentally
negative, an absence, an aloofness from something, an insulation,
a state of being untouched, which once being violated cannot be
restored. Only something positive can be actualized. But in
purity the only positive element is the valuational quality, not
the material. Furthermore, the accompanying phenomena are
also positive; for example, the influence for good. But the
essence proper, the attitude of the intention towards the de-
values, continues to be negative. Hence purity stands alone
among the moral values ; it is radically different from every one
which may be otherwise related to it: it is either fulfilled in
person or it is for ever unattainable. Hence of it may further be
said: one may indeed lose it when one has it, but not gain it if
one has it not. It is a primal state of the ethos before conflict
has set in, before real “life” has begun, before experience and
guilt. It falls into the lap of the young ; but, once it has been
forfeited, the mature man longs in vain to have it back. He can
still rescue only what has not been forfeited. The purity that is
lost is irretrievable — -just as guilt is unescapable, just as the
deed that is done cannot be undone.
Purity is no merit in one who has it; it was not acquired,
it was given. But so much the more is the loss of it a moral
fault. Although it is not possible to acquire it, yet to preserve
it is altogether possible. Also purity as a value is thus related
to freedom, not otherwise than are all the other moral values.
Indeed there lies something like a positive task in the Ought-
to-Be of purity. And in this way it can very well be aimed at.
The impulse towards its preservation is the strictly moral
element in the ethos of the pure. In it consists the inner watch
and ward against evil. At this point we begin to see that the
ethos of purity is not limited to an ideal primal state of child-
1 Cf. Chapter II (d), (e), Vol. II.
PURITY
2X9
likeness before all conflict and responsibility, that man can
much rather retain something of it far into the depths of his
life. He does not lose innocence with one fell stroke. It is
precisely the beginning of guilt which permits him to feel what
kind of a value is at stake. And the deeper he sinks and the more
he loses of his purity, so much the stronger can the positive
ethos of preserving it become in him. For so much the better
can he measure the value of the purity which he has forfeited
and also the purity that is still enjoyed.
If there existed only absolute purity and absolute impurity,
it might 'be said that the value of purity bars out its own
existence-for-itself, that is, the consciousness of itself. Who-
ever would have the maturity and experience to appreciate it,
must already have lost it; but whoever still possessed it, would
be unable to appreciate it. For the extremes this holds good.
But the extremes are not given in the moral life and are not
actual. The human ethos moves through the long scale of
intermediate stages. And there the law of relativity holds good :
the deeper the consciousness of guilt, the higher the estimate
set upon purity. This means : the less a man possesses of a value,
the more he may have a feeling for its worth . 1
(/) The Inner Dialectic of Purity and Many-sidedness
We have already spoken of the antinomic relation of purity
and many-sidedness. They exclude each other. But the peculi-
arity which distinguishes this relation from other pairs of
opposites is this: the ethos of many-sidedness requires the
value of purity, and the ethos of purity requires the value of
many-sidedness. Each is incomplete without the other. One
1 More than this "may” must not be asserted. We cannot say that
riie sense of the value of purity "necessarily” increases in proportion
to the impurity. Here other, value-obscuring factors set in, which
work in the opposite direction. With impurity, moral obtuseness also
increases. It naturally first obscures that value which it assails. In
this case it is the value of purity. Hence after a certain grade of
impurity the relation is reversed.
220
THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
might even say that after a certain degree there arises in each
kind of ethos the diametrically opposite tendency, that is, they
exchange intentions. «*
This fact is well known. In the person who is replete with
experience, there is a yearning to return to the purity which he
has lost, the yearning of the morally mature, indeed of the
person who has grown up, for the original state of child-
like innocence, simplicity and guilelessness. Similarly the one
who has remained pure yearns for the fulness of experience
which he has missed, just as the child longs for the rich humanity
of his elders — a yearning which makes straight for the darkly
foreboded earnestness of conflicts, of responsibility, even of
tragedy. The difference between these two yearnings is apparent :
that of the pure moves toward its own fulfilment, although the
fulfilment will not be what was anticipated; while the yearn-
ing of the other for purity remains necessarily unfulfilled, it
is inevitably an eternal yearning. And both kinds are rooted
in the essence of their respective values, each is the inner
destiny of its own ethos. But the process of change which is
irreversible moves only in the one direction, from purity to
fulness of experience. The child does not escape the seriousness
and manifoldness of life, but the matured mind longs for ever
in vain for the lost innocence. The child’s yearning passes
over into striving and actualization ; that of the other cannot.
The value of purity can neither be striven for nor actualized.
In this antinomy one may speak of a positive connection
between the opposites, a dialectic in the values themselves.
Hie synthesis of the two in a single character remains of course
for ever imperfect ; the reciprocal exclusion of the two permits
of nothing else. But the real stages in the transformation of
character may very well be approximately described as a
synthesis. And the more strongly the ethos of purity stands
fast as a bulwark, while experience becomes many-sided, so
much the more is the synthetic unification of the two values
achieved in the one character. But the limit to the synthesis is
due to the essence of the values themselves, it can never be
PURITY
221
annulled. And perhaps in nothing do moral types differ so
fundamentally as in the preponderance of the one or the other
ethos.
(g) Purity and Freedom, Belief and Character
It is natural that the human spirit should not be satisfied with
this dialectic, which is decisively unfavourable to purity, that
it should look about for help from another quarter and for
another kind of enrichment of life. The higher a man’s estimate
of the vtlue of purity, so much the more does he struggle
against !us irretrievable loss, and so much the stronger becomes
his “metaphysical need” of restoration to innocence. For ages
past religious thought has met this need, just at the point where
the value of purity as such is drawn into the centre of moral
consciousness. The ancient concept of “purification” ( KaOapois )
as the superstitious “wiping away of guilt” is here joined with
the thought of forgiveness and salvation through the suffering
and sacrifice of the divinity intervening for man. Purity returns
as a gift of grace. The condition which man must fulfil is
simply belief. The mystery of the new birth resolves the anti-
nomy of the values.
The fact that the mystery itself conjures up indeed another
and more serious antinomy — that between purity and freedom
— would inevitably have dawned some time or other to its full
extent upon the religious consciousness. In considering freedom
as a value we have already met with this conflict in its more
general form. It unavoidably develops into a comprehensive
antinomy between ethics and religion. But it is not for ethics
to resolve the antinomy; ethics says nothing of a work of salva-
tion. The burden of clearing up the difficulty falls solely to
the lot of religious thought. For ethics, on the other hand,
which takes its stand on this side of metaphysical needs, the
law of purity retains its power, the law which inheres in the
essence of the matter: that purity, once lost, can never be
restored.
222
THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
Were purity the one moral value, or even only the central
one, that would mean for ethics a radical pessimism. But
purity is neither the one nor the other. It is only one of the two
members in a perfectly poised opposition of values. And above
this contrast a basic value is to be sought solely in the positive
pursuit of the higher as conditioning the lower, solely in the
pursuit of the “good.” But this basic value leaves open to
actualization and the steadfast will the whole manifoldness
of the special moral values, even up to the highest.
To dispute over the impossible is folly. Actual life, however,
is full to the brim of that which can be striven for and attained.
Section V
SPECIAL MORAL VALUES
(first group)
CHAPTER XVIII (xliii)
THE VIRTUES IN GENERAL
What was true of the basic moral values, is true also of the
more special ones, the virtues. They are the values of h uman
conduct itself ; and as conduct extends over very different kinds
of situation, they necessarily show a rich variety, differentiated
according to theif material. •
T What is common to them all is the valuational mart of virtue
a# such, as the good connected with certain relations. Among
them the proposition holds necessarily, that moral values are
based upon situational values, that is, that they attach to the
intention’ which is directed to valuable situations, and that
their specific character as compared with the latter is neverthe-
less independent of the connection. As regards method, this
point is of importance here; for the virtues are distinguished in
content according to the situational value. Ever since Aristotle,
who approached the smgle virtues everywhere with the question
concerning the rrepl rl (“with what the conduct is connected”),
the attempt has been made to distinguish them in this circuitousi
way. For every virtue has a different situational value in view.
This is the 1 traditional method of procedure.
Of course there is a certain danger here, namely, •■that in
considering the situation one might lose sight of the virtue.
When one is new to this kind of analysis, one continually
forged Jhat the conditioned value is at best but indirectly
indicated by the value which conditions it but is in no way
determined in valuational quality by the latter. In facf, even
the conditioning relation itself does not permit of being brought
into a dpflhite scheme; it varies with the variety of content
itself. And the specific characteristic can be here disdosed,
as everywhere else, only by the living sense of values, or by
its way of expressing itself, the response and the predicate.
The conditioning relation *can offer here only .an access,
Ethws — II > P
2*6 , THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
an approach of the valuational sense itself to its object, the
moral value.
To give a complete diagram of the virtues would mean to
exhaust the realm of moral values. That is a task which cannot
be carried out. There is no question of doing so. We can only
pick out what the consciousness of the age has elaborated and
has to a certain extent made palpable. But we must entirely
leave out of consideration what has been understood by the
“doctrine of virtue”; to such a doctrine belongs not only a
description of the virtues, but even instruction as to their
actualization. Instruction of this kind has at all times missed
its aim and inevitably, for no one becomes good through instruc-
tion. Such instruction everyone of morally fine discrimination
has always dismissed, not only as arrogance but as a trifling
with what is highest and most serious, as that which has
degraded even the words “moral” and “virtue” into something
tiresome and half ridiculous. Ethics has no occasion to
“moralize.” Everyone can provide himself with a “doctrine of
virtue.” But the moral values themselves permit of being simply
pointed out within the limits of the current valuational vision,
without reference to their practical tendencies.
An historical survey shows that several specific groups of
virtues can be distinguished, but that between them the inter-
mediate members are evidently still lacking. We must seize
upon the values, where and how we can, at the risk of losing
their unity in their variety and of making mistakes as to their
gradational order. Thus in the following presentation three
groups are to be discriminated. For the first two a basic value
can be assigned (justice and brotherly love), about which the
others “cluster. The first corresponds nearest to the ethos of
antiquity, the second to that of Christianity. But both are
undoubtedly much richer in content than would appear from a
limited numerical survey. Here there is no question as to com-
pleteness, but as to the quality of the manifold values, as to the
contrasting character of the groups, the valuational relations
produced, the conflicts between values, and so on. Besides all
THE VIRTUES IN GENERAL
327
this the gradational order remains as an important desideratum.
But this is difficult to trace, at least in the present state of
research.
The following analyses do not go beyond the task outlined
above. The seriousness and positive nature of the moral
problems concerning value permit of nothing else. Every
ovgtstepping of this boundary — and the older doctrines of
virtue have always overstepped it — must degenerate into the
Ambiguity of “moralizing.” For us the only question is con-'
ceming the vaiuational quality of the single virtue itself, so far
as it can be seen and defined. The greater the variety which
can herg be surveyed, the closer shall we approach to the
general character of the realm of values.
CHAPTER XIX (xliv)
JUSTICE
(a) Law, Equality and Personal Justice
The Platonic system of virtues culminated in justice
(Sucatocruvr]). It was to be a sort of crown to -self-control,
courage and wisdom. This was in harmony with Plato’s funda-
mental interest in the value of the community. In itself this
arrangement does not inhere in the essence of the four virtues.
But justice retains the central position in the group. We
accordingly give it the first place here.
The primary significance of justice is its tendency to counter-
act the crude egoism of the individual. As regards the good
things of life the egoist’s standpoint is: everything for me,
whether anything remains over for others or not. Against
this, justice maintains : not everything for me, but the same for
myself and others. All grievous sinning against one’s fellow-man,
whether against body, life, property, social status, reputation
or honour, finds in this fundamental attitude a complete check.
The essential feature in it is from the outset the idea of equality:
equal rights, equal duty with others, whether the individual
or the whole of the community, on the principle that this is
the basic condition of all communal life.
As regards its contents this principle may mean various things.
To the ancients it meant primarily only this : equal with equals ;
which involved the reverse side: unequal with unequals. The
principle does not then extend its authority beyond the current
inequality of the given individuals. Against this position there
was a widening of the claim, under the influence of Christianity,
until it meant: equal rights for all. That signifies: however
unlik e men may be in character, disposition or social position,
there exists a court of appeal, before which they are all equal.
This idea of equality is a strictly idealistic demand; it does
229
JUSTICE
not deny the differences, nor does it extend to all the relations
of life, but only to quite definite ones, to certain fundamental
interests and primal rights of mankind in general. All positive
law seeks to formulate these elementary rights in their various
ramifications. A violation of them is injustice, and according to
their intent men “ought” to be equal. But the justification of
this'demand for equality implies that even the man who violates
it in fact makes a claim upon it for his own person, and therefore
goes counter to his own interest in violating it. Who steals
another’s property, claims that it is now his property — which
is only possible where in general property is held to be
inviolable. The criminal by his deed denies the legal basis
upon which he himself rests in the temporary advantage
accruing from his deed. In practice he excludes himself from
the very law which he puts into requisition.
Justice is not objective right, nor even ideal right. At best
the latter is the object of the just man’s intention. But ordinary
language adds to the confusion. In the wider sense, a law, an
arrangement, an established order of things can be “just,” in
so far as it tallies with the idea of the right. But in this sense the
word “just” does not mean a moral value of a person. Here the
carrier of the value is not a person at all ; the value, although
human conduct may first have made it actual, is that of an
object; it is a situational value, a good for someone. In this
sense all positive and all ideal right is valuable. But in another
sense the man is “just” who does right or aims to do it, and
sees and treats his fellowmen in the light of the equality that is
required, whether in disposition or in conduct. In this case
“justice” is the value of a person, it is a moral value.
(b) Doing Wrong and Suffering Wrong
This point comes to clear expression in Plato’s attack in the
Gorgias and the Republic upon the sophistical conception of
justice. The Sophists, Callicles and Thrasymachus appear as
champions of a kind of morality of power, according to which
230
THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
the “just” is that which is useful for the stronger person but is
disadvantageous for the weaker. One might describe this as
the natural, the pre-moral view. One can also separate it from
the morality of power and universalize it. Established law has
merely the significance of means, man’s legal sense has merely
that of consequences, for instance, protection against outside
aggression. The greatest injury is to suffer wrong. “Good”
means to maintain one’s rights, “bad” to surrender them.
Here only the situational value of justice is meant. This is quite
right, but it is not the moral meaning of justice.
Over against it Plato advances the thesis: to suffer wrong
is better than to do wrong. At a flash the moral value is revealed.
To enjoy justice is a great good, but nothing more. To do
justice, on the other hand, is a value of a totally different kind.
It is not a good, but a moral dignity of the person instead.
Nothing brings this more fully to expression than the Platonic
dictum: The man who suffers wrong, may still be 729 times
as happy as he who does wrong. This sounds like a joke. But
the meaning is clear: the value of being just is simply not
commensurable with that of experiencing another’s justice —
it is on a wholly different plane. No suffering of an injustice
justifies a man m violating justice.
Thus we can understand how Plato could assign to justice
the highest place in the scale of moral values. If virtue consists
in right conduct toward one’s fellow-man, it is reasonable to
allow justice to pass as the sum of virtue. Still the three other
Platonic virtues have more the quality of a merely inner dis-
position, at least as compared with justice.
(c) Justice as the Lowest and Most Elementary
Moral Value
Plato did not overestimate justice. The discovery of the moral
value proper to it, in the ethics of Socrates and Plato, could
not be placed too high in their newly awakened consciousness
of value. Still, what was quite right in the Platonic ethics is
231
JUSTICE
not tenable for a widened survey. If one adds the variety of
moral values which since then have been disclosed — and that
on the basis of the original discovery — one must reverse the
proposition. Among the virtues proper, justice is to be classed
not as the highest, but rather as the lowest.
This is seen in the fact that in justice the Ought-to-Be puts
forth not the maximum of moral demand, but quite evidently
the minimum. Its claim upon a man’s conduct is purely
negative : not to do injustice, to commit no transgression, not
to encroach upon another’s liberty, not to injure another nor
anything that belongs to him. It is this which is unmistakably
expressed in the Commandments of the second table of the
Decalogue; they are prohibitions: Thou shalt not murder,
steal, co mmit adultery, bear false witness nor covet what is
not thine. If that is the whole meaning of morality, its tendency
is merely conservative, not constructive. The one concern is
the protection of the lower, the elementary goods : life, property,
family, and so on. If that is the whole of justice, then it is only
a means to those goods-values.
Of course that by no means exhausts the essence of justice.
In the first place, behind those goods-values is hidden some-
thing of positive moral value, the sphere of personal freedom.
Justice merges into respect for this. But beyond it there rises
something still greater. Law with its objective order and
equality, as the just man strives for it, is indeed a court of
protection, but by no means merely of the lower goods-values,
but also and pre-eminently of the higher and the highest
values, which are not directly affected by its arrangements.
The higher spiritual, the communal and cultural values one
and all can flourish only where body, life, property, personal
freedom of action, and the like, are secured. There only is
scope found for the higher purposes. Justice, then, makes
room in the sphere of actuality for the higher values. The
more diversified moral life cannot begin, till the simple con-
ditions are supplied. Justice is the moral tendency to supply
these conditions. It is the prerequisite of all further realiza-
232
THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
tions of value. At the same time it is the pioneer among the
virtues. Justice is the minimum of morality that paves the way
for all the higher forms.
( d ) Legality and Morality
Consonant with its being a minimum is the fact that the
objective content of justice, law, permits of being pressed into
fixed formulae, of being codified, and even within certain
limits where it is not voluntarily fulfilled by individuals, of
being enforced by a public power watching over its fulfilment.
Such fixation and such enforcement go counter to the
meaning of morality, the essence of which consists precisely
in the freedom of fulfilment from instance to instance and in
the spontaneous finding of the right. A commandment authori-
tative and leaving nothing undetermined is not a moral com-
mandment at all. The disposition does not permit its aims to
be prescribed from without, not to mention forced into
actualization. But it is just this which legality would do; the
legal claim does not appeal to the disposition but looks ex-
clusively to the action. Legality is not morality; legal force
leads only to the former, not to the latter. But the lower goods
are of so elemental an importance — simply because they
constitute the basis of all higher valuational reality — that they
need such a stronger weapon of defence. For them the good
will, so easily deficient, is not an adequate security.
This does not preclude the possibility that the minimal and
predominantly negative stratum of requirements can be
purposed and achieved without force, that is, from a genuinely
moral disposition, for their own sake. Such purpose and such
fulfilment are naturally the moral ideal, which is involved in
all legal claims. In this instance, morality in content coincides
with legality. And only in this case is man’s moral attitude
“just” in the narrower, moral sense of the word. All voluntary
subjection, all genuine obedience to the existing order and
the laws, all real virtue of the citizen as such — from simple
JUSTICE *33
unerring honesty and truthfulness up to unhesitating sacrifice —
all this rests upon such an attitude of mind.
This is the ethically decisive factor in justice. Its moral
distinction lies not at all in the direction of the objective
situation, public or private, towards which the intention issues,
but in its value as a disposition of the person. Here also, as
everywhere else, the moral value of the intention is not the
same as the intended value, however important this may be.
Justice as a value of the disposition is indeed based upon the
situational value of the legal order ; but this dependence does
not constitute the value peculiar to the disposition. The will
to justice is a value, and as such, independently of the inci-
dental value of what it demands, protects or secures. The will
to justice is right, even when the intention is objectively
wrong, when the situational value of the law has been mis-
understood — exactly as it is right independently of the conse-
quence. The rightly disposed man respects the property of
another, but not because as a material piece of goods it is
worth so much; also he respects it not in proportion to its
relative height in the scale of goods, but because it is the
property of another and as such sets an absolute limit to his
possessive intention. Between persons and their rightful
spheres there exists a dividing line. It is the sphere as such
which is respected.
But even here the objective and inherent value of the sphere
does not yet constitute the moral value of the self-limiting
intention; a new value appears, that of the intention itself. The
free commitment to the right, the inner conquest of contrary
impulses of desire and fear, of ambition and will to power, are as
regards value incomparably higher than all situational values,
which can ensue upon such a commitment. It is this which
lifts justice immeasurably above the mere utility of means and
constitutes the awe-inspiring element in a simple life of homely
justice. In the objective law this moral value remai n s latent.
The juridical point of view cannot recognize this distinction
between legality and morality. The distinction does not he in
*34
THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
the action— in the action the two are indistinguishable; but the
inner disposition is withdrawn from any human judge.
( e ) Law and Solidarity
There is a still deeper connection between justice as a virtue
and justice as an objective order in the community. Justice as a
situational value adheres not alone to the individual as a carrier,
but also to the collective unit. It is a value which is actualized
in the community. The regulation which it establishes is for
the community as such. The objective forms in political, civil,
penal law, and the like, are moral creations of individual peoples,
in which each people actualizes in its own being the idea of law,
as it understands the idea. These creations express the moral
attitude of a people exactly as his judgments express the disposi-
tion of an individual man. And so far there is something more
in legal institutions than mere situational values.
This view is limited by the fact that a community as such
never attains to full personality, that moral initiative even in
the creation of law always rests ultimately in the mind of the
individual, however much the individual may be bound by the
voluntary co-operation of others. Co-operation itself is, once
more, just such a primal act of individual initiative. Finally
it comes to this, that the individual holds a twofold position
in regard to the law current in the community. On the one side,
Jie is the one affected by the legal arrangements, the one who
owes submission to them, and at the same time enjoys their
protection; on the other side, he is there also as a law-giver,
who, either directly or indirectly, participates creatively in the
continual process of legal development in the community. He
also has his share in the responsibility for the existing law.
This joint responsibility is the inevitable reverse side of his
subjection; otherwise this latter would contradict his personal
freedom, the preservation of which is inherent in the very
meaning of law. The consciousness of such joint responsibility
is the second moral factor of importance in the individual as
335
JUSTICE
a member of the community. It is the foundation of his legal
and civil solidarity with the mass of others similarly placed.
This solidarity is the deepest formative factor in the historical
life of peoples. It is also the primal element in the ethical being
of the citizen of a State ; and wherever it is strong and outweighs
the special claims of the individual, the community flourishes
upon it. Its decline spells downfall. The history of the Roman
Republic with its classical blossoming of the communal life is
an instructive instance of the rise and fall of solidarity. This
solidarity, which consists in the unhesitating devotion of the
individual person to the whole, is a genuine virtue. For it is a
dispositional value in separate persons, even if the greatness of
its influence is first manifested in its communal effects.
For our modem sentiment this value is not fused with that of
justice. But for the ancient Greek it blended throughout with
Swccuoowij, it constituted its essential element, as it was tacitly
assumed. The ancient ethics never brought it, as such, fully
into consciousness.
In idea there is more contained in solidarity than the joint
responsibility for the whole. Joint responsibility for the indi-
vidual is also contained therein, indeed for the individual even
when he goes astray and violates the common right. To punish
the criminal, to render him innocuous, to kill or banish him,
is an embarrassing duty for the one who, jointly responsible,
has to fulfil it, that is, ultimately for every citizen. The various
attempts at penal theory, which for all their differences are
equally unsatisfactory, fail at this point, because they start
exclusively from the position of the collective unit and from
responsibility for it, while they leave out of account responsi-
bility for the criminal, a responsibility which has in itself
exactly the same import. But if we consider that in the criminal
a citizen has been lost to the community, who as such is at the
same time an appointed law-giver, the situation is changed,
and the question as to responsibility for the criminal becomes
very serious. It behoves that he be won back to the com-
munity, that he be rehabilitated legally and civilly; and
2 3 6 THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
atonement through punishment is seen to be the means to
this end.
As to the question of guilt it is important to arrive at the
final ground for it, its super-individual, social ground. This
question coincides with that concerning joint responsibility.
For if the criminal acts from need, he is of course not excused,
but the guilt then falls not upon him alone ; it touches those also
who tolerate the public condition which engenders or prolongs
the need. The idea of joint responsibility leads to the question
as to “whether the criminal has not lost his orientation in the
collective unit because the State as compared with him is only
a majority” (that is, only a party, only a group). If his sphere of
liberty was too narrowly confined by the view of the empirical
“majority,” “the moral problem arises for the State as to a
widening of the limits, therefore as to an adaptation in the most
genuine sense to the criminal, who in truth had orientated
himself in the collective unit, but not in the defective repre-
sentation of the collective unit.” 1
If we bear in mind that the State together with its legal
institutions is a structure continually undergoing an inner
revolution and never attaining finality, so that there are always
individual cases in which something inadequate is visible in it
and in which a new formation should be striven for — if we bear
this in'mind, the revision of the existing law appears as an
inevitable consequence of the universal legislative trusteeship, a
revision issuing from the solidarity of all with all (including
even the criminal), from that solidarity which rests on the idea
of justice. In fact all have a share in the guilt of each individual.
And all are called to bring about that transformation of things
which is required by the sense of justice.
This solidarity is a disposition of the individual ; but never-
theless it is a disposition which he can have only in connection
with the collective unit. And in so far it is at the same time a
1 The sentences cited are taken from M. Salomon, Die Idee der.
Strife, in Philosophuche Abhandlungen (H. Cohen, Berlin, 1912),
p. 241.
JUSTICE 237
value of the community, just as justice in general is. But, besides
all this, solidarity is also a claim made in the same way upon
all, it is something wherein men ought to be equal and ought
to feel themselves equal. Solidarity is therefore a strictly
universal value. Indeed, it is the strictest and most absolute
value conceivable in its universality, because the uniformity of
the dominant moral claim inheres in its very essence. If one
takes it in the complete fulness of the moral tasks which it
imposes^ this uniformity loses immediately every trace of
schematism; it does not in the least exclude the diversities of
claim, their vividness and their perpetual novelty from case
to case. On the contrary, in it alone does the rigidity of the
objective meaning of law and justice become relaxed. Through
solidarity man outgrows himself, by devotion to his perpetual
task as the architect of the community and the creator of law.
CHAPTER XX (xlv)
WISDOM
(a) The Ethical Meaning of So < j>ia and Sapientia
Plato regarded aoj>la as the virtue of a part of the soul,
although of its highest part ; with Aristotle it is already supreme
as the dianoetic virtue; but from the Stoics onward the whole
contents of ethics is treated under the “ideal of the wise man.”
In this historical process aoj>la becomes more and more a
concept embracing every virtue.
It is not to be wondered at that in this way its special mean-
ing was lost sight of, and that finally there remained only a
form pale in colour, which could at times becdme a mirror of
virtue, at times a repellent phantom of morally good men.
Yet despite every absurdity which arose in this process of
profanation, there is hidden in oofta a high and genuinely
ethical ideal, a moral quality of a unique kind. One can easily
conceive of it as the exact opposite of justice, the contents of
which refers to the community. Wisdom has no such reference.
In tendency it is wider.
It has only a peripheral contact with the intellectual values
of insight, truth and knowledge. These appear in it as instru-
mental values, but they are remote from its essence. For this
reason alone Aristotle’s conception of it as dianoetic was a
mistake. Through it one was drawn hazardously near to
contemplative self-indulgence and unpractical remoteness from
the world. In the practical significance of wisdom there is a
complete rapport with the world, a sensing of everything which
contains value.
Yet it does not consist in mere valuational lucidity or a
priori ethical intuition, just as little as in the mere foresight
of the practical consciousness (prudentia), which, taken by
itself, is only worldly shrewdness and has no value as a dis*
position at all. Likewise it is an error to see its meaning in a
WISDOM
239
synthesis of these factors, in an orientation of life, as it were,
to the many sides of value. Even that would still be too near
to intellectual insight. As a virtue, it can be only a fundamental
and really moral commitment, a primal direction of acts. None
of those factors, in so far as they pertain to their own kind of
value, can be properly attributed to the person; they are a
matter of individual endowment or of involuntary perception.
Only to a very limited degree does the responsibility for their
failure fall upon the man himself.
In wisdom the disposition is a special kind of commitment of
the man to life in general, whether his own or that of others.
We come a step nearer to it when we start from the literal
meaning of the term with which the Latins translated the
word aofoa: sapientia. Through it resounds distinctly the
sapere (to taste). Sapientia is moral taste, and indeed fine,
differentiated, discriminating, cultivated taste, the refinement
of moral capacity, in so far as this capacity, directed towards
fulness of life, signifies appreciation of everything and an
affirming, evaluating, attitude towards whatever is of value.
This is fundamentally different from knowledge, insight, fore-
sight or circumspection. It is the penetration of the valuational
sense into life, into all discrimination, into every reaction and
action; even down to the spontaneous valuational responses
which accompany every experience ; it is the fulfilment of one’s
whole ethical Being with its points of view, the fixed and basic
attitude of the practical consciousness towards values. In a
strictly anti-intellectualistic sense one might indeed call it
ethical spirituality, the attitude of the ethos as the ultimate
spiritual factor in humanity, dominating the whole life.
( b ) The Socratic Ideal of Life
Socratic self-knowledge is the first fruit of this attitude. Only
upon it do the more positive valuational factors rise. Although
it is negative, self-knowledge has nothing in common with
fear, remorse, despair, despondency. On the contrary, a certain
240 THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
dispassionateness in looking upon oneself is peculiar to it.
It signifies knowledge exactly at that point where it is most
difficult, where all our natural tendencies check objectivity of
knowledge — knowledge of one’s own ethical Non-being, failure
and short-coming. The ethical import of this knowledge can
be measured by the value of that which it brings with it, the
right appreciation of the moral life which is demanded, the
appreciation of what a man ought to be.
Here the Socratic proposition that there is knowledge
inherent in virtue is justified, but of course without the
exaggeration which identifies virtue with knowledge. On the
contrary, genuine self-knowledge sets the limit even to this
error of intellectualism, and it does so not only in theory but
in the moral perception of the individual. Here knowledge
itself counteracts all over-valuation of mere knowledge. It does
so, as it is a knowledge of the fact that no insight into the good is
sufficient to make a man good, that insight must be reinforced
by volition, determination, active energy and self-mastery.
The attitude of the wise man is the commitment which is
directed from out the modesty of his self-knowledge to the
ethical values. It is therefore not the direction towards values
in general, as goodness is, nor indeed towards the higher value;
wisdom does not coincide with goodness, although it lies in
the same general direction. To it belongs pre-eminently the
preservation in one’s own person of moral “taste” in its objec-
tivity, and indeed not by paying attention to it, but in every
transient intention. This it is before all else, which constitutes
the distinguished feature of lucidity and calm, of inward
superiority and spiritual mastery, the feature which makes
itself unmistakably felt in the ancient ethos of aofoa, even in
its onesidedness. To the wise man the domination of values in
their ideality (the domination, in Platonic phrase, of moral Ideas)
is something natural. Motives and ends of other kinds fall into
the background. In this sense Plato was right when he joined
this virtue to the beholding of Ideas, and indeed in such a way
that a man, returning from the vision of ideas, sees in their
WISDOM
241
light everything which appears to him in life. The wise man
carries into all the relations of life the standards of value which
he possesses in his spiritual “taste,” Jie saturates his outlook
upon life with them. This domination of values does not come
to him by way of reflection, or through knowledge of com-
mandments, but is an immediate, intuitive, emotionally toned
domination, which from the centre of moral perception pene-_
trates all unobserved and impulsive excitations, and is there-
fore already alive in them.
In the figure of Socrates, which for centuries has fixed
our ideal of the wise man, there is still a second factor, which
has been of service in the evolution of our conception. The man
who took the words “Know thyself” as the motto of his life,
describes himself as the bearer of an inner voice, which warns
him prophetically when he is on the point of doing wrong. He
calls it divine, his “daimon.” There has been much dispute as
to the nature of this daimon. But so much is certain: it is a
kind of ethical divination, a foreboding presentiment of the
wider perspective, in so far as this is not included in the given
situation. For the wise man the intuitive grasping of the
situation is in part determined by this wider perspective, by
that of the Idea. The understanding of the significance of a
situation depends upon the perspective in which it is seen.
The larger the perspective, the deeper the insight into the
situation. Ethical divination is the bestowal of meaning. For
at bottom it is the living sense of value — but obscure, fore-
boding, not yet clear as to content. With a thousand tentacles
the wise man reaches out beyond himself and his own limited
understanding; he does not live in what he already knows of
himself, but always a span beyond. This is the strict meaning
of sapientia.
(c) Ethical Optimism and the Capacity for Happiness
It goes without saying that fulness of the prophetic sense
augments the power to evaluate situations, whether it be as
Ethics — II q
242
THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
active construction or as mere participation. And this reacts
upon the attitude of the wise man and upon his general estima-
tion of life. His total mental outlopk is an intelligent optimism.
Of course not one that is eudaemonistic, but one that is
genuinely- ethical, a sense of the presence of inexhaustible
riches. The wise man is he who is open-minded towards every
yalue and is recipient, always learning more, never ceasing to
‘Investigate. Everything administers to his moral growth and
heightens the potential value of his own life, although at this
he is not aiming ; and at the same time, in so far as he influences
others, they also receive an access of spiritual power.
The attitude of the wise man towards the life and personality
of others is by no means exhausted in right action. It is an
interest of a distinct land, a desire to understand another
from within, a surrender to the values peculiar to him. The
wise man has the rare virtue of wishing to understand before
he understands, of giving credit, even where he fails to under-
stand. When we consider how the lack of the wish to under-
stand prevents our doing so, and on the other hand how great
is the spiritual need of all those who their life long yearn in
vain to be understood by one single soul, it becomes easy for
us to appreciate how one truly wise man among the unwise
may bring salvation, freedom and happiness. He is the bom
friend, the spiritual helper. And not less is he the moral leader,
the educator. The guidance of another’s life does not consist
in burdening him with requirements, but in directing him to
the personal values in himself which he has not understood.
Even in this there is ethical divination which extends the vision
beyond the limits of what is actually seen.
However little the optimism of the wise man is eudaemonistic
in theory, it nevertheless brings him near to real happiness.
The proposition of the ancients, that the wise man is the happy
man, does not point out the ethical kernel of wisdom, but it
is true all the same. It calls attention to the natural effect of
ootya. Calmness and clearness of vision, a loving recognition
of the individuality and intrinsic merit of others, are the
WISDOM
243
extreme opposite of the hunt for happiness, and therefore of
any sort of eudsemonism proper. But it is of the essence of
happiness that it always comes to him who does not pursue it. r
He combines with a heart for ideals the modesty to which
extravagant expectations are as alien as is indifference to
genuine values, or envy or resentment. He does not take
another’s happiness as his standard, but his own claim to
happmess; this, however, in the case of one who lives under K
strict self-criticism, is always greatly exceeded by the abun-
dance of the happiness which real life offers. Cynic philosophy
with its extreme depreciation of demands upon life is an
exaggeration of this principle, as is also the Stoic doctrine of
self-sufficiency (avrapKeia), Yet in the tendency to be inde-
pendent of external goods is seen a genuine characteristic of
the wise man. And, if stripped of its exaggeration, the Epi-
curean ideal is no less right; it commends the acceptance of
the happiness near at hand. The wise man does not spend his
life in grasping, but in appreciating with fine feeling the
various values of life and participating in them continually and
wisely. He lives in the fulness of life ; whatever he understands
and knows how to appreciate, belongs to him. When viewed
from within, the comprehending perception, the living appre-
ciation and the expansion of the mind with the richness of
reality, are increments in spiritual wealth.
In this synthesis of the Stoic and Epicurean ideal is found
the true concept of the wise man. A sense of reality, guided
by a sense of its values, is the secret of the wise man. With
him, to overlook the fulness of values is just as much a sin
against life as to make Utopian claims which are incapable of
being gratified. Pure joy in everything which is worthy of joy
has its criterion in the unenvious delight one takes in the happi-
ness of others, which is denied to oneself, and in the admiring
recognition one gives to superiority in others. It culminates
ultimately in a deep sentiment of gratitude, in a great and
profound sense of reverential wonder at the richness of life,
x Cf. Chapter X(/.), Vol.I.
244 THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
To the wise man the real world is infinitely richer than that of
fiction or imaginat ion. He lives in the consciousness of his own
littleness and narrowness, of his backwardness and his inability
to exhaust the resources of life. He sees himself as one who is
too rich, who is overwhelmed, and whose power to receive is
not equal to the gifts bestowed. His cup is already overflowing,
Jiis capacity is exceeded by his possessions. And in that he in
this way exercises unintentionally an influence as an example,
he is a true educator of men in inner spiritual freedom and in
the one true happiness.
CHAPTER XXI (xlvi)
COURAGE
( a ) Personal Commitment and Moral Adventure
Wisdom is a value which spurs man on to the choice of ends;
bravery, to the execution of them. The former lies in the
valuational direction of the fulness of life; the latter, in that
of strength and freedom, activity and the ability to suffer.
The wisest outlook is morally impotent unless active energy,
which is ready to cope with obstacles, reinforces it, especially
when one’s own life, welfare and happiness must be risked.
The most conspicuous form in which this value manifests
itself is outward bravery, the ability to stake one’s life, the
spontaneous facing of extreme danger, the standing at one’s
post, or manliness (avSpela, virtus), as the ancients called it.
In the early war-waging period of a nation’s life this is held
to be synonymous with all virtue.
But it is more general still. It inheres in all decisive effort,
in all steadfast perseverance, in all quietly persistent tenacity;
that is, wherever there is an element of adventure in a situation,
which requires personal commitment and demands sacrifice.
Perhaps there is something of it in all genuine effort, at least
so far as adventure enters into it. In this more general sense
avSpeta means courage.
Indicative of its separateness as a value is the fact that it
is independent of the value of the objects for which the com-
mitment is made. A brave act can be worthy of a better cause,
as was Cataline’s. We may therefore morally condemn the
object and still morally admire the high spirit which is devoted
to it. This independence of its object has no connection with
that caricature of bravery, impetuous foolhardiness, the
gambling with danger (which can become mere delight in
excitement). On the one hand, there is genuine bravery; and,
although the object be a bad one, yet, subjectively, faith in it
THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
246
is the presupposition of the commitment. On the other hand,
foolhardiness has only an outward resemblance to it. In it
the principal thing is lacking, the felt seriousness of the com-
mitment and the seriousness, although only presumed, of the
object in view. Nothing but the deliberate entering into the
danger of a project, a staking one’s life upon it — which is
reasonable only if the value of the project is more precious
than one’s own life — is genuine fortitude in the sense of this
distinctively moral value.
Even in its most primitive stage it has the characteristic
of self-conquest. But it can rise until it is a capacity to deny
oneself and to take delight in sacrifice. Here the paradox is
due to the fact that the increase in fortitude and active energy-
keeps pace with the increase in the resistance offered. It is a
special mark of genuine bravery that it is not diminished with
the greatness of the opposition, of the venture and the danger,
but grows and is at the same time strengthened by it. It is as
if ever new moral powers were liberated, as the burden becomes
heavier.
Ethically this psychologically puzzling phenomenon is very
easy to understand. At bottom fortitude is an act of freedom.
But freedom is never a fact existing beforehand; it is always
awakened in the given conflict, and indeed in proportion to its
greatness. In this particular no one can know himself before
life puts him to the test. Many a man honestly believes himself
in the highest degree brave, and yet fails under the first stress
of circumstance. Many a one is timid, so long as no great
emergency arises, but at the critical moment proves himself
to be strong and steadfast. What, then, comes to light is a sort
of individual sterling quality that was hidden. It is this which
constitutes the virtue of bravery.
( b ) Moral Value and the Delight in Responsibility
Hazardous enterprise is always the acceptance not only of
actual consequences but of moral responsibility. This may be
COURAGE
347
of many kinds, according to what it is that the person stakes.
It need not be life and limb, it may be another’s welfare,
happiness or destiny In this case is added to the free deter-
mination of one’s own fate that of others. Here fortitude takes
on the significance — ethically more profound — of the will-to-
assume-responsibility, the courage to be under obligation.
Wherever a man’s circumstances place him in a position of
leadership, the courage to act is a function of the capacity to
assume responsibility and to delight in it. To determine
another’s life — and this is demanded by the circumstance of
the ordinary man from day to day — is for everyone who is not
lac king in conscience, incomparably the greater adventure, the
severer test of courage. For here guilt is the danger which he
exposes himself to. Nevertheless, one who rejoices m responsi-
bility, who runs the risk of guilt, is morally the greater, while
one who fights shy of responsibility is less worthy— he is
cowardly. It depends upon moral courage; with that the issue
rests.
In fact, all courage to act is at the same time fortitude in
suffering, in the bearing of consequences, of disaster and guilt.
In the case of illustrious examples this is well known, as in
the tragedy of heroism and moral greatness. It is less evident
in the conflicts of ordinary life. Still the principle is the same
here as there. Every actual conflict demands the courage of
deciding. The moral coward is always prone to remam in-
active, to let things go, not reflecting that he thereby — and
indeed especially thereby — incurs guilt. He preserves only the
appearance of not having been a participant; in truth, what it
was in his power to change remains a charge upon him. Self-
deception hides from him his moral self-indulgence and his
incapacity to take the initiative and to assume responsibility.
Moral life is a venture and requires courage at every turn.
Along with the courageous deed must be classed the courageous
word, conviction and opinion, bravery in truth, confession and
thought ; and not less, courage towards oneself and one’s real
feelings, one’s own personality, the courage of great emotions,
248 THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
of love, of fateful passion (the special field of false shame, fear
of public opinion, a cowardly hiding of oneself). Indeed there
is such a thing as the courage to live, to undergo experiences,
to see things through and know their quality, not less than
the courage to be happy. Thus it comes about that merely
participant wisdom refers us step by step to the complementary
virtue of courage.
CHAPTER XXII* (xlvii)
SELF-CONTROL
(a) aax^poavvq AND iyKpareia
What the ancients called aco<f>poenjw) has been set in a false
light by being ordinarily translated as circumspection. It does
not refer to deliberation, but to spiritual proportion and sym-
metry, to the restraint of destructive excess and to the moral
strength of self-control. This is best expressed by the Stoic
conception of ey/cpareia, which means: having oneself in
hand; being master of oneself.
Antiquity brought it into close connection with oro<j>ia and
dvSpeia. Both of these reappear as elements in it, the one asi
guiding, the other as giving strength. But, as compared with*
both, it is an entirely new and distinctive value. For it is not
concerned with guidance or strength as such, but with the
subordination of one’s own inner life to them. Nor is the point
which is here in question personal devotion to a cause, but the
rejection of inward excess for one’s own sake, self-limitation
as an independent value, the combating of exuberance, of inner
turmoil, in the interest of inward harmony.
Self-control is by no means to be understood as purely
negative, as a rejection and suppression, as if the natural were
nothing but evil. It is the inner construction and transforma-
tion of everything natural in man, of all the obscure powers
which he finds present there, which, rising up out of the un-
conscious depths, confront consciousness as something real.
Instincts, impulses, emotions, passions are in themselves by no
means neutral in value, though they are primarily and strictly
neutral. In content and power they constitute a mighty material,
constructive and destructive, an inner world, which, like the
outer world, waits to be exploited.
Only too long has the Stoic notion of the badness and per-
250 THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
nidousness of the feelings prevailed in ethics. Its consequence
was the demand for the extermination or deadening of emo-
tions. This ascetic ideal was encouraged by the Christian view
that human nature is radically sinful. If desires are no thin g
but disturbances or weaknesses in man, the result was inevitable
-that morality should adopt the unnatural ideal of asceticism.
We have already considered 1 the serious misunderstanding at
the root of asceticism, concerning not only h uman nature in
general but also concerning an autonomous value, that of life
itself, the manifest form of which it absolutely denies. But the
fact that asceticism likewise loses altogether the ethical mean-
ing of uioSpoovvrj requires a chapter by itself.
In the first place, it is psychologically false. The affections
and everything which in kind belongs to them are the root cf
our emotional life, of our spiritual strength; they are the sub-
stance of the inner content of life, the basis of its fulness. With
its eradication the spiritual life itself would be eradicated
Hence the ethical penury of asceticism.
But in the second place it is false ethically. Every genuine
Ought is positive. It demands not destruction but construc-
tion, the creation of the higher out of the lower. Out of
“nothing” no value can be actualized. The world of desires is
the material for the building of the inner life; of course in
itself it is not unshaped, but it is of a lower kind of structure.
If this be destroyed, all formation becomes impossible.
The only tenable meaning of the situational value pre-
supposed in cruxftpocrvvq is exactly the opposite of extermination;
it is reconstruction, the unfoldment of the affective life itself,
its completion, its organic transformation, its advancement
into harmony, the fostering and protection of its bloom. For
this safeguarding no more emanates from the affective life
itself than does its harmony. The psycho-physical character of
the affective impulses is tyrannical; every one of them tends
to crowd out the others and to extend itself at their cost. This
conservative strength of the emotional energies is an mn^r
1 Cf. Chapter XI ( b ), Vol. II.
SELF-CONTROL a Sl
danger, man is menaced by them from within. We might say
that their equipoise is for ever unstable. Its stabilization must
come from some other quarter.
The negative side of self-control is directed exclusively
against excess, lack of balance, the state of being divided
against oneself. Its positive aspect is eytcpdreia in the strict
sense, as the possession of power over affective impulses, the
virtue of inward right proportion, of positive transformation
of the emotional life and its appraisement from points of view
that unify and guide. It is a kind of inward setting of one's
house in order, a lawfulness and rightfulness in one’s spiritual
modus vivendi — similar to SiKaioovvr) in the outer life. With the
ancients, in so far as they did not lose their bearings through
asceticism, ouxfipoovvjj culminated in the inward reconciling
beauty of the man whose character was completed and had
become steadfast, in KaXoKdyadla. Nothing is so radically con-
trary to this ideal as the Stoic blunting and coarsening of the
emotions, simply for the sake of serenity and of the ability
to endure everything. Far more akin to it is the Epicurean
refinement, the enrichment, the rounding out of the emotional
life, ultimately the enhancement of the capacity for enjoy-
ment in the sense of ethical “good taste” (of sapientia), although
the eudaemonism involved in it lacks the objectivity and unique
character of self-control, as a moral quality of the disposition.
( b ) Obedience, Discipline, the Education of Character
A peculiarity of this virtue is that in a high degree it can be
acquired and developed, and can even be induced in others.
This is due to its essential character; it consists in becoming
master inwardly over that part of man’s nature which in itself
is without a master. It is perhaps the lowest value among the
virtues (it was already so appraised by Plato); it is the least
claim which a man must impose upon himself; yet upon it, as
a basis, do the higher moral tasks rest. According to Aristotle
it attains only the level of the “not bad.” That may be an
zgz THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
exaggeration; weneed only to "regard it in comparison with
the Hi gh ethos of bravery and wisdom — which can become
heroism or moral greatness — in order to feel the difference in
valuational height.
Nevertheless the attainment of it is by no means on that
•account easy and native to everyone who, according to his
perso nal constitution, satisfies the requirements of many a
higher value. But, then, in the moral being of such men there
is a void, which makes their ethos incomplete. In all these
respects self-control is akin to justice.
Because it is morally basic and because it can be trained,
very definite educational tasks adhere to the valuational direc-
tion of self-control. That self-conquest can be acquired in little
things, that obedience and discipline can be learned, that the
form of the inner life can be striven for and gained, that
one can accustom oneself to the domination of chosen ends
over vacillating inclination, in short, to inner discipline, which
finally becomes self-correction, spontaneous self-command and
guidance— that all this can be done has been well known to
educators from ancient times. Accordingly many have often
fallen into the error of mistaking “discipline” for the whole of
morality. That is as untrue as the notion that all virtue is justice
or bravery.
But a more serious danger to education lies in a purely ex-
ternal drill: for example, that of mere obedience. Equipped
with submission of the will alone, however valuable that may
be, a man is not ready for active life; he must also be capable
of independent self-direction. But this is far less teachable,
simply because it is more positively and more highly orga-
nized in content and transcends considerably the limit of
mere self-control. In the edifice of character, discipline is
only the ground-floor. The whole training of the lower powers
in man is only a prerequisite, to provide scope for the higher
moral qualities.
CHAPTER XXIII (xLvm)
THE ARISTOTELIAN VIRTUES
(a) The Theory of the Golden Mean
The table of the virtues, as antiquity constructed it, is riot
exhausted in the four Platonic virtues. For example, Aristotle
and the older Stoic school contributed much which has* proved
to be of abiding worth. To this day the Nicomachean Ethics
is a veritable treasure-house for the explorer of values. ^With-
out any pretence to completeness, we may study it here,
because of the wealth of its contents. Since the words by
which these values may be described are highly inadequate —
ordinary speech does not distinguish as finely as does our sense
of values, and even Aristotle found words inadequate and saw
himself constrained to coin clumsy new ones — we cannot at
this point avoid taking a glance at the whole method of deter-
riiining the content of values as Aristotle elaborated it. But
this presupposes his very peculiarly planned theory of the
virtues in general. And since a series of traditional misunder-
standings attaches to it, it is necessary at the start to restore
the meaning of this theory itself.
It is well known that Aristotle defines virtue as a mean
(jj,e<r6rt)s) between two extremes (anpa), which are both evils
(kojcmw). Of the evils one is always too much, the other too
little (yneppokri and eAAeti/rt?). An analysis of the contents of
the values is the only way to test this theory, (rctxfapocrvvq
(moderation) provides the best example ; according to Aristotle,
it is a mean between licentiousness and apathy or emotional
dullness (aKoXaata and avaicrOrjaia). Likewise bravery i^ the
mean between cowardice and foolhardiness (SeiXta and
9pacrvrr)s), justice between doing wrong and suffering wrong*
(d8 iKetv and ahiKsZoBai), iXevBepior^s (that is, liberality with
one’s money and possessions) between penuriousness and
squandering (aveX evdepia and" dcram'a); irpaorris, which ^ is
*54
THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
akin to <raxf>pocrvvr ) — it seems to mean equable temper almost
more than gentleness — between violent temper and incapacity
to feel righteous indignation {opyiXorqs and aopyqoia).
From these examples it is already evident that there is a
different mean in each one — now more now less than the exact
middle point. Nor does Aristotle keep throughout to this
cdnception; he drops it in regard to <f>Ma and the “dianoetic
virtues.” Whether the principle can be universalized is there-
fore from the beginning a futile question. But it is carried out
as a guiding hypothesis in the case of the “ethical virtues.”
Each one of these is referred {nepl ri) to something else, to a
specific content, as to a material, in relation to which there
exists a whole scale of human habits (!£«?). Thus aw<f>pocr6wj
refers to pleasure and pain, bravery to danger and fright,
liberality to money as a value. And each time the specific virtue
is a habit in the series of possible habits, and indeed an inter-
mediate one.
This theory has always been subjected to the mockery of
critics. It appears only too ridiculous that the seriousness of
virtue should resolve itself into the triviality of a "golden
mean,” that is, into a mediocrity. Even the reflection that with
the Greeks “measure” and “beauty” were wellnigh identical,
helps us very little here. It is still more absurd that a further
enhancement of a moral good should lead back to a vice, even
if to another one than that above which it arose as an opposite.
Rather is it evident that a virtue can be augmented in itself,
without ever losing its distinctive value, that is, that its quality
is absolute and is an axiological extreme (a upov). Self-control,
bravery, justice, taken as values, have no upper limit at all.
It is impossible to transcend them.
This cannot be the sense of the doctrine of the mean. How-
ever much one may see in it of the popular motto “nothing in
excess,” the absoluteness of the virtues, after Plato’s doctrine
of Ideas had philosophically discovered it, could not have
escaped the mind of Aristotle. What, then, is the positive
meaning of his theory?
THE ARISTOTELIAN VIRTUES
One need not go far to find it. Aristotle himself expresses
it most baldly in a passage of the second book of the Nico~
machean Ethics , the philosophical importance of which has
not been sufficiently appreciated by its interpreters: “There-
fore from the point oj^view of Being and of Reason which
expressly defines essence ontologically, virtue is a mean; but*
from the point of view of the best and of the good generally,
it is an extreme .” 1 Here it is clearly stated that virtue is always
at the same time both a mean and an extreme, but in different
connections. In every virtue two points of view stand over
against each other, one ontological (suggested by ovala and ri
rpr etvcu) which refers to the existential form of the conduct — we
might say, the material of the value — and one axiological, which
concerns the valuational quality itself (/cam to dpiarov Kal to eu).
In the sense of the latter, virtue is an extreme; in the sense of
the former, a mean. This affirms unequivocally that as an
ethical value it is something absolute, beyond which there can
be no “too-much” (wepjSoAiJ). It is a mean only according to
existential reality.
If we analyse the situation more precisely, we find that two
dimensions of heterogeneous opposites cut into each other, or
stand at right angles to each other: one, that of excess and
deficiency, is the ontological dimension; and the other, that
of the good and the bad, is the axiological. Ontologically, m
every species of habit, which refers to a definite content, the
continuum of possible habits would be rectilinear, between the
extremes of excess and deficiency. But the adding thereto of
the axiological dimension bends the straight line into a para-
bola; for both the ontological extremes are m meaning vices
1 The passage in the text, Eth . Nic., II. 6. 1107 a, 5-8: did Kaxd pip
xr\v ova lav Kal tov Xoyov xdv xd xl rjv elvai A iyovxa psadrrjg icg&v
dpexrf, /card Si xd dptaxov Kal xd sti dKporf}q,
The suggestiveness of the contrast suffers in every translation,
because the heaping of the ontological terms otiata and xl fjv elvai
can in no way be reproduced. In the interpretation of this passage,
as in many details of this chapter, I follow the expositions of the
work by M. v. Kohoutek on Die Differenzierung des dv&pdmivov dya&Sv,
I. Kap. 6 (compare the remark on p. 58, Vol II).
THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
256
(the lower extremes), while the intermediate elements approxi-
mate to the good (the higher extreme) and in a culminating
point attain the status of apery. This therefore is ontologically
at a point midway, but axiologically it is at the highest point.
From it the curve falls away again towards another vice. Thus
there exists, if we bear in mind the two oppositional dimensions,
no rectilinear transition from vice to vice, but only a parabolic
path over apery. 1
Hence it is to be understood that according to Aristotle
there is no passing beyond apery in a further enhancement
of the valuational quality of right conduct. For the extension
of the curve cannot rise above its culminating point, but can
only fall. The mean is not a valuational intermediate. But, as
a highest point, it is a behaviour which is not qualitatively
(ontologically) an extreme. Hence the ontologically inter-
mediate position is justified.
Of course in this it remains unexplained, why there is
exactly the one point in the curve, the one kind of behaviour
among the infinitely many gradations, which has the one
value. Here evidently a higher point of view enters tacitly in,
which for the first time connects unequivocally the two dimen-
sions in every single case. That Aristotle discerns this m the
higher formation can be inferred with considerable certainty
from the concrete relation to his metaphysics But this is a
problem by itself, which as such is not brought out by him.
1 M. v. Kohoutek (p. 55) provides for this point the accompanying
diagram (Fig 1). The horizontal line represents the ontological, the
vertical line the axiological dimension The essence of dpsrr/, as
Aristotle understands it, inheres in its double position as /xsadrrj; m
the first and as d/cpSry; m the latter.
GOODNESS
DEFICIENCY BADNESS EXCESS
Fig. 1.
THE ARISTOTELIAN VIRTUES
257
The whole theory — however much it may require to be supple-
mented 1 — must have been right in its main point, that in general
virtue is a structure based upon two dimensions which cut mto
each other. For virtue, as human behaviour (according to its
matter), is something real, and falls within the variety of real
forms of existence; but, as moral value, it is an ideal formation,
the autonomy of which is preserved in the actualization. To
this extent it actually passes, precisely as regards its ethical
essence, into another dimension. But this means that all human
behaviour, besides its incorporation into the specific deter-
minations of existence, falls also under the ethical dimension
of the opposites: “Value — anti-value” (ayadov-Kcucov).
(5) ao)<J>pocrvvr) IN THE LIGHT OF THE fi€<JOTr}S
It is not so much the theory itself as the point of view hidden
in it which proves to be empirically fruitful in showing forth
moral values. In fact Aristotle has discovered values by it
and made them clearly evident, but no one before or after
has done anything similar. The fact that their quality as
dispositional values does not receive full recognition in
Aristotle’s work does not detract from the service he has
rendered.
From this procedure less benefit accrued to the Platonic
virtues, which apart from it are well known. For instance,
concerning the essence of bravery, it is of little help to know
that it lies between timidity and rashness; it is only too evi-
dent that it lies much nearer to the latter (the excess) than
to the former, and that its distinctive opposite is cowardice.
Still weaker is the intermediate position of justice ; to it as a
dispositional value only doing wrong (aSiKelv) is a moral
opposite, not suffering wrong (aSiKticrdai). This latter is not a
badness, but only an evil.
The sense of the mean comes out more strictly in the case
1 For a systematic appraisement of the fieaoTrjg theory, cf Chapter
XXXVI (d) and (e), Vol. II
Ethics— II
THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
358
of moderation. Here the essence of the matter is precisely a
keeping within limits. In contrast to the Cynic and Stoic
morality of blunting and deadenmg, it was a great merit on
the part of Aristotle to have recognized dvaia 07 ]cria (that is, lack
of the feeling for pleasure and for the values of possession), as
an inferiority (/ca/a'a) of moral worth. Thus a limit is set to
every form of asceticism. Here also the virtue does not properly
lie m the ontological middle point, but nearer to avaiaOrjala.
Licentiousness is the badness which is really to be fought
against. For — so argues Aristotle — to turn away from pleasure,
to strive against emotion, is contrary to h uman nature.
(c) Liberality in Giving, Mildness, Magnificence
From the cases cited above we see that it is exactly the less
known virtues, to which the doctrine of the mean, as an
empirical principle for the determination of values, applies
more closply. They are at the same time the values which are
more special and less central. Liberality in regard to money
(iXevdepiorqs) is in fact finely characterized through the double
contrast to penuriousness and extravagance — although Aristotle
sees in the latter the lesser fault.
But with regard to mildness of temper a special merit lies
in the view that not only easy excitability to anger but also
complete incapacity to feel wrath is a moral defect. The pre-
supposition of this view is that anger in itself is something
valuable, therefore, indirectly, that in general there is moral
value in emotion, and that here also, as generally in the realm
of the emotions, the crisis of good and evil is to be found in
right guidance — one might say: in the direction of the emotion
towards the object which is proportionate to it. It is evident
that here a far deeper appreciation of emotion is expressed than
we find elsewhere among the ancients.
For the completion of the table of values it is of especial
interest that Aristotle supplements liberality, which refers to
the lowest material possessions, by a virtue which is higher,
THE ARISTOTELIAN VIRTUES 259
but which refeis to the same fundamental value, the virtue
of peyaXoTrpeireia. One might translate this admirable word,
which was current among the Greeks, most closely by the word
magnificence. The meaning may be more exactly given by
saying that it is behaviour which befits great circumstance.
It is not a virtue for every man. It only concerns him to whom
much has been given. The thought is that from him much
also will be required. In so far as one who has great possessions
is exposed to special moral aberrations, such a higher claim
upon him is justified. Here, then, the ontological opposition
appears on another plane: the two extremes are shabbiness
and vulgar display. The former is that ridiculous care for the
farthings which is unsuited to the man’s circumstances, but
which would be commendable in one of little means (the literal
significance of the word /uK/xwpejreia). In connection with
SiireipoKaXia the love of vulgar display is equivalent to purse-
pride, the swindler’s desire to outdo others. The common
factor in both these vices is the radical failure to recognize the
ethically subordinate value of riches and of outward pos-
sessions. But even here there is clearly a tacit recognition of
the lower, goods-value, which the Stoics lost.
( d ) Ambition and Magnanimity
It is a trite commonplace that ambition is axiologically a
variable concept, in which both a value and a disvalue are
contained. Language does not specially indicate either the
virtue or the vice involved in it. The same is true of the Greek
word juXoripia except that the vice perhaps is somewhat more
strongly suggested. Hence the moral value in ambition is
without a name (dvd>wp.os). Over against it appear as vices
excessive ambition and complete lack of it or, so to speak,
place-hunting and an inability to strive (inertness of will).
<j>iXort,pla is a genuine mean, a strict virtue of right propor-
tion. Of all the special values ,of the Nicomachean Ethics it
appears as the one least independent; it coincides completely
260 the realm of ethical values
with moderation. Even here the underlying emotional factor
as such is of value.
As with liberality in giving, Aristotle raises over ambition
a higher value, /xeyaAoi/ruyi'a. The relation of the two is obscured
in die Nicomachean Ethics by the form of presentation and
the context, but it is nevertheless unmistakable. This remark-
able new value, for which the later schools had little apprecia-
tion, is with Aristotle a kind of crown, a moral ideal. The name,
which literally means greatness of soul, tells us very little. In
this virtue is hidden a whole system of specific values. But its
fundamental distinction is this, that with it as with ambition
the point at issue is a relation to honour as a goods-value
(rrepl Tifias). But like magnificence it is not every man’s con-
cern, but an exceptional value. It has to do with great privileges,
or, as one might say, with the highest values (™p/q fieyaAij)
and not at all with the more serviceable, the useful, ones. The
fieyaXoifmxos is the high-minded man, his ethos is in the valua-
tional diction of the noble. He demands for himself what is
great and justifies his requirement, in that he is really worthy
and capable of it. His pre-eminent characteristic is the high
self-esteem which he justifies or, more correctly said perhaps,
the achieved justification, the moral pride, which rests upon
genuine greatness and worth. Self-depreciation in one who
stands morally high, the belittling of oneself, the humility of
self-disparagement (ixiKpoifwxia) is according to Aristotle of as
little value as over-estimation of self and arrogance (x<xwo'tjjs).
These two extremes are not properly vices : they bring about
no harm. "But still they are morally of less value. Greatness of
soul, which stands as the mean between them, is a virtue of a
higher order. The mean here is self-appreciation itself, moral
self-consciousness (agiovv iavrov). Descriptive of it is the
definition of the fieyaXdipvxos 1 as the fieydXcov iavrov a£iojv
of to? <Sv, that is, the man who thinks he is worthy of great
things, in so far as he really is so. All disparity between one’s
self-estimate and one’s real meral being is unwqrthy; not only
1 Eth. Nic., 1123b. a.
THE ARISTOTELIAN VIRTUES 261
the false pride which one’s personal being does not justify, but
equally that lack of pride which leads to moral deterioration.
The former is vain, the latter worthless. The fieyaXotjwxos is
he who on great issues is justifiably appreciative of himself;
he is in little matters simply aa>cj>pu>v (the sane man) who knows
his own moral limitations. For moral self-consciousness, is to
be named pride only in connection with great worth; in con-
nection with slight worth it is just as naturally humility. Only
real greatness of moral being is entitled to be proud.
Genuine moral pride does not constitute the whole essence
of [leyaXoifwxLa, but it is nevertheless the central factor and also
the interesting element in it. For that there is at all a moral '
value in pride is not self-evident. Nor is it essential for our
consideration to decide whether there exists such a value; it
is sufficient, if we make clear that antiquity recognized it, and
that its philosophical representative Aristotle knew how to
define it very exactly and even saw in it a kind of moral com-
pleteness, a world of excellences. It is also important to note
that he had as little respect for idle gazing at oneself in the
looking-glass as for the boasted moral pride of the Stoics, in
their ideal of self-sufficiency. That there is always danger that
this value may be counterfeited should not tempt us to deny
its existence. But it would be quite a mistake to suppose that
genuine pride would exclude genuine humility. The man who
is justified in being proud will always, if he sees himself clearly,
have something before which he humbles himself, although it
be only the ideal which he aims to satisfy. But the humble
man, if he does not wish to become worthless, must always
have something in himself which he prizes. This combination
may be morally difficult; for the contrast between these values
and the ethical attitudes corresponding to them is clearly
evident. Yet it does not assume the form of a valuational
antinomy proper.
a6a THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
(e) Giving Each his Due
vipecris, the detailed analysis of which we owe to Aristotle,
is a virtue related in content to justice. *tVe might describe its
content as morally justifiable participation in what befalls
others, in their happiness and sufferings. Lite justice, it is
directed towards others, but not in reference to their posses-
sions and their modes of conduct, but exclusively in reference
to their emotional susceptibility. Aristotle starts from the view
that there are here two kinds of badness : the one is displeasure
at seeing a fellow-man happy, envy; the other is pleasure at
seeing him unhappy, delight in another’s misfortune (<f>d6vos
and emxaipeKaKia). As the mean between these he sets up vepems.
It does not entirely escape his notice that these two extremes
are not strictly opposites. He is clearly aware that a more
complex relationship is here involved. For what interests the
man who wishes to give everyone his due is not another’s
happiness and suffering as such, but the relation of both of
these to the man’s deserts. It pains him who would give every
man his due, when anyone suffers undeservedly (aval; iW),
and likewise when anyone is undeservedly happy, as when the
triumphant rogue enjoys the fruits of his deeds.
Accordingly it might be thought that the one extreme of
badness must consist of delight in seeing undeserved happiness
or suffering; and therefore that the other extreme would be
displeasure at the sight of deserved happiness or suffering.
Both are involved in the nature of the matter, but with Aristotle
they do not come fully to recognition. Yet, however it may
be with the mean and its deficiency, the matter itself is con-
ceived correctly in its central feature: namely, there is such a
thing as a right attitude towards another’s enjoyment and
suffering, and this does not consist, so to speak, of sharing in
the enjoyment and suffering — such participation may in itself
have value but of a different type — but of a kind of inward
justice which enters sympathetically into another’s life, m
proportion to his worthiness and desert. Morally such inward
justice penetrates deeper than outward justice.
THE ARISTOTELIAN VIRTUES 263
(/) The Sense of Sham
In the Nicomachean Ethics the sense of shame, is
treated as a kind of step-child. Aristotle does not wish to
recognize it fully as a virtue; for a morally good man ought
to be good in every respect, so that he has nothing to be
ashamed of — how, then, can being ashamed of oneself count
as a virtue? Nevertheless it is to be commended (iiraweiTcu).
Men actually do very much which they ought to be ashamed
of ; but in that case it is better for them to feel ashamed than
not to. The sense of shame also restrains them from many
things ; a man feels that he would need to be ashamed if he
should do a certain thing; accordingly he is ashamed to do it.
Thus indirectly al$co$ is a value. It is at the same time a sub-
stitute for the sense of right, when this is lacking. We shrink
from the condemnation of others, from a bad reputation (<f>6i 80s*
a8o£ias). This is a kind of surrogate, when the voice of con-
science does not speak directly.
This value has many shades, when one considers its posi-
tion as a mean. According to Aristotle the man who is ashamed
stands midway between the timid and the shameless. This
mood, again, is strictly a mean, since shamelessness is worse
than excessive shyness. The sense of shame falls short of
virtue, because it is not properly a habit of conduct but is
more a passive state. In the young, Aristotle is willing to con-
cede that this passivity is a positive value, inasmuch as the life
of the immature is more a life of passive acceptance than of
conscious worth. From his position, Aristotle could not of
course recognize that a sense of value — although immature and
indirect — was concealed behind the sense of shame.
In a certain respect the sense of shame is closely related to
meekness, the sense of honour and the sense of what others
deserve. In common with these qualities it has the peculiarity
of being an emotional value. Equally with the moral sense of
shame, sympathetic justice, noble ambition, righteous indigna-
tion (when blended with gentleness) are passive states. Indeed,
364 THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
we could include greatness of soul in this group, in so far as in
genuine pride there is an element of moral emotion. Aristotle
has expressly recognized such an element only in the sense of
shame. But, in spite of their difference, the whole group is
significant, because in the sphere of the emotions generally
there exist positive moral values, and indeed a variety of them.
In recognizing this fact Aristotle was far in advance of the
Stoics and of most of the later philosophers . 1
1 Further examples of Aristotelian virtues in Chapter XXIX (c),
Vol. II.
Section VI
SPECIAL MORAL VALUES
(SECOND group)
CHAPTER XXIV (xux)
BROTHERLY LOVE
( a ) Interest in the Welfare of Others
With the transformation which the ancient ethos underwent
through Christianity there emerged into consciousness a new
class of moral values. Whether this was from every point of
view a higher class may remain an open question — the facts
quite clearly speak for themselves — but in so far as its funda-
mental value, brotherly love, surpasses justice, the funda-
mental value of the ancient world, it is undoubtedly on a
higher plane.
To disentangle this change of outlook from its religious
basis is not easy, but in itself is altogether possible. Especially
can this be done without distortion in the case of its mam
feature, brotherly love. It is harder in the case of ideal purity,
which relaxed the concentration of the older ethos upon pleni-
tude and variety of experience. It becomes impossible only where
Christianity permeated the ancient outlook, obscuring it. The
idea of wisdom, for instance, was submerged under the new,
all-controlling relationship of man to God; in the same way
<icocj>pocrvv7] was submerged under the religious conception of
sin and grace, and the ethos of courage and pride under stead-
fastness of faith and humility of the sinner. Here opens an
antinomy between the values of this world and those of the
Beyond — of ethics proper and religion, an antinomy which as
such is no longer an ethical problem . 1 But we must not there-
fore misconstrue the fact that here, although m a transcendent
connection, new values do come upon the scene, which have
to do exclusively with the relation of man to man.
Love of one’s neighbour (aydrrr}), as the Evangelists meant it,
is not love in general — neither the Platonic Ipcar which turns
x Cf. Chapter XI (/), Vol. II.
368 THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
to the Idea, nor Aristotle’s “love of a friend” , also it
is not the Stoic dycwnjcws, which in its universalistic tendency
does indeed come nearer to brotherly love but plays only a
secondary r61e. Love of one’s neighbour is primarily directed
towards whoever is nearest, towards the other person, and it is
a positive affirmative tendency, the transference of interest from
the I to the Thou. The word “love” is therefore misleading
in so far as it stresses the emotional side too much, while the
essence of the matter lies in one’s disposition, one’s intention,
finally — and not least — in one’s conduct. It all depends on an
inner propinquity to another; but it manifests itself in con-
sideration for him as a person, in intercession for him as if for
oneself.
The modem word, altruism, which admittedly is much mis-
used, gives exact expression to this fundamental tendency in
its opposition to all egoism — and by no means to its more
blatant forms only. In altruism the centre of one’s whole sphere
of interests is transferred from oneself to the other person.
It is the abrogation of the self-centred tendency and a trans-
ference of interest to the being of another for his own sake.
Where this new commitment is reciprocal among several
persons, at once there appears a spontaneous devotion of all
to each, in contrast to the indifference or even antagonism of
mere proximity to one another. For each the sphere of values
of the others falls into line with his own. This is the fundamental
structure of the mental attitude on which the moral value of
brotherly love depends.
(b) Positive Contents and Creative Spontaneity
The nature of brotherly love is familiar enough. But for all
that it is not easy to outline exactly. For this purpose a com-
parison with justice is especially illuminating. Justice also con-
sists in an attitude towards one’s fellows ( 7 rpos It epov). But
it is only concerned with recognized claims, the rights of the
other, not with whatever affects him, and not with his own
BROTHERLY LOVE 269
personal being. Brotherly love is concerned with the person
himself and for his own sake — irrespective of his rights, deserts
or worthiness. The same contrast holds good in relation to
v€fi€ms > which also accepts or rejects the joy or suffering of
others according to their deserts. Brotherly love affirms and
welcomes the entire well-being of others, deploring and con-
tending against their hardships of every kind.
This tendency, however, goes only one step of the way.
The valuational point of view, the moral claim, is itself a
different one. Justice puts all men on a level, expanding ulti-
mately into uniform collectivism. Neighbourly love only places
one's own ego on a level with that of others, concerning itself
merely with those who are nearest at hand, those accidentally
present, with the narrow circle of those who are within reach.
Indirectly, of course, it applies to the whole community as
much as justice does; but it begins at the other end, not with
conduct that is outwardly right, but with the central point of
one’s disposition, which determines all positive treatment of
others.
This is due to a still more radical difference. Justice m its
ultimate purpose is indeed constructive, but m its basis it is
negative; its primary demands are prohibitions and restric-
tions. Love of one’s neighbour is positive from beginning to
end. Its command forthwith declares what one ought to do.
Certainly it thereby says also what one ought not to do. But
its negation is secondary. Therefore in its total tendency it
includes justice — except the objective regulations of the com-
munity — and surpasses it in richness of content. Aristotle saw
this clearly in the nature of faXla : if all men were friends,
there would be no need of law — a statement of which the
converse cannot be affirmed; for even if all were just, they
would still have need of love. 1 Even more cogently do the
Gospels define the relation of the new morality of love to
the old morality of justice: “I have not come to destroy
1 Eth. Nic , 1155a. 26; compare also 1159&. 25 : justice and love are
7 repi ra avza teal ev rotg avrolg.
270 THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
but to fulfil”; or “Herein lies the whole Law and the
Prophets.”
Of course brotherly love is not in every respect an adequate
substitute for justice. In the community as a whole there is
need for the firm structure, the formal system, of law. Social
structure on the grand scale cannot remain a matter of feeling.
Justice retains its unique value. Within a small circle, on the
other hand, love of one’s neighbour has a much greater influ-
ence. In content it is richer; it meets every single case. For it
there is no legal formula. Yet it finds a new law each time. It
would be pointless to prescribe for it anything definite, since
from any given situation it constructively discovers what is
needed ; and, as it is continually making new laws, its content
is always different. This inner spontaneity raises it above the
uniformity of a fixed standard.
( c ) Antinomical Relation to Justice
Unlike justice, love of one’s neighbour has its root deep in
the spirit. In so far as both have to do with the binding of
person to person, justice unites merely surface with surface
(hence its origin in social frictions and the negative character
of its commands) ; but brotherly love directly links the inward
life of one person to that of another. This is why it cannot tie
itself down to laws and standards, indeed cannot set up any
laws or make any general rules. It extends over the whole life
of man and into all his spheres of interest and all situations.
For such love there is nothing too small or too trivial; even
the least weighty matter has significance for it, in so far as it
expresses the mental attitude of the one who loves. In this way
it hallows what seems of no account, filling it with meaning
and import. Accordingly, in every new emergency it is a living
orientation, an ingenious discovery of the commandment in-
herent in the situation itself. Its vitality is due to the fact that
it is rooted in the concrete fulness of everyday life.
This concrete fulness is not accessible to justice, because
BROTHERLY LOVE
271
justice ignores the inner world of the individual person. Justice
is not allowed to see it. A judge, who respects the person, is
unjust. The ancients depicted Themis with eyes bandaged,
and holding in her hands a pair of scales and a sword. Justice
is blind, weighing objectively, judging rigidly. Love for one’s
neighbour sees, is responsive and judges not. It understands
everything, having brooded over all the details of the situation.
It is not a sitting in judgment upon the deed, but an entering
of the spirit into the spirit of the doer.
From this point of view early Christianity saw in brotherly
love the unifying principle of all virtue; it was “the greatest,”
even when compared with “faith and hope.” Whatever good a
man might do was only accounted morally good by the Chris-
tian, provided it was an outcome of love. For him all other
values derived their worth only from this one. The basal
implication here is that dispositions are the only moral values.
What could only be seen dimly when justice was the dominant
value, now becomes clear: that the question is not concerning
the action itself but the motive. From the point of view of
love, the value of the intention is plainly distinguished from
the intended value.
Brotherly love is certainly not on this account the unifying
principle of all virtue. That was an exaggeration. Its very
contrast to justice can teach much on this point. Justice may
be unloving, brotherly love quite unjust. Desire for justice,
even when combined with hate, enmity, disdain, still remains
a desire for justice, and as such is of value, while love even
in cases of obvious injustice still remains love and is valuable
in its own way. This lies in the nature of both values ; their
difference is basic. The various attempts also to bring them
both under one law should be looked upon as having miscarried,
Kant’s categorical imperative ^spired to be such an attempt.
In fact, however, through its legal form alone, it remained
suspiciously close to justice. It could not draw into itself the
spontaneousness and creativeness of love. The reflection as to
whether the particular maxim could become a law for all,
2iz THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
weakened its vitality. From this it followed naturally that
Kant rejected love as a motive, together with all other “in-
clinations” and — quite in accord with the Stoic doctrine con-
cerning the affections — described it as pathological.
Love and justice make fundamentally different demands.
They take only the first step together— this is what occasions
error — and then their ways diverge, each with its own justifica-
tion; and in the richness of their concrete consequences they
stand in antinomic opposition — just because and in so far as
they relate to the same situation. Thus it happens that in any
single situation, if it be of this kind, they may confront each
other m open conflict. Here we have a case of antinomy among
the virtues themselves. It is the more significant, in that it
exists between the basic values of two distinct groups. But
the strange thing in this case is that the two values are obviously
not of the same axiological grade. Brotherly love is morally
the higher.
( d ) Resentment, False Love and Pity
A neighbour in the context : Love thy neighbour, is primarily
the needy person, the one who is in want. Hence has arisen
the impression that love is merely an aspect of pity. This mis-
understanding, out of which Schopenhauer constructed a
theory, led further to Nietzsche’s criticism of brotherly love.
If love is devoted essentially to the weak and oppressed, the
notion is not far-fetched that in itself love is not really a value,
but has been falsely set up as such by the oppressed them-
selves in resentment. Their resentment is of this nature: the
things they really long for but cannot attain, such as power,
strength, wealth, prosperity, they declare to be of no value
but to be the very opposite. By this falsification of values, in
so far as they succeed in believing it, they escape the pangs of
envy. It is clear also that the oppressed would inevitably be
disposed to see value in a benefactor’s brotherly love, even
if it were not in itself of any moral worth. That this psycho-
BROTHERLY LOVE *
a 73
logical process might suffice to form a hidden basis for a
morality of pity at least cannot be denied. Nor can it be dis-
puted that the morality of brotherly love, like every one-sided
moral code, has led to a depreciation of values of a different
kind. Even so, the argument is faulty : for it ignores the main
issue.
The essence of neighbour-love is not pity at all nor suffering,
but a feeling, a striving, which approves another person as such.
One suffers sympathetically only with what is poor, weak and
sickly in a human being. But love does not spend itself upon
this at all, but upon something else. By its nature it turns
toward what is of value, never toward the opposite. “What is
loved in a person who is sick and poor is not his sickness and
poverty, but something behind these; and from this alone
comes help.” 1 Brotherly love is the living sense of another’s
worth; and in so far as this is endangered — whether from
without or from within — it comes to the rescue. It is funda-
mentally positive, spending itself upon a man’s total humanity,
upon that in him which is capable and worthy of life. This
alone love accounts valuable. Only as an effect of this attitude
does devotion to one who is in want and misery follow; and
it does so, because want and misery stifle the man’s free
humanity. As a basic tendency love is not at all a reaction to
the person’s momentary condition, but is a spontaneous,
original interest in him as a person, including all that concerns
him , like the interest one has in oneself and all that concerns
oneself.
This tendency, which appeals directly to our sense of values
as of eminent worth, cannot in any way be explained by resent-
1 For this and for the more exact analysis, as well as for the refuta-
tion of Nietzsche’s theory concerning Christian love of one’s neigh-
bour, see Max Scheler, Ueber Ressentiment uni moralisches Werturteil
(Leipsig, 1912), p. 29. The explanation of the altruism of brotherly
love, which is given there, must not be accepted without reservation.
In fact, only a special form of altruism, one that does not exhaust
the concept, is considered there. But what is said is true of that
special form.
Ethics— IT
s
?74
THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
ment. On the contrary, the resentment theory expressly denies
it. But to deny it is quite impossible, if one at all grasps the
phenomenon of brotherly love. What is true in the theory
is the fact that there exists a kind of attitude which is sufficiently
like neighbour-love to be mistaken for it, without being like
it in substance. There is, indeed, such a thing as resentful
renunciation of strength and the fulness of life, which in its
unnatural distortion turns toward sickness and weakness as
such, as though these were in themselves something valuable.
But to anyone who is acquainted with real love, whether in his
own experience or by observation of others, it is self-evident
that such an attitude is never genuine pity, much less genuine
love, and indeed that genuine pity, like sympathy with joy, is
always bom of love, while the converse is never true.
Confusion on this point, however, as we come across it
again and again, even in the form of self-deception, is very
natural. For the capacity to love is as unequally distributed
as the inclination to feel resentment. Spurious love, like a
weal, springs up everywhere, side by side with real love.
Outwardly they are indistinguishable. The deceptive mimicry
of the spurious extends even to the highest and finest flowers
of the ethos. Only an unperverted sense of values, which, as
it were, listening, can detect the emotional tone itself, is able *
to distinguish the one from the other.
( e ) Emotional Transcendence of the Sphere of Self
Genuine brotherly love is altogether wonderful, a phenomenon,
the mere recognition of which requires a certain amount of
faith. It is a curious invasion of one ego into the experience,
the emotional life and even the moral being of another ego, an
ethical communication between the two worlds, otherwise
eternally separated, of the Self and the Not-self. It is not
knowledge which brings this about. To knowledge each con-
sciousness is closed in upon itself. What a consciousness
“experiences” of the outer world must be given to it, either
BROTHERLY LOVE
2%$
by aprioristic discernment or through perception. Now the
senses give only physical reality. They cannot disclose another
person to view. Is there perhaps an a priori insight* which
penetrates so far? At all events there is no cognitive insight
of this kind. But there is indeed an emotional apriorism of
love which pierces through the dividing wall. How it comes
about* how it is possible, we cannot say. But it is an accom-
plished fact in the aprioristic focusing of one’s mind upon
another person, together with the whole sphere of his inner
life. Emotion, disposition, ultimately will and deed, with their
intercession in favour of the other person, perform this miracle
of positively transmitting the ethos from man to man. It is
different from the passing from subject to object in the cogni-
tive act. Love as a trend forces its way whither knowledge
cannot reach, into the sphere of another’s inner experience, his
feelings, struggles and failures, his happiness and sufferings.
Indirectly, of course, it has the character of knowledge. In it
there is a recognition of that, in someone else, which otherwise
each person knows only m himself, a kind of emotional anam-
nesis (which, like that of Plato, does not refer back to one’s
ow r n experience), a feeling-after and with, a living-through by
participation.
In this eminently transcending act is accomplished the
extension of one’s sphere of feeling and experience to another
person. The limits which otherwise are rigidly individual are
here projected in an outward direction and at the same time
externalized; they now include a world quite different in
richness and variety of content, the world of a plurality of
persons. This does not mean a fusion of persons; in the act
of participation the other does not become oneself, although
as regards content what is experienced becomes one’s own
experience. Another’s interests become one’s own concern,
affecting one with the same directness. This is why in him
who loves the impulse to help another, to take part, to inter-
vene, is primal, and not at all due to reflection— as little so
as it would be in regard to one’s own concerns. Deliberation
376 THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
and judgment ordinarily play just as small a part in stimulating
the desire to intervene on another’s behalf, as they would in
prompting one to look to one’s own interests. Conversely, all
understanding of another’s ethos, in fact any real knowledge
of human nature which deserves the name, rests upon the
emotional act of transcending one’s own ego. And this under-
standing is fundamentally different from that of psychology,
which builds on experience and infers from analogy. It is
intuitive, it even begins at a point which psychology never
reaches — another person’s experience and feeling.
(/) The Apriorism and Metaphysic of Brotherly Love
The apriorism of brotherly love does not of course extend
to the material, external details of another’s experience, or to
its provocations, but, on the assumption that these are empiri-
cally given, to the emotional character of the experience. Only
from the outward situation in which he is placed, through
outward signs in his behaviour, can I know that he suffers,
grieves, and so on. But what suffering means, and indeed any
specific suffering (this particular distress), or how some special
suffering works, this I can only “feel a priori.” Hence all
loving comprehension, which can create a sense of oneness
with another person, is intuitive in character. The loving glance
is full of insight, of divination. From the slightest sign — from
a half-word, a pained smile — it sees in a flash the most complex
inner conditions. Even before any stimulus or occasion, it
rests on one’s own sensitive aprioristic attitude towards the
other person. Whenever in this way another’s inner life is
intuitively disclosed to us, it is always as if we had long known.
What is puzzling in this is at any rate common to all aprioristic
insight, including the theoretical. Even the infallibility of
genuine sympathy is strictly analogous to the certainty of the
theoretically aprioristic ; like the latter it is by no means granted
to everyone, and it is not to be acquired by any generalization
from experience.
BROTHERLY love
2 7 ?
If one wants to specify this kind of apriority more exactly,
it is more akin to the knowledge of things than to the discern-
ment of values. The latter is only the grasping of an ideal form
(although ideally self-existent); but aprioristic knowledge of
things is a grasping of something actual. In it the gulf that is
crossed is greater. So it is in the participation of one who loves.
Here also the object grasped is ontologically real in the fullest
sense. Its subjectivity does not contradict this in any way.
It is real mental life, the psychic and ethical reality of another
person.
The fact that moral feeling discovers in its object another
personal subject, together with all his ethical prerogatives, a
subject who discerns values, pursues them and is himself a
carrier of them, in short, that it discovers its own ethical mode
of existence in a fellow human being, has from ancient times
lured metaphysics into speculative interpretations designed
to explain the mystery of sympathy. There is an attempt of
this kind in the Stoic minrdde ux, the universal cosmic emotion
of one who in the unity of the Aoyos senses all things. More
deeply anchored still is the Neo-Platonic co-operation of each
and all in emotional intimacy, wherein all individuation
(fiepuTfws) is a later breaking up of the primal One (e>), as
Godhead. But the thought that all entities are ultimately one
Being, and that only man’s blindness causes him to see himself
and others as separate beings, is as old as philosophy; it goes
back to the Vedantic teaching. According to this view, indi-
vidual life is only an appearance, not a reality, for all life is
one. By the path of sympathetic presentiment man breaks
through the appearance and returns to identity with primal
Being.
This ancient and respected view of the universe, which has
become widely known through Schopenhauer’s metaphysic of
“pity,” rests upon a simple proposition of identity and suffers
from the characteristic defects of such a proposition. It over-
shoots the mark. It destroys the phenomenon, the mystery,
the act of self-transcendence. For this act belongs to the
278 THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
phenomenon and must not be denied. On what the bridge over
the intervening gulf rests is the eternally enigmatic, the meta-
physical, factor in the problem of brotherly love. If in its
place one simply posits the identity of all finite entities, one
misunderstands its nature, just as much as one misunderstands
the nature of knowledge of things, if one simply identifies
“thought and Being.” Here once more the essential thing is
to stand by the phenomenon.
( g ) The Autonomy of the Moral Value in Brotherly
Love
Independently of any interpretation and of any metaphysic
the moral value of brotherly love, as such, subsists. One
cannot maintain that this value was brought, in its full purity,
that is, in its complete autonomy, into current acceptance by
Christianity. In it there stood behind brotherly love the love
of God, which no longer has the ethical impress. In his neigh-
bour the Christian loves the Christian God. “Whatsoever ye
do unto one of the least of these, my brethren, ye do unto
me.” This savours of the traditional metaphysic. Still more
doubtful does the morality of love become, when it is linked
to the notion of “laying up treasure in heaven.” Here a trans-
cendent, other-worldly eudaemonism discloses itself. Neither of
these aspects of Christianity is compatible with the ethical
nature of brotherly love. Even in Christianity one must first
free this virtue from traditional errors.
Precisely in brotherly love can the self-subsistence of moral,
that is, purely dispositional, values be more clearly seen than
anywhere else. Not that it is not based on goods and situational
values; these are all that it intends and achieves. Its striving is
directed throughout to the procuring of goods for one’s fellow-
man. That he should have and enjoy them is the object in view.
The value of the disposition is conditioned by the fact that
the things aimed at are of value. But this condition only provides
a basis. Not only is the value of the loving intention different
BROTHERLY LOVE
«79
and of an order altogether higher, but it is also quite inde-
pendent of the actual grade of the goods in the scale of values.
The greater amount of help rendered is not attached to the
greater moral value. On the contrary, the amount and genuine-
ness of the love ennobles the help it bestows; something of the
value of the disposition goes over into the lifeless thing and
appears in it as a finer lustre. This is what the Gospels so
eloquently proclaim in the story of the widow’s mite. The
moral value does not increase with the greatness of the gift,
but with the greatness of the love, with the depth of the in-
tention which is directed toward the other person. The distance
between it and egoism, the degree of self-abnegation and self-
transcendence, constitute the measure of brotherly love. For
therein alone lies the proof of its reality, of the living participa-
tion in the value-carrying personality of another.
The self-subsistence of its value becomes still clearer, if one
takes into account that brotherly love is a kind of solidarity,
and a kind different from justice, corresponding to the different
sort of union between person and person. It does not bear
the whole social structure on its back; it resists any fixed form.
Yet it by no means spends itself wholly in the strong sentiments
which bind us to those who are near and dear to us. In contrast
to the solidarity of justice, it is truly universal, not being
confined by any boundaries of nation or State. For although
only one who is near is the object of sympathy, yet potentially
every human being is a neighbour — and this is no mere possi-
bility, for there are many ways of coining into contact. But,
above all, through brotherly love the fact of being jointly
responsible grows into universal participation in the fate, the
sufferings and actions of the rest of the world. On account
of the relatively small share of each, this may have only a
subjective significance. But when a wider section of the multi-
tude encircles the world with the same love, and actively con-
centrates upon doing what is enjoined upon them by sympathy
' and the fact of a common destiny, this solidarity rises to such a
power that it can determine the fate of whole classes of society.
28 o
THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
The common responsibility is then something in the highest
degree real and positive. And perhaps of all the active forces
of social life it is the deepest and purest. In this respect it is
stronger and more fundamental than the solidarity of justice.
As it springs from union of a deeper kind, it radiates over a
wider area.
CHAPTER XXV (l)
TRUTHFULNESS AND UPRIGHTNESS
(a) Truth and Truthfulness
Truth and truthfulness are not the same. Both are of value,
hut only the latter is a moral value. Truth is the objective
agreement of thought, or conviction, with the existing situa-
tion. The agreement is not in the least dependent upon the
free will of man. Hence it has no moral value . 1
Truthfulness, on the other hand, is agreement of one’s word
with one’s thought, or conviction. It is in the power of man to
establish this agreement; he bears the responsibility of doing
so. Truthfulness is a moral value. One’s word, the object of
which is to be a witness to one’s real opinion, conviction and
attitude, ought to achieve this end solely. For as this is its
object, everyone assumes involuntarily that one’s word is
truthful — unless there exists some special ground for dis-
trust. The thing said is taken as really meant. Nothing is
presupposed, but that the sense peculiar to the words will be
fulfilled. Herein consists the natural and good trust of anyone
who is not morally corrupted, the faith he puts in the words
he hears. The lie is the misuse of this good trust. It is not
simply a violation of the sense of the words, but at the same
1 This sounds paradoxical, but only because one is not accustomed
to distinguish truth from truthfulness. The merging of the two
concepts has worked confusion even in the theory of knowledge. In
fact the two are altogether indifferent to each other. The truthful
man may very well say what is untrue, of course bona fide, in that
he is in error. And a liar may very well speak the truth, of course
against his will, in that he mistakes the truth for untruth. For the
essence of the lie is not to present as true what is untrue, but what
one holds to be untrue. Thus it comes about that an untrue word
jaay be truthful and a true word may be a he. It is the same relation
as that which exists in all action (and speech is action) between die
inward disposition and its effects. The best Will may bring about
evil; the worst, good.
38a THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
time a deception of another person, based upon his trustfulness.
Inasmuch as words are not the only form of expressing one’s
actual attitude of mind, there is together with truthfulness of
word also truthfulness of act, of allowing oneself to appear to
be such or such, indeed of conduct in general. One can tell a
lie by means of a deed, by one’s bearing, one’s pose. Straight-
forwardness, or uprightness, is related to pretence not other-
wise than truthfulness to a lie. Still, mere silence can be a lie.
One who pretends and conceals is a liar in the wider sense of
the word.
A lie injures the deceived person in his life; it leads him
astray. Sincere expression is a good for the other person, since
he can depend upon it ; and under these circumstances it is a
high and inestimable good. One might accordingly think that
the dispositional value of truthfulness is only a special instance
of neighbourly love. A lie is, in fact, loveless. This connection
may exist; and a trace of it must always be at hand. But it is
not the distinguishing mark of truthfulness as such. There
is something here besides. The unloving man, for instance,
is merely less worthy from the moral point of view, but he is
not reprehensible, not despicable. But the untruthful man is
indeed so. He heaps upon himself an odium of an entirely
different kind. He is “branded” as a liar, as one in whom we
can have no confidence, as an untrustworthy person. Trust-
worthiness is a quite distinctive moral value; it inheres as a
constituent element in what gives a man “integrity ” The
liar is precisely the man who cannot be regarded as an “in-
teger,” his worth as a witness is damaged.
In truthfulness and uprightness there is an element of
purity. A lie is a kind of stain — which one cannot say of a
failure to love; it is a degradation of one’s own personality,
something to be ashamed of. In it there is always a certain
breach of trust. And there is also in it an element of cowardice.
For in truthfulness there inheres “the courage of truth.” All
this distinguishes it from neighbourly love. A truthful man
may in some other respects be immoral ; likewise one who loves
TRUTHFULNESS AND UPRIGHTNESS
283
may be untruthful. For there are lies which do not at all injure
the person who is deceived; indeed, there are some which one
commits out of genuine love. And conversely there is a truth-
fulness which is highly unloving.
But, despite everything, the essential connection between
truth and truthfulness is by no means broken. Objective truth
is still the value which is intended and striven for by the truthful
person. It is the goods-value upon which truthfulness is based.
The situation which the truth-speaker aims to bring about is
that the other person shall experience the truth. Upon this
reference to objective truth — in which the general connection
between the intended value and the value of the intention re-
appears — depends the high situational value of truthfulness in
private as well as in public life. There is also a public truthful-
ness, just as there is a fraudulent and falsified public opinion.
Freedom of speech, of conviction, of instruction, of confession,
is a fundamental moral requirement of a healthy communal
life. In the ethos of nations the struggle for such freedom is a
special chapter on truthfulness; likewise the official lie, the
deliberate misleading of the masses to attain particular ends,
even down to the practice of official calumniation and instiga-
tion to hatred, constitute another special chapter. Truthfulness
as a community-value is a permanent ideal of the moral life,
which in history for ever meets with new obstacles.
( b ) Valuations. Conflicts between Truthfulness and the
So-called “Necessary Lie”
Truthfulness as a value, with its specific moral claim, admits
of no exceptions at all. What is called the necessary lie is always
an anti-value — at least from the point of view of truthfulness
as a value. No end can justify deliberate deception as a means
— certainly not in the sense of causing it to cease to be a moral
wrong.
Still we are confronted here with a very serious moral
problem, which is by no means solved by the simple rejection
284 THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
of each and every lie. There are situations which place before
a man the unescapable alternative either of sinning against
truthfulness or against some other equally high, or even some
higher, value. A physician violates his professional duty, if he
tells a patient who is dangerously ill the critical state of his
health; the iiriprisoned soldier who, when questioned by the
enemy, allows the truth about his country’s tactics to be
extorted from him, is guilty of high treason; a friend, who
does not try to conceal information given to him in strictest
personal confidence, is guilty of breach of confidence. In all
such cases the mere virtue of silence is not adequate. Where
suspicions are aroused, mere silence may be extremely eloquent.
If the physician, the prisoner, the possessor of confidential
information will do their duty of warding off a calamity that
threatens, they must resort to a lie. But if they do so, they make
themselves guilty on the side of truthfulness.
It is a portentous error to believe that such questions may
be solved theoretically. Every attempt of the kind leads either
to a one-sided and inflexible rigorism concerning one value at
the expense of the rest, or to a fruitless casuistry devoid of all
significance — not to mention the danger of opportunism. Both
rigorism and casuistry are offences against the intention of
genuine moral feeling. The examples cited are so chosen that
truthfulness always seems to be inferior to the other value
which is placed in opposition to it. It is the morally mature
and seriously minded person who is here inclined to decide in
favour of the other value and to take upon himself the responsi-
bility for the lie. But such situations do not permit of being
universalized. They are extreme cases in which the conflict of
conscience is heavy enough and in which a different solution is
required according to the peculiar ethos of the man. For it is
inherent in the essence of such moral conflicts that in them
value stands against value and that it is not possible to escape
from them without being guilty. Here it is not the values *as
such in their pure ideality which are in conflict; between the
claim of truthfulness as such and the duty of the soldier or
TRUTHFULNESS AND UPRIGHTNESS 28s
friend there exists no antinomy at all. The conflict arises from
the structure of the situation. This makes it impossible to
satisfy both at the same time. But if from this one should
think to make out a universal justification of the necessary
lie, one would err, as much as if one were to attempt a universal
justification for violating one’s duty to one’s country or the
duty of keeping one’s promise.
Nevertheless a man who is in such a situation cannot avoid
making a decision. Every attempt to remain neutral only makes
the difficulty worse, in that he thereby violates both values ;
the attempt not to commit oneself is at bottom moral cowardice,
a lack of the sense of responsibility and of the willingness to
assume it ; and often enough it is also due to moral immaturity,
if not to the fear of others. What a man ought to do, when he
is confronted with a serious conflict that is fraught with re-
sponsibility, is this: to decide according to his best conscience;
that is, according to his own living sense of the relative height
of the respective values, and to take upon himself the conse-
quences, external as well as inward, ultimately the guilt in-
volved in the violation of the one value. He ought to carry the
guilt and in so doing become stronger, so that he can carry it
with pride.
Real moral life is not such that one can stand guiltless in it.
And that each person must step by step in life settle conflicts,
insoluble theoretically, by his own free sense of values and
his own creative energy, should be regarded as a feature of
the highest spiritual significance in complete humanity and
genuine freedom. Yet one must not make of this a comfortable
theory, as the vulgar mind makes of the permissible lie,
imagining that one brings upon oneself no guilt in offending
against clearly discerned values. It is only unavoidable guilt
which can preserve a man from moral decay.
CHAPTER XXVI (lx)
TRUSTWORTHINESS AND FIDELITY
(a) The Ability to Make Promises
In valuations^ quality, reliability is closely allied to truthful-
ness. Both refer to the trustworthiness of the person. But in
their more specific content they are wellnigh opposite to each
other. The reliable man vouches for his word by his deed; the
truthful man vouches for a fact (as he understands it) by his
word. In both cases it is a guarantee of agreement by the
person; only in the one case it is the guarantee of one’s word
regarding an actually existing situation; in the other it is the
guarantee of a situation, still unactualized and outstanding, by
one’s permanent word. The situational value therefore in
truthfulness rests upon the certainty of the witness ; in the case
of reliability it rests upon the certainty of a future deed, in its
actualization, or generally in its future existence. Accordingly
the moral worth of these two certainties is not the same.
It inheres in the essence of a promise, that with it a claim
arises on the one side; on the other, an obligation . 1 Every
stipulation, every compact, every treaty — even that which is
ideally at the basis of positive law — rests upon this connection.
A treaty is a two-sided promise. This connection as such is
independent of whether there is an intention of keeping the
promise. A promise, on the contrary, has worth only if, the
intention is there.
If the intention is only a momentary one, which vanished
in the hour when it was discharged, its worth is slight. If the
will remains unchanged, it is great. The reliable man is the
one whose promise is of value, whose will is fixed by his word
1 Adolph Reinach, Die apriorischen Grundlagen des hurgerltchen
Rechtes, Jakrbuch f&r Philos, und PhSnom. Forschung, I. 2, 1912,
p. 718 ff.
TRUSTWORTHINESS AND FIDELITY 287
(he will abide by it) until it is discharged, however much his
mind may have changed afterwards. He holds himself bound
by his promise. And it is exactly his being bound, upon which
the man relies, who has the claim upon him.
It does not need to be proved, that by far the greatest
part of all existing co-operation and order in public as in
private social life rests upon treaty — whether it was overtly
entered into, or arose according to custom, or was tacitly
recognized. But then it is evident that only the reliable man is
capable of keeping to such co-operation and order, that is, of
living in the community. Reliability is the capacity of a man
so to promise that the other man can be sure that the promise
will be discharged, a capacity for treaty, compact, valid assent,
to undertake or desist. It is therefore the moral strength of
the person to speak for himself, to determine beforehand his
future conduct, to guarantee in his own person future conduct
not yet actual but yet under his control, therefore to guarantee
for himself beyond the present moment.
( b ) The Identity and Substance of the Moral Person
This is not one of the natural endowments of man. The natural
man follows impulsively the momentary excitations. He cannot
know what he will afterwards decide to do, for he does not
know what determines him. He cannot promise. The self-
predestination, which is involved in the binding promise, is a
specifically ethical power in man, which, as an identical and
abiding element, stands over against the coming and going of
the determinations! factor, whether inward or external. The
morally mature man has this power; he can determine before-
hand what he is going to will and to do. His present will has
power over his future will, and can be a substitute for it ; or,
more correctly, he knows that it is not merely his momentary
Will but one that will preserve itself in the future Will —
however this may be otherwise directed. All depends upon the
element of self-conservation. In the fixed resolution there is
288 THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
something which remains the same, the continuity of which
overleaps the temporal process, something which not only
determines but is aware also of this determining power, and
from it derives certainty.
But behind this volitional identity there is ultimately the
identity of the person himself. One who promises identifies
himself as he is now with what he -will be later. He can do
this, in so far as he is certain that he, as he will be then, will be
identical with himself as he is now. The breaking of a promise
would be a renunciation of himself, its fulfilment a holding
fast to himself, a remaining true to himself. On this personal
identity depends a man’s moral continuity in contrast to all
natural and empirical instability; on it, therefore, depends at
the same time the ethical substance of the person.
It is the essential basic superiority of the moral over the
natural constitution of man, that he possesses such identity,
such substantiality. A man is rightly estimated among men
to be moral, in proportion to the value of his pledged word.
So far as he is worthy of trust, capable of treaty, so far can
one reckon upon him as the same person. Whoever has once
realized this has moral pride in being trustworthy. To him the
unreliable man is despicable, is morally defective.
(c) The Ethos of Fidelity
Thus it comes about that in the moral life the ethos of reli-
ability has won a decisive and dominating position. But in its
universalization it bears the lofty name of fidelity.
Fidelity is not confined to the keeping of promises and
agreements. Its field is wider. There is an obligation which
holds although no word has been given ; only very few of the
fixed human relations upon which the individual relies in life
rest upon definitely made bargains. Everyone tacitly recognizes
a host of claims of other persons upon him, so far at least as
he also makes them upon others.
But fidelity extends beyond this to the disposition itself.
TRUSTWORTHINESS AND FIDELITY
289
A change of mental attitude is itself infidelity. For instance,
it is fundamentally true that every avowed disposition — good-
will that has been shown, love that has been manifested —
carries with it the expectation of its own continuance, as well
objectively in its meaning and nature as subjectively in the
emotion of him to whom it is expressed. Sympathy, friendship,
love, if it is only a transient mood, bears the impress of spurious-
ness, and is not worthy of the name. False, inconstant disposi-
tion deceives the person who accepts it, exactly in the same
way as does a lightly given, quickly forgotten promise. Even
the outer symbols and signs of love have something binding
m them, something holy, postulating inviolability. It is sense-
less to give to anyone friendship or love, in order to take it
back on the next occasion. All love which has been felt and
expressed has already in truth the character of a promise; in
essence it is of full promise and thus awakens a justifiable
hope. Therefore fidelity is the test of a genuine disposition.
The unfaithful person esteems lightly a promise given in
outward deed. But the faithful man is he who preserves the
moral identity of himself as a person in the constancy of his
attitude towards others.
Thisfc preservation extends to all human relations as a moral
requirement, from the most external and physical to the inner-
most and lealfc palpable. The ethos of fidelity is that of the
preservation of every disposition universally. Upon its worth
depends the holiness of the ancient German fidelity of man
to man, celebrated in song, as also the holiness of personal and
intimate loyalty; outward apostacy and treachery offend
against this value, like a hidden breach of faith. Fidelity extends
to everything to which the human will can commit itself.
One may be faithful or unfaithful to a goal, to a cause. Un-
faithfulness even to a cause is morally of low worth, but con-
stancy in disposition is a sign of full and permanent moral
worth ; and like bravery it is independent of the value of the
object in view. To the person, however, who puts his trust
in an avowed disposition, ^unfaithfulness is a moral crime.
Ethics— II T
29 ® . the REALM OF ETHICAL VALDES
.Here it always has something of the character of a breach of
confidence,
The ethos of fidelity is fundamentally personal stability. It
stands in antinomic contrast to the ethos of excitability and
variability, which inheres in so many other values (for example,
in fulness of life). There reverberates through it a dominant
motive from the sphere of the most general contrasts of values:
inertia as the perseverance of ethical substance . 1 The substance
is the person. Its active excitability, so valuable in itself, always
brings with it the danger of its losing itself. Against this stands
as a check the strict moral requirement of persistence. All
valuational factors of habit, which lie in this direction, belong to
the ethos of fidelity: every tenacious clinging to ends of pur-
suit, to precepts, to life-tasks, to persons — be it in love or
friendship, reverence or contempt — every Royalty to nation,
home, State, to communal interests of every kihd.' All fidelity,
because as continuity of disposition it is at the same time a
conservation of personality, is ultimately fidelity to oneself, all
unfaithfulness is unfaithfulness to self.
1 Cf. Chapter VIII (b), Vol. II.
CHAPTER XXVII (ux)
* TRUST AND FAITH
( a ) Adventure, Courage and the Spiritual Power of
Trust
Justice and brotherly love, as well as whatever is related to
them in the way of conduct, have a meaning for everyone to
whom they are manifested. They need here no special praise
in order to receive recognition; no virtue is required on the
part of him who stands in the enjoyment of them. But it is
otherwise with truthfulness and reliability. Their value as such
is indeed just as independent of any definite recognition on the
part of others! But the goods-value attached to them — and
both are accounted among the highest possessions for one’s
fellow-men — is dependent upon a certain attitude in which
one meets it. This attitude is faith, or trust. It is a new and
distinct moral value, fundamentally different from that of
.truthfulness and reliability and still related to both these,
which are presupposed in the other person; and it is rational
only in this relation; it is a complementary value. Fidelity is
rational only for him who really trusts himself to it, truthful-
ness only fot hun^who believes the word he utters. Once more,
trust, unless another’s truthfulness and reliability justify it,
floats in the -air 4 is’ imprudent, frivolous, pernicious.
Credulity, too, ready trustfulness, is a serious fault. One
may indeed excuse it, for a knowledge of human nature is
not every man’s business. But habitual distrust, the opposite
fault, is morally far more flagrant, a rooted scepticism in
regard to moral character. The distrustful man sins against the
one who is trustworthy; in him is lacking the feeling for the
goodness of an upright disposition, when it is presented to him.
By his doubt he belittles the'truthful and faithful man. The
excuse for him, of course, ^es again in the restrictedness of
*92 » THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
human insight. All trust, all faith, is an adventure; it always
requires something of moral courage and spiritual strength. It
is always accompanied by a certain commitment of the person.
And where the trust is far-reaching, where the faith is im-
pregnable, there the commitment is unlimited, and with it the
moral value of the trust rises proportionately.
Real trust is always a claim imposed upon the other person
— namely, to justify the trust — but at the same time and along
with this it is a precious gift, an honour conferred upon the
person, which can be raised to marked distinction. One entrusts
one’s own interests to another and appreciates his trustworthi-
ness. This gift is comparable to that of love and, as a value, can
even transcend it. But the principal difference is not in the
degree of the value, but in the character of the gift itself. The
one who loves does not surrender himself; he stakes nothing,
he gives only from himself ; his own personality remains un-
touched. The trustful person, on the contrary, puts himself
into the hands of him whom he trusts ; he stakes himself. In
this way his gift is morally the higher, and presupposes a
greater moral strength. This is reflected in the fact that one
can and ought to love everybody in the sense of neighbour-
love, but cannot and ought not to trust everybody. Trust and
faith have something discriminating in them. From the point
of view of love, no one is entirely unworthy; its gift is never
squandered, not even when it is rewarded with ingratitude.
He who loves is thereby never endangered. But he who trusts
exposes himself to danger. If his gift is trampled underfoot,
he himself is trodden upon. Hence the unequalled depth of
moral indignation which a deliberate breach of faith calls forth
even in those who are not betrayed by it.
(i b ) Blind Faith
The ability to trust is spiritual strength, a moral energy of a
unique kind. Its foundation is not experience, not .previous
testing. For it is only by showing trust that a man can be
TRUST AND FAITH
*93
tested; and doing so presupposes that spiritual energy. Faith
exists prior to experience. It alone is the foundation of genuine
trust. What justifies such faith is only a sensing of moral value
in the person. This sensing may be erroneous. Faith is for ever
an adventure. It is always at bottom “blind faith.”
This blindness is just what is essential to it. A “seeing”
faith, which has good grounds or objective certainty, is not at
all genuine faith ; there is no risk in it to one’s own personality :
for example, when one is certain of the discharge of a pledge,
because it is to the interest of the other person to discharge
it. “Not to see and yet to believe,” that is the heart of the
matter. Even religious faith is subject to the same sensing of
values. A faith which requires “signs and wonders” is not
real faith. Indeed, one might add that he who sees and knows
can no longer take on trust, that is, can no longer believe
autonomously and properly — simply because he knows.
Knowledge steals a march on faith, rendering it superfluous.
Hence genuine blind faith — for example, simply holding fast
to the mere word of a man, where all evidence of the facts is
overwhelmingly against him — is a unique phenomenon,
bordering on the marvellous. Blind faith, blind trust, is the
supreme endurance-test of moral strength, the true criterion
of genuineness in all the deeper dispositional relations of man
with man. How many a person believes himself to be capable
of “friendship” in the high sense of the word, and yet loses
faith upon the first occasion, where the apparent “facts” are
unfavourable to the friend. Afterwards he would need to confess
that his friendship was morally of little worth — even when his
loss of trust proved correct. For fidelity is often at a loss, when
it sees itself to be mistaken.
(c) Solidarity and the Educative Power of Faith
That faith “removes mountains,” that it is eminently a creative
power in life, this fact, long known in the domain of religion,
has never attained its rightful recognition in ethics. All human
*94 THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
relationships, from external material “credit” up to the highest
forms of delegated power in public life and of personal trust
in private life, are based upon faith. All the strength derived
from co-operation consists in men’s reliance upon one another;
this holds good in the highest degree, where a common faith
enters in and binds men in devotion to high purposes. It is
pre-eminently a communal value; it is the most positive uni-
fying energy, which welds together a variety of individual
persons, with their separate interests, into a collective unit;
it is more elemental than justice or neighbour-love — the former
being deliberate and a matter of judgment, the latter too un-
equal and far too private an affair of the emotions. There is a
type of solidarity different from that of love and the sense of
justice, a standing together “like one man” in the unity of a
conviction and in the consciousness of standing together, that
is, in sure and reciprocal trust. Solidarity of faith is more funda-
mental than any other kind, it is the basis of all commonalty.
Community, whether national or intimately private, is always
community of faith. The distrustful man is not adapted to it;
he excludes himself. Distrust breaks all bonds. Lack of faith
in a cause, like lack of faith in a man, means separation. Faith
is capacity for co-operation. Upon it rests the tremendous
extension of the individual’s sphere of power by his uniting
with many; it is like solid earth under his feet at every step
in life. The distinctively moral value of life begins in the sphere
of those who trust one another. In that sphere as the sub-
stantial element their best qualities and capacities first un-
fold. In it alone is found outward freedom, on the basis of
which the education of a race towards inner freedom and the
capacity to assume responsibility and to delight in it, becomes
for the first time possible. When a community as a whole lacks
faith, the individual seeks it in a small circle, whether in the
family or among those of like mind (among natural friends,
according to the ancient conception), or in a personally chosen
friend.
The proof that faith is a creative power is that it actually
TRUST AND FAITH
395
generates in another person that which is believed to exist in
him. The moral energy issuing from one who believes is in a
high degree an educative force. It is capable of making the
man who is trusted, reliable and deserving of faith and trust.
Of course this holds good only within definite limits, and pre-
supposes certain moral conditions (certain endowments) in the
other person. But it remains true that in general trusting a
man makes him good, distrusting him makes him bad. He to
whom nothing good is ever attributed, never learns to be good
or to justify the placing of confidence in him. A man who has
undeservedly acquired the reputation of being a liar easily
becomes one; he lacks the moral incentive of satisfying faith
placed in him. He is driven towards that which is attributed
to him.
Conversely, in the unreliable man there exists a sensing of
the value which he has not but is believed to possess ; and this
feeling can be aroused and educated into a moral pride to
deserve the trust put in him. So long as a man retains a spark
of moral feeling, the impulse lives in him, not to fall short of
what is expected of him. This is a well-known method of
moral discipline; but that there is in faith a general power of
awakening the moral life, has been less widely recognized; yet
it deserves to become a common possession. Finally, there is
somthing good in everyone. And it grows with the exercise
of it and through encouragement. It languishes through lack
of appreciation. Faith can transform a man, towards good or
evil, according to what he believes. This is its secret, its power
to remove mountains. Distrust is impotence. Trust imposes
an obligation. The ethos of fidelity increases with faith. It is
carried by the consciousness of what is attributed to it. This
inner dependence is not reversible. Of the narrower valua-
tions! group of “truthfulness, fidelity, faith,” faith is the basis *
which supports everything else, however much the contrary
may appear to be true to external and traditional observation.
396
THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
(d) Faith as a Factor in Friendship
Trust as a value becomes complete only when it is reciprocal.
The reciprocity produces among men a unity of a higher kind:
a certainty, a stable and fixed security. When such a relation is
justified by uprightness on either side, by reliability and
fidelity, we see on a small scale the ideal ethical form of life.
This is the foundation of friendship. A still further factor,
personal love, is essential — friendship is indeed a highly com-
plex value; but trust, including its complementary values, is
its basis. In relation to these values love is autonomous; it
can subsist without faith, it rests on a foundation of its own,
however much a tendency to good faith may be native to it.
Friendship is different. A friend is pre-eminently one whose
faith in us is unwavering; nothing can shatter it, not even our
lack of love for him. Friendship is more objectively based
than love; of course this dispositional foundation by itself is
without the higher qualities of love, without its depth of feeling,
without the richness of content, the glowing devotion. Friend-
ship comes to fruition in love, but does not arise out of it.
(e) Optimism and Hope
In an individual the ethos of faith may develop into an all-
dominating view of life. It is the view of the morally strong
man, the strength of whose faith is not to be overborne by
disappointments. As there is an inclination to love and justice,
so a man may have a predisposition which inclines him to
trust. It consists of a kind of general faith in the goodness of
man. It is not incompatible with a prudent reserve on the
part of a person of experience. It manifests itself in a capacity
- to detect what is good and genuine in another’s disposition
amidst less worthy tendencies and to seize upon the good,
even to draw it out and develop it by the influence of one’s
trust.
In such an ethos there is a peculiar form of optimism —
TRUST AND FAITH
397
fundamentally different from that of wisdom, and yet, like
that of wisdom, not eudaemonistic but purely ethical. It is
akin to the simplicity of a child, to purity, which is supported
by a similar faith in the good, and has the same power for
good over human hearts . 1 In this optimism is preserved an
element of genuine innocence in the midst of mature life;
indeed, in the strengthening of this disposition there takes
place something like a substitute for the return to the ethos
of purity, which in the nature of things cannot fetum. And
with it comes a capacity for happiness, which is astonishingly
like that revealed in the spirit of a child.
Yet the parallel to purity must not be carried too far. For
faith is attained by striving — at least it may be; it is a fruit
of moral ripeness, a power developed to a certain height. Cer-
tainly it is not found in the “pure fool,” who has no suspicion
of evil, but rather in him who sees evil but who is not deterred
by it from holding fast to the good in man.
Beyond this there is still a higher ethos of faith — ia the
vision of the great moral ideals of life, which the individual
person does not actualize, and in the vision of the great upward
strivings of humanity. Distant goals and vast enterprises
require a "different kind of faith, a faith which temporal un-
attainability dcfes not stifle. It inheres in the essence of all such
outlooks upon life — and these are those which lend its highest
meaning to our existence — that the non-actuality of the goal
does not prejudice the reality of the undertaking. Herein the
potent moral element of “not seeing and yet believing” attains
its c ulmin ating point. For it is the high ideals, which man
never sees actualized. To this lofty spirit of faith corresponds
Hope — a valuational sense of a distinct kind. It is not properly
a morafValue, like faith; it is not a new “virtue,” but only an
accompanying emotional factor, the form of happiness whid^
accords with. faith and which anticipates its contents.
1 Cf. Chapter XVII («), Vol. II.
CHAPTER XXVIII (mi)
MODESTY, HUMILITY, ALOOFNESS
(a) The Ethos of the Upward Gaze
Together with all their divergences the values of the second
group, which we have thus far considered, have this in common,
that they are the values of human neighbourliness. Their
ethos is directed to the inner world of another person. But this
tendency may go too far. It finds its limit in the rightful claim
of the person himself, to remain unmolested in his intimate
sphere. Trust, neighbour-love, and especially the sympathy
which flows from it, may become aggressive. As a counterpoise
they require aloofness. Indeed even truthfulness, uprightness
and fidelity (the latter in the form of attachment) must be kept
within bounds. It is the same with the values of the first group.
Wisdom, justice, valour and especially pride may presume too
much ; they have a secret tendency towards vanity and haughti-
ness. They need a similar limit set to them, only in another
direction, in the direction of modesty and humility. These are
the limiting values of moral self-consciousness and, as such, are
genuine and unique. They constitute a narrower group by
themselves.
Modesty is according to Socrates the primal virtue of the
knowledge of one’s own moral nothingness. It appears as the
basis even of the proud ethos of “irony.” What it is in an inward
direction — self-knowledge, self-criticism, judgment of one’s
own value (and thus the true beginning of wisdom), 1 this it is
also in the outward direction, in relation to others : it is reticence
in the presence of another’s moral worth, due to the conscious-
ness of one’s own unworthiness.
The modest man is not at all the one who belittles himself,
even there where his total habit of mind tends towards general
1 Cf. Chapter XX (b), Vol. II.
MODESTY, HUMILITY, ALOOFNESS 299
humility. He is rather the one who aims high in his moral
standards, whose points of comparison lie decidedly above Mm
He thus from the start raises himself above the arrogant and
haughty man. The haughty person makes it easy for himself,
because he aims low. For purposes of comparison, morally, a
worse man is always easy to find, especially if one is helped by
having an unsympathetic eye.
As there is an art of being happy and contented by keeping
before one’s mind those who are less fortunate in worldly goods,
so there is a finer art, peculiar to modesty, of keeping before
one’s mind those who stand on a higher moral level. But as the
ethos of modesty is an enduring one, which pervades the whole
disposition, it not only attends to those who are morally superior,
but extends to the conduct of everyone. In the presence of men
morally inferior to him, the modest man is not more exalted
than usual ; for he does not measure himself by them. Where
one is thoroughly conscious of this relationship, it brings about,
in an eminent degree, a morally discriminating habit of mind.
The modest man is the despair of one who is arrogant, in that
he ignores everything which makes the arrogant man feel
important, The gaze of the haughty man is directed downward,
that of the modest man upward. And on this account the
former sees only what is below him, the latter only what is
above him. In life there is always something to which a man
can look up. The upward gaze is not a result, but a cause. It
does not arise out of comparison, but itself selects the points
of comparison. In the ethos of the upward gaze all reverence
and awe have their basis, as everyone who is morally unspoiled
proves by his reverence and awe for real worth and merit, for
antiquity or for persons in positions of higher responsibility.
( i ) Humility and Pride
What modesty is in relation to others, humility is as an inner
form of the character itself. It is the consciousness of falling
infinitely short of the mark, in which all comparison with others
300 THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
is ignored. It measures one’s own moral being by perfection,
as this is understood, by divinity, as the moral ideal or as
some sublime exemplar. Unattainability gives the sense of
remoteness, which at the same time both oppresses and exalts;
the oppression is the sense of one’s own nothingness; the
exaltation, the sense of being in direct relation with what is
transcendently great.
Man does not feel humility in the presence of man — that
would be false humility, self-degradation, servility. False
humility is a moral aberration, exactly as arrogance is; it
lacks all feeling for the infinite distance between oneself and
the ethical Ideal. All humility towards what is external is at
bottom a false ethos; some moral defect is always concealed in
it, a perplexity, a pettiness of spirit, an anxiety, or indeed
some spunous passion, such as false shame, or fear of others.
Equally adrift is all arrogance, self-righteousness, Pharisaism,
when it is organic and not merely a pose. The haughty man
has no conception of the loftiness and the inexorability of the
moral claim under which he actually stands. To anyone who
has a living sense of values, arrogance is something absurd and
truly degraded. Genuine humility, on the other hand, is in
contradiction neither to the dignity of man nor to justifiable
pride. Indeed, correctly understood, it is compatible with
genuine pride, which is far removed from vain self-admiration.
The ultimate reason for true moral pride is that one measures
oneself by a standard which is absolute and unattainably
high.
The seemingly antinomic relation between humility and pride
is therefore easily broken down. At least in principle. It is not a
genuine valuational antinomy. On the contrary, genuine pnde
and genuine humility evidently belong necessarily together,
re-enforce each other and can exist only in synthesis. In this
of course it is not said that the synthesis is established of itself,
where the attitude of the man inclines to the one or the other
side. Rather does there subsist in the human inclination a
certain opposition, and this is to blame for the appearance of
MODESTY, HUMILITY, ALOOFNESS 301
the antinomy. Humility is just as dangerous a virtue as pride.
Both lie dose to the boundary of fantastic aberrations. Pride
without humility is always on the brink of arrogance and
vanity ; humility without pride, on the brink of self-degradation,
worthlessness and hypocrisy. Each by itself is unstable, is
without balance. Only when together, in synthesis, do they
become stable, each gaining support from the other.
Their grappling hold of each other, their inward union, con-
stitutes a moral value for which there is no suitable word in
language, but the content of which is recognizable from the
circumstance that here the two elements, otherwise so easily
manifesting themselves outwardly and so disposed to falsifica-
tion and posing, are wholly bound together inwardly and hold
close to the standard of absolute ideals.
(c) Keeping One’s Distance
On another side modesty is connected with reserve, the feeling
and the keeping of one’s distance in relation to another person.
All human proximity requires a limit, as a protection against
aggressiveness which takes advantage of proximity itself.
Keeping one’s distance is a kind of moral shame, different
of course from that of the Aristotelian alSats. The latter is a
feeling arising from the exposure of oneself. The ethos of
reserve, on the contrary, is shame felt out of respect for another
because of his nearness and his exposure, or even only at the
thought of his defencelessness; it is the preservation of the
intimate privacy of another. There is an intimate sphere for
each person, which does not endure the clear, cold, and too
intrusive observation of others, even of those who love. Adi
near approach is fundamentally an intrusion. A person stands
defenceless against intrusion ; and indeed so much the more so,
the purer tod more transparent he is. Much curiosity and
sensationalism may go hand in hand with a loving interest in
one’s neighbour, for even one who loves is subject to human
weaknesses. Sympathy, moreover, is easily shameless, easily
302 THE REALM OF- ETHICAL VALDES
vexatious. The proud ahd the noble want no sympathy. They
accordingly are themselves chary of sympathy, not from lack
of affection, but from a sense of shame, out of respect for others.
Every man in his unique divergence from others, where this is
exposed to view, has an alluring effect by the attraction of
secrecy. But his human dignity suffers under uncalled-for
inspection. Shyness about the good which one does is a charac-
teristic of the truly good deed. Even towards a friend a friend
cannot dispense with the sense of reticence. The tacit relation-
ship of trust also, by its very nature, needs retirement. In this
case the limit to willing exposure simply lies deeper within
one’s inner being. But it is never altogether absent. One who is
entirely without reticence cannot be a friend. He would be
unbearable in his lack of shame.
The truly loving glance is one which covers up and veils.
It does not dare to observe even when it might. This holds
true still more in the case of the proud man. He is precisely
the one who is especially reticent — and not from regard for
himself but for the other person. Only he who has a sense of
his own worth can respect another’s. With him a failure to
keep one’s distance is a violation of good taste. We might
describe the ethos of the man who keeps his distance as that of
social distinction. In him we see, clearly outlined and finely
felt, the synthesis of pride and modesty, analogous to that of
pride and humility. Social distinction in one’s attitude towards
others is the same as the fusion of pride and humility in one’s
attitude towards the absolute standard of the moral ideal.
A man of social distinction creates about him a permanent
sphere of reserve, which not only wards off aggressive persons,
but protects others from too great exposure. He sets up the
claim for himself as for them, and in so doing manifests a
kind of justice within the most intimate relationships of feeling.
He preserves reverence for personality, even where it does not
know how to protect itself. He thus provides an area of intimate
intercourse, wherein, even when the danger of exposure is
nearest, its approach is checked. Only under the protection of
MODESTY, HUMILITY, ALOOFNESS 303
such security, as a finely discriminating and inward arrange-
ment of emotional justice, can the flower of human neighbourli-
ness best thrive. For it does not bar out sympathy, love, trust —
these are absolute and their value knows no boundary — but
only their substitutes, only the imitations and distorting
caricatures of the genuine ethos.
CHAPTER XXIX (uv)
THE VALUES OF SOCIAL INTERCOURSE
( a ) The Moral Character of Conventionalities
The ethos of reticence introduces us immediately into a
further group of values, which can no longer pass as dispositional
in the strict sense, but still are values of conduct. They are more
on the surface of human nature, where it exists in the outward
contact of individuals, in the friction, as it were, of social
intercourse. The depths of consciousness, the sphere where
intentions originate, are not touched by them. But every
intention, moving outward, receives the stamp of their impress;
independently of its deeper value, in passing to the surface it
falls under the standard of other values, which affect only its
form of expression.
Such forms are by no means without significance in life.
A person’s “bad form” may be intolerable and make the life of
others unendurable. However accidental and conventional the
existing forms of social intercourse may be, however absurd
they may appear to anyone introduced among them from another
circle of society, they are still profoundly necessary to life, and
anyone who violates them sins against his fellow-men exactly
as much as a person who is unjust or heartless. Indeed by
doing so, he is unjust and heartless; he is a transgressor in
little things and shows all the signs of such a one; he refuses
to others what he claims from them for himself; and like a
real criminal, he is subject to condemnation and punishment,
to boycott and ostracism.
True neighbourliness applies itself very seriously to the
preservation of social forms, even to a delicate and minute
conformity to them; it shows deference and it wishes to be
inoffensive to others. In these matters one feels a serious
responsibility. And a quite definite attitude of mind corresponds
to it, when once it is grasped; and thus the formal values of
THE VALUES OF SOCIAL INTERCOURSE 305
social intercourse prove to be indirectly genuine dispositional
values.
Like justice and love, the remaining values of the inner
ethos reappear in social forms, diminished and yet unmistakable.
This is most clearly seen in offence against social custom. In
this sphere a person who lacks self-control is petulant, the
unwise man is inconsiderate, blase or disappointed with the
world; cowardice reappears as irresoluteness and vacillation;
lack of pride and dignity, as familiarity or boisterousness;
untrufhfulness, as deliberate pose or affectation; immodesty
and lath of reticence, as insolence of manner and petty obtrusive-
ness; arrogance, as self-assertion and superciliousness.
But in this sphere reliability and trust play a special r&le.
In view of generally existing forms it is of the essence of social
life, that each individual depends upon every other for the
maintenance of forms. Trust of this most external kind is a
condition of social intercourse ; one who violates the form cannot
be relied upon. Finally, in this sphere, the distrustful person,
who is suspicious of everyone’s deportment, becomes himself
uncertain in behaviour and spreads about him a sense of
insecurity. He never knows how he stands with others; and
-they do not know how they stand with him. The whole circle
of outward association rests ultimately upon a relationship of
trust transferred to the plane of everyday life. All propriety in
social encounter with others calls imperatively for a like pro-
priety in them. All human relationships, even if external and
apparently of no account, rest upon the power of good faith.
In the domain of social forms the man who is heartless and
unjust is merely inconsiderate and intolerable; the suspicious
man disintegrates, dissolves and even destroys all the bonds
of social converse.
( b ) Existing Customs
The content of this sphere is an extraordinarily variegated, but
an essential, constituent of human civilization, changeable like
EOua-II u
THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
306
it and capable of unlimited improvement. Whatever is “custom”
m the narrower sense of the word, from external usages to the
imponderables of a cultivated style of living, is an illustration.
Existing custom is of course historically accidental, perishable,
a conventionality, and it is never possible to know a prion why
it is just so and not otherwise. There is no axiological reason
for its special form. But it is never on that account neutral
in value. For it is always a formation of actual values: for
instance, of moral values such as considerateness, tact, sim-
plicity, friendly welcome, politeness, quiet demeanour, aTSense
of propriety and fitness, fine judgment as to when to advance
and when to retire — projected into the sphere of outward
associations.
These latter qualities and much that is related to them are
genuine and permanent values, which recur in every conven-
tional structure, however differently selected and graded the
details may be. They do not themselves constitute the existing
custom; but custom is the specific form into which they seem
to be cast. For without some special form these values cannot
become actual.
Here the historical diversity is so great, that it is in fact easy
to overlook the moral unity of all customs. This may be unam-
biguously outlined as follows : The separate existing custom as
such is never of absolute value; yet it is relatively so; for it is
altogether an absolute value that, in general, customs of some
special kind should prevail. Without established customs man-
kind sinks into formlessness and savagery. Indeed, without
them development of the inner ethos is hindered, because it is
as dependent upon fixed forms, however superficial, as upon
forms of law. The moral value of custom is accordingly a very
peculiar one. As its material it has not the special contents but
only what is essential in them, their real power of self-main-
tenance in the special environment. Indirectly there is moral
value in the social forms which in themselves are morally
indifferent.
We by no means deny that the moral cultivation of these
THE VALUES OF SOCIAL INTERCOURSE 307
superficial forms may have a high quality, indeed a peculiar
depth of its own. One need not have in mind simply the more
aesthetic kinds of moral refinement, urbanity (to acrretov) and
the social graces. In the varied structure of this sphere is
included a considerable amount of heart-culture, fine feeling and
humanity generally. The work devoted to it can never be a
matter of indifference to a morally mature personality, and it
will never come to an end; it therefore holds an important place
io^he education of the young.
(c) Aristotle’s Virtues of Social Intercourse
The view that there are special values in outward converse is
not a new one. In its table of the virtues the Nicomachean
Ethics enumerates three such, but in characteristic fashion two
of these are said to have no name. But where language fails,
paraphrase comes to the rescue. These virtues are described,
according to Aristotle’s custom, as p^aorqres, and as such
referred to converse in word and act. 1
The first has reference to conflict of opinions, to the practical
clash of conviction with conviction. The two extremes inhere
* in the attitude of the apeaKos and that of the SvmtoXos. The
former is the man who is excessively anxious to please, who
talks blindly and never ventures to defend any conviction; the
latter is unapproachable, difficult, insisting on his own opinion
and refusing further discussion. The implied virtue therefore is
evidently a synthesis of willingness to welcome opinions and an
actual holding by what is known to be right, or a defence of
one’s own conviction and a recognition of the other person’s
view.
A second virtue of this kind refers to one’s being true to
what one really is. Aristotle describes it as a being true in one’s
outward demeanour (aXrjdeveiv). As it has only a loose con-
nection with truthfulness, its name is misleading. What is
meant is here again to be inferred from what is said concerning
1 Eth. Nic., Chapters XII-XIV, p. 1 1266 ff.
THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
308
the intermediate position. The virtue is a mean between
dAa£o veta and elpcaveia. The former is boasting, the latter
self-depreciation. Both are untrue, disingenuous, assumed.
Between them is the presenting of oneself simply as one is,
without self-display and without concealment, in short, without
posing. One might name it the virtue of straightforwardness.
Outwardly, in reporting oneself, it is what inwardly peyaXoiJwxla
is in self-estimation. 1
A degree still nearer to the surface is the third Aristotelian
virtue of social deportment. It is on that account of special
interest. Its realm is light conversation, the social tone; its
subject matter is pleasantry and seriousness. There is a virtue
of pleasantry, a genuine ethical attitude of mind, not as it were,
the art of being witty (this as such is ethically indifferent), but
the rightly balanced, tactful relation to jesting, which is dignified
and yet is appreciative of humour. The Aristotelian descrip-
tions im8e£i6rr)s and evrpaneXla express but imperfectly
the nature of the matter. In German it is very difficult to
describe. The Sinn fiir Humor misses the necessary note.
This becomes evident if we glance at the extremes which are
specified by Aristotle; aypoiKla and j6w/ioAo^ia. The former
is a deficient sense of the comic, the latter is frivolity, which
converts everything into a subject of jest. The ethos of the
mean between these extremes becomes still clearer, if we relate
it to the way one takes the utterances of another person. The
aypotKos is the man who cannot see a joke, the f5a>p,oX6x°s
is the one who refuses to take anything seriously.
Genuine moral values inhere in these three virtues. By taking
them as models, it would not be too difficult to discover further
values in the same sphere. But the examples given are sufficient.
None of them is of great ethical import, although they may
rise to a considerable height. The entire domain of social inter-
course is a border region of the ethical table of values. On the
whole its significance lies only in its connection with the relative
autonomy of the fundamental values.
* Cf Chapter XXIII (d), Vol. II.
Section V 11
SPECIAL MORAL VALUES
(THIRD GROUP)
CHAPTER XXX (lv)
LOVE OF THE REMOTE
(a) The Limiting Values in the Ethical Survey
As the virtues in the first two groups were but loosely connected,
so those of the third do not properly constitute a group at all.
Rather may we conceive of each of the four following values as
itself a narrower group. Compared with those previously con-
sidered, each lies in a special valuational region, points to a
perspective reaching into the infinite and passes into the sphere
of the axiologically irrational. In direction they are diverging
limits, not indeed of the realm of values (for we could not know
that), but of human vision.
With some of them it is not easy to outline their content in
words, or even to name them exactly. This is true of the first
two. There is no historical ethos which corresponds precisely
to them. On this account they have never had a name, like so
much else that our feeling for values knows very well and
discriminates. And as even analogies are inadequate, the attempt
to define them objectively is a bold venture.
Still the attempt must be made. We must seize upon the
central themes, where and in as far as we can find them. Here
Nietzsche has been the pioneer in more than one direction. The
exaggerations of his aphorisms, which often spring from his
craving for paradox, must not divert us from what he positively
saw. The sensationalism of two decades ago, which fell greedily
upon these exaggerations and cast suspicion upon the serious-
ness of the problem, must be entirely ignored. So far as it was
right, what was prophetically seen under the pressure of passion
must now be calmly surveyed.
( b ) Effort as an Element in the Following Virtues
AH ethically active life is prospective, it is a living in the future
and for the future. This inheres in the nature of activity. Only
312 THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
the future belongs to striving. The will has no power over what
has already transpired, once it exists . 1 The great gift of foresight
and pre-determination (teleology), which is peculiar to man,
imposes a profound obligation. It loads hi m with responsibility
for the future, in so far as the future is in his power. How far
it is so, cannot of course be estimated beforehand. But no
absolute limits can here be set. Man’s power of intervening
in the cosmic process and determining its course extends just
so far as he knows how to expand his capacity by his own
energies. The fact that his will goes beyond his capacity is
here irrelevant.
This absence of known limits stands in bold contradiction
to the fact that man ordinarily is inclined to restrict himself to
what lies nearest to him, to what is most evident and close in
front of him. His thought does not reach beyond the next day.
The pressure of the moment constrains him. What is near
absorbs his activity, thrusts itself between him and all wider
perspectives and causes them to fall into oblivion.
To this is added the natural tendency to inertia. It is most
comfortable to exercise the minimum of activity along beaten
tracks. It is much, if a man rises to a perspective which surveys
his own life. In so far as such a survey concerns his outward
career, every normal man attains it at least in certain moments.
This is little, especially as such a “practical” outlook seldom
reaches beyond material and eudaemonistic ends. Of course
there are noted exceptions, men with high ideals of life. But
they usually suffer from the opposite mistake, their idealism
is unpractical, visionary, exhausting itself in perpetual yearning
and inevitable disappointments. In these cases there is no
proper foresight, none gained by serious experience and made
critical by it. Ethically this dreamy idealism is just as worthless
as dull absorption in the passing moment. In both, the thing
that is most important is lacking, complete earnestness of effort.
To combine a life, viewed in the light of ideals, with a cool
eye for the actual and the possible, requires an ethos con-
* Cf. Chapter XI (g), Vol. II.
LOVE OF THE REMOTE
3*3
siderably above the average. Such a synthesis gives to the
bearer of it a certain dignity, which grows with the greatness
of the ends he pursues and with the practical effect. In such a
life is fulfilled something of man’s destiny, which is to become
a participant in the creation of the world. But just here it is
seen that the perspective of any one individual’s life is too
small for the actualization of human ideals. One individual can
advance a few steps upon such a path. And also in the work
which he accomplishes he can go far; he can draw a group of
men into the circle of his own idea, and under favourable
circumstances he may evoke a total transformation of historical
importance. But what will that signify, if his life-work dies
with him, or soon after? It is just such work that requires
permanence, continuation, a living energy of its own. It inheres
in the nature of all effort that looks to an objective value, to go
on beyond the life and enterprise of the individual, into a future
which he no longer can enjoy. It is not only the fate but is also
the pride of a creative mind and is inseparable from his task,
that his work survives him, and therefore passes from him to
others, in whose life he has no part.
But it is also in the nature of man, that he wishes to see
the fruits of his struggle. He also wants to have something for
himself; there is something in him which resists the passing
of his work out of his hands. Whether it be a strain of egoism
which is concealed here, or some more deeply justified need
of participation, the fact is that almost all human effort is held
fast in this tendency. To free oneself from it requires a
self-conquest and self-renunciation of a radical kind. But
it is just such conquests upon which the issue turns. With
it is ushered in the new moral value, which we are now
to consider.
It is important to keep clearly in mind that it is by no means
merely the natural propensity in man, or the “anti-moral
impulse,” which brings with it the desire to participate in the
consummation of creative effort. Many a lofty character betrays
this tendency. It is most conspicuous in brotherly love. Why
314 THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
does this kind of love attach itself especially to the one who is
closest, and not equally to him who is remote, to the man of
future times? It is because our neighbour is present to us, we
know him, his life, his need, and we see in him every effect of
our love. It is easy to love him, he is just at hand, he offers
himself. What is overcome is only egoism of the vulgar type
which demands all for self; the egoism of emotional participa-
tion, the higher egoism, that of sympathetic delight in another’s
welfare, still remains.
(c) The Platonic ipcas
It is an abiding service rendered by the Platonic philosophy, to
have seen clearly the unique value of that kind of striving, which
leaves behind it not only all personal ends but even those of
one’s own social environment and of one’s contemporaries. The
question is not whether we regard the epcos of the Symposium
as a figure of speech or strictly as the concept of a value. The
subject-matter itself is alone important, and that is unmis-
takable. epcos is participation in immortality. Animal nature,
in that it reproduces itself, survives in what it brings forth.
Its care for its young, its capacity to die for them, the fixed
attachment to the future life of the species, is symbolical. It is an
immortality in the mortal. But besides physical procreation,
man knows another kind, spiritual procreation, whereby he
passes4nto the imperishable. His work survives him, he parti-
cipates in the eternal through immortal virtue. He too can live
and die for his offspring.
The Platonic epcos — when we strip it of everything else and
attend only to its ethical substance — is deeper absorption in
the Idea, great passion for it, personal commitment to it. This
passion brings it about that a man is transported beyond himself
and beyond his environment. It is a man’s losing of himself in
his work, his inward life in what is not yet, in what is “still
on the way from Non-being to Being”; it is the abandonment
of the present for what is future, uncertain ; the sacrifice of his
LOVE OF THE REMOTE 315
life for another life, for one more valuable, but one that is not
his own.
There is a potency syi generis in man, which here emerges,
a germinal capacity with a distant aim, a generative energy of
the ethos. Plato called it a pregnancy and a bringing to the
birth (Kvr)oi,s, yewyots). The driving force is the Idea. The
creative worker is carried with it. It is the generating power
of values in man, for instance, of his ideals which are laden
with values. Through them he outgrows himself. He transcends
himself. But the direction and the extent of the transcendence
are not the same as in the case of brotherly love and of everything
akin to it. It lies in another dimension of life ; it does not tend to
fellowship with individuals nor even to union with the com-
munity, but is prospective towards some future time which is
still asleep in the non-existent. The trend of its intention has
exchanged the breadth of simultaneity for the depth of succes-
sion. Herein the transcendence advances not only in degree but
in quality : it goes beyond the boundary of the actual and present
and plunges into the unreal, which can be discerned only in
the Idea, in order to actualize it.
This kind of purpose is only an extension of the direction
which in tendency exists in all striving, in all devotion to a
cause, however near and insignificant. Even in self-fulfilment
the basis is self-conquest. Likewise all communal progress
rests upon the self-subjection of the individual. From its
beginning the perpetual revolution of the collective'* life is
composed of the differentiations in the intentions of individuals.
But as a communal process it is purposeless and aimless, so
long as man as ‘such does not give it a special aim and gain
power over it, to lead it.
( d ) The Human Outlook and Historical Solidarity
Here is a field of human foresight and activity which, although
itself unlimited in extent and richness of tasks, is subjectively
limited by the narrow bounds of human foresight and self-
3 x6 THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
conquest. It is of no use to man to excuse himself on the score
of his small equipment of capabilities; the responsibility for the
course which public life takes falls ultimately upon him alone.
At least he alone has the gift of foresight and predetermination.
In political life moral transgression is not due to the narrow-
ness of this gift, but to the failure to use it in a spirit of glad
responsibility. The type of the statesman, as we know him in
our day, and as history repeatedly shows him, does not act
from a sense of responsibility for the wider future of nation
and State, but from the need and opportunity of the moment.
He is not a conscious carrier of the great and far-reaching
responsibility which actually rests upon him. He works for
immediate ends, as if beyond them there were no wider and
more important perspectives.
To-day we generally know only the short-sighted politics of
the moment. The survey of centuries, to which we have become
accustomed in historical retrospect, we omit to make pro-
spectively; yet it is most urgently needed in regard to the future.
The past gives us examples of truly far-seeing politicians. But
they stand there apart ; the present age has little understanding
of them, perhaps as little as any former age. To-day we know
only party politics and party rule. We form groups to meet
transient emergencies. So long as no one is superior to their
petty conflicts, only immediate issues are visible in public life.
The truly political spirit is lacking, the spirit of self-subjection
and gfeat historical responsibility. To us it may sound Utopian,
if we are asked to consider the children of generations which
will be of another mind and another circumstance. Nevertheless
it is true that those generations will be our toSirs and will reap
the fruits of our actions, and that we bear the responsibility
for what we load them with. It is the moral business of all to
reform political life. There is no escape from this claim.
Political life, however, is only one example. Our responsibility
is wider. It reaches to all the departments of life. Everywhere
the same law of spiritual inheritance holds good, the same
historical continuity. Everywhere, besides being linked to the
LOVE OF THE REMOTE
3i?
community of our own time, we stand in another connection.
In every cultural relationship each one sees himself in the
setting of another community, that of the following generation,
which teaches him that Ee himself is but a link in a chain. The
responsibility which arises therefrom signifies a solidarity of a
newer and greater kind than that of justice, brotherly love and
faith. Like these it is a bond, a fellowship, a pledge, a joint
responsibility of person for person. And still it is altogether
different. In it the man of to-day feels himself one with the
man of the far-away future, though the latter will have forgotten
him and cannot be of help to him. The temporal direction of
cause and effect is not reversible. The influence of man on man,
solidarity itself, is only one-sided. Only he who lived previously
can be of service to him who lives afterwards. The successor
bears no retrospective obligation. Instead, there falls to him a
new obligation towards the generations coming after him.
Solidarity is directed forward only; its form is progress, not
co-existence. Still it is a bond which is great not only in extent
but great in the quality of its task.
That it is a bond of a more fragile kind, that it is taken so
much less earnestly by the living than is the solidarity of justice
or love, this is not due to its own nature. It is due to the moral
immaturity of the living, to their not having wakened to their
greatest task. It is their lack of thorough self-conquest, which
transcends the sphere of the Now and the Near.
t *
( e ) Love of the Nearest and Love of the Remotest
There is an ethqp which brings about this new transcendence
with the emotional strength of the Platonic epa>s. It is an ethos
of love, but of another love than that for one’s neighbour, a
love for the man who is to be, as he is conceivable in Idea by
the living. It is a love which knows no return of love, which
radiates only, gives only, devotes, overcomes, sacrifices, which
lives ,in the high yearning that cannot be fulfilled for the one
who loves, but which knows that there is always a future and
3i8 THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALDES
that indifference to it is a sin. Such love is “Femstenliebe”
(Love of the Remotest).
This is the name Nietzsghe gave to the newly discerned
virtue, to contrast it with “Nachstenliebe” (Love of the
Nearest). His denial of the latter may be disregarded here; it
overshot the mark and only damaged his own contention . 1 That
the discoverer of the new value could go to extremes is under-
standable. The conflict of the two values is undeniable. But to*
see the antinomy is one thing ; positively to approve it is another.
To resolve the antinomy in favour of one side is always a
temptation. But it leads inevitably to a misunderstanding of
the other value.
The antinomy shows itself in this, that love of the remotest
at first really requires an overcoming of one’s commitment to
the nearest. It is the same overcoming which generally inheres
in the nature of a future intention. Everything which is dear
and entrusted to man attaches to the immediate environment.
Here an attachment of love to the remote is demanded. Hence
not only natural inclination, but also genuine moral habit,
must be overcome. A valuable commitment, not acquired without
moral struggle, is to retire into the background and give way to
another ethos. It is the conquering of a product of previous,
self-conquest. Love of the nearest (altrmsm) went counter to
self-love (egoism) ; it was a tremendous extension of the sphere
of life, efficiency, evaluation, participation. Now even this
widened sphere is seen to be too narrow, to be -a drag on the
intention of love. Love of the nearest does not go beyond one’s
contemporary. Its effect does not endure, it-dies with its object;
it is not adapted to the continuation of its object, but to his
present existence. Love of the remotest seeks a different
measure of efficiency, an efficacy which will last. It is Plato’s
“immortal virtue.” Of course it can attach itself only to the
nearest, for all effectiveness has the form of teleology and must
seek its first means in what is at hand. But its aims do not
centre in the nearest. It sees in that only a means fd something
1 Cf. Chapter XXIV (d), Vol. II.
LOVE OF THE REMOTE
3*9
greater, which cannot he actualized in the nearest. It derives
the end from a valuational view which does not concern itself
with the individual person, which in itself is also indifferent
both to the near and the far, and points into the distance, only
because it finds no ground in the near.
In love of the nearest the energy of striving, as it has no
choice, reconciles itself with whoever is accidentally at hand.
Whether he be the worthiest, it does not ask. For it there are
none unworthy; it does not judge. With love of the remotest the
reverse is true. The energy of striving shall serve not the nearest
but the best, whom it will bring to further fruition. Herein a
selection of persons from the point of view of values is intro-
duced, a selection which on its side does not refer to the given
person at all, but to the type of man.
In love of the nearest there is a characteristic which must
make a morally thoughtful man pause, a weakness in its con-
stitution. It responds to the need of the nearest, it prefers the
helpless, the sick, the injured (even if not, as was shown, for
the sake of their weakness). From the point of view of the weak
this is pre-eminently right. But for the wider perspective such
service is entirely wasted. At best it raises the fallen to the level
of the average. And from the point of view of general progress
this is of no use. For the advancement of the community those
who are above the average are the persons who are worth
encouraging. And they are the individuals whom neighbour-love
sends empty away. Indirectly they are even oppressed, they
are burdened with the weakness of the weak. Their level is
lowered. Logically n^ghbour-love leads to a levelling of man-
kind, it is a causerof stagnation and of retrogression — since there
is never an arrest of change. Levelling makes selection impos-
sible, it leads te?an inversion of development, past recovery.
This is what love of the remotest, as the ethos of progress,
must disavow. It must unearth again the principle of selection
which love of the nearest has buried. It must reinstate the
worthiest, the ethically strong and aspiring, and favour him at
the fcosfr of the man who is sinking. This is straightforward
320 THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
and reasonable. It has nothing to do with the lofty passion for
ideals for which it opens the way, any more than with Nietzsche’s
well-known exaggerations and his passionate disparagement of
brotherly love. “What is inclined to fall, we should throw
down”: whether this is true, whether it follows from the
alleged weakness of neighbour-love, is very questionable. The
fact of their antinomy does not release us from the task of
blending the two values. In itself love of the nearest is right
and must not be discarded. If precedence should be given to a
higher value, the lower at most should be restricted in its
domination. The complete abandonment of brotherly love
would also vitiate the life of the remotest, vitiate it more perhaps
than it would vitiate the life of the nearest.
Here the conflict is deep-rooted. To treat the nearest merely
as a means is a dangerous principle. Kant’s categorical impera-
tive rightly demanded the opposite: everyone’s personality is
to be regarded, never merely as a means, but always at the
same time as an end in itself. Of course this was directed
against the egoism of the individual. But if the personality of
the one nearest at hand is threatened by a high ideal just as
much as by crude egoism, should not the Kantian demand be
directed with equal right against the ideal ? At least on principle _
no one would question the right of so directing it. But how the
conflict is to be overcome is not thereby settled. In itself a
synthesis is very well possible. Love of the remotest, as such,
does not require that the nearest should be treated “merely”
as a means. It allows him scope as an end in himself. It only
insists that he should “also” be regarded as a means to ’a
farther end. But, so far, this gives us only an empty space for
a possible synthesis, by no means the synthesis itself. The
phrase “but also as an end” shows an entirely different practical
aspect. And if we consider that the problem concerns a claim of
the remotest and a responsibility for him together with the
claim of the nearest, we see that the conflict leads to a reciprocal
restriction of both values, that is, that in every synthesis the
conflict must on principle be retained.
LOVE OF THE REMOTE 3**
It penetrates into the inner disposition. Neighbour-love is
sympathetic, soft, long-suffering; its yoke is easy. The way of
the creative spirit is hard. It is as hard towards oneself as
towards another. It does not set much store by either, both are
means. To be a means is what is hard for any man ; all that is
sensitive in him protests. Here the apriorism of sympathy must
be silenced. Another apriorism, which is also fraught with
value, rises up against it, a prophetic sense of the ethical
potentiality in man, his latent capacity, the future value which
transcends his own person and his own environment.
(/) Justice and the Love of the Remotest
The relation to justice is similar. With it also there is conflict.
Of course justice does not entirely shut out the distant per-
spective, as love of the nearest does; it requires a wide vision.
But love of the far distant is not on that account just, it cannot
be so. It must disregard the single individual and even the
community, for it aims neither at the individual nor the exist-
ing community, but at the type. What preserves this, is right.
But here another right prevails.
In the eyes of justice men are equal; and, in so far as they
are not equal, they ought to be. Love of the remotest sees the
opposite: men are not equal, and not only in nature and
character, but also ethically they are not of equal worth in
their human potentiality. It is precisely in this inequality that
a peculiar strength inheres in the human race, its ability to
evolve. Only where among the many there exist individuals who
excel, who in some quality or other are the “best,” is upward
evolution possible, for it issues from these “best” as from humble
beginnings. Where there exists a love which fosters what is best
in the few who are best, progress is the result. In this respect
justice is only a foundation, a preliminary. It is directed only
against the selfishness of the lower ethos. Absolute justice
would restilt in as absolute a levelling as would brotherly love;
and thereby an inversion of development would ensue.
k 4 , ' x
322 THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
Love of the remotest goes a step farther: not only are men
ethically unequal, but they also ought to be. The more unequal
they* are, so much the more movement there will be in the
process of development, and so much the higher will be the
ends aimed at. This is the absolute antithesis of justice: it
recognizes inequality as a principle, as a value, not of course as
an end in itself, but as indirectly of pre-eminent worth, as a
means to ends which are superior to those of justice.
At the same time it would be a mistake if we wished to trace
back this antinomy to that between the universal and the par-
ticular. 1 Only the one element, universality, agrees with it, the
other does not. The opposite here is not the singularity of the
individual, but the type, and indeed not the actual but the
non-existing “ideal” type. And only so far as the ethical potency
of the ideal type appears in the special species of the individual,
is any emphasis laid here upon the individual. But this is
enough to bring about a transvaluation of equality; or, to speak
more exactly, not a transvaluation of the value — for values
remain what they are — but a trans-orientation of our feeling in
regard to the relative grade of the value. Equality is now no
longer dominant ; it recedes in the presence of other values for
the sake of which inequality is demanded.
Nietzsche saw correctly that from this point of view social
ideas must yield to higher ethical ideas, although his polemic
shoots far beyond the mark. The demand that our feelings for
values be revolutionized is right; and this is har4 enough,
more difficult than the rigour of justice. A self-conqhest pf a
peculiar kind is required ; elsewhere only one’s weakness is to be
overcome, but here a virtue also. The man must now overcome
the very end for which he had conquered his egoism, but.jiot
in order to return to selfishness, but to move forward to a new
ethos. This is the most difficult sort of self-conquest, taunleam
one’s estimate of the values which have penetrated deep into
one’s emotions and to subordinate tttem to newly discerned
values. '
* C£. Chapter IX (a), Vol. Hj£
LOVE OF' THE REMOTE
3*3
(g) The Formation of One’s Ethical Ideal
In all this the moving principle is the ethical ideal, the Idea. of
man as he ought to be. This too is a Platonic doctrine, the
epcos looks to the Idea and is a passion for it.
But just here there is a danger. Nothing is so much suspected
as human ideals. The man of experience in life is accustomed
to have only an indulgent smile for “ideals.” This is certainly
not without ground. Perhaps everyone has his ideals — at least
once in his life. But our idealistic visions are seldom forward-
looking, practically feasible or ethically significant. Likewise
there are many USta ideals, of a strongly materialistic and
eudsemonistic nature. There is also such a thing as an exalted
but impracticable and chimerical ideal. The latter is as worth-
less ethically as the former; and a life, directed towards it, is
wasted. Of this kind are the childish ideals, one or the other of
which most men take with them through life. As play, they are
innocent enough and beautiful; they are also harmless, even
when the mature mind is delighted by them, provided it be only
in fancy. But they are pernicious when they take hold of a man’s
life and determine its course. They should be put away with
childish things.
In the life of everyone who is ethically alert there is a critical
period when ideals which are lovingly entertained lead him
astray. While one is still immature, one is abashed before the
real world and disappointed; it appears not worth living in,
deprived of its values and its divine attributes. The disappoint-
ment is nothing but a fall to the solid earth from the heaven of
impracticable ideals. It can become a danger to anyone who is
morally weak. But if the childish ideal is not dispersed, if the
man continues under the spell of the dream, if he means even
by violence to put it into practice, sacrificing himself and others
to the phantom, he remains morally a child his life long,
unteachable, a world-reformer; and to his grief he is under the
curse of being comically tragic.
Not everyone attains to morally positive ideals, which are
324
THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
capable of transforming real life. In every moral struggle there
is a contest for ideals. But more is required. Not all positive
ideal? are forward-looking. Much rather is the disenchantment
only in reference to one’s own life, at best to one’s own imme-
diate world. Ultimately the earnest seeker finds the aim in
life which is his. With it he shuts out the wider perspective.
Love for the remotest is not everyone’s concern. Its claim is
wider. The question is how to transfer high faith and strong
hope from the sphere of youthful dreams into one’s later life,
without remaining subject to its unclarified contents. There is
genuine and invaluable moral strength inherent in the ethos of
immature ideals. It must be retained in late* life.
This is what makes the formation of one’s ethical ideal such a
serious problem. The discarding of the impracticable and barren
ideal must accompany the creation of ideals which are adapted
to the future and are capable of reproducing themselves, and
must contain at least a tendency towards the creation of them.
For the process is a living one and develops with the deepening
of valuational discernment.
The procreative power of an ideal, however, depends upon
two factors : a genuine discernment of values on the one hand,
and, on the other, conditions of actualization. What altogether
contradicts the latter cannot be actualized in life. But what is
not valuable is not worth actualizing. The former belongs to
an ethically fabulous world, the latter to a realm that is morally
irrelevant. The content of a fruitful ideal necessarily lies beyond
the momentarily actual. And because it reaches beyond the
limits of an individual life, it naturally reduces the individual
to a link in the chain of life, which connects the past with the
future. Man sees himself caught up into a larger providence,
which looks beyond him and yet is his own.
Such an ideal, as a value, manifests itself in life as a really
creative power. It is the form in which values become driving
energies in personal life and in history. It attracts the faith of
the strong to itself, like a magnet. And with this power of
faith it transforms man and his human world. For in content
LOVE OP THE REMOTE
325
it is objective, it is never the possession of one man, even if he
be the only one who discerns it. It draws others after it, binds
together all who are able to grasp it. At first it separates the
few, the seeing and believing, the noble and self-sacrificing, and
forms them into a group. And this closed group moves forward
in the process . 1
As can be easily seen, the nature of love for the remotest
is akin to nobility of character. It is preferential in its dis-
crimination. Like the noble in general it selects not only
persons but values — the former from the point of view of
values, the latter ^from the point of view of the excellence
of the values as regards their rank or other aspects. The
formation of an ideal is a valuational selection, a process
whereby the inertia of consciousness is overcome. This self-
conquest Neitzsche rightly felt to be the most difficult ; man
clings to nothing more tenaciously than to the values which he
has appropriated as his own, for which he has striven and
suffered. The whole weight of the community as well as the
individual resists such self-conquest. Thus the conflict of values
expands into the vaster clash between the two solidarities of
the moment and of history. The formation of the ideal is a
passing beyond recognized values, an anticipation of others, a
revolution in consciousness. It avenges itself upon the person
in whom it takes place, upon the hero, prophet or thinker. He
destroys the solidarity of his own times and is regarded as an
offender.
(A) The Content of Prospective Ideals
The ideals which we are considering are human ideals. But
they are by no means merely ethical. They embrace all sides of
humanity. Nietzsche regarded their content as consisting pre-
dominantly of vitalistic and aesthetic qualities : strength, fulness
of life, beauty and whatever is related to these. These qualities
are profoundly important and must not be omitted; but they
1 Cf Chapter XV (d) and (<?), Vol. II
3*6 THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
are one-sided and, on that account, when projected into the
Idea, are misleading. The Idea of man requires the rounding
out of his whole nature, physical as well as spiritual, of all
capacities and all the splendid possessions which are within his
power. The great yearning of the creative spirit is for a humanity
which is altogether more nearly perfect, more abounding in life
and richer than mankind is at present. Out of the abundance
which his prophetic sense discerns, the creative spirit gives to
the ideal a vastness which it does not find in itself nor in its
environment and which it is not able to actualize. And it is
unable, because to actualize it is not the work of one man but of
generations.
This yearning is itself inherent in primitive man. It is found
in the early myths. But there it lacks the ethical impress. Its
ideal is passive, eudasmonistic, an enjoyment, not a creation, of
values. Besides this, it looks back to the beginning of time; the
process of human history is more and more away from it.
“Paradise,” the “golden age,” are retrospective ideals, the ideals
of a lost happiness. The mood which corresponds to them is
that of a downward course, the vain mourning for a vanished
splendour. In the primitive vision of himself man is powerless,
he can only consume himself in idle longing for the irrevocable.
The one alternative is to wait for divine assistance.
The breaking away of ethical thought from mythology is the
passing of man out of the stage of childhood with its day-
dreaming ideal, a reversal of his perspective, the discovery of
his own power and of the significance of the ideal as a guide.
The process is now understood as one of advancement, as a
development to something higher. Man began in a rudimentary
state, but potentially he can attain the highest. The ideal is
prospective. The future is disclosed : everything must and can
be achieved by effort. This is the point of view of the Platonic
epcas. Man stands midway (h> peou>) between wanting (luSeta)
and the Idea which is discerned; his task is to strive towards
it (intfivula). His gaze is directed forward; what is about to
be is his. He lives in hope, in ardent desire.
LOVE OF THE REMOTE 3*7
Of course the history of the human mind, as we survey it
to-day, only partially justifies this reversal of perspective.
Together with various kinds of progress it shows much retro-
gression. But here historical experience cannot be decisive.
The creative element in man is necessarily in opposition to it.
And if it should be true that the human race is declining, it
is only the more true that mankind must bestir itself about its
destiny, and must do what is in its power to transform its
downward movement into an upward course. The chief question
is not how much or how little is in his power, but how fully or
how little he grasps the task which looms before him. For
historical experiende cannot dispute the possibility as such.
Now here the formation of the prospective ideal receives
concrete significance. With it the weight of responsibility falls
upon man. No longer is it a question of imaginary happiness,
but of the objective constituents in hardly discernible but
imperative “ideas” ; it is a question of strenuous claims. Not at
one glance can the ideal of man be grasped. Only what discloses
itself to the vision of values tends to converge in it. And the
valuational view itself advances. The formation of the ideal
emerges in a second process, which in content anticipates the
real process of development. Even the discerned ideal as such
remains incomplete at every step. It is not achieved by the
mere bringing together of separate values ; and even Nietzsche
only brings such together. This produces no concrete unity.
The ideal must be seen from the point of view of the manifold
values in their fulness, and as a unity. That the human vision is
always restricted is due only to an empirical limitation.
When in any age ethical perception is strong and vivid, not
only is no original insight lacking but also no concrete embodi-
ment and plastic expression of the ideal. Doctrine and personal
example accomplish nothing here. There is need of another
kind of language. It is chiefly the creative artist, the poet, who
contributes suggestive speech to the prospective ethos. Homer
created for the Greeks not only their gods but their men, the
Greeks themselves. The Hellene of the flowering time measured
THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
3*8
himself by his heroic figures. Among the Romans the poet was
called the seer (vates). And everywhere the poets are the
greatest of the creative minds, they set before men the ideals
visualized in palpable form. This does not mean that the content
of the ideals has been transferred to the realm of aesthetics.
Nor does it mean that the distinctively aesthetic values, so
entirely different in structure, have had violence done to them.
Much rather do these values always develop most vigorously
where more positive valuational material requires expression
and shape. How the artist fashions them remains his secret.
It is his super-aesthetic significance in the historical process of
humanization, that he does give expression to the more positive
values. All artistic transformation is born of aspiration. This
aristocracy of birth connects the aesthetic vision with the
seriousness of ethical struggle. In the groping of the spirit
from age to age the universal moving power is the discerned
and envisaged ideal. For within the limits of actual possibility
the astonishing fact is this, that in the long run man always
becomes what he wills to become.
(*) Love of the Remotest, its Moral Character
In love of the remotest the content of ideals only plays the r 61 e
of a situational value which gives a basis. In this kind of love
the content of ideals is the object of intention and at best is
actualized. But the distinctive moral value of the love is not to
be found in the content. The moral value exists, here also,
exclusively in the disposition of the person who loves. It is
purely a value inherent in the intention. It is based upon the
content of ideals, but raises itself above them. Yet the height of
its value as such stands in no discernible relation to the height
of the intended value. The intention of the ideal is in itself
valuable, without reference to its content and the valuational
grade of the content; the intention of the ideal is valuable
purely as a disposition, as an act of love, in so far as only a
discerned value is Intended. On the other hand, the rank of the
LOVE OF THE REMOTE 329
moral value in it rises in proportion to its strength, to the com-
mitment of the person and to his self-conquest. In this respect
it is not different from love of the nearest ; in that also the value
of the disposition is not commensurate with the greatness of the
work intended. The value of the work is irrelevant to it. It
remains what it is, even in case of outward error and failure.
In this respect the two kinds of love are exactly alike in funda-
mental structure. The relation to the basis of each is the same :
the value of the moral act is autonomous in spite of its material
dependence. The fact that in love of the remotest moral values
are found also in the content of what is intended, causes no
change. Those values belong to the intended complex and on
this account should be assigned to the situational value. In
the discipline of a person there is also the same phenomenon
in the case of love of the nearest. Here as there another
value, that of the love itself, appears on the back of the
intention . 1
In a twofold connection this situation is fraught with con-
sequences. The construction of the human ideal is problematical.
It is always a venture, the issue of which the adventurer does
not experience. In this venture love of the remotest is for ever
problematical in its real effect. If one wished to estimate its
value by its effect, one would be forced to be in despair about it.
Nevertheless history itself teaches that human progress is open
to question. Certainly we must not here infer from analogy;
but it is still doubtful whether man can have influence upon
the distant future, whether venture and sacrifice are not
1 Here the inner relationship of the two kinds of love becomes clearly
apparent. It is natural to see in both a fundamental value, although
only a moral one. This shows the same valuational factors There is
a cleavage between these in regard to the intended values. Only
between these is there any conflict. One can observe between them
a concrete superstructure, such as the Nicomachean Ethics presents
between ihevOeptfar]; and fteyaXoirpiireia, or between <f> XonpiCa and
(isyaXotjivxla (cf. Chapter XXIII (c) and (d), Vol. II). Love of the
nearest is on a small scale what love of the remotest is on a large
scale. The former is an everyday virtue, the latter an exceptional
one. The relation between the good and the noble is similar.
33 ®
THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
sins against contemporary man — presumptuous gambling in
"futures.” In this respect love of the remotest is worse than
any other virtue, but especially so in its damage to brotherly
love, which is always sure of its immediate objects and which,
even when it does not achieve them, is sure that they are
reasonable.
Yet who would take it upon himself on this account to
abandon the ipco$ which reaches out towards the future! That
would be a moral scepticism, a flaccid pessimism, a renuncia-
tion of the higher meaning and value of life. In spite of every-
thing, responsibility for the future is of a provident nature
and is capable of actively determining beforehand. No scepticism
can free us from that responsibility.
This difficulty inherent in love of the remotest is easily
solved, provided its moral value is independent of its success
or failure, of whether it attains or misses its objective goal,
indeed provided it is also independent of the valuational
height of what it aims at. However much man may err and
fail in his intended object, the moral quality of his intention
can nevertheless be right and possess the higher value. Indeed,
it is a distinctive moral quality, in which love of the remotest on
this account excels brotherly love and every other virtue:
greatness of moral spirit, intensity of spiritual energy, which
is required in the taking upon oneself of what is inherently
uncertain. The venture is great. Only a deep and mighty faith,
permeating a person’s whole being, is equal to it. It is a faith
of a unique kind, different from trust between man and man;
a faith which reaches out to the whole of things and can do no
other than stake all it has. It is faith on the grand scale, faith
in a higher order, which determines the cosmic meaning of
man. When it becomes active and carries out its schemes, its
work is of historic import. In a pre-eminent sense the expres-
sion "Remove mountains” may apply to it. And this energy is
harmonious with a similar feeling — hope, when it is raised to
its highest power, the basic feeling of ethical idealism, which
bears all things and gladly suffers for an Idea, never despairing :
LOVE OF THE REMOTE 33*
hope, the peculiar assurance which takes hold on one who risks
all on a single issue.
There is yet another consequence. The situation which love
of the remotest strives for is incomparably greater than that
which neighbour-love aims to achieve; as for height of value
the well-being of one’s neighbour cannot be weighed in the
great scales in which the ideal value of humanity, as always
understood, must be weighed. If the whole value of the two lay
in the values aimed at, their axiological relation would prove so
utterly unfavourable to neighbour-love that one could never
speak of a conflict between them. Love of the nearest would
need to withdraw from comparison with love of the remotest.
Perhaps it was thus that Nietzsche conceived the relationship ;
so it was easy for him to reject love of one’s neighbour. But
the presupposition is simply false. The whole value is not that
of the object intended. On the contrary, all the moral value lies
in the intention. But in the two kinds of love the value of the
intention itself is practically the same. In principle the values of
both stand on the same plane. Thus the balance between the
two is restored, and at the same time also the antinomy existing
between them. It is impossible to impugn the one in favour of
the other. Although the goals of the two are incommensurable,
the dispositions stand in height of value close to each other.
CHAPTER XXXI (lvi)
RADIANT VIRTUE
(a) Spiritual Goods and the Personal Character
ACCORDANT WITH THEM
If anyone approaches the realm of values from the point of
view of love of the remotest, which is one of its high summits,
whatever is near and present must appear to him small. He will
be dazed by the Ideal. Yet so long as epu>s m its grandeur
stands there as a solitary peak, it is an absurdity. We need only
to ask: Ought the lives of those who will be living in the far-
distant future also to culminate in love for the remotest ? And
likewise the lives of those in the still more distant future,
and so on ad infinitum ? If that were so, sacrifice and self-
surrender would become the ultimate goal of all goals, and
the axiological process would throughout remain empty of
content.
Futuristic ideals cannot be the ultimate, even if we disregard
their uncertainty. In them must be contained absolute values of
immediate significance; otherwise the future mirrored in the
ideal is valueless. We cannot always seek for the meaning of
moral tasks, even though they be everlasting, in further tasks.
Somewhere or other in this process a value of fulfilment must lie
hidden which can be seized upon forthwith. But such a value is
by its nature a present one. This does not mean that at
every given moment it could be actualized, but that it is
applicable at all times and retains its inherent and absolute
validity. All humanity at every moment must carry a
part of this value in itself. Otherwise the ideal construction
is incredible.
This is what gives self-sufficiency to the whole series of the
following virtues. But they do not exhaust the realm of what is
attainable at any time. In the three following types of value we
RADIANT VIRTUE
333
find fulfilment of another sort. And each one of them is in its
own way an axiological summit. The first, although it often
enough finds fulfilment in individual persons, is without a
name of its own. Nietzsche was the first to attempt its definition.
He names it Schenkende Tugend — Radiant Virtue.
The law of giving and taking which prevails in the realm
of spiritual goods is different from that which reigns in
the domain of material goods. As a single individual, no one
can be an exclusive possessor of spiritual goods; they belong
to everyone who can seize upon them. Possession of them
always contains somethmg of mere sharing and controlling.
One may indeed keep them back by force from others, one may
treat them contrary to their nature, as if they were a personal
possession. Such conduct is spiritual miserliness. But a man
may also, in so far as he is himself participant in them, have
special regard to their nature and to the idealistic claim of his
fellow-men, in that he offers them, makes them accessible and,
where no access exists, opens up an avenue to them. That is
the moral attitude of one who dispenses spiritual goods. It is
clearly a form of love, for the giver is concerned not with the
gift, but with the receiver of it. As compared with love for one’s
neighbour and for the remotest, it is a different kind of love,
having a new valuational accent.
Inherent in the essence of spiritual imparting, as distinguished
from material giving, is the peculiarity that he who bestows does
not give away, does not become the poorer, but himself stands
by as a recipient of gifts. Imparting to others is the only attitude
of mind which accords with the nature of spiritual goods, for
they can never be really surrendered. Radiance is the life of
spiritual fulness ; its life is not the fulness itself— the presence
and value of which are here presupposed — but personal living
in accord therewith, a vast overflowing, the ability to share,
to make rich, to scatter broadcast; and in addition to this a
delight in so doing and in enhancing the spiritual insight of
those who accept.
334
THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
(5) Imparting and Receiving. Virtue without Sacrifice
In contrast to neighbour-love the distinctive value of radiant
virtue becomes evident. In the one as in the other we may in
the wider sense speak of imparting. But here the process is
different. In the former there is a dispensing because of the
other’s need and from our knowledge of the need ; in the latter
the bestowing is from the pressure of the fulness of life within.
Neighbour-love bestows upon the weak, the needy, the unfortu-
nate as such; radiant virtue imparts to everyone who knows how
to take, who stands on a level with the gift, who is capable of
appreciating its value. Everyone is in a position to receive the
gifts of neighbour-love. It is otherwise with those of radiant
virtue. In regard to them men are divided into the appreciative,
those with minds that are opened and those with shut minds,
the deaf. The parable of the sower, who scatters seed both on
barren and on fruitful ground, is a true picture of him who
imparts spiritual goods.
A bestower is allotted to the moral height of a recipient. He
goes forth in yearning for him who will receive his gift. Such
in all times is the spiritually great man, the poet, the artist, the
thinker, and everyone who partakes of the abounding fulness of
life. With this abundance he cannot keep to himself, because it
inheres in the nature of the fulness of life to radiate. His mis-
fortune is his solitude on the height, when there is no one within
his sphere who is of his mind. Herein he is like light which finds
no world to illuminate. The tragedy of his greatness is the
smallness of the small ; he misses the fellowship of a mind that
receives. His greatest fortune is someone who can take his gift.
All his love turns to such a one. In the acceptance the out-
pouring finds its meaning.
Neighbour-love ordinarily dispenses lower gifts; its task is
the well-being, the happiness, of another. It is fully justified,
since the other’s distress is most painfully felt. Misery accord-
ingly summons brotherly love to its aid. But radiant virtue must
first awaken a need for its gift, and must therefore plead for
RADIANT VIRTUE
335
itself. It dispenses gifts which stand in no universal relation
to other values, which are not serviceable for other ends, having
worth only in their own content, in their own structures, which
as means are worthless but as ends in themselves are autono-
mous; they are imponderables which hover above the weighty
and positive values of life. Of this kind is everything aesthetically
of value, such as the artist bestows; but not less of this kind is
mere admission to participation in the fulness of the real, the
opening of eyes to the hidden riches everywhere ; also, all making
of others sensitive to the imponderables, all disclosure of
meanings even within the sphere of common everyday life.
But the difference in the moral attitude itself is still greater.
The kind of gift which neighbour-love bestows concerns only
the conditioning values. It sacrifices, divesting itself of what it
gives; its greatness depends upon the greatness of its commit-
ment and self-denial. The imparter of spiritual values makes
no sacrifice, for he does not give anything away; his ethos is
not to be measured by his commitment. Nevertheless his is a
genuine virtue, a genuine love, but merely a fundamentally
different one. The imparter simply overflows — out of the
fulness of his life. Thereby he obeys the basic law of spiritual
Being, putting himself at its service as a faithful steward. He
yields in his personality to this high law. For this he lives.
And in so doing he lives pre-eminently for those who receive
his gifts.
(c) “A Useless Virtue”
To define the ethical value of this attitude concretely is more
difficult than to make it felt. The imparter of spiritual values is
akin to the noble-minded man, the proud, the loving, the great-
hearted; he combines values in a peculiar way, and something
new is the result. He is lavish of himself ; like the sun, he shines
on the just and the unjust. His tendency is to dispense to all— —
and yet to none. Not only because the recipients are selected
through the nature of the gift, but also because the one who
336 THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
accepts strikes against a barrier which he cannot surmount.
The imparter stands on the further side of reciprocal love; no
one may lovingly own him. He never imparts to the individual
from love of the individual, but to all who are there to receive
for the sake of the receiving and of the outpouring. The law
of his gift requires this; a law which can be hard even for the
* giver himself. For only as a giver does he stand on the further
side of reciprocal love ; he cannot do so as a man. And he must
remain human. A love that is beyond human measure is the
law to which he is subject, as unlike love of the nearest as it is
unlike love of the remotest or even personal love.
But that kind of greatness of spiritual energy which dis-
tinguishes creative genius is not properly characteristic of the
radiant type. The imparter need by no means be a heroic
spirit. There are besides in life remarkable men to whom
hearts are attracted as by some secret spell ; or perhaps another
metaphor fits more closely: in their presence all hearts are
opened. No one goes away from them except laden with gifts,
yet no one can say what he has received. One only feels that m
such men the meaning of life is somehow perceptibly fulfilled,
the meaning which one elsewhere seeks in vain. And one feels
that in mere communion with them something of this meaning
is carried over into one’s own personality. A stream of light, a
splendour, a spiritual grace floods one’s life. But one does not
comprehend it, one only feels the mystery of it. Comprehension
is confined to the sphere of discerned values and of what is
serviceable for them. Radiant virtue, however, is of service in
no direction. No other values lie behind it. It is only for its own
sake, “a useless virtue.”
Its moral value for him who imparts has no equivalent in the
value of the gift. And again this gift has no other value except
what is inherent in itself. Hence radiant virtue can never be
common to all. And yet the moral wealth of every virtue is
somehow related to it, as if it gave to each a meaning.' As
Nietzsche expresses it in his comparison with gold: “But tell
me, how did gold come to have the highest value? For this
RADIANT VIRTUE 337
reason, that it is uncommon and of no use and bright and
mellow in lustre. It is always radiant .” 1
These are the precise characteristics of the virtue which
imparts spiritual values. In no respect is it of service, it has
no further purpose beyond itself, such as justice has, or
brotherly love, wisdom, courage, self-control, or indeed even
love for the far distant, all of which possess something of
value “for” someone. It has no end in view, it is the absolutely
final member among the values, a bloom, which, even without
fruit, purely in itself, is its own excuse for being. And even
where it is enclosed in the circle of generation, seed, growth
and fresh ripeness, nevertheless it is not of value for this
circular course; but this course is for its sake. Here is the
valuational boundary of creation and elaboration and at the
same time of the Ought. The highest value of life is inevitably
'a spending of life. And even where this virtue is creative, it does
not consist in creating. It is itself the final creation, the ultimate
meaning, an ethical Being m and for itself — a kingly virtue.
What happens from need remains under pressure of necessity.
“To do nothing more than is needed” is a phrase which refers
only to serviceable values, to the useful. But only that which
exceeds above want, only the useless, the superfluous, the over-
flowing never ceases to possess the highest value.
Radiant virtue is not the ethos of the fulness of life, but the
meaning which the fulness of life acquires through its overflow ;
it is an issuing forth without anxiety as to whither it goes. It is
a pure out-streaming, but with no diminution of itself; it
endows the human heart with riches. The fulness of life is
justified by its peculiar way of passing beyond the man’s own
personality. It is a transcendence of a unique kind, different
from that of sympathetic participation in the life of one’s
fellow-men; it is the objective transcendence of the contents, a
pur$ transference of spiritual goods with their imponderable
elements, and in addition thereto, a calm blissful consciousness
of the out-going, which is given by the priestly consecration
1 Thus Spake Zarathustra.
Y
Ethics~~II
338 THE -REALM OF &THICAL VALUES
of him who administers the mystery; it is a partaking of the
eternal in time, a palpable manifestation of the Timeless within
the current of human life, above its compulsion and beyond
its aims. Hence it comes about that to the imparter of spiritual
goods it is not the just, the truthful, the loving or the faithful
man who is worthiest, but he who receives with an open heart,
the unspoilt spirit which is still capable of unlearning everything.
That is why the man of radiant virtue loves those who are
ethically imperfect, unripe, unspent and still flexible, with the
love peculiar to one who has mellowed, is blessed and is filled
with gratitude. He is the eternal ipaonjs of youth . 1
( d ) The Giving of Meaning to Life, Anthropodicy
Uselessness is not fruitlessness, not meaningless waste. It is
compatible with the greatest fruitfulness, but only of a kind
that is not willed, not aimed at. Just as happiness follows virtue
as its inevitable result but is disturbed if striven for, so fruitful-
ness, unaimed at, follows inevitably from the conduct of the
dispenser of spiritual values; but, if striven for, it violates the
meaning of the gift.
The man of radiant virtue is also of course creative, and
possibly to an eminent degree ; but his ethos is fundamentally
different from that of a creative genius. Unplanned prodigality
is the true form in which spiritual values are propagated. The
superabundance, which arises naturally from their character,
makes prodigality the adequate form of reproduction. It is like
wind-scattered pollen, which with its tremendous over-produc-
tion most easily attains its result, without the least selectiveness.
Accordingly uselessness is not worthlessness, but the absence
of an end in view; it is not only not “adaptation to an end
without an end,” but also not “purposive activity without a
1 The figure of Socrates is here seen from a new point of view— the
man whom the ancients honoured as their greatest dispenser of
spiritual goods. Compare the passage in Plato concerning the divine
images within the statue of Silenus (Symposium, 215 b ).
radiant* virtue
339
purpose.” Rather do end and means return upon each other;
the means in the final end. All teleology here finds its limit.
It is a great thing that life, together with its moral Being and
Not-being, derives its meaning from such values and through
them becomes worth living. Radiant virtue is not the only value
of this kind (the two which follow are of the same order). But
it is the one in which this characteristic can be seen in the very
structure of its content. In the useless as such man justifies
his existence as well as his claim upon life, his strivings and
failures — for they are never final. He finds herein his
anthropodicy.
It does not matter that radiant virtue is uncommon and is a
moral power found in the few only. The vindication of man
need not devolve upon all men. It may devolve upon the few,
upon single individuals. Indeed it might devolve upon one only.
Values are not diminished through the narrowness of the area in
which they are actualized. A single individual can be the giver
of meaning for a whole world, in so far as it participates in him.
A life in which only one such exists becomes full of significance
for everybody. This does not at all imply individualism. The
import here does not depend upon the individual value of the
one. Nothing rests with him merely as “this person here.” It is
only the vindication of all and the giving of meaning for all,
which wins through in him. The virtue of the exceptional man
inheres precisely in the fact that he is uncommon, yet again m
a higher sense is all-common. As it is an overflowing of the
fulness of life upon all who are reaching in any way towards
its value, so too it is, morally, a shining-forth upon all who have
any degree of sensibility for the meaning and its vindication.
Thus finally, its unplanned work is a solidarity of a unique and
novel kind, a solidarity not of aims or of guilt or of responsibility,
but of participation and fulfilment.
Here even love of the remotest finds a special vindication.
Its yearning and its hope have before them a portion of
fulfilment. What one can otherwise behold only in vision as an
ideal, can be seen here in flesh and blood. Radiant virtue is a
34 ®
THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
power of the ethos, it instils the Ideal into the race; and
where this occurs, it is as though the ideal man were already
a reality. Certainly there is here only a fragment, but for all
that a real one. Here the real anticipates the Ideal, a living
proof that the Ideal is possible in the world of actuality.
CHAPTER XXXII (lvii)
PERSONALITY
(a) Relation to Individuality
In a certain sense every man is by nature a personality, that is,
he has a certain human attribute which does not reappear out-
side of himself. This is more than mere personality in general.
The latter is common to all, but every one has personality
distinctive of himself. It is individual. Nevertheless it is not
identical with individuality. A communal being, an institution,
a situation, a thing also, is individual. Only an individual
person is a personality.
We must distinguish this fact of personality from its valua-
tional character, although they are never separate. Like all
values, this also is independent of actuality; it has an ideal
self-existence. Personality as a value, therefore, cannot coincide
with the actual personality. It must always be something which
stands over against the actual, which does not accompany the
changes of its empirical being, but to which the latter is speci-
fically related as to something that ought to be, just as every
human and actual disposition is related to universal moral
values.
Personality as a value differs radically from all those pre-
viously considered, in that it cannot be decisively fixed for
all persons; it is not a universal value Its claim as an Ought
is applicable only to one special person : only that one ought
to be “so.” This cannot be said of individuality in general, as
a value . 1 The latter is common to all. That in contents it is
different in everyone, does not affect its universal character.
The very singularity is itself universal. It is otherwise with
personality. By this is meant what distinguishes the indivi-
duality of one from that of another. There is no “personality
1 Cf. Chapter IX («), Vol. II.
34 *
THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
in general.” Or more correctly perhaps: one may very well
conceive of such a thing, without inner contradiction; but here
something else is meant. In contrast to personality in general
as the common factor, that which distinguishes personalities,
that which distinguishes them qualitatively in idea, is meant.
Strictly, then, one may speak here only in the plural, or point
to this or that personality. In this sense we are to consider it
as a value.
In reality then we have to deal not with a single value but
with an unlimited variety, with a whole new stratum, with an
entire perspective into which the table of values issues. Ethics
naturally is not in a position to follow this diversity as such.
Its task is simply to elaborate what is common to the whole
stratum in contrast to the universal values. It is inherent in the
nature of the case that ethics cannot do justice to the varieties
of personality. Its task embraces only the universal, and this
is not the essence of the personal, as the sense of value conceives
it in the concrete case.
(6) The Real Being and the Ideal Ethos of Personality
(Its Intelligible Character)
We must not describe personality as the person’s ethical
“Being for himself.” Personality is pre-eminently what it is
“for others.” On the other hand, it is for oneself only in so far
as the self-discernment of the special person reaches ; and this
does not reach far. Were the Being of one’s personality bound
to one’s moral self-consciousness, there would be little per-
sonality in the world. In truth there is much more of it than
human consciousness conceives. Only, as a rule, it does not
exist where rummaging and vain self-consciousness seek it. Its
values are the most concrete of all the ingredients which every-
where in life make up the variegated abundance of values.
Only with difficulty does consciousness trace this fulness ; and
it always flags far behind.
The matter of personality is different in every man. It is
PERSONALITY
343
built up from a mass of components. These are general values.
But the kind of composition is always different. And, as such
combinations everywhere and always produce new character-
istics, so this is specially the case here. For this reason one may
describe personalities as “individual values”: each individual
has his own for itself.
This does not mean that the specific complex is actualized
in the real personality. It only expresses the axiological Ideal
and is its ideal ethos. The empirical man falls short of his
Ideal to the exact extent to which he falls short of the claim
of the general moral values which the Ought makes. His actual
moral being never coincides with its ideal. In this respect per-
sonality is like the universal values ; it has a strictly ideal self-
existence, which holds its own independently of the degree of
its actualization. It is a norm, like the other values, only not a
universal one. It may be achieved or missed in all conceivable
degrees by the actual person. The achievement, even approxi-
mately, need by no means be conditioned by a consciousness
of the values. Much rather is there, independently of all valua-
tional discernment, in every person at every moment a specific
disparity between the ideal personality, as a value, and the real.
This disparity varies greatly, it is in continual movement. But
the variation is always only on the side of the actual personality.
Its ideal value stands fast, like all ideal Being. The movement
also need not in any way be an approximation. There is also a
withdrawal of oneself from the Ideal, an advancing failure of
one’s own ethos. Wherever a man lapses into imitation of
another’s personal ethos — and this happens with the strongest
personalities — he is on a road that leads away from self-fulfil-
ment. Likewise there is a host of lower powers in him, whose
unrestraint can cause him to miss his own higher ethos. Finally
also the tyrannical domination of some one universal value can
repress the personality. In this case the man perhaps fulfils
in a high degree certain common claims, but he misses the
inner claim of his own essential being. One might rightly call
the ideal ethos of personality its inner culmination; it is the
344
THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
special form of moral Being, to which under the most favour-
able circumstances a man may raise himself. In the nature,
however, of such a form there is, at least in principle, the possi-
bility of failure.
It inheres in the nature of all values, that their actualization
as such is of value. Likewise the realization of the ideal ethos
of a personality is a moral value. This manifests itself in a very
palpable genuineness of a man’s nature, in a special fidelity to
himself, indeed in a general fixity and sterling worth. That in
contents it is different in each personality is not at all to its
prejudice. The moral being of a personality as such is a kind
of anchorage of his whole nature to its ideal, an inner founda-
tion, a penetration of the ideal into the empirical character.
The Kantian phrase, “intelligible character” — if one discards
the Kantian metaphysics of reason with its universalism and
falls back upon the strict meaning of the phrase — might be
used as the exact equivalent of “personality as a value.” For
the realm of values is a realm of “intelligible” essences, while
“character” in contrast to everything merely typical is an
expression for individual originality . 1 The moral value of a
personality could then be described quite unequivocally as the
fulfilment of the intelligible character in the empirical person.
If one reflects that even the neglect of an outward talent is a
sin, and by no means against oneself only, but as much against
others, the same principle, applied to the inner factors of moral
determination, gives one a stern sense of what a real actualiza-
tion of values means. And in this sense one may speak of per-
sonality as a virtue.
But it is an entirely different question, whether there is a
conscious striving towards the value of one’s own personality.
Such a striving would presuppose a valuational consciousness
complete in contents, such as can scarcely exist explicitly in
1 One may perhaps best understand it from the popular application
of the older theories of the “thought of God” in a man If one allows
the theological drapery to fall away, what remains is the intelligible
character.
PERSONALITY
345
regard to an individual and highly complex value. Indeed it is
open to doubt whether, even if it were possible, it could fulfil
its ethical meaning, whether the very reflection upon oneself,
and upon the ideal Self, would not prevent its actualization.
But all the components of personality are directed outwards,
toward other persons, toward situational values. This pre-
occupation with what is beyond oneself is the basic form of
the moral attitude of mind, and it is contradicted by pre-
occupation with oneself, such as would occur in a conscious
striving for the values of personality.
But in this respect personality, as a value, by no means stands
alone. The same difficulty is common to all moral values,
although of course in different degrees. The moral value is
never identical with the value aimed at. This does not absolutely
exclude the pursuit of moral values, but limits it to the extent
that the moral value which is striven for is not the same as that
of the striving. Ordinarily the actualization of moral values
ensues without an effort directed toward them; and this so
much the more, the more specific and individualized the value
is. Within certain limits moral values that are easily compre-
hended permit of being actualized by effort; thus at least
there is a striving to be just, truthful or faithful. Whether in
the same sense one can become loving by trying to be so, is
very questionable. But it is impossible to attain the value of
personality by effort; the reason, however, is not the same as
in the case of purity. This cannot be actualized, but it well
may be yearned for. Personality, on the contrary, is perfectly
attainable — for instance, in the pursuit of other values, in so
far as one’s personal ethos is fulfilled in that kind of pursuit —
but it cannot be made the object of pursuit without one’s
missing its essence. For by its very nature it inheres in a pur-
pose directed to something else. Indeed it is a question whether
the mere yearning for it does not induce the same falsification
of it. In principle at least it is the same inversion of the general
basic direction of moral intention . 1
1 Cf. Chapter II (c), (d), (e), Vol. II.
THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
346
But this is not saying that a man is not responsible for the
fulfilment of his personal ethos, that to miss it is not a sin and
does not involve him in guilt. To incur responsibility, it is
not at all necessary that a moral value be capable of being
attained by direct effort. It is sufficient, if the conditioning
values can be striven for. While every man individually in his
own way and according to his own moral feeling pursues values
in general, he is thereby actualizing his individual ethos. If
he neglects this general determination, he is thereby neglecting
his own self-determination. For this consists essentially in the
special way of achieving the general determination. The
responsibility for fulfilling one’s own ethos is coincident with
the responsibility for whatever one is free and able to do. But
naturally this does not mean that the constituent values of one’s
ethos coincide with those of the objects pursued. In his deed a
man bears guilt for the failure of his own moral being; and the
fulfilment of it is, in the true sense of the word, his virtue.
(c) Subjective Universality and Objective Individuality
The significance of individuality in relation to personality
has not yet been clearly presented. Only so much is clear : these
values are highly complex, but their constituent elements are
universal values. By itself there is nothing astonishing m the
fact that the area of validity becomes narrowed in proportion
to the degree of concrete complexity. Thus there are yirtues
which apply only to a group of individuals, while to others,
not included therein, they would involve a falsification of the
ethos. The group has its own special virtue. The area of validity
may be so small as to include only one individual. Then we
have personality as the value ; and in this way there is a “virtue”
peculiar to everyone, besides that which is common to all,
but the moral claim of the former in no wise displaces that of
the latter.
Now values are ideal essences, and their cognizability is
purely aprioristic. Universality necessarily belongs both to
PERSONALITY
347
essences and their cognizability. How is this compatible with
the individuality of personal values? Are these not genuine
essences ? Then they would also not be genuine values. Values
cannot be individual in the sense in which their carrier may be ;
hence the values of personality also cannot be individual in
the sense in which the personalities themselves are. In fact,
then, they also as values are universal, and indeed in two
respects.
In the first place they are “subjectively universal,” that is,
they are valid for every subject who grasps values, not of
course in the sense that every subject must be able to grasp
them; his sense of value may be limited, it may very well be
so constituted that it does not discriminate certain values of
personality. But they are valid for everyone in the other sense,
which alone holds good in regard to all aprioristic knowledge :
every subject, in so far as he at all discerns the value, must
necessarily conceive it as it is in itself, including its specific
valuational quality, and not as anything else. Even mathe-
matical propositions are subjectively universal only in this sense ;
not everyone can understand every principle, but whoever
understands a principle at all, necessarily sees it just as it is
in itself, and not otherwise.
This meanjng of subjective universality has no bearing upon
objective individuality. For this fact aesthetic values furnish
the clearest evidence. Taken in their full concreteness they are
always only values of one single object (for instance, of a work
of art), but as such they are nevertheless valid for everyone
who grasps the object in its aesthetic meaning. One can of
course pass it by unnoticed, but by doing so one cannot change
its value. In the same way one can overlook moral personality;
indeed there are always only a few who really perceive its value.
But this is nevertheless universally valid for anyone who
perceives it at all. It is of no consequence that someone, per-
ceiving the nature of the personality, should find in it another
distinct value than that which is there. Rather does he then
not even perceive its nafure.
34 «
THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
(d) Objective Universality and Individuality in the
Personal Value
In the second place, objective universality is also found here.
It inheres in the nature of the essence.
In its structures the ideal sphere attains the highest concrete-
ness and complexity, but does not attain strict individuality.
The latter is singleness, hence it is something more than the
extreme degree of concrete complexity. An ideal structure can
be so specific that some single real instance corresponds to it,
at least approximately. Then one may say that in the real
world it is represented individually, singly. But the ideal
structure as such is not on that account individual. Its nature
would not be at all contradicted, if a second real entity or
several corresponded to it. That this is not the case, is not due
to it, but to the actual world All singularity, as seen from the
point of view of the ideal, is accidental, merely a fact, an
affair of actual existence.
But this fact is sufficient to indicate the only kind of indivi-
duality which pertains to personality as a value. Strictly taken,
the latter is not an individual value, but only the value bf an
individual, that is, of a single actual person. Here, as every-
where, then, individuality does not pertain to the valuational
quality of the ideal as such, but to its connection with the
actual. The real essential singleness of the carrier of a value
constitutes the individuality of personality.
Here the question concerns a peculiar tie between the ideal
and the actual, between a specific value and an empirical person ;
it concerns a bond which exists between the two, notwith-
standing the perpetual disparity between them. However little
the actual person tallies with his own ideal self, yet he is bound
to it ; his moral Being or Non-Being consists in the degree of
his approximation to it. It is his own individual virtue, else
it is no one’s virtue, because in any other person it would
not be virtue. But this means that personalities are indeed in a
certain sense individual despite their universality, but are so
PERSONALITY
349
only indirectly. In themselves they are not individual, but only
“in actuality individual,” that is, only in their actualization,
or in their bondage to actuality. Hence, logically, they are not
individual — that would be an impossibility — but only through
the alogical, the actual carrier, therefore, as it were, per nefas
logician.
It is important to keep this basic relationship in mind.
According to their genus personalities are not in absolute
opposition to universal values. They are the extreme case of
the concretion and individualization of valuational matter.
The chain of separateness, all the way from the first and almost
empty universalities to the unique value of this or that par-
ticular person, does not break off. Diversity and gradation of
typical values bind the two extremes. Thus also we are to
interpret the fact that the ideal character of Being perdures
unabated, that it is the same in personality as in the “good”
generally. Not only “is” personality different in every single
individual, but it also “ought” to be different. And precisely
through the difference a man in his Ought-to-be becomes
unique, irreplaceable. The specific direction of his nature
actually exists only once, and only in him. In him it co-exists
with the universal direction of human nature. In him the
individual ethos entrenches itself upon the universal ethos.
The moral Ought-to-Be in man is not spent in that of the
general moral values. It is not fulfilled until it reaches a cul-
minating point in the special moral value of “this” particular
person. Thus arises an opposition of values, indeed an antinomy
between personal value that is universal and the value of per-
sonality. For the same person ought at the same time in the
same disposition to respond to both.
(e) The Law of Preference in the Individual Ethos; its
Relation to the Order of Rank
As in all stratification of essential features, so with personality
as a value; it is not complexity alone which constitutes the
35 «»
THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
distinctive character of the new structure. Something new is
added, by which the reappearing and more general factors are
for the first time brought together into unity; but the new
element was by no means contained in the old ones. The
idiosyncracy of the complex constitutes the new factor. To
trace it in detail is not possible for human thought. But what
in general characterizes it can be discovered.
Our analysis of the good has shown that in all morally
positive conduct there is found a trend not only towards values,
but towards what is always the higher value. In the noble
character it was seen that the content of this trend changes
according to the momentary area of the valuational feeling,
and that there is a self-direction in man towards new and not
yet explicitly discerned values; but at the basis of both these
characteristics there is reference to a fixed and self-existent
order of rank among the values . 1 If now the systematic order
of the values were merely a linear order of gradation in height,
and if into the bargain this as a whole were set before every
valuational consciousness, then the law of the good would allow
no scope either to the preferential ethos of the noble or to the
individual ethos of personality. But neither of these is actually
the case. There neither is a consciousness adequate to the
“system” of values, nor is the “system” a one-dimensional
gradation of height. Values constitute a manifold of many
dimensions . 3 Various, materially different values stand side by
side on the same level ; and often enough between them there
exists an opposition, as regards contents, which may become
direct antagonism. We have seen examples of this. But it is
clear that the antinomies are more numerous than the examples
can show, since the number and the variations of the values
are far greater than those cited. Upon nearer observation
almost every more specialized value opened to view an entire
group of values. But it is by no means only the antinomies
proper which here come under consideration. Many values,
■ Cf Chapters XIV (h) and XV (c), Vol. II.
3 Cf. Chapter III (d), Vol. II.
PERSONALITY
35i
which do not at all contradict each other, nevertheless cannot
at the same time be actualized, on account of the structure of
the given situation. Then the conflict is secondary, being con-
ditioned only by the empirical situation. But it is not on that
account less actual or less important ethically.
Now here it is left to the person himself to make a decision
from case to case. And this is the point at which the conduct
of the particular individual becomes differentiated axiologically,
and indeed not simply in regard to preference for the higher
or lower value, that is, not merely from the general point of
view of good and bad, but according to a far greater variety
of possibilities in axiological distinction. Under some circum-
stances, m one and the same complex situation, innumerable
kinds of conduct and of resolution are possible, according to
which of the values touched upon is taken as fixing the standard.
Every human ethos brings with it preferential trends in specific
valuational directions; every ethos thereby neglects other
values which also are at stake. And still in its way each one is
right — and not only subjectively; for at any given time no
one can do justice to all the values concerned.
The individual ethos consists of such preferential trends,
which are relatively indifferent to valuational height, because
they move within the co-ordinated manifoldness of values, in
other words, lie in a line perpendicular to the order of rank.
The ethos naturally cannot spend itself in a single line of pre-
ference. It reaches out to all human objects and to every
conceivable grade of the manifold values. The more richly and
highly the personality is individualized, so much the more
does it permeate the realm of values with its many-sided
system of preferences. Such an arrangement of preferences
therefore does not signify a rearrangement of the order of
rank, at least it need not. For the order of rank remains absolute,
in itself. A rearrangement of it could only spell failure. There
may of course be such failure, and it may occasionally attack
the individual system of preference. But it cannot on that
account be asserted that the individual ethos is nothing but
35 *
THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
a failure to reflect the universal order of rank. Personality
would then not be a value but a disvalue. Often enough on
this ground ethics, basing itself only upon general command-
ments, misjudges the valuational quality of the individual
ethos. If morality consists of nothing else than the carrying
out of one or a few general laws, then personal individuality,
which attempts anything beyond, is utterly immoral.
The case is different, if there exists a real realm of values,
in the overwhelming variety of which the order of height in
the scale is only one of many dimensions. Here there is room
for an order of preference with its variety according to one’s
liking, together with the order of rank in the scale of values.
Thus we can also understand that an individual ethos has its
own Ought-to-Be. In all concrete situations there is need of
definiteness of preference; only in this way will their valua-
tional resources be exploited. The mere order of rank cannot
do this. Its law is too abstract and too devoid of contents;
it leaves all the other dimensions of the realm of values un-
determined. It is related to the finer differentiations as justice
is to love. The type-values of whole groups of persons, of
peoples and epochs constitute here an indispensable and
positive addition to the picture; for they also consist of such
preferential trends, although relatively universal ones But
just for this reason they do not exhaust the variety in what is
morally of value. Only the strictly individual values of per-
sonality form a kind of culmination in this direction. In them
the human ethos exhausts its positive* possibilities, latent in
the structure of the realm of values. In the sense of such
extremes in the unique axiological trends of the ethos — and
of course only in this sense — the values of personality are the
highest morally and, taken as a whole, make up an entire stratum
of the realm of values, which rests everywhere upon the stratum
of the universal virtues.
In these values, which are super-imposed upon the “virtues,”
the single individual as such is axiologically autonomous,
spontaneous, creative. In these values he is, what in the
PERSONALITY 353
“virtues” he is not, the law-giver of moral Being, in the strict
sense of the word law-giver. He is this, of course, not self-
consciously, but only on that account the more so in his ideal
moral existence itself. He is this moreover only “for” himself.
But he ought to be it only for himself. In general, law-giving
appertains exclusively to all the moral values. But only the
pure values of personality are a self-legislation.
(/) The Rank of Personality in the Scale of Moral Values
However little the material structure of the values of per-
sonality has to do with the axiological height of its constituent
parts, yet the grade of its distinctive character varies greatly
in the scale of values. A man’s individual ethos may be highly
or little endowed, significant or insignificant. Perhaps one
might say that in the majority of men it differs but slightly
from the type. Such men have “little personality.”
On the other hand, what one calls “great personality” is by
no means always a highly individualized ethos. What one
ordinarily so describes, for example, in history, is much rather
the especially marked and energetic representative of a general
ethos, or even merely the historically productive, efficient,
stimulating man, the hero, the intercessor, the pioneer in a
common cause.
It is not in this sense that we are here discussing personality,
but exclusively in the sense of individuation of the ethos
itself and of its impress in the actual man. In it historical
greatness is by no means involved. The brave man, the wise,
the just, the loving, the faithful or the trustful, can also possess
moral greatness. The strict sense of personality, on the other
hand, applies solely to the uniqueness and differentiation of
that valuational complex which constitutes in a man’s ethos
the preferential trend of his inner disposition. Only through
such a trend, or perhaps a number of such trends — in so far
as they are somehow bound organically together into a uni ty
of an ethos — does a man really rise above the Ought-to-Be
Ethics — II 2
354
THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
that applies to everyone. Personality, in the strict sense, is
not to be found among famous persons— the moral signi-
ficance of the hero is precisely his super-individual quality —
but away from the noisy stress of great ends and services. The
greatness of personality is much more a purely inner greatness;
it has scope in the most narrow sphere of life, for it is nothing
else than uniqueness of commitment to values and, indirectly,
uniqueness of the valuational perspectives with which a man
permeates his sphere m life. Whoever is really a marked per-
sonality, carries his standards beyond all question in himself;
in following them he is loyal to himself. He shows very definite
and unmistakable sympathies and antipathies, for which he
can give no other account than that which as to be found in
their existence and their felt necessity. He sees the world,
in a light of his own, as no one else sees it, in the light of his
preferred values; and lives in accord with them. He is a world
for himself, in the true sense of the word.
This is the reason that genuine personality possesses such
attraction for others. Participation in it is a second life in a
second world. Who sees the personal element in a man and
lovingly comprehends it — and only to the appreciative glance
is it visible — lives amidst abounding values of another order
from those of one who is blind to personality. His world is in-
finitely richer, fuller and higher, diversified in values and vast.
( g ) Two Kinds of Gradation in Personality
Personality increases and decreases in two respects.
First, the amount of individuation varies greatly. In its
lower stages it is lost in the typical. Only in the higher stages
does personality proper appear. But even, then, towards the
boundary where the typical, where even all similarity, ceases,
there are still many gradations which are distinguishable to the
fine sense of values, although no longer to understanding proper.
They consist in differentiations of preference for one value over
another.
PERSONALITY
355
In the second place, there are gradations in the approxima-
tion of the actual person to his ideal ethos. Here also there is
a long series of stages. But its relation to the other kind of
gradation is one of indifference. The two kinds vary inde-
pendently of each other. There exists a highly individual
ethos with little actualization of it, and again a high degree of
actualization with not much individuation. Personalities of the
former kind are disrupted, inward failures and unsteady; but
in spite of that they possess for any discriminating observer
the extraordinary attraction of originality and distinction which
glimmer through all the self-contradictions. Conversely, per-
sonalities of the other kind manifest their inward unity,
definiteness of outline, organic harmony, but they do not rise —
or only a little — above the typical and they are morally unin-
teresting.
There is something else, moreover, which binds the degree
of axiological approximation to that of individuation. If the
ideal ethos of a person is merely typical or little beyond, his
individuality does not increase with the greater fulfilment of
his ethos; for individuation attaches to man as a natural entity
independently of the ethos. The natural difference between
individuals may decrease along with an increasing adaptation
to a uniform ethos. It is otherwise when the ethos is really
distinctive; then increasing individuation is accompanied by
increasing self-fulfilment. And here for the first time appears
personality proper, as a moral value. Hence there are not
only two conditions, which must be fulfilled in this connection ;
but the genuinely ethical phenomenon of personality does not
exist until there is a certain amount of fulfilment and until
there is reciprocal penetration of the two conditions.
( h ) Antinomic Relation to General Values and the
Conversion of the Categorical Imperative
It is a mistake to construct a general individualism out of the
ethical recognition of personality. But there can be no doubt
THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
356
that a one-sided presentation of the matter naturally leads to
such a mistake. For the values of personality stand in un-
deniably antinomic relation to universal values, especially to
justice, in so far as it demands equality, but also to brotherly
love which at least ignores differences of worthiness. Whoever
is under the spell of the universal values is always prone to
misjudge the worth of personality; and anyone who appre-
ciates it is inclined to depreciate them.
We have already encountered this antinomy among the valua-
tional oppositions; there it became clear that in principle it
cannot be solved, and that it introduces a lively conflict into
all human relationships . 1 But it must be remembered that in
life personality has an especially difficult position. In the
equalitarian ethos of justice all stand against the one. They
demand the same from everybody. And certainly in general
this is right, for personality ought to claim nothing for itself
in the sphere of outward life and of goods, in so far as it is
subject to the law of justice. Its realm belongs to another
world, where no legal relationship should enter. But naturally
there is a wide border region in which the two spheres overlap,
and it is just here that life is most strenuous ; here the relative
wrong of justice is as glaring as the defencelessness and out-
lawry of personality. For all legal protection extends only to
the “person” as such, as an individual, not as individuality,
therefore not to personality. This is outside the pale of law,
as law is impersonal.
In order to see this, we need notespecially stress the con-
flict; indeed there is no occasion for casuistical reflection. Law
is not wrong in regarding the individual person as a means ;
for so to regard him is not its true intention. But by the strength
of its solidarity it oppresses personality; this, where it supports
injustice, stands alone against all. In life, the lower moral
value shows itself to be the stronger; the higher is subject
to it.
This relation can be discussed in connection with Kant’s
* Cf. Chapter IX (e)-(g), Vol. II.
PERSONALITY
357
categorical imperative, as the general formula of equalitarian
ethics. The formula says that one ought so to act as to be able
to will that everyone should act so. In so far as this affirms
that the moral test for every act is whether its maxim could at
the same time be a universal law, there is evidently something
here which m principle man as a personality cannot will.
Rather must he at the same time will that over and above all
universal applicability there should be in his conduct something
of his own, which no other in his position ought to do or need
do. If he neglects this, he is a mere numeral in the crowd and
could be replaced by anyone else; his personal existence is
futile and meaningless.
In personality there is the tendency always to have something
personal in its volition and action, such that no one else can
will it, or even imitate it — the tendency in every deed, together
with all the general claims, to be something “more” than one
of many, to have a value of one’s own in life, and thereby to
prove one’s individual moral right to existence. Of course this
tendency can never assume the form of a deliberate principle
deliberately determining the will. It can inhere only m the
feeling for values — as is the case with other moral values also —
in so far as the concrete value of personality has already the
form of an inward individual law of preference.
But in the abstract we can very well formulate it as a law
and set it over against the categorical imperative, as its con-
verse, which also is indeed only an abstract formula for a
general moral disposition. The law would then run: So act,
that the maxim of thy will could never become the principle
of a universal legislation without a remainder. One might also
express it in this way: Never act merely according to a system
of universal values but always at the same time in accordance
with the individual values of thine own personal nature. Or:
Always act not only in accord with thy universal conscience
(the sense of moral value in general) but also at the same
time follow thy private conscience (thine individual sense of
values).
THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
358
The paradoxical nature of the formulations is not intentional.
It inheres in the essence of the matter. If we remember exactly
what a private conscience is — a4eeling of preference or rejec-
tion which is not indicated in the general scale of values — we
cannot challenge the rightness of such a categorical counter-
claim, especially as it leaves untouched the universal values
which the Kantian imperative advocates. The conflict there-
fore, when we go to the root of it, is seen to be not so glaring
as it appears on the surface. Of course the antinomy is not
removed. But we can see how it is at least in principle possible
for anyone from case to case to solve it practically by his act.
Indeed, we can go a step farther in this direction. It can be
shown that the converse of the categorical imperative does not
at all clash with it, when it is strictly taken, or — expressed
dialectically — that it already contains in itself its own opposite,
that is, that it is antinomic in its very nature. The imperative,
for example, does not declare that all men ought to will the
“same”; also it does not say that I ought universally and
absolutely to will as all others ought to will. It cannot at all
imply that ; for then it would also require that all others ought
to come into the same situation. The maxim, for example, is
altogether relative to the situation ; to act according to the same
rule in another situation would indeed be morally wrong. But
to will that the momentary situation in its uniqueness should
return, would be meaningless. Rather does the imperative pre-
suppose a certain type of situation. Likewise it is intelligible
only so far as the assumption may be made that others come
into “the same predicament. This assumption is justified .within
the limits of that similarity which as a fact exists in situations,
however individualized they may be. But it overlooks the fact
-that the structure of situations is not exhausted in any such
similarities, that in reality they are strictly individual, indeed —
to be exact — that two perfectly similar situations no more
exist than do two persons who are altogether alike, or even
two things. Situations are real; and every real thing, under-
stood in its entire concreteness, is single, once for all, and never
PERSONALITY
359
recurs. One must remember that even a situation outwardly
altogether the same — in case there should be such — would be
inwardly, that is, ethically, a ■different situation, provided only
that it existed between persons differently constituted, between
persons whose specific mode of intention was involved in the
situation. We forget this only too easily, because we are
accustomed to keep all deliberate moral reflections within the
boundary of perspicuity, that is, of a certain classification.
But how narrow are the bounds of deliberate reflection! It is
reflection and its classifications which deny the value of per-
sonality. Here is the limit of all grouping into classes, as well
for persons as for situations in life.
At this point the meaning, correctly understood, of the
categorical imperative 1 itself gives preference to the limit. Its
real demand is: I ought so to will, as under literally the same
circumstances everyone else ought to will. But “literally the
same circumstances” includes the peculiar nature of my indi-
vidual ethos. The imperative, accordingly, when the complete
structure of the case is borne in mind, not only excludes the
moral justification of a will exactly the same in others, but it
positively demands also the unique factor in my own will,
without prejudice to the classification which brings my will
and that of others under a rude uniformity of the Ought. The
Ought allows unlimited scope for an individually articulated
will. But that the categorical imperative actually demands indi-
viduation for the will — the uniqueness of “my” maxim — is
inherent m its essence, in so far as its demand is a universal
one and includes everything that can be universally demanded
of everyone. For that everyone should will individually and
act in the spirit of his own personal ethos, and that conse-
quently every maxim of a definite person in a definite situatiorf-
should have a distinctive character which is in accord with
1 It is self-evident that this “correctly understood” does not refer to
the historical correctness of understanding as to Kant’s meaning. The
interpretation here given m no wise pretends to be an historical
interpretation.
THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
360
this definiteness — this is an eminently universal moral require-
ment. In short, the individuality of personal behaviour, as an
ethical claim of the Ought, is jusfcas general as the universality
of the Ought itself within the limits of the class of possible
situations. Hence the categorical imperative has within itself
its own opposite. It involves its own converse. Its limitation
lies not outside of it, but in it.
Therefore we might say: the converse of the categorical
imperative does not lie outside of the proper meaning of its
formula. One does not need first to suspend it, in order to
establish the peculiar right of the personal will. Rather does
the imperative itself establish it. The demand, so to will as
not everyone ought or may, is not in contradiction to the
universal demand, so to will as everyone ought to will. The
two demands do not clash, because they move on different
levels. It is this which makes the right of personality compatible
with that of the universal virtues, and vouchsafes scope for it
as a moral value of a peculiar order along with them.
This is of decisive significance for the understanding of
personality as a separate moral value. Not everyone is able to
see such scope in his life. Hence arises the blindness of that
rigorism which always believes that the universal requirements
are endangered, where personality sets up its claims. Whoever
has breadth of vision, feels that to everyone should be granted
a right of a higher order: “this” man may do what no other
may, and ought to do it, because he is what he is. Whoever
does not at least occasionally feel this in the presence of some
living personality, and is not aware that precisely in t]y£ way
the strictest demand of the universal Ought is also best vindi-
cated, has neither insight nor spirit for the moral Being of
personality. His sense of values does not extend so far. But he
is the very one who is least able to cope with that individualism
which is just as one-sided, is always ready to spring and is in
fact ethically dangerous. Only he can keep individualism
within bounds who understands and appreciates its limited
rights.
PERSONALITY
361
(i) Genuine and Spurious Personality
The Ought-to-Be in the values of personality is only apparently
different from that of the remaining virtues. Every man ought
to “be” in accord with his own individual ethos, he ought to
fulfil it in his Being. Of course he ought not to do this at the
cost of the universal values, but so much the more within the
bounds which these allow him. The area, however, is wide, as
wide as the distance between the contents of the universal
and the individual claims. To be a personality without ful-
filling the commandment of justice, truthfulness, fidelity or
brotherly love, produces an inner displacement, a chaotic and
false morality without any ethical foundation ; such a personality
operates in vain, it is a moral swindle.
The universal values constitute the basis of all morality
and as such take unconditional precedence. Only upon them,
as the foundation, can the more highly differentiated form of
personal values be raised.
But in principle this changes nothing as to the character of
the Ought-to-Be, which adheres to the values of personality.
On this point a man may easily err, m that he, as is right,
gives scope before all else to the universal requirements. But
the Ought-to-Be which is valid only for one appears less
absolutely binding. We confuse only too easily objective extent
of validity with the existential character (the modality) of the
validity itself, with the Ought-to-Be as such. This blunder is
very natural — and pardonable — but it is none the less an error
on that account.
It is another matter with the Ought-to-Do. We cannot say
that a man ought to “strive for” the fulfilment of his individual
ethos. But the same holds good within certain limits of all
moral values. The phenomena, in which a certain striving for
the universal virtues is manifested — such as conversion,
repentance, the desire for one’s own improvement, self-
discipline, the imitation of an exemplar — are not ethically
primary phenomena. In all these cases there is a prior dis-
3 fe THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
position of a special kind. Personality, however, as a value is
never by its very nature actualized in reflection upon itself,
but in reflection upon other values. It accordingly assumes a
special attitude only in so far as it constitutes the limiting case
in this respect. As regards attainment by striving, the Ought-
to-Do forbids it. But this is not a difference of principle but
only one of degree. Ought-to-Do is not the basic form of the
Ought of moral values; for a person it is the direct form of the
Ought only in regard to situational values. But it is these which
in personally formed effort are the intended values; and upon
them appears to be based also the individual intentional value
(together with the universal) in the special quality of the
intention.
Herewith is connected the fact that, m the carrier of per-
sonality as a value, all awakening to consciousness of it entails
the danger of failing in it, or even of falsifying its nature. It
inheres in the essence of the individual ethos to take part in
all conduct of the person as a special determinant, but not to
be an object of explicit self-consciousness. Much rather is it
inclined to make the individual ethos of someone else the
object of attention. Another person is throughout made the
object of inspection. The power of inspection can penetrate
deep into one’s own being. Indeed it may be that, under the
dangerous pressure to be a personality himself, while a man
has before his mind the personality of another, he mistakes
his own. Whoever stands under the spell of a powerful per-
sonality, only too easily lapses in this way. But precisely this
shows how austerely individual the values of personality are,
how utterly they exist only for the one as “his” ethos, but for
everyone else they mean a falsification of his own nature,
indeed a moral disintegration. The values of personality can
very well be in content opposed to one another; what for A
is a valuable preferential trend, is possibly for B an anti-value,
in so far as in his ethos the preferential trend is different.
Thus are produced innumerable conflicts, as soon as the one,
by universalizing his own idiosyncracy (for him quite war-
PERSONALITY 363
ranted), overpowers the other. Life abounds in instances of
such conflicts . 1
The proof of the individual Ought-to-Be and of the genuine-
ness of personality as a moral value is that any imitation of
another’s personality is ridiculous. When the law of his own
inner value is lacking in a man, he seizes upon another man’s
law, where and as he understands it. By so doing he achieves
the opposite of what he seeks. The law can issue only from one’s
own moral being. Only then is it a necessity, even in the way
it manifests itself. In moral striving, to follow an exemplar is
something altogether different from copying an individual.
The disciple chooses his model among historic persons from
valuational points of view which he himself already has —
how else should he distinguish the worthy from the unworthy
model? — and for the sake of the values which the model
embodies. Naturally this is wise only when the values are
universal, valid for everyone, or at least for many, that is, are
typical. There can be discipleship in brotherly love, justice,
truthfulness and the like, but not in personality. Such imitation
is essentially linked to general values. If applied to personality,
it becomes mere copying and brings about only a counterfeit
of personality. One who merely copies is not only not a per-
sonality, but is positively a destroyer and falsifier of his own
true personal essence ; not a man, but a human ape.
So it is with all deliberate effort to be a personality, even
when its content is not appropriated from another personality.
Within certain limits we can construct for ourselves an ethos
whiph we do not possess. But the result is only a pose. This is
shown by its hollowness and brittleness ; it is merely outward
behaviour. Whoever takes the trouble to probe it, finds an
entirely different ethos behind it, and indeed, as might be
expected, one that is undeveloped, impoverished, chaotic and
stunted through adulteration. A genuine personality is cast
in one mould, is solid, a moral entity which, as it were, has
1 Dramatic art has a special predilection for cases of this kind. One
may recall Tasso and Antonio, Rosmer and Rebecca.
364 the realm op ethical values
grown naturally. It can never Ibe found where there has been
deliberate effort to become a personality. It is not a thing
willed; over against the will it is autonomous; it has its law
in itself and follows its law without deliberating.
(k) The Values of Personality, Discernible and Aprioristic
Wherever there are real personalities, their values can be felt.
Through such feeling they are no less capable of being known
than the universal values, notwithstanding that a full sensing
of any particular value of personality generally arises merely
as a particular experience.
But the question as to whether they can be known is essen-
tially changed, if one is referring to a clear understanding of
their inherent structure. Practically, values of personality
cannot be understood explicitly, being essentially irrational.
Their complexity is a barrier to one’s penetration. Only typical
factors m them can be distinctly discerned. And these forms
not only do not contain the values without a remainder, but
are intrinsically contrasted with them. The values of personality
are indeed within the limits of possible discrimination through
the feeling for values, but they are beyond the limits set to
our discernment of valuational structure.
This circumstance, however, sets no limit at all to the
significance of the values of personality for practical life. As
regards the specific value of a living personality, our sensing
of it can assume an extraordinarily concrete and differentiated
form. Of course, by the mere sensing of values no value of the
kind in question can be anticipated, unless the personality is
empirically at hand or at least unless a picture is concretely
delineated (as may be done in fiction). The actual presence in
some form or other, although only incomplete, must always
be presupposed. And in this point our sensing of the values of
personality is essentially different from our sensing of other
kinds of value. It would seem accordingly as if this sensing
were not aprioristic, but empirical and bound down to the
PERSONALITY
3<>S
presentation of the actual case. This impression becomes still
stronger when we bear in mind that anyone sensing a value is
in the presence of a variety of single values which is practically
infinite in quantity and quality, and, again, that every one of
these in itself is of an impenetrable complexity. How should a
man’s sense of value discover them a priori ? In fact he always
waits, until the actual personality is presented before him;
and even then he senses the distinctive value in it only in
relatively rare cases.
The question, therefore, is: Have we not here reached the
limit of valuational apriority, and does not the sensing of values
extend beyond it ? In fact, does not valuational empiricism set
in at this point, in contrast to the complete apriority of the
universal values? This would be a conceivable inference.
Values are essences, and essences can be discerned only a
priori (it is all one whether by feeling, thinking or in some
other way). Then, either the values of personality would not
be genuine essences, or else what is presented by experience
of the actual person is not a valuational quality.
It is not difficult to show that the latter view is correct.
What is mediated empirically is by no means the value itself.
What is in fact grasped empirically, and only empirically, is
nothing but the fact that there exists an individual ethos of
“this” peculiar structure — we cannot a priori conceive or con-
struct personality. But that this ethos, discerned in the actual
person, is something morally of value we never know from its
empirical presentation, but only by an aprioristic sensing. This
is evident, when we consider that by no means everything in
an empirical personality is morally of value. The value in it
must first be discovered. And only an aprioristic norm, which
the sense of values brings with it, can furnish the criterion.
But if we look more closely, we find that in this matter the
case is not fundamentally different in regard to the knowledge
of all the other values. The sensing of the universal values is
not purely an inward contemplation, but proceeds by way of
observing an actual moral life. The valuational vision does not
366 THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
unfold itself through reflection and rummaging, but under the
stress of an actual situation, through conflict, by taking sides,
by approval and disapproval. And here also in the first instance
the materials of values and disvalues are always known in the
given case; but that one material is of value and another
contrary thereto, only a norm that is applied a priori can decide.
The sensing is in reaction to the empirical case, it is a valua-
tional response. But the response itself is aprioristic.
This interpenetration of empirical presentation and aprioristic
insight is especially important in the case of personality, only
because here the general, constant and familiar norms do not
fit and must be applied from case to case. This newly gained
norm sets up a new valuational feeling, the prophetic dawning
of a value not yet discerned and unanticipated. Here the
aprioristic feeling widens step by step with the expansion of
ethical experience. In that, new human idiosyncracies are con-
tinually being presented.
Finally one becomes convinced of the strict apriority of the
feeling directed towards personality, if one takes into con-
sideration that an individual ethos is never completely actualized
in any real individual, that there is always a disparity, always
only an approximation. The value of a personality therefore
is never actually given adequately — as little as are the general
values; for this reason then it cannot be simply derived from
experience. It is never empirically given. Nevertheless there
exists a feeling for the pure ideal ethos of a man, an intuitive,
often a lightning-like illumination of his personality, and pre-
cisely in so far as it is not fully actualized in him. What takes
place here is very marvellous. The intuitive glance forces its
way, as it were, through the actual personality, it breaks through
the boundaries of the empirical man and beholds something
different, which in the man himself is only intimated. To the
intuitive glance the personality is transparent. But what shines
through it is its ideal essence, its true ethos, the value which is
its inner destiny, its intelligible character.
No empirical knowledge is adapted to such perception. What
PERSONALITY
367
is beheld stands in contrast to what the eyes see. If seen at all,
the values of personality are seen purely a priori. But we must
not forget that aprioristic discernment — here as throughout
the realm of values — never stands detached from empirical
presentation of the actual and can succeed only when m con-
nection with it. The actuality experienced is here as elsewhere
the occasion which incites the mind to the beholding of Ideas.
CHAPTER XXXIII (lviii)
PERSONAL LOVE
( a ) Personal Being, the Fulfilment of its Meaning
Everyone who does not lead a shadow-like existence amidst
generalities and principles is well aware that besides universal
love of one’s neighbour and of the far distant, and besides the
love which dispenses spiritual gifts, there is another, closer
and richer, an intimate love directed exclusively to one indi-
vidual person. The other types are impersonal, do not parti-
cipate in the innermost nature of anyone nor seek after it in
its entirety and fulness. But personal love aims at personality
as such and for its own sake. In tendency it is all-embracing,
a human intimacy far greater than that between neighbours
It is the virtue of one personality towards another; it is the
devotion of him who loves to the personality of the loved one.
Indeed all love aims at values, all epa>s in one way or other
looks to the Ideal. Such reference to the Ideal is characteristic
of personal love. Brotherly love attends to the universally
human value of a person; on that account it overlooks nothing.
Love of the far distant fixes its gaze upon the discerned ideal
of man; radiant virtue, upon participation in spiritual good.
In none of these cases does the individual entity receive the
recognition that is its due, as an object of love. It too has a
claim, it is in need of appraisement by a special sympathetic
sensing of its specific value. For whatever in itself is of
worth finds its fulfilment only by becoming a value “for
someone.”
Personality also craves such fulfilment. Otherwise its very
existence, its blossoming, is overlooked in the exhaustive
search for values. But in mere existence-for-itself it cannot
become actualized. For self-consciousness is contrary to its
nature, which is not valuational consciousness but moral Being
PERSONAL LOVE
369
wholly and solely. It necessarily seeks someone “for” whom it
could Be. Only another personality can satisfy this yearning
and be the counter-pole in the fulfilment of its meaning. And
the mystery of love is that it satisfies this deepest and least
understood craving. One who loves gives this unique gift to
the person he loves. He gives a new dimension to the Being
of the loved one, enabling him to be “for himself,” what other-
wise he is only “in himself.” Personal love is the value comple-
mentary to personality, a communication to it of its own
meaning. It provides what a personality cannot acquire for
itself, a mirror which it cannot itself hold before itself. To
picture one’s own personality is to distort it. But here is a
mirror which gives back a perfect reflection. In the nature of
things consciousness of one’s personality must be another’s
consciousness. For it is a consciousness of the value of the
personality. Such is personal love.
Since empirical personality never strictly corresponds to its
own ideal value, but love looks exclusively to the latter, it
inheres in the essence of personal love, to pierce through the
empirical person to his ideal value. This is at least its tendency.
Thus we can understand how it may attach itself to one who
is morally undeveloped and imperfect, indeed to one whose
ideal ethos is deficient. Its commitment merges into the ideal
of personality; it lets this stand for the empirical individual,
accepting him as equivalent to his highest possibilities, as
raised to a power above his actual being. It loves in him what
inheres in his essential tendency, the axiological idiosyncrasy
of his Ideal, yet not as an Ideal, but as a trend towards actuality,
just as if it were already actualized in him. In this way, looking
back from the Ideal upon its imperfect carrier, it loves the
empirical individual in his characteristic peculiarity. For it
the man, as he is, in the trend of his ethical preference, is
accepted as a guarantor of a higher moral Being, which of
course he is not, but which only in him and nowhere else in
the world finds something real that approximates to its own
value. Personal love lives by faith in this highest that is within
Ethics — II AA
37 °
THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
the loved one, which despite its inadequacy love senses pro-
phetically. Such love is ethical divination in the pre-eminent
sense of the word, not of course divination of a universal human
ideal, but of the Ideal of a particular individual. It sees the
perfect in imperfection, infinitude in the finite.
( b ) Love, its Distinctive Life and Value
Because it is the mirror and fulfilment of the loved one’s
personal being, love for him creates an ethical situation of a
special kind, an intimate, absolutely reciprocal union between
two human beings. A third person requires again a new and
equally special commitment. Distributed among several, love
loses its personal character and approximates the more to
superficial sympathy existing among members of the same class.
And even when a man personally loves several individuals, his
love for each is distinctive, even individualized, reflecting the
individuality of its object. Hence every personal love tends to
an existence-for-itself, to isolation. There is an individualized
ethical existence-for-itself only between two. Neither more nor
less than two is consistent with its nature. One person for
him self is not “for himself”; several in a group are not what
they are, each to each ; they are no longer strictly personalities.
One for one is the only form of existence-for-self.
There is a unique feature in the creation of this personal
situation. It widens the sphere of personality. Personality is
raised to a higher power by including within its compass and
oounting as its own the personal Being of the loved one. Where
this widening is reciprocal, each of the two personalities is
re-enforced ; there arises a new communal structure of an ethical
order, which is not contained in the two persons and which in
its significance and power can develop beyond both of them.
Herein the human ethos is seen to be eminently creative, and
creative of something literally beyond itself. For in its develop-
ment beyond the two who love, the total relationship raises
their personal being, and confers upon them a dignity which
PERSONAL LOVE
37 *
they do not have for themselves, but still never in such a way
that the total structure is merged in either of them. The total
situation leads a life of its own beyond that of the participants,
and indeed with the full import of a really ethical existence of
its own. Like everything actual, it has a moment of beginning
in the temporal process; it develops in its own way from frail
and perishable origins; it grows strong, reaches its prime,
undergoes inner crises, transformations and conflicts; and like-
wise it can decline and die. In its own life it is conditioned by
the personal ethos of the two who love; but as it can grow in
power far beyond their combined wills and capacities and can
even determine their destiny, there is a law of a higher order
which rules in it, which is also individual but never coincides
with that of the participating personalities.
The relationship consists not simply m the union of the
empirical personalities, but at the same time in the higher
union of two kinds of ideal ethos. And on this account the
law of its life transcends the empirical being of the persons,
because it issues from the axiological fusion of two purely
valuational complexes with their respective preferential ten-
dencies. This is what the one who loves never fully sees,
although at times he may surmise it, namely, that it is pre-
cisely the ethical nature of himself and the other person which
in his love is struggling for fulfilment, and that it is his own
innermost nature especially which (not understood by him,
strengthened by the support in the inward self of the one he
loves) is striving to raise him above itself. Intelligible characters
take stronger hold of one another than do the empirical persons.
Thus in these a destiny is fulfilled which is greater than their
actual ethical being — a destiny to the power of which they in
their finiteness might very easily succumb.
Nevertheless just this destiny is the true revelation of their
own infinitude. And this is the distinctive power of all love
which enters deeply into one’s personal life ; it brings to light
the otherwise hidden and neglected essence of one’s indivi-
duality. That this revelation can be achieved only in a life of
37* THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
another order than that of the empirical man, is because of the
gulf between him and the Ideal of himself.
(c) Love, its Strength and its Will as Values
The narrower moral value of love, its virtue, is distinct from
the objective value of its real life. Its virtue, like all moral value,
inheres in the disposition, the intention. Love is the absolutely
positive disposition as such; it is absolute affirmation, good-
will, devotion, constructive tendency, just as hate is denial,
overthrow, annihilation. Love that is personal is the same
affirmation in regard to personality.
Hereby effort enters as a factor into it, a factor which is
liable to be forgotten on account of the emotional strength
of love. Something of the moral strength, the efficacy and
productiveness of epees reappears in it. Not as if personal
love must develop a special working energy, nor as if a will
must stand behind it — that would make of love something
planned and not genuine. A will accompanying it or behind it
could only be in contradiction to it. Love no more allows itself
to be forced than to be willed. It is unique, a primal tendency.
But it is precisely this which we have to consider.
There is of course a love that is weak in will, which may
still be strong emotionally, just as the converse is sometimes
the case. In the end a man can introduce into his love no more
volitional energy than is native to him. Nevertheless an ele-
ment of will rightfully subsists in love. It has the tendency to
draw to itself and into its service a person’s entire volitional
energy. And the stronger it is emotionally, the stronger is this
tendency.
In love the element of will does not consist in willing to
have the loved person for oneself. This tendency also is naturally
m it and a certain valuational emphasis is laid upon it, although
a subordinate one; it is akin to egoism and manifests itself
in the same way. That this is so is evident from the fact
that a love in which there is no will to possess does
PERSONAL LOVE
3*73
not act convincingly, and is not accepted as entire by the
loved one himself. But this is not the question which now
concerns us.
In all personal love there is a second and more deeply rooted
factor, which expresses only the positive trend, the kindness
and devotion which place oneself at the service of the other —
a tendency of the will, which is the reverse of the desire to
possess and which even in renunciation can continue un-
diminished. Expressed in a formal way, it is a pure Being-for-
thee on my part, irrespective of any Being-for-me on thy part,
and stands in perceptible contrast and occasionally in acute
conflict therewith.
The altruism of personal love is essentially different from
that of brotherly love, which looks primarily to the empirical
Bemg of another, to his welfare, happiness and the like. It is
much more closely akin to the altruism of love of the remotest ;
like this, it looks to the pure ethos, the Ideal of man, except
that here, the Ideal is the individual ideal of personality. And
here again the distinctly marvellous, the metaphysical character
of personal love manifests itself. To the loved one it is what his
own will can never be to him, a will, a striving, a guidance, a
creating directed toward his unfulfilled moral being, his per-
sonality as a value. No one can strive for the actualization of
his own ethos as such, without running the risk of failure.
But everyone can strive to fulfil— naturally not in his own
person but in that of the loved one — the ethos which with the
eye of love he beholds in the beloved ; and there will not be
the slightest danger that he will thereby mistake it or distort
it. For it is not his own. Such a striving is of course limited
in means, it can never be more than a favourable circumstance.
But that is much. In fact it is a supremely real and decisive
power in the life of the beloved, an actual leading up to his
true moral being. No one who has experienced it will deny
that genuine, deeply felt love has the power to transform
him morally whom it is directed toward, to make of him what
it sees and loves in him. Such influence is certainly not all-
374 THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALDES
powerful, it encounters all the resistances of the empirical
man, and often enough also a radical misunderstanding of its
real trend. But in tendency it still persists. And everyone
experiences it who has the good fortune to be surrounded by
the genuine personal love of another.
One must not reduce this phenomenon to purely intellec-
tualistic terms. It does not take place in the light of conscious-
ness; only seldom does it force its way through to a rational
surmising of its ethical significance. It remains obscure,
borne by the emotions; and obtrusive consciousness can only
embarrass it in its instinctive certainty of its own goal. In one
who loves there can indeed be a happy sense of such a power,
like the no less happy sense in the loved one of being led and
exalted by it. To the one who loves it gives the triumphant
consciousness of being for the beloved the highest which one
person can be to another ; and in the beloved, who feels this
love resting upon him like a fulfilment, there is a thankfulness,
without his knowing precisely wherein its high value for him
consists. But neither of these is a knowledge of the meta-
physical circumstance involved in the love. The loved one
feels the power that upholds him; he feels that the loving
glance penetrates his empirical being and points beyond it.
Thus he is aware that for the one who loves him he has become
transparent, but he himself cannot see what the other sees in
him. He cannot follow with his sense of values, because he
cannot cast his gaze upon and through himself. At best he can
trustingly surrender and yield to the other’s guidance. But he
is in need of nothing more. For even this exalts him above
himself; he feels also that which shames him for not being in
reality as the other sees him. But instead of feeling that he is
misunderstood he has rather a sense that he is known to a
pre-eminent degree, and at the same time is forced to be what
the other sees him to be.
These are of course only general circumlocutions which
hint but imperfectly at the secret of the moral power of love.
The peculiar metaphysical element in it— -the deep trans-
PERSONAL LOVE
375
cendence, the gliding over from man to man of valuationai
insight and of creative power — remains untouched. It is funda-
mentally a different transcendence from that in brotherly love;
nor does it have its effect through outward conduct or the
visible work of love; and yet it is a moral deed, a genuine
creative activity. Indeed, in greatness and objective value,
what is accomplished by the other kinds of love cannot be
compared with its achievement. No longer is there here that
disparity between the intended value and the value of the
intention, which we noted in the case of every other virtue.
For the achievement of personal love is the moral Being of
the loved one. The one who loves causes this Being to rise
transformed into what it is in Idea and what it was to him
from the beginning. At least the tendency thereto exists in all
genuine personal love. And often enough also there is fulfil-
ment in part.
( d ) Beyond Happiness and Unhappiness
According to the ordinary conception, the emotional value of
love stands in the foreground of its nature. In this view thus
much is indisputable, that it is the most positive of all human
emotions; among life’s manifold riches it possesses the highest
intrinsic value, it is the purest and most elevated joy, the
deepest happiness. To feel itself to be eternal, super-temporal,
is of its essence, despite its temporal, psychological, affective
growth and decline. Its meaning is eternal, just as the real
object which it beholds is an eternal one. And one who loves
feels its eternity immediately and convincingly as the better
part in himself. Every personal love is individual and unique,
as are its carrier and the object he beholds. Each love has its
own special ideal existence. And this is in fact eternal. How long
the empirical man is able to retain it is quite another question.
Nevertheless it is precisely the empirical man who loves. And
thus it happens that in his love the high sense of participation
in the eternal comes to him. At the same time, this improb-
376 THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
able event, altogether incredible to one who does not love,
is not a delusion but sober truth.
“Happiness” is a misleading term to describe this high
emotion. And the popular conception, which can detect
nothing but happiness in the emotional feeling of love, over-
looks the essence of the matter. It is precisely happiness which
is secondary in love. It always includes both suffering and joy.
From the point of view of happiness its peculiar feature is that
beyond a certain depth of emotion, pain and pleasure are
matters of indifference to it, they become literally indistin-
guishable to it. The suffering of one who loves can even be
happy, his happiness be painful. The specific emotional value
of love falls on the further side of happiness and unhappiness.
Its sense of inner exaltation rises above both of these — it is
a feeling of another order with a different spiritual content, in
which pleasure and pain with the incessant beat of their waves
form only a subordinate factor. They are the empirical temporal
accidents of a substance which, as the deeper emotional strain
in him who loves, is the immediate presence of the participating
Idea, the eternal value.
The proof of this remarkable phenomenon is to be found in
unhappy love, as it is called. Where it is fated to meet one who
loves superficially, in whose love the will to possess dominates,
there undoubtedly the burden of misfortune, of privation, of
resignation is preponderant. It is something altogether different
for him who loves deeply and whose striving tends wholly
toward the loved one. Although unreciprocated, his love
remains the lofty emotion which it is in itself; in him it suffers
no loss of value, it is unperturbed. This exalted sense is toto
cash removed from self-indulgence in pain. It is simply the
feeling of the autonomous value of love itself.
Certainly all personal love looks forward to a return of love.
Indeed it can even awaken a response, so far at least as the
loved one feels an enrichment of his being. But its emotional
value by no means depends upon the response. Being loved is
indisputably a value and is altogether unique; but the value of
PERSONAL LOVE
377
one’s own love is not dependent upon it; in contrast thereto
it is a “moral” value. The worth of the love which receives
is not a condition of that which gives, but conversely. The
emotional depth ther of one’s own love does not wane because
there is no return; it often grows the more; but it becomes a
source of pain. For the loved one, on the other hand, the value
of another’s love is evidently enhanced in proportion to his
own love. Not until he himself loves can be appreciate it. The
proverbial bliss which a man experiences only in personal
love is not that of being loved but of loving.
( e ) Depth of Soul and Spiritual Communion
It is the depth of the self’s participation which corresponds to
the sense of eternity and to the elevation beyond pleasure and
pain. That precisely this feeling can on the one hand become a
passion (and by no means merely on a sex basis) and on the
other can flood a whole human life with vast serenity, is due
to the fact that, deep below the threshold of consciousness, it
touches, like soft light, the primal source of spiritual life.
If to this fact we relate the transcendent linking of man to
man, we discover in it a characteristic contrast to every other
kind of love, indeed to every other kind of virtue. Justice, for
instance, joins person to person, but only surface with surface.
Still more is this the case with the virtues of social converse.
Brotherly love binds far more deeply; likewise love of the far
distant and the dissemination of spiritual values, each after its
own kind, but both obviously at certain points only. Personal
love, however, unites forthwith innermost depth to innermost
depth, overleaping the surfaces. It is quite possible for those
who are bound in personal love to irritate each other super-
ficially and to suffer disagreements and restraints of every
kind. The remarkable thing is that this love can remain stead-
fast despite the conflicts. It can also suffer under them; into its
emotional values the savour of pain can enter; indeed, this
love can succumb to antagonisms, when it has not the strength
3?8 THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
to rise above them. But a characteristic feature of it is that
even when it is oppressed by conflicts it does not settle them,
but finds a way over them to an inward harmony. For love is
capable of suffering, it can endure and bear; it is not rooted
where conflicts have their root; it is embedded in a different
stratum of our moral being.
Nor does it merely strike its roots into the spiritual source
of personal life, but is able also to raise this into consciousness,
or at least into the region of clear emotional discrimination.
It even invests with speech the mysterious depth which else
would remain for ever mute. Its speech is only imperfect
language. But the language of love is not tied to words. Verbal
expression does not embarrass it ; it has a thousand languages,
symbols, revelations. Body and soul must serve it with all their
capacities. It makes for itself organs of insight, its resources are
inexhaustible. From it there blossoms an understanding, of
which a man who does not love knows nothing, a life of inward
and profound communion. Without it a man would never
discover his own innermost nature, he would pass it by with
no suspicion of its existence. It is no fairy tale which the
lover dreams, when to him there appears to open within him a
depth hitherto closed and yet full of unimagined treasures.
In very fact such a one unlocks his own being; what is higher
and better in him, what was not understood, comes into its
own and sways him. Indeed, it may well happen that his
love outgrows his strength and follows another law (the law
germane to love), one even different from that of his own
personality. In that case from the unlocking of his nature
ensues a painful up-rooting, a desolation. Even love as a value
manifests here something like an inherent danger-point.
( f ) Love as a Source of Knowledge
Love has a value of its own not only as a disposition, a striving
and emotion, but, finally, also as a kind of cognition.
This element in it is the least recognized. Nothing seems
PERSONAL LOVE
379
remoter from love than knowledge. It appears to take the
beloved person as it sees him, or would like to see him; and
for it that is enough. The popular saying declares that love is
blind and this means: love is fortunate in its blindness, it has
no need of seeing.
Still the whole .series of valuational factors in it, mentioned
above, presupposes a radical element of knowledge. How can
love move to the ideal value of personality, even find its way
to the real Being of the man, unless it somehow comprehends
it? This comprehension is its presupposition. That it is an
emotional understanding makes no difference. In this sense a
cognitive element is always contained in love, and not only in
the inferences from it. Anyone who means by knowledge only
a thinking, reflective, rational consciousness of an object,
must naturally find a contradiction in our contention. But that
is an untenable idea of knowledge, which not even science —
much less life and the ethical consciousness — would admit to
be adequate. Still every understanding of values rests upon
feeling. Hence the fundamental element of valuational know-
ledge is based on feeling. Plainly this must be true of personal
love also. For it is an emotional hold upon values of its own
kind.
In a certain sense the popular saying is right. Love is blind,
in so far as it does not see what is before its eyes. More correctly
stated: it sees what is not in front of its eyes, what is not really
at hand. It sees through. Its glance is of the nature of divina-
tion. To it the ideal essence behind the actual man is the man
proper. As regards personality, he who loves is the only one
who sees; while he who is without love, is blind. That is why
the just man is blind to personality and the loving man in
his discernment of its essence is unjust. The former being
loveless accepts only the actualized, the latter only the ideal
personality. But also on this account the loving man must
necessarily appear to the unloving to be blind; what the latter
sees is exactly what the former does not see. The loving man in
his way is always right as compared with the throng of the
3 8o the realm OF ETHICAL, VALDES
unloving — always of course only in regard to the one person
whom he lovingly beholds. For every other person the knowing
glance can only be that of one whose love is differently directed.
Love’s ability to know does not permit of being universalized.
It is as individualized as its object — the ideal personality.
But within these limits it is autonomous, it shows a conviction
which is rightly regarded as infallible. The lover’s proverbial
unteachableness, which causes the man of experience to smile
indulgently and shake his head, is exactly what betrays the
utter seriousness of this phenomenon. Even where the facts
justify the man of experience, the lover is ideally in the right.
In fact no experience, not even his own, can teach him, so
long as he really loves, that is, so long as he has intuitive insight
into the ideal ethos of the loved one. For even his own ex-
perience is not an experience of the ideal but only of the
actual personality. But his valuational insight holds good in
reference to the ideal. And this he discerns, not empirically
but aprioristically, through the empirical personality.
The problem of personality as a value has already led us to
this paradox in the apnorism which recognizes and accepts the
individual . 1 The cognitive factor in personal love coincides
with such apriorism. For only the lover knows personality as
a value. There is no way of understanding it, except through
the insight of love. It discovers the ideal in the empirical. And
as, by striving and leading, it actualizes for the first time the
ideal ethos and within the limits of its power creates it in the
loved one, it must first have understood the ethos and known
it in contrast to the given empirical person. Here as every-
where else an anticipation of the ideal precedes its actualization.
The constructive work of love follows after its discernment,
All fulfilment together with all deep sense of fulfilment rests
upon the penetrating knowledge of intuitive love.
It cannot be shown how empirical and aprioristic discern-
ment supplement each other. The latter is conditioned by the
presence of the empirical person, but in content stands con-
**Cf. Chapter XXXII ( k ), Vol. II.
. PERSONAL LOVE 381
trasted to it. The valuable element in it is seen in a state of
unfulfilment, the ideal in the inadequate actual. A tendency
towards fulfilment of course always exists in the actual per-
sonality. It shows the way to the gaze which is in search of
the Ideal. But still it is not as if the one who loves saw two
personalities, one disposed behind the other; he discerns the
ideal immediately in the real, he sees it projected upon the
latter, he sees the actual raised to the Ideal.
In this there is not only a truth, but also an error ; for if he
sees the actual man as if he were the ideal, he sees him under a
false aspect. On this point the observer who is without love
is by comparison right. But he is wrong in what he does not
see, in the Ideal. To the lover this error may become an evil
fate, a disappointment for life — just as much as, on its reverse
side, the truth discerned may mean fulfilment for him and the
loved one. The crisis depends upon how far he knows how to
love the Ideal alone, how far he is able to unite the life of the
Ideal with a sober view of the actual, that is, with actual life
and the actual man. This combination need not be a com-
promise.
Of course no suffering he may undergo is too dear a price
to pay for the highest degree of pure vision and participation.
The whole art of love consists in retaining this high point of
vision as a perspective and remaining under its spell. A life
of love is a life spent in the knowledge of what is best worth
knowing, a life of participation in the highest that is in man.
Thus personal love, like radiant virtue, gives an ultimate
meaning to life; it is already fulfilment in germ, an uttermost
value of selfhood, a bestowal of import upon human existence —
useless, like every genuine self-subsistent value, but a splendour
shed upon our path.
Section VIII
THE ORDER OF THE REALM
OF VALUES
CHAPTER XXXIV (ux)
THE LACK OF SYSTEMATIC STRUCTURE
( a ) Limits of Our Survey
The uniform character of the morally good has resolved itself
into a whole firmament of stars. If one examines it searchingly,
one involuntarily arrives at a kind of classification of values.
But the classification which is obtained in this way cannot
be accepted as complete or unambiguous in its arrangement.
In this it is characteristic of the stage which our investigation
has reached. We are at the beginning of our search, our pro-
cedure is still external, a gathering and putting together of
scattered details. We see ourselves resorting to accidental
points of contact which are supplied from history, and we can
add very little to what is acquired in this way. Nevertheless a
number of single values or small groups has been added,
although to the total problem such accession makes no per-
ceptible difference.
The extent of the realm of values is greater not only than
our philosophic consciousness, but also than our primary
sense of values. We realize that on all sides we cannot see the
boundaries. In the direction of the simplest elements it became
clear that what seem to us final are not really so. And, in the
opposite direction, in regard to the most complex materials
the case is similar; in regard to personality we can never speak
of strictly single values. Of these there are indefinitely many,
but there are still more in the case of personal love, which in
every instance has a different character. In this stratum the
territory stretches out into a wide variety apparently without
bounds, the riches of which the philosophical consciousness can
surmise only in the abstract.
The two poles of the realm of values, that of the simplest
elements and that of the most complex materials, elude our
Ethics— II BB
386 THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
observation. They lie beyond the limits of what can be known.
It is only in the intermediate section that we can move with
some freedom. The maximum of knowledge is in the higher
strata of the conditioning values, and in the lower and more
general strata of the moral values. Accordingly one might
expect that the “good,” which here occupies the central posi-
tion, must be most capable of being known. But almost the
opposite is the case. The “good” is comprehensive as to
contents, and presupposes the whole table of values, not only
in its details, but in their reciprocal relationships. It also pre-
supposes orderliness among values.
( b ) Results Obtained Concerning the Scale of Values
The question arises: What do we know about these inner
relationships, this orderliness? Can we learn anything from
our incomplete survey?
Only within very modest limits can we answer in the affirma-
tive. Very little oijder may be inferred. Where connections
are clearly indicated, we cannot discover whether a relation
revealed by some particular values recurs in the case of others
or not. Even there we have no real insight into the law. At best
we catch sight of a certain inherent order.
Here great expectations of discovering the system are
radically disappointed. Our survey is inadequate even for a
mere “theory concerning a tabulation of values.” Likewise,
even for a further analysis of the “good.” If its content con-
sists in aiming at the higher value , 1 the scale of values is pre-
supposed in it. Upon detailed analysis much of the order of
rank vanishes. But even here the gain is little, although the
elaboration of the materials produces also a more exact dis-
crimination of the valuational responses and predicates.*
Nevertheless we must not fail to recognize that almost every-
where qualitative discrimination is in the foreground, and
1 Cf. Chapter XIV (h), Vol. II.
* Cf. Chapter IV (c) and (d), Vol. II.
THE LACK OF SYSTEMATIC STRUCTURE 387
that discrimination of the relative grade lags far behind.
Quality stands much nearer to the material differences. And
it is only the material factors that present themselves for
direct description, while the distinctive characteristics of the
value remain a matter of feeling.
In contrast to the external criteria (for instance, Scheler’s), 1
which indicate only the larger differences of rank, analysis
also distinctly furnishes within the narrower class of moral
values certain differences of grade. Thus, for example, brotherly
love is evidently higher in value than justice, love for the
remotest higher than brotherly love, and personal love (as it
appears) higher than either. Likewise bravery stands higher
than self-control, faith and fidelity higher than bravery, radiant
virtue and personality again higher than these. But it is more
difficult to say how, for example, truthfulness, wisdom and
faith stand to one another in relative height; it is the same
with the basic motives running through all the more special
values, such as universality and individuality, likewise purity
and fulness of life, pride and humility, and so on. It may be
that these values stand on the same plane. But even this cannot
be definitely known. The materials involved are too hetero-
geneous. We cannot bring them near enough together to
decide.
In general it appears that the sense of preference indicates
only within a certain material kinship the finer distinctions
of grade. If the realm of values were a lineal, one-dimensional
manifold, we could at all events establish the proximity of
value to value once for all, and thereby make the differences of
grade perceptible. But since there is evidently a co-ordinated
variation, which at every grade extends as a horizontal level,
the problem is much more difficult. The separate values never
permit themselves to be tom from their special place in “valua-
tional space.” Just as the values which are separated vertically
(in the order of height) cannot be brought together by any
artifice — it might be done in the abstract, but then their specific
1 Cf. Chapter IV (a) and (b), Vol. II.
388 THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
character would be sacrificed, — so it is with those that are hori-
zontally separated. The projection of all the materials upon a
perfectly simple linear scale is easy to effect in the geometrical
scheme which everyone involuntarily makes use of here. But
it cannot be effected in the realm of values, because our actual
emotional discrimination is bound fast to the material and
axiological differences; and on all sides in several dimensions
these arrange themselves about the scale of grades as about
a line of reference.
We must leave undetermined, whether there be some other
kind of procedure which would make such a projection possible,
without eliminating the feeling for values; and this would
depend upon retaining it, since the feeling for values is the
only ’cognitive authority which could test the projection by
the scale of heights. Yet it would always be possible that there
might be an analysis especially directed to valuational grades,
perhaps on the basis of a qualitative analysis of the materials.
But evidently at the stage which investigation has reached, we
are not capable of answering this question.
This is why in the present state of the problem the meaning
of the good cannot be fathomed. And it is well to assume that
here, in general, limits to insight are drawn, that is, that in
the problem of the good we are confronted with a problem
which can never be completely solved. But it would be entirely
wrong to draw sceptical conclusions from this, or to give up
analysis as a vain effort. The disappointment, which is always
natural for the beginner when he sees the solution of a much-
discussed problem suddenly removed to a remote distance, is
only the disenchantment inevitable to the inexperienced.
Before any investigation, he held the matter to be too simple.
Analysis has just the merit of laying bare the great difficulty
and complexity of the ethical problem at the very start. For
the many cleavages in the realm of values are not self-evident.
Descriptive analysis yields only the initial orientation in the
realm of values. But starting with it, we can at least grapple
with more urgent problems.
THE LACK OF SYSTEMATIC STRUCTURE 389
( c ) Types of Regularity in the Table of Values
Uniformities are never disclosed at a first glance. In the begin-
ning we find them only adumbrated. But where nothing is
transparent, such adumbration may be most helpful.
We must naturally start from the fact that the table of
values,, like every diversified object, has its structural laws.
Nothing else then is to be expected than that at least some-
thing of these will be somehow manifested in the values them-
selves. It is only a question whether our analysis penetrates
sufficiently deep to strike upon them.
Now, in surveying the whole series of developed values, we
can, without too great difficulty, discriminate among them laws
of six different types of connection, which fall into three
groups of two laws each. They are : —
1.
2.
3 -
4 -
5 -
6 .
Laws of Stratification
Laws of Foundation
Laws of Opposition
Laws of Complementation
Laws of Valuational Height
Laws of Valuational Strength
| First Group
j- Second Group
| Third Group
These essentially different types and groups of regularity,
as such, can be seen with great distinctness. But the laws
themselves are difficult to set forth, although one intuitively
feels quite able to grasp them in many special cases. Neverthe-
less, amidst the general obscurity which surrounds the system
of values, even to hold in mind the mere types of regularity
is a help.
Besides, it is natural to look about in other departments of
reality for analogous laws of systematization. Here the danger
that the analogy will not fit is not great. What is not applicable
is excluded by the mere fact that it is not applicable. Values
do not allow any law to be forced upon them. And since we
have in hand a certain foundation of values, this constitutes
a natural criterion. In the realm of values there can be no law
390 THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
which would not at least "be confirmed in the values visible at
anytime.
The realm of the categories offers itself as a region where
the laws are possibly analogous. It is the universal system of
the principles of Being. Now, as ethical Being retains the uni-
versal outlines of Being in general, while it acquires specific ones
of its own, the relation of ontological to axiological principles
remains fixed, as regards essential points. There is a relation
of supplementation and continuation in all antithesis (for
instance, in that of the Ought to real Existence), as both kinds
of principle refer to the same actuality. Thus it comes about
that much of the character of the categories can be recognized
again in the values. In their lowest stratum, in the valuational
contrasts, the categorial elements of value and the Ought
appear themselves as valuational elements. Here we imme-
diately detect the proximity of the ontological basis. It is not
indeed the stratum of the transitional links — this cannot be
shown ; where one may assume it, it is unrecognizable ; it falls
into the hiatus irrationalis between the realm of the categories
and that of values but, in the universal continuum of prin-
ciples in general, the stratum of transition lies close to the
structures which can be comprehended. It makes itself known
in the prevalence of the ontological structure, as also in the
paleness of the valuational quality. Here one can still trace
what farther up in the realm of values fades into the back-
ground : that in a more extended sense values are as yet categories
(principles of existence mi generis), and have in them a cate-
gorial arrangement, except that they are other categories than
those of ontological reality.
The transference of the term, like all further mixture, is
naturally a metaphysical venture as well as a kind of specula-
tion in which one is not accustomed to engage. The matter at
issue is only the strictness of the fundamental analogy amid the
equally fundamental differences. From this point of view it is
not only justifiable, but is also fruitful, to bring forward certain
basic regularities of the realm of the categories into the table
THE LACK OF SYSTEMATIC STRUCTURE 391
of values, and to test them at the same time in it. It may be
anticipated that these regularities, where they ought in fact
to apply, nevertheless will exist in essentially different form.
But the changed form itself would be the instructive feature.
At least it should be traced back to the peculiar axiological
regularity.
In the following pages this is attempted within the different
types of relationship. It does not come into question to the
same degree for all the types. The first two and the last two
of the above-mentioned relationships receive the most elucida-
tion. But the difficulty there is this, that there can be no ques-
tion anywhere as to a direct transference of a regularity. So
long as the decision does not arise out of the valuational
relationship, the possibility of such a transference is every-
where questionable.
CHAPTER XXXV (lx)
STRATIFICATION AND THE FOUNDATIONAL
RELATION
( a ) The Dialectical Law of Combination
If we look more closely, we see that the laws of the categories
in general are adapted to the valuational relationships, but
with restrictions and in a very different degree. The validity
of some shows evident gaps. Others appear throughout to be
confirmed, but they undergo an essential displacement; some
gain an entirely new meaning. Hence it can be inferred that
the orderliness ruling in the realm of values contains the
categorial order, but is not restricted to the latter; it is more
complex — conforming to the more complex categorial struc-
ture of values and to the Ought generally — and as such is
constructed upon the categorial order and based upon it. One
may therefore reckon upon a recurrence of the categorial laws,
but not without a transformation.
What in the table of the categories immediately strikes every
investigator— and not only m an absolute table which is the
desideratum of all research, but also in most historical schemes
— is the extraordinarily close union of the separate principles
with one another. It is not possible to isolate them, without
forfeiting their essence. This law, which Plato established in
the Sophist, and which we might call the “dialectical law,”
may be formulated in this manner : there are no isolated cate-
gories, no existence for itself on the part of any one of them,
but within every group or stratum there is a co-existence, a
reciprocal conditionality, an interwovenness — the Platonic
ovfj/trXoKrj. In the realm of the categories this law prevails
almost universally. Here every principle has its inner essence
at the same time beyond itself, in its every-sided connection ;
it is a distorted image of the whole system, and in this sense is
STRATIFICATION AND FOUNDATIONAL RELATION 393
itself a system. Hence it can also be discovered from the other
co-ordinated members of the class.
In the realm of values there is evidently nothing analogous
to this. Here it is not possible in any stratum to find the
separate value directly from the others. There is indeed the
implication. But it is much more elusive. It extends so far
that, from some values which have been found, one sees that
there must be still others co-ordinated with them; but where
discernment (or the feeling) is lacking, the content cannot be
estimated. And indeed the strength of the implication de-
creases with the height and the concrete complexity of the
stratum. In that of the valuational opposites, and partly also
in that of the conditioning values, it goes so far that discern-
ment can be guided by the connecting threads at least up to
the unseen values. But upwards from the “good” even that
fails — even up to the few separate cases in which there is
clearly present a relationship of another kind, a kind specifically
axiological. The higher the valuational relationships are, so
much the less dialectical they become. If it be granted that
implication is a phenomenon specifically ontological, this
assumption of its validity could be simply explained by the
fact that the lower valuational strata stand nearer to the existen-
tial categories — as also that their quality as values is paler — that
consequently in them the type of the categories comes more
strongly to expression, while it fades away in the higher values.
In the case of the moral values proper, the law of implication
at all events plays only a subordinate role.
(5) The Implication of Disvalues and the Implication
of Values
If a dialectic of the categories is already a daring conception,
which has hitherto always led to speculative aberrations, so
much the more so is a dialectic of values. Nevertheless it
cannot be entirely abjured. It might be possible that with the
advance of investigation there would be a place for it. But in
394 THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
any case it would be structurally different from that of the
categories.
This is indicated by the circumstance that disvalues stand
over against values, that they are counter-members, such
as the realm of the categories does not know. An interlacing
of disvalues must run parallel to the interlacing of values — or
possibly not parallel, but according to a regularity of its own.
That would give a doubled dialectic with a constant reciprocal
polarity, whereby what is not discernible in the one series
could very well be visible in the other. If we recall that many
anti-values are far more comprehensible than their positive
counter-members, that many values are definable only in-
directly by way of their disvalues — a fact which we became
practically acquainted with in our analysis — then it becomes
clear that a dialectic of values would need to have a main
support in one of disvalues. What exists unconnected in the
values could very well be bound together in the disvalues.
The Aristotelian method is one which in all naivete makes use
of this principle. Here the determination of a currently accepted
value is arrived at by its position between two disvalues. Even
the ever-recurring twofoldness of the disvalues in their attach-
ment to the oneness of a value may cause us to reflect. So much
at least is noticeable, that the relationship between values is
different from that between disvalues, a fact which does hot
prejudice the fixed connection of the one with the other.
This, again, explains why the implication of values is more
indefinite than that of the categories; it is more complex,
because of the interweaving with the differently constructed
implication of the disvalues. And, finally, in principle it is not
otherwise possible. The absence of a fixed relation to reality
allows a wider scope to co-existence: the valuational mode of
being is merely an Ought-to-Be, it is necessity without the
fulfilling conditions of possibility. Values can be united to one
another according to a totally different principle; even harsh
antinomic oppositions are not excluded here. For the two
members never purport to be anything but an Ought-to-Be,
STRATIFICATION AND FOUNDATIONAL RELATION 395
which does not involve an existential contradiction. Only in
the actual, in a situation, in a conflict of real life can a clash
occur.'It does not become actual until there is a move towards
realization. What could not exist ontologically and under the
categories, does exist in the valuational realm. But this ques-
tion concerns another kind of regularity, which we are to
consider later . 1
(c) Stratification and its Laws
We have previously seen that the structure of valuational
materials gives the widest scope to logical subsumption.
Because the materials are made up of ontological factors, their
law naturally obtrudes with them. But it does not affect the
valuational character of the materials or their valuational height
or their specific quality. And even in the relation of the materials
themselves, where the laws of subsumption are exactly fulfilled,
the weight does not rest upon them, but upon a series of other
laws which accompany and mould the subsumptional relation.
We may name them laws of stratification, after their funda-
mental character. In the categorial realm they play a con-
spicuous part, and even in the realm of values they are still
dominant, although not without certain displacements. There
are four laws : that of recurrence, of transformation, of novelty
and of distance between strata. As they are the universal laws
of the principles of stratification, and not at all special valua-
tional laws, they may be stated here at the outset in their general
categorial form.*
1. The lower principles and their elements recur in the
higher as their partial factors; thus they may enter into the
foreground or the background of the higher structures, and
accordingly be visible in them, or “vanish.” In both cases
they are pervading structural elements.
1 Chapter XXXVI, Vol. II.
* Naturally only the general doctrine of categories can offer an
explanation of these laws. Still, by their own import they may be
clearly recognized.
396 THE REALM 'OF ETHICAL VALUES
2. In their recurrence these elements are not affected by
the structure of the higher forms. They vary in many ways,
according to the r 61 e which falls to them in the higher complex.
Only their elemental essence remains the same.
3. The higher forms cannot be resolved into the various
elements recurring in them. Together with the elementary
stratification — which is only in the structure of the complex —
they always manifest something specifically new, which is not
contained in the elements. It is this novelty for the time being,
which determines the prominence or seclusion of the elements,
as well as the transformation of their significance.
4. The superimposition of the higher upon the lower
principles does not advance in unbroken continuity but in
strata, which are separated from one another by distinct in-
tervals. As compared with the lower ones, each higher stratum
shows a new feature common to it, while its union with
them is preserved by the recurrence of the self-transforming
elements.
The recurring elements constitute a cluster of divergent
lines, which cut through the superimposed strata. They move
in a dimension which lies at a right angle to the plane of
the strata; at the same time, through their transformation the
elements spread out over the width of the strata (divergence).
In this way the stages in their modification are determined
by the intervals between the strata as well as by the regional
novelty. The four laws of stratification give in common the
type of a connection which binds the strata “vertically” together,
while the dialectical law of implication applies to the “hori-
zontal” relation within the separate strata. Dialectical unifica-
tion and the binding of the strata together stand, therefore,
at right angles to each other, and only together constitute the
multi-dimensional unity of the system, which for the realm
of the categories is characteristic.
Thus arises a deep interpenetration of the two types of
systematic unity. Ontologically the recurrence and the trans-
formation extend not only to the elements but also to the
STRATIFICATION AND FOUNDATIONAL RELATION 397
implication ; that is, the dialectical binding of principles itself
reappears in a changed form in the higher strata. It is here
complicated by the regional novelty of a higher implication,
and from stratum to stratum produces ever new and firmer
types of reciprocal dependence.
(d) The Laws of Stratification, the Limits of their
Validity
But in the realm of values this is the case only to a limited
degree. Here we find not only the law of implication, but also
the laws of stratification very considerably modified.
In general the law of recurrence retains its force. Yet, the
higher the grade of the value, so much the more indefinite
is it m form and so much the less binding in validity. The
most general elements of value evidently recur pervasively, as
may be easily seen m the pairs of contrasts of the first group
(m Section II). It is most striking m the example of the indi-
vidual and the collective unit, which as polar directions are
decisive even up to the highest virtues, which are divided
throughout into the more communal and the more individual.
This holds good only in a limited way of the basic values which
concretely condition the others. For the conditioning relation
here introduces a new and differently articulated factor of
stratification. But among the moral values recurrence is almost
entirely lacking. The four basic values of course recur charac-
teristically modified m many ways. The ethos of nobility, that
of purity and that of fulness of life, are in evidence again and
again m new garb. Likewise in the types of love we can follow
a graded recurrence of certain basic elements (for example, that
of solidarity); and finally in personality the whole series of
general values is presupposed. But whether the law can here
be pursued still farther is questionable.
It has its foundation in this, that here the two laws of
transformation and of novelty come more into the foreground
The peculiarity of the single virtues, and moreover of the
398 THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
valuational strata, evidently outweighs the relatively thin
species of recurring elements. In regard to personality and
personal love we may indeed find a higher significance in
fidelity and faith than on the level of mere contract, upon
which these values first occur. Likewise there is a lower (literal)
and a higher (spiritual) meaning in truthfulness, bravery and
other values besides. But the higher and more complex types
of ethos are thereby characterized only quite externally; their
proper essence is scarcely touched. That is to say, with values
this essence inheres in the new factor to a quite different
degree from that found in the categories. The specific pecu-
liarity of the higher values, as compared with the character
of the lower, is far more autonomous than that of the higher
categories as compared with their categorial elements. The
fissures between transformations are greater, the space between
the strata is wider. This is especially noticeable in the vast
interval between the moral values proper and the values of
goods and of situations.
But even among the moral values themselves similar fissures
appear; for example, between the whole complex of universal
values (from justice up to radiant virtue) and the individual
values (those of personality and personal love). With those of
personality, where the recurrence of the universal values is
clearly seen in the factor of the preferential trend, it is quite
evident that the stratification of the elements falls completely
into the background before the new factor. It is just this gap
between the strata that can of course be filled up by the
series of the type-values. But there can be no doubt that even
for these, mutatis mutandis (from stratum to stratum), the same
thing holds good. Finally, in personal love the universal
elements, of faith, of fidelity, of altruism, of solidarity and so
on, are raised up to a higher power and transformed into
something new, something higher, in such a way that they
almost vanish in comparison with the novelty of personal
devotion.
STRATIFICATION AND FOUNDATIONAL RELATION 399
( e ) The Absorption of the Conditioning Relation into
Stratification
This laxity of the categorial laws in the realm of values evi-
dently has oth&V grounds than an actual failure of power. On
the contrary, the laws of the gradational principles retain their
force — as one sees in the fact that some of them even increase
in power — only they do not now rule alone. Together with
them other connectional laws come to the front, albeit laws
of a more complex kind. Indeed the whole realm is more
complicated in structure. But it is another question whether
these unique, specifically axiological laws of connection can
be discovered. And — in the present state of research — it must
be, on the whole, answered in the negative.
Only at one point can we lay our finger on such a law as is
not found in the realm of the categories. And this one instance,
however isolated it stands in the refusal to be generalized, is
of the greatest value for the philosophical understanding of the
situation, because it in fact has to do with a gradational type
of a more complex kind, a regularity of a higher and indeed
purely axiological order. It is the relation of goods and situa-
tional values to moral values, a relation we continually met
with as a conditioning relation, when we were considering the
moral values.
The expression, a “conditioning relation,” taken by itself,
of course says very little. In a certain sense one may regard
every basis as a condition and all stratification as a conditioning.
In this wider sense one may find many kinds of conditioning
in the table <5f values. 1 But these other kinds it shares with all
systems of principles. It is different with the specific, complex
mode of conditioning which prevails between situational and
moral values.
The central position, which this relation assumes in the table
of ethical values, we have been able to trace even down to the
particular virtues. Everywhere the moral value adheres to an
1 Cf. Chapter I (b), Vol. II.
4oo
THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
intention directed towards a situational value; it is therefore
conditioned by the situational value, but it reveals throughout
a different character, which cannot be compared with that of
the situation. Thus brotherly love aims at the, well-being or
happiness of one’s neighbour, but is not itself t eudaemonistic
value; the object of truthfulness is that another shall know
the truth, but its own value does not consist m the value of
this knowledge; it even has no axiological resemblance to it.
In general, the values of intentions do not resemble in any way
the values aimed at. And precisely herein lies the basic differ-
ence between the conditioning relation and stratification. In
reference to what has been previously said concerning par-
ticular virtues, this difference may be summed up in the three
following statements : —
1. In stratification the lower value reappears as an element
in the higher; it is contained therein in a modified form, and
cannot be removed from its substance. In the conditioning
relation, on the other hand, it does not reappear, it does not
enter as a constituent into the new material. The moral value
no longer has in it anything of the situational value. The latter
is neither transformed in it nor even merely completed by any
new factor, but is simply presupposed in it, as its axiological
condition. The content of the condition does not enter into
the thing conditioned, but stands over agamst it. The irre-
m&vable difference between the carriers of the values is clearly
seen to be this: the moral value inheres in the person, but
the conditibning value remains inherent in the situation. Each
is inseparable from its carrier. The valuaSonal character of
the situation does not at all reappear in that of the attitude
directed toward it. The latter is indeed built upon it, but
leaves it outside of itself. With its whole material it adds a
higher storey to the building. For it the conditioning value is
an external, not an internal, condition. Hence the peculiarly
hovering position of the moral values above the situational
values, as becomes perceptible in the two following factors.
2. In stratification, when the higher value is actualized, the
Si 1 RATIFICATION AND FOUNDATIONAL RELATION 401
recurring lower element is necessarily actualized at the same
time. In the conditioning relation, on the other hand, when
the conditioned value is actualized, the conditioning value is
not necessarily actualized with it. With regard to love, as such,
it is not a qu^tion whether the service which it undertakes
succeeds or not (whether the intended situation becomes
actual), but only whether it was sincerely undertaken. Truthful-
ness is not morally less valuable, if the speaker is in error
or if the hearer fails to grasp the truth. Moral value does not
depend upon its success but exclusively u pon the disposition .
not upon the actualization of the desired object but exclusively
upon the genuineness of its existence in the intention. Since
the moral value of a person is already real in the mere inten-
tion, the conditioned value is actualized in the conditioning
relation, although the conditioning value be not actualized.
This might be stated formally as follows: The value of a moral /
disposition is indeed dependent upon the value of the object j
aimed at; but its actualization in the person depends in no I
wise upon his achievement of the object, but simply upon the
object’s being intended in his disposition.
3. Wherever there is a stratification of values, the matter
of the higher value is not only conditioned by that of the lower,
but even the grade of the higher is conditioned by the grade
of the lower. The value of trust rises with the strength, venture
and courage contained in it ; that of radiant virtue grows with
the fulness of life within it. But this dependence also does
not reappear in the conditioning relation. The value of a just
disposition is not. less, where small possessions are involved,
than where it is a matter of great ones ; the value of brotherly
love is the same, whether it has (or wills to have) great or small
effects in the life of one’s neighbour. Everywhere here the moral
value rises or falls with the degree of commitment, as well as
with the depth and genuineness of the intention, but not with
the height of the value aimed at. We had the supreme example
of this in the relation of brotherly love to love of the remotest. 1
■ Cf Chapter XXX (*), Vol. II.
cc
Ethics— 11
402 THE REALM' 1 OF ETHICAL VALUES
There the values aimed at are scarcely any longer commen-
surable in height ; but in order of rank the values of the respec-
tive intentions stand close to each other. The reason is simply
this: the values aimed at and those of the intention stand to
each other in no assignable relation as regards their order of
rank. The highest moral values may be based upon the lowest
situational values, and conversely. In formal terms, the moral
value is indeed dependent in general upon the existence of the
situational value aimed at, but its axiological height is in no
wise dependent upon the axiological height of the situational
value. This type of independence very clearly shows the
cleavage between the two types of value. Yet the presence in
general of an intended situational value is a condition of the
value of the intention. In all other details it xs “unconditioned.”
This conditioning relation stands by itself. There is nothing
analogous in the realm of the categories. But even in the realm
of ethical values there is no other relation of the same kind.
At best one might find further down, between goods and situa-
tional values, a relation which always shares some features
with it. At least situations that can be aimed at (such as the
well-being of one’s neighbour or his knowledge of the truth)
are referred back to goods (for instance, the goods upon which
well-being depends, or the objective truth the knowledge
of which is to be conveyed). But here the reference is far
simpler. It stands much nearer to categorial stratification and
its regularity. Yet there is evidence here of the reappearance
and transformation of the goods-value in the situational value,
likewise of the dependence of the actualization and height of
the conditioned value upon the actualization and height of
the conditioning value. And finally we must consider that in
their genus the values of situations and goods do not differ,
that situations have the character of more complex goods.
Neither the heterogeneity nor the distinctive “hovering” of
moral values finds anything analogous here. It is a type of
dependence which stands structurally between stratification and
the conditioning relation. But it stands nearer to the former.
STRATIFICATION AND FOUNDATIONAL RELATION 403
(/) The Relation between Ethical and ^Esthetic Valdes
In passing, it may be mentioned here that we find the nearest
analogy to the conditioning relation in a far distant and entirely
different region of the realm of values — outside of all dis-
tinctively ethical problems as to value — namely, in the relation
between certain aesthetic values and those of morality.
There is a series of aesthetic qualities (most evident in the
domain of epic and dramatic poetry), which in subject-matter
are bound to the ethical conduct of persons and presuppose
the valuational diversities in such conduct, without being
themselves merged therein or even being axiologically similar.
Here are fou'nd the well-known values of the heroic, the tragic
and the comic, the all-too-human lovable, the ironic and the
naive, among others, likewise the various values of the dramatic
situation, the fore-shortening, exaggeration, suspense and re-
laxation, and so on. All such values and a throng of others
akin to them manifest the same “hovering” over the moral
values, as these manifest over the situational values, even if m
an essentially distorted form.
They have as their presupposition the substance of the
human ethos in all its concreteness and fulness of values and
disvalues ; they are therefore founded upon the moral values,
and as much upon the universal virtues as upon the personal
(down to the smallest idiosyncrasy). The ethical accent rever-
berates through them, just as the moral partisanship of the
listener is throughout a factor in the dramatic effect. But as
the dramatic effect is not contained in the partisanship, so the
dramatic values are not contained in the conditioning moral
values. The aesthetic value (for example, that of the tragic) is
by no means dependent upon the degree to which the tragic
hero actualizes moral values, indeed not even upon the moral
height and quality of the ethos which inheres in his Ideal.
In general the manifestation of the aesthetic value is relatively
indifferent toward the actualization of the conditioning moral
value; finally its specific quality and its height follow an
404
THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
entirely different law from that of the former. A highly signi-
ficant tragic situation can be built upon human figures who are
extremely insignificant. And nevertheless, if these figures were
entirely deprived of their moral significance, the aesthetic value
also of the situation would completely vanish, exactly as the
moral value of honesty would vanish, if the goods-value of
property were denied, to which the honesty is directed.
Here accordingly there is in fact present a similar condi-
tioning relation, in which the stratum of aesthetic values appears
to be in the same way suspended over that of the ethical values.
Here also there is no proper recurrence, any more than a
transformation, of the values; the moral values remain entirely
outside of the relevant aesthetic values, and do ifot become a
proper axiological constituent in them. Here accordingly there
is no simple stratification. It is superseded by a more highly'
constructed, more complex conditioning relation. ,
The fact throws a strong light on %e whole situation in the
realm of values, in so far as one clearly sees how the moral
values, together with their narrower system of stratification,
constitute a compact body which on both sides, above as well
as below, is shut off by a deep chasm, by a space of another
kind than the interval between strata — one might say that on
both sides it is shut off by a hiatus irrationalis. As to the isola-
tion on the upper side, we must be cautious how we interpret
it axiologically. For with aesthetic values, being “higher” is
by no means a self-evident feature and upon closer analysis
might easily prove to be false. Rather would it appear that in
general no clear relationship exists between aesthetic and moral
values as regards their respective scales of rank; and this seems
to indicate a kind of incommensurability of the two scales.
But this in no wise detracts from the conditioning relation
which we have described. Much rather can we learn from it
that it does not universally inhere in the essence of a condi-
tioned value to be a higher value, and that there might be con-
ditioning relations which prevail in some other axiological
dimension than that of “height.”
STRATIFICATION AND FOUNDATIONAL RELATION 405
It is to be expected that a closer analysis of aesthetic values
and an elaboration of their table — which has never yet been
made — must needs throw further light upon the structure of
the ethical table of values. We should not forget that moral
values do not constitute the whole realm. They are merely
nearest to life and actuality. This is why they have from of old
forced themselves into the foreground of investigation.
( g ) Consequences
So far as can be seen to-day, it inheres in the essence of the
complex conditioning relation that, wherever it occurs, there
is a manifest hiatus in the stratification. Now the table of the
more restricted moral values begins with such a conditioning
relation. This is the reason why in ethics the valuational analysis
* cannot directly' commence with the moral values, but must
draw into its consideration the lower strata which are entrenched
in front of them. The conditioning relation consists in a rigid,
indissoluble connection, without prejudice to the peculiar
hovering of the higher structures.
But because in this way a hiatus extends through the table
of values that are normative for ethics — like a cleft which
splits the whole from start to finish into two axiologically
heterogeneous parts — this cleft forms the limit to the laws of
stratification. They extend continuously to the highest con-
ditioning values (even to those which adhere to a conscious
subject and transform him into a person). But then they break
off, to enter again above the hiatus, together with the newly-
formed conditioning relation, which in part determines them.
Thus we can understand that within the strata of the moral
values they can occasionally be pursued a little farther, but
no longer play a really dominant r61e. They are here outdone
by another kind of dependence extending in the same dimen-
sion, and are forced into the background.
Thus it happens that here the law of recurrence seems to
be encroached 'tjpon, while the law of novelty gains in impor-
4 o6 THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
tance; but transformation makes such considerable leaps for-
ward that it can scarcely be recognize^ as such. For with the
greatness of the modification the identity of the thing modified
diminishes. Yet identity is the presupposition of the trans-
formation. As it vanishes, the transformation becomes equiva-
lent to the introduction of something new. Hence the seeming
disparity between groups of ethical values and the width of
the intervals between their strata.
CHAPTER XXXVI (lxi)
OPPOSITIONAL RELATION AND THE SYNTHESIS
OF VALUES
( a ) Five Types of Axiological Contrast
An entirely different type of regular connection is that of
contrast. It stands nearer to implication than to stratification,
but does not completely fall into that dimension, as is the case
in the realm of the categories.
Valuational contrast is more complex than existential con-
trast. The new factor in the realm of values is the pervasive
plus-minus relation, which is peculiar to them all. We know it
as the polarity of value and disvalue. The opposition is by no
means one of contradiction, as might be supposed, in dis-
tinction from the positive relation of value to value. Rather is
the contrast contradictory between the valuable and the
neutral, and between the neutral and disvalues. “Value-dis-
value” is, on the contrary, a special polarity, characteristic only
of the valuational realm. It co-exjsts with the positive contrast,
as we learned from the lowest stratum where the positive
contrast is the ruling principle, and then again in the higher
strata where it continually recurs and often develops into a
sharp antinomy.
In the positive contrast both members have their special
disvalues over against themselves — but “over against” in a
different dimension — although the conceptual expression for
the disvalue as distinguished from the opposing value is by no
means always at command. One need only recall the instructive
instance of “inertia” as a value and “inertia” as a disvalue . 1
That the dimension of the positive contrasts, at least pre-
ponderantly, coincides with the breadth of the strata is seen
in the majority of the pervasive antinomies; but that this is not
* Cf. Chapters VIII (b) and XI (c), Vol II.
THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
408
a fixed law is shown by such cases as that of justice and brotherly
love, or that of brotherly love and love of the remotest, where
the positive opposition evidently extends over the strata and
is shifted diagonally into the vertical dimension of height.
Hence it is not feasible to identify the value-disvalue dimen-
sion, which evidently stands at right angles to that of the
antinomic relation, with the vertical of stratification. Much
rather does one clearly see in it that in the table of values we
have to do with.a higher multi-dimensionality which no longer
can be expressed in a plain three-dimensional scheme. And
it must be added that the elementary contrasts constitute
among themselves a kind of “valuational space” of several
dimensions, 1 and, finally, that, just as with these, so the de-
values are connected oppositionally, and together form a
system in contrast to the whole positive realm of value.
If one wished to bring into view the entire variety of oppo-
sitions, one would need in every individual case to have in
mind^the following five types of contrast in their extremely
anomalous inter-connectedness: —
jfi. Value-Neutrality
[ 2. Disvalue-Neutrality
II 3. Value-Disvalue
jjj f 4. Value-Value
[5. Disvalue-Disvalue.
It is easy to see that these five types fall into three hetero-
geneous groups. Only the first two (types 1 to 3) are common
to all values. The third group (types 4 and 5) does not recur
in all. Not every value has a positive contrasted value, but
every one has a disvalue and a neutral point. Likewise (but
it does not necessarily follow) not every disvalue has a con-
trasted disvalue, but of course has a value and an indifference
point. The first three types of contrast inhere in the very
essence of all valuational Being, the last two on the other hand
1 Cf. Chapter VI (c), Vol. II.
OPPOSITIONAL RELATION 409
only in the essence of special valuational structures. They are
merely contrasts in the contents of the value.
( b ) Reduction of the Table of Contrasts
Now valuational neutrality has two meanings. On the one
hand, it is that which in general stands outside of all valuational
reference, anterior, as it were, to value and disvalue (like
everything that is merely ontological) ; but on the other hand
it is what stands ideally midway within the polarity of value
and disvalue, therefore at the indifference-point in their con-
tinuum. In the first sense it does not at all belong to axiology,
and therefore not to ethics, but to the much more general dis-
cussion of the relation between ontology and axiology. In the
second sense, however, it is drawn into the basic correlation
of value and disvalue and forms in it only a structural moment,
in so far as every value-disvalue scale passes through an in-
difference-point. Hence, without going beyond any essentially
axiological factor, we may omit for the present from our con-
sideration the relation both of value and disvalue to neutrality,
and devote our attention to the remaining three types of
contrast.
The omission of course must not lead to a misunderstand-
ing of the problem. For on one point neutrality retains a
peculiar significance. It is involved in the problem concerning
the order of rank. For values, like disvalues, differ widely
from one another in the scale of grade, but over against them
all the indifference-point is one and the same. It is the fixed
point, in relation to which the distances of height first attain
an absolute meaning. But a special chapter must be devoted to
this matter.
What chiefly appertains to the regularity of the table of
values is the determination of the relation between types 3
and 4, that is, between the essential contrast “value-disvalue,”
which is axiologically universal, and the positive contrast
“value-value,” which is not universal but is confined to definite
4xo THE REALM" OF ETHICAL VALUES
structures. Upon the latter depends the riddle of valuational
antinomy, the elucidation of which is an undisputed desi-
deratum of research. Any light which falls upon this compli-
cated question — and, as was shown, it extends even into the
most vital moral conflicts — is of supreme importance for
ethics. If an inner relation between the antinomies and the
value-disvalue relation could be shown, mudi would thereby
be gained towards an understanding of th» situation.
(c) The Formal Relation between the Types of Contrast
AND THEIR RECIPROCITY
Now it is easy, on the one hand, to see that absolutely no such
relation can be directly discovered in the nature of these two
A B
Fig. z.
types of opposition. Both evidently lie in different dimensions
— the value-disvalue relation in that of height, but the positive
value-value relation principally in the horizontal dimension of
the strata, and each plainly varies independently of the other.
On the other hand, a diagram of the relation can easily be
constructed. So much at least can be taken in at a glance that
there can be no question of complete indifference between the
types of contrast. If, for instance, the values A and B stand
to each other in positive antinomy, then each one has besides
(in the other dimension) its relevant disvalue over against it;
these may be represented diagrammatically by —A and — B.
Then it is clear that the positive contrast of the values must
recur in the disvalues, whether in strict analogy to the positive
contrast or differently constituted. So the contrast between the
OPPOSITIONAL RELATION
41 1
two disvalues emerges as something indirectly involved in the
contrast of the two values, that is, implied through the value-
disvalue oppositions. In this way the fifth type is drawn into
the relation between the two main types (3 and 4).
This is significant to the extent that the examples show
that the relation between disvalues, which corresponds to an
antinomy between value and value, is not at all antinomical
and indeed need be' scarcely oppositional. Purity and fulness
of life stand in an antinomic relation ; but impurity and moral
poverty may quite well be compatible. Justice and brotherly
love exclude each other at least in some essential respects; but
injustice and lovelessness never bar each other out — merely
in content are they different vices, but the same man in the
same deed without the slightest inner conflict can manifest both.
Therefore, in the diagram (figure 2) only three of the four
basic relations represented are in opposition (A to B, A to —A
and B to — B), but the fourth ( — A to — B) is not oppositional.
This is so striking that from the relation between the disvalues
one might expect light to be thrown upon the whole relational
complex. The expectation, if possible, increases, when one
further discovers that even the two diagonally placed con-
nections A to — B and B to —A manifest no oppositional
character at all. Brotherly love is entirely compatible with
injustice, but justice also with lovelessness. Likewise purity
does not conflict with moral poverty, but neither does fulness
of life conflict with impurity. Here a value is compatible with
a disvalue. And this is easy to comprehend : the disvalue stands
in a doubled (a two-dimensional) contrast to the value; it is
the negative antithesis to its positive counter-value — thus
blunting the point of the antithetical relation.
( d ) The Antithetic of Disvalues and the Theory of
THE f leaorrjs
One’s expectation here is of course at first disappointed.
Nothing issues directly from introducing the relation between
412 THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
disvalues — or at most this, that in general the reciprocal rela-
tionships between disvalues must be different from those
between the values to which they belong; but even without
the diagram this was no mystery.
Are there then no oppositions among disvalues? The
question inevitably obtrudes itself here. For it is natural to set
up the counter-test: what relation holds between the values in
question (A and B) when their disvalue# (—A and — B) are
antinomic to each other?
This question assumes a very serious aspect if one sees it
in the light of the wider problem. Over against the whole
realm of values there stands a realm of disvalues, its counter-
part, member for member, but in its inner dependencies not
at all a true counterpart. Now, since the regularities of the
realm of values are in part unknown, indeed in some points
(in the antinomies which emerge) are directly enigmatic, so in
reference to the complete polar connection of the two realms
the thought suggests itself that from the co-ordination of the
disvalues, and perhaps in contrast to it, that of the values could
be inferred.
In their concrete materials there are contrasts enough among
disvalues; miserliness and extravagance, cowardice and fool-
hardiness, wantonness and coldness, pretension and self-
belittlement, precipitate anger and incapacity to feel righteous
indignation. This type of contrast is familiar to us from
Aristotle’s doctrine of the virtues . 1 They are those a/cpa,
between which, as opposed “vices,” a virtue is always installed
as a neoorrjs. Aristotle therefore was evidently on the way
towards inferring the character of values from their relation
to disvalues. Now here is the point at which through the un-
intended blending of two methodological perspectives the two-
sided problem-complexes can throw light on each other: the
Aristotelian theory of the / leaorqs and the antinomic of values.
But what appeared illuminating and at the same time objec-
tionable in the Aristotelian theory is precisely its central
1 Cf. Chapter XXIII, Vol. II.
OPPOSITIONAL RELATION 4x3
thesis, namely, that moral values are midway between two
disvalues; as if the good were nothing but the commonplace
average. Now the offensiveness was removed, by placing here
two oppositional dimensions at right angles to each other, an
ontological and an axiological . 1 The virtue is a mean only
according to its existential determination (its matter) ; accord-
ing to its value, on the other hand (/cara to dpiarov kclI to ev),
it is the highest point (a* pov). This furnishes for the continuous
transition from the one KaKia to the other the curve of a
parabola. But how is this diagram consistent with that of the
contrasts (Fig. 2)? Plainly enough both dimensions reappear;
the ontological one is horizontal; the axiological, vertical. Here
—A and — B correspond to the Aristotelian a/epa (the vvepl 3 o\tf
and ehXeu/ns). But at the upper pole not one single value but
two correspond to them. Each of the disvalues has its own
opposed value. Aristotle therefore either had not grasped the
whole valuational relationship or else in the square of the
contrasts is concealed some error.
Now the latter is not really possible, as the cited diagram
(Fig. 2) is a purely formal one, and in its structure is easily
grasped. The examples of purity and fulness of life, justice and
brotherly love, demonstrate besides that the twofoldness of the
values A and B is in fact present, as can be seen in all cases
of positive antitheses. But precisely here we strike upon the
remarkable fact that the antithetic of the values corresponds to
no antithetic of the disvalues. In agreement with this is the
other fact that the antithetic of the values is by no means an
all-pervasive phenomenon, but emerges at best only in single
pairs of values. Hence the cases analysed by Aristotle are in
fact different cases. The only question is: Wherein does the
difference consist? Does only a single value really stand here
over against the duality of the disvalues ? Or, hidden behind
the Aristotelian virtues, is there always a duality of antithetic-
ally placed values, the synthesis of which constitutes the
sought-for “virtue”?
1 Cf. Diagram, Fig. 1, p. 256.
4X4
THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
( e ) The ^ecronjs as a Valuational Synthesis
At this point the enigma must be solved. It can be shown that
the second of these alternatives is the true one: behind the
Aristotelian virtues there are in fact two values always con-
cealed, and these manifest a distinct oppositional character.
The only difficulty is that language (and not only the German
but also the Greek) has no labels for these values ; one can only
describe them. But one sees clearly that they are present, when
one views the reputed unitary “virtue” in the twofold light
of both the /ccwaat, which are attached to it as opposites. This
dual light dissolves the unity; there is another valuational
element in the virtue; one value is over against one nania,
another over against the other.
Every individual example can teach this. In juxtaposition
to awjtpocruvrj stand aKoXaaia and avcuoBrjola ; only in con-
trast to the former of these is it properly self-control; in
contrast to the latter it is the fully developed capacity to react
emotionally, to live in the affections. In contrast to SeiAta
bravery is spirited endurance, in contrast to dpaavrrjs it is
deliberate foresight, cool presence of mind. Seen against
opyiXorqs irpaorrjs is mildness, but seen against aopyrjala it
is the capacity to be righteously indignant. eXevdepionqs is
liberality with regard to material values, and at the same time
the capacity not to spend, the former in contrast to aveXevdepta,
the latter to aacorla. AlSws is the capacity to be ashamed of
oneself, and at the same time it is the limitation of shame, the
latter as opposed to the conduct of the #ca tcotAij^, the former
to that of the avaiaxvvros. Still clearer, if this be possible, is the
relation in the case of the more complex virtues. Neptois
stands in contrast to <j>Q6vos as unenvious delight in another’s
happiness, but in contrast to imyaipeKaicia as participation in
undeserved calamity. MeyaXoifruyia, finally, is perhaps the
purest example of such a decomposition in its dual attitude
to piKpot/ivyia and x avv ° rr l s > in opposition to the former, it
is justifiable moral pride, the power to stand alone; in opposi-
OPPOSITIONAL RELATION 415
tion to the latter, the modest consciousness of the limitation
of one's own moral being . 1
It is characteristic of this state of the case that the terminology
concerning the virtues is never quite correct in regard to the
double bearing of the contrast and the duality of the valua-
tional factors, since in the expressions chosen by Aristotle
only one side of the depicted value is made clear, but the
other, the opposed shade of meaning, is omitted. It must
strike everyone who reads the Nicomachean Ethics that in the
analysis of the virtues a second side of the virtue is indicated,
which from the name of the virtue one would not expect. This
proves sufficiently that the Aristotelian virtues are not so much
/ leaorrjres as valuational syntheses. They are complex values,
which never consist of one-sided enhancements of single
valuational elements alone, but of inner organic combinations
of two materially contrasted elements. These syntheses mani-
festly form more highly constructed values; they have the
stratification of the lower in them, but it is a very specific
stratification, namely, the unification of such elements as have
a tendency to go to a one-sided extreme and to exclude each
other. Here the thought is undoubtedly right, and at all events
incomparably deeper than the superficial morality of the golden
mean. It is the view that morality imposes upon man complex
claims, which through an inner oppositional relationship of
constituent values are raised high above the constituents them-
selves. Both sides of an alternative are always required of man
at the same time. If he satisfies the demand of only one of the
members of the twofold claim, he is morally of little worth.
Not until there is a synthesis of the values in one and the same
disposition of the man is there real virtue.
To anyone who has grasped the principle, this is easily
made evident in each of the Aristotelian examples. Bravery
is neither boldness alone nor cool foresight alone — for the
prudence of the coward is as worthless as the daring of the
foolhardy man — but solely a synthesis of both. Just as little
1 Cf. Chapter XXIII (&)-(/), also Chapter XXIX (c ) 9 Vol. II
4 i6 THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
can the apparent self-control of a person without passion
pass for virtue (rather is there nothing in him which it would
be worth while controlling); likewise with the passionateness
of the uncontrolled ; aw<f>pooi}vr) is simply the self-control of
one who is overflowing with the fulness of life, an unmistakable
synthesis of two heterogeneous elements.
In this way it is easy to complete the whole series of the
examples given above. Everywhere the positive synthesis
behind the pLeaorqs rises to the surface; everywhere the latter
is only the outward form it assumes. On this point peyaXoijrvxla,
the crown of the Aristotelian virtues, is especially instructive.
Moral self-sufficiency is ridiculous and vain, when one’s moral
nature does not justify it; and the moral being of one who
really has this virtue is lowered if he refuses to maintain it.
Justifiable moral pride consists of a harmonious agreement
between one’s moral being and one’s moral self-consciousness.
In this way a new meaning is given not only to the Aristo-
telian fieaorrjs, but also to the antithetic of values in general.
It is shown to be untrue that the pLeaorqs is merely built upon
the antithetic of disvalues. Actually it is also built upon an
antithetic of values. That Aristotle did not see this, although
it is his analyses which have proved it, is nothing against it;
and herewith is solved the question previously raised: How
is the formal diagram of the axiological contrasts (Fig. 2)
consistent with the Aristotelian theory, according to which it
is always only one value which corresponds to two disvalues?
According to the diagram two values necessarily correspond to
them, and indeed two values which are in positive opposition
The solution is this. If«in the p,ecr 6 rqs is concealed a syn-
thesis, the synthesis presupposes the antithetic of the elements
contained in it; as a fact, therefore, two values are always
hidden in it. But this means that the previously given diagram
of the parabola, which shows the culminating point of aperq
(Fig. 1, page 256) can be incorporated into a diagram of the
contrasts (Fig. 2) ; the arrangement of the one is confirmed by
that of the other (Fig. 3). 'Aperq is the synthesis of the one-
OPPOSITIONAL RELATION
4i7
sided factors A and B (this is expressed only vaguely in the
diagram by the position between A and B) ; now since A and
B have their disvalues opposite them, aperj is referred to the
two disvalues as opposites.
Also in the two diagonal lines the diagram indicates the
vanishing of opposition. The disvalue —A and the value B,
likewise the disvalue — B and the value A, stand in a double
(two-dimensional) opposition ; the opposition is cancelled
through opposition to it. In fact the examples exhibit not only
the cancellation but even a close material kinship — a kinship
so close that only a slight shade divides the disvalue from the
value which is diagonally opposed to it. Thus, in the complex
of cr(jo<f>poavvrj, avcuoQrjola is in content so closely akin to a one-
sided self-control that the ethics of the Stoics could confuse
the two and recoin the disvalue as a value; axoXaala is just
as closely allied to a one-sided development of the emotional
life, and often enough this likeness has led to a rejection of
the emotions. In the complex of bravery, imprudence is simi-
larly akin to boldness, while cowardice resembles prudence.
Still more annoying in practice is the difficulty, in the complex
of fieyaXoifwxia, of distinguishing genuine pride from worqs
(uhjustifiable self-esteem), and modest self-criticism from
[UKpotfwxM. On this account the right ethical appraisement of
pride as well as of humility has suffered. Fundamentally all
such confusion rests upon obtuseness of insight into values,
as well as upon ignorance of the basic structure of the opposi-
tional combinations underlying all valuational syntheses.
Ethics — II DD
418
THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
(/) Application of the Synthetic Principle to the Higher
Moral Values
Thus far there is no conflict between the two views of
valuational contrast — between the Aristotelian and the formal.
But there are two things which are not in agreement.
First, the relation of A to B is different. Here the oppositional
complex manifests an open antinomy (of course only in regard
to some values, but these are the only ones which come under
consideration); it is precisely here that the Aristotelian virtues,
on the other hand, exhibit unity, a synthesis of values.
And, secondly, the relation of —A to — B is different. Here
the Nicomachean Ethics throughout exhibits the antithetic of
disvalues (zmepfioXri and eXXeafiis), while the formal complex
on the other hand shows a cancellation of the antithetic, a
thorough conciliation (for example, in the relation of love-
lessness to injustice).
How are we to understand these two discrepancies?
The question is substantially the same as if we asked : How
does it happen that brotherly love, truthfulness, fidelity,
faith — that is, the entire series of the higher values — no longer
manifest the character of syntheses ? Is there then lacking in
them the antithetic of the disvalues? And is this perhaps the
reason why in them their antithetical character becomes more
prominent and in some of them is most striking? Then it
would have been right to expect that this character would
somehow exist latent in the rest of the values, and must permit
of being seen even there from some wisely chosen point of
view. But the point of view would need to be that of the anti-
thetical disvalues ; from thence the blended elements could be
seen even in the Aristotelian virtues. But a wider, most highly
important consequence then follows : the higher values which
are antinomic must be understood to be owcpa, in which syn-
thesis is lacking, and in the antithetic of which it must there-
fore needs be perceptible to feeling as an axiological postulate.
The principle of the synthesis would thereby be carried over
OPPOSITIONAL RELATION 419
into the higher values without a remainder, of course as a
principle still unfulfilled in our present-day morality, which
declares itself in valuational antinomies merely. The whole
table of moral values would then need to be so conceived that
in their lower elements the syntheses would be apprehended
by the emotional sense of values — namely, in such virtues as
the Aristotelian and others like them — but in the higher
elements the syntheses are still lacking, because our feeling
for values cannot discern them (whether at times only or not
at all). Then from the unitary principle of the table of values
it would be evident why in the lower values the antithetic has
vanished and can be reconstructed only by analysis, while in
the higher values the synthesis seems to be lacking and the
antithetic alone seems to rule.
Now, even if it cannot be proved, it can be stated with strong ,
hypothetical certainty that the fact is so, and that the principle
of synthesis constitutes a universal law of the ethical table.
The difference between the Aristotelian and the higher moral
values is in truth not an all-important one; one sees this, as
soon as one drops the habit of looking only for single values.
Even Aristotle could not apply his principle to the higher
virtues. In regard to justice the p,ec6rr]s is very questionable
(and on that account it was the centre of ancient polemics),
but in it the synthesis also seems to be weak. Both are quite
lacking in <f>iXta and the dianoetic virtues. If syntheses proper
do exist here, at all events they are not to be sought for within
the valuational structure of these virtues but outside of it, in
its relation to other valuational materials. On the other side
it is clear that the syntheses, as they are found in his “virtues,”
are not really completed in the consciousness of values, but
rather are discerned only as moral claims. Perhaps in
eXevdepLOTTjs, <xoxf>po<r&in), avZpeia and some others it is com-
pleted in the consciousness of positive morals. On the other
hand, in peyaXoipvxla. one sees clearly how the philosopher
struggles, without being quite able, to grasp it positively. If
we think of this struggle in regard to synthesis as being carried
430 THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
still a stage farther — even to the point where the sense of
values cannot anticipate the unity of the antithetical elements,
not to mention the concrete discernment of the unified moral
disposition in idea, we stand exactly at the place where we
find ourselves to-day in regard to higher valuational antinomies.
What is it exactly which we feel to be antinomic in the
relationship of justice and brotherly love, of purity and fulness
of life, indeed even of pride and humility? Precisely this, that
our sense of values longs for a synthesis, searches for it, but
cannot grasp it concretely. Of course it could very well be
that these antitheses are “genuine antinomies,” that is, cannot
be resolved by any synthesis. One may be especially inclined to
assume this in regard to purity and fulness of life. But that
does not change the situation. The axiological demand for a
synthesis as such still exists; it exists independently of the
possibility of fulfilling it. It is simply due to the fact that in
all actual cases of conflict the conduct of man cannot fail to
be a unity. In an ideal moral disposition the idea of synthesis is,
therefore, in the face of all existing antitheses, the necessary
postulate of ethics. What is sought is precisely a unified ethos
of purity and fulness of life, of justice and brotherly love, of
pride and humility. Only this should be called “virtue” in the
higher and stricter sense, since the one-sided values do not
properly deserve the name— just as with Aristotle neither
boldness nor prudence, neither penuriousness nor lavish
expenditure, bear by themselves the name of aperf, but only
in their syntheses, avSpeia and iXevdepiorrjs, both of which
(each in its own grade) signify a superiority of an ideal disposi-
tion above the tyrannical one-sided ethos of the single valua-
tional elements.
It is of course a very different and high-strung moral
demand when one requires a similar superiority to such values
as brotherly love and justice, which are both no less tyrannical
but are far higher in the scale of values. Here real moral
striving struggles only too hard for the one-sided value. How
could it at the same time struggle also for a synthesis of'these
OPPOSITIONAL RELATION 4«
qualities? But this distinction is not one of principle: it is
purely empirical, relative to the given stage of development
in the actual moral existence. Sub specie atemitatis — and this
means : from the point of view of the ideal realm of values — the
distinction does not exist at all.
(g) The Tyranny of Values and its Restriction in the
Synthesis
That the same thing applies to all cases of the antinomies
in question, that everywhere the living sense of value spon-
taneously seeks for the synthesis and thereby indicates most
clearly the direction in which philosophical reflection must
look, is in need of no proof. It is a priori evident in the essence
of the valuational antinomies. Whether in all cases the syn-
thesis really exists, and whether, even when it does exist, it is
discernible to the sense of values, is quite another question.
The watchfulness of valuational feeling is independent of
that, and with it the indication of the way to a philosophy
of values.
At all events there are single antinomies which are of special
interest fof* the construction of a table of values. Such pre-
eminently is the antinomy between the values of personality
and the universal values, which divides the whole of the moral
realm into two layers. Closely observed, it is seen to consist
of an innumerable variety of special oppositions — for each
single universal value finds its limiting counterpart m a throng
of values peculiar to personality — and all these opposites
demand a special synthesis. But the universal type of these
syntheses has at its foundation the double demand: on the
one side, so to act as all ought to act ; and on the other, within
this type of action to have in all one’s conduct a distinctive
mark, which could not and should not be found in everyone’s
conduct . 1
1 Cf. Chapter XXXII, Vol. II, on the conversion of the categorical
imperative.
422 THE REALM t)F ETHICAL VALUES
Not less instructive is the opposition to almost all other
virtues, especially to justice and brotherly love, into which love
of the remotest sees itself drawn. Even behind this is con-
cealed a great diversity of contrasts and, although of another
kind, such contrasts pervade the whole of the table of ethical
values. In this case the difference is that between the values
of the present and those of the future. The synthesis would
need to unite these two in one and the same disposition, as
guiding points of view. How it should be brought about is
just as much a question as with the other antinomies.
But with all the contrasts which can be directly established
the abundance of moral diversity is not yet exhausted. There
are many relationships besides, which have not the character
of antinomies. If that ended the matter, the principle of syn-
thesis would not be universal — even if it be only in the watch-
fulness of the valuational emotion. For its postulate is nothing
but contrast.
But here two things must be considered. Contrast of values
is by no means limited to the antinomies proper. These are
only special cases where the contrast is intensified. There are
conflicts, however, between all values, that is, in every concrete
situation. This simply brings the material diversity with it.
Now where it inheres in the structure of the situation that two
different values, participating in it, cannot be satisfied at the
same time, the decision can be only for one and must violate
the other. If the two values lie in very different grades, the
conflict of course is not a moral one; precedence is due to the
higher (according to the law of the good). But if they are
approximately equal, or even only comparable in height, the
conflict exists. There are conflicts of this kind 1 which permeate
the whole of human life. They place before a man the necessity
of choosing. But on principle this means that in the concrete
situation all material diversity of value can assume an anti-
nomical character. And granted that just here fully satisfying
syntheses would be perhaps least possible, the moral
1 Cf. Chapter XXV (b), Vol. II, the instance of the “necessary he.”
OPPOSITIONAL HALATION 423
requirement still holds, to search from case to case for the
syntheses.
But, secondly, something of an oppositional character
inheres in all moral values. One recognizes this immediately,
if one takes the single values which are extreme in their one-
sidedness, each in the strict rigour of its idea. To do so is not
a theoretical experiment in abstraction. In practical life there
is a sense of the inexorableness of single values. It can mount
even to fanaticism. Every value — when once it has gained power
over a person — has the tendency to set itself up as sole tyrant
of the whole human ethos, and indeed at the expense of other
values, even of such as are not inherently opposed to it. This
tendency of course does not adhere to the values as such in
their ideal sphere of existence, but to them as the determining
or selective powers in human feeling; it is the tendency to
crowd out other values from the range of emotional appraise-
ment. Such tyranny shows itself plainly in the one-sided types
of current morality, in the well-known intolerance of men (even
men otherwise compliant) towards the customs of foreigners,
but still more in the individual person’s obsession by one
single value. Thus there exists a fanaticism of justice (fiat
justitia per'eat mundus ), which by no means attacks love merely,
not to mention brotherly love, but all the higher values. Like-
wise there is a fanaticism of brotherly love, which can become
self-surrender, indeed even self-torture; it clashes not only
with justice, but with most of the moral values, from the
highest down to that healthy egoism which is necessary for
life. 1 Even a fanaticism of love for the far distant is in itself
possible, as we know — so far as theory is concerned — in
Nietzsche’s case. Not less dangerous is the fanaticism of truth-
fulness and fidelity; the former is willing to betray friend and
fatherland for the sake of an empty principle; the latter, b l i n d
to the most hazardous moral entanglements, clings to a person,
a party, a principle through thick and thin, no matter what
the consequences of an error once committed. The same holds
* Cf. Chapter VIII («), Vol. I.
424
THE REALM *OF ETHICAL VALUES
good of a one-sided extreme of modesty (self-belittlement), of
humility (self-depreciation), of reserve (superciliousness), of
pride (an inflammable sense of one’s own dignity), and even of
faith (an elated blissfulness of trust). All these values in their
extreme degree are most dangerous. This is most evident in
trust and faith. “Blind faith” is the greatest moral risk; whether
one should exact it of any man is always a critical question of
conscience.
In this sense it may be said that every moral value has a
point in it, not indeed in itself but for men, where it becomes
a danger; there is a limit beyond which its dominance in
consciousness ceases to be of value. In it recurs an axiological
motive, which we are well acquainted with from other spheres
of value. Activity, suffering, freedom, foresight, predetermina-
tion are of value only within the limits within which a man has
a carrying power equal to them . 1 It is the same with moral
values, except that the line is drawn not by the carrying power
of the person, but by the concrete manifoldness and reciprocal
violability of the valuational materials. Here lies the danger line
of values, in the relation between the narrow field of con-
sciousness and the structure of the table of values itself. That
even personal love has its danger line we have seen in our
analysis of it . 2
What Aristotle so strongly felt in the lower moral values,
without being able to formulate it, was just this, that all valua-
tional elements, taken in isolation, have in them a point beyond
which they are dangerous, that they are tyrannical, and that
for the true fulfilment of their meaning in their real carrier
there is always a counter-weight. Because of this profoundly
justified feeling, he assigned virtue to no one of these elements
but to their synthesis. It is precisely in their syntheses that
the danger in values is diminished, their tyranny in conscious-
ness paralysed. In this matter Aristotle’s procedure is a model
for every further treatment of the problem of contrasts.
1 Cf. Chapter XI (c)-(A), Vol. II.
* Cf. Chapter XXXIII (e), Vol. II.
OPPOSITIONAL RELATION
425
For the further understanding of the table of values it is
necessary to apply this point of view to the higher moral
elements which we see still to be unconnected and without
synthesis. The danger in the higher moral values, as well
as their evidently tyrannical nature (although this is in many
ways graduated), sufficiently proves that here also there is
throughout an antithetic of disvalues, even if the quantitative
diagram of the vTrepfioXrj and eXXeiijtis should prove to be too
narrow. That we see instead only the antithetic of values is
due to the fact that we cannot discern the syntheses concretely,
however much we grope for them with our sense of values.
Here, also, only the syntheses would be virtues proper. Only a
sense of justice which is at the same time loving, only a
brotherly love which also considers the far distant, only a pride
which would likewise be humble, could be valid as an ideal
of moral conduct. But in so far as the antithetic of values, with
its gradations, permeates the whole realm, it follows that in
general no isolated values exist for themselves, that rather
does every value reach true fulfilment only in its synthesis with
others — and indeed finally only in Idea, only in its synthesis
with all.
The law of ov/mtAoktj, from which we started in our dis-
cussion of the table of values, acquires in this way a new and
far stricter meaning than it could derive from an analogy to
the realm of the categories. The implication of values is uni-
versal ; only it is different from that of the categorial dialectic,
is of a new kind, is axiological: every single value first attains
its own full character through its axiological counter-weight in
the synthesis. Even in itself it is incomplete ; it is even threatened
in its valuational character, without its counter-weight. Whether
this consists, as with the antinomies, in a single, specific
counter-value, or as in other cases in a larger series of
values, makes no great difference. The synthesis, the under-
standing of which is under question, may have any degree
of complexity.
436 THE REALM' OF ETHICAL VALUES
( h ) The “Unity of Virtue.” Outlook upon the Ideal
System of Values
In pursuing this thought it is imperative that we turn our
attention to an ideal synthesis of all moral values. So long as
single values — however complex they may be in themselves —
stand over against each other without being bound organically
together, they must necessarily retain some element of danger
in themselves. Since this danger destroys their value, they
can be fulfilled only in a synthesis which destroys the force
of the dangerous element.
Along this line ethics approaches again the old Stoic idea
of a “unity of virtue.” The Stoics taught that he who lacks
one virtue lacks all ; he who really has one possesses all. Accord-
ingly he cannot be brave, wise or self-controlled who is not
just. The error in this doctrine has often been denounced:
the theory may very well be applicable to the ideal virtues, but
not to the actual conduct of men, which is always only an
approximation to the idea. The objection is right, but it is
no objection. The Stoic is referring to the ideal virtue; he
does not cede validity to compromises. This rigorism is of
course as little tenable in practice as the fanaticism of the
single virtues. Yet the universal synthesis of values is contained
in the idea of a table of values. All that is said is this, that in
the strict and absolute sense only the just man can be truly
loving, only the proud truly humble, only the pure truly
participant in the fulness of life. These paradoxes are right
throughout, but of course only in idea. It would be wrong to
contest the virtue of a living man, merely because the axiological
counterpoise was lacking in him.
For anyone who is speculatively inclined, it is a tremendous
temptation to follow up this outlook constructively, to forestall
the gradual historical development of the valuational conscious-
ness by a bold stroke, and to take by storm the whole starry
realm of the moral values with the aid of a heaven-assailing
dialectic. Such a dialectic, so it seems, would need only to
OPPOSITIONAL RELATION 427
start with the antinomies which are present to the sense of
values and to pile on top of them synthesis on synthesis up
to the highest and all-embracing synthesis, in which then the
essence of the good must needs be fulfilled and must main-
tain a unity of meaning. This meaning would then no longer
be lost in a preferential trend, the guide-posts to which were
an open enigma, but would be identical with the unity of
moral values in general, with their total, inter-articulated system.
Unfortunately, this seductive ideal is both practically and
philosophically as good as worthless. To construct dialectical
syntheses is of course not difficult. Although the “unity of
virtue” were not reached, a few steps might be gained beyond
the discerned values, and perhaps even a system of axiological
stages might be indicated, to which the sought-for syntheses
must belong. But the stage would be empty. Dialectical or
any otherwise completed construction of values remains an
idle play, so long as it does not succeed in causing our insight
into values, and ultimately our primary sensing of them to
accompany it upward to its own heights. Values must be felt
and on the basis of feeling must be concretely discerned. There
is no other way to secure their ideal self-existence. But the
sensing of values has its own, quite differently articulated law
of procedure, which allows the intrusion of no outside scheme
of work. To it values, and consequently also their syntheses,
always become accessible only in proportion to their own
autonomous mode of advance, only in proportion to their
own historical mellowing into new perspectives. On the other
hand, no speculative impatience can prosper. All daring dreams
here find their limit. (*)
(*) The Antithetic of Values, its Removal to the
Disvalues
The partial transparency of the connectional laws prevailing
in the table of values should not deceive the serious investigator.
We never attain the “system of values,” concretely understood,
4*8 THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
merely from its inner arrangement, even when we fully com-
prehend this. So far as we grasp it, it can only help our orienta-
tion amid the many discerned values, as well as our critical
awareness of the limitation set to all human discernment of
values.
But the vastness itself of the perspective causes no detri-
ment. One may well say that only here — after analysis — does
the whole scope of the problem unroll. This alone would be of
decisive significance. But there is something more. The mere
outlook upon the possibility of higher syntheses suffices to
reflect a new and unique light upon the antinomic of values.
The Aristotelian virtues showed an antithetic of disvalues;
this is lacking in the domain of the higher virtues. On the
other hand, the antithetic of values, which had disappeared
in the Aristotelian virtues, emerged here, that is, had not been
cancelled but overlaid with syntheses and at the same time
bound by them. If now this displacement of the whole struc-
tural form rests upon the problem elaborated above, that is,
upon the fact that insight penetrates incomparably deeper
into the total structure of the lower moral values than into that
of the higher, it follows that, with advancing penetration of
insight into the complex materials of the latter (in case it should
be possible), the antithetic relation must more and more vanish
from the realm of the actually discerned values, but must
become conspicuous in the counter-realm of the disvalues. The
oppositional relation itself must at the same time be transferred
from the values to the disvalues, so that, the higher the grade,
so much the more distinctly would be manifested on the part
of the values a kind of superiority to the oppositional relation.
The one side of this double proposition, the tendency of
values to synthesize, can be proved by the valuational sense
itself. As against every oppositional relation, the search for
synthesis is spontaneous and inheres in the essence of the
valuational consciousness.
The other side is more difficult to prove. For, as we saw,
—A and — B, in the higher strata, exhibit no antithetic proper.
OPPOSITIONAL RELATION 439
Impurity is compatible with deficiency in fulness of life, in-
justice with lovelessness, and so on ; may we assume that these
disvalues intensify each other when their positive opposites
are unified in syntheses? This question cannot be decided by
the feeling for values; in order to decide it, one would need
already to have the syntheses and, proceeding from them, to
survey the entirely oppositional complexes — yet even the
Aristotelian axpa can be exhibited as opposed to each other
only by the unity of the intermediate virtue.
From this, one can always infer something in anticipation.
If, for example, there exists a unitary “virtue” which would
bind justice and love together, then it would follow from this
that a moral attitude which would be merely just, without
being loving, must clash with a disposition which was only
loving, without being just. The conflict would always be purely
inward; it would not necessarily appear in external conduct.
The question is only one of dispositional opposition, of con-
trast in quality of intention. The relation perhaps becomes
clearer in the case of love of the nearest and love of the re-
motest. So long as these two remain discrepant, the mere
absence of regard for one’s neighbour harmonizes very well
with absence of regard for the men o£ future times. But if one
views the relation from the summit of an ideal synthesis, in
which spiritual solicitude for the nearest would be blended
with solicitude for the remotest, then, inwardly in one’s dis-
positional commitment, the one-sided devotion of oneself to
a neighbour (and to his immediate situation) is seen to be
inconsistent with the equally one-sided devotion to the re-
motest (and to future humanity). The change in the relation
is due to the fact that the disvalues themselves, which stand
over against the fuller synthesis, show a character which is
axiologically more positive. They absorb the antithetical factors
into themselves, and it was to these that the contrast adhered.
They also then are no longer absolute disvalues, but only
elements of disvalues which adhere to a disposition in itself
valuable but one-sided. Their matter, which beforehand existed
430 THE REALTY OF ETHICAL VALUES
in the duality of the values, is the same; only that now, seen
from the point of view of the synthesis, the one-sidedness as
such becomes conspicuous; and this is an anti-value. The one-
sidedness of what is axiologically positive in them is the con-
trastedness, which breaks forth in them and appears as the
antithesis of the more complex, and in this sense the higher,
disvalues.
If, therefore, the removal of the antithetic of values to dis-
values be rightly conceived, it follows that with adequate
knowledge — in which all lower values would be seen united
synthetically under higher ones — the whole table of values
must be presented as free from antinomies. But this means
nothing else than that in its ideal self-existence it must “be”
without antinomies. But at the same time it is implied that the
table of disvalues must “be” throughout antinomic. To the
idea therefore of a “unity of virtue” there would correspond
no “unity of disvirtue” — not even in idea. The perfect coward
would not need at the same time to be completely uncontrolled
and unjust. The %>ics were not acquainted with this counter-
relation. In$%jir absolutistic antithesis of the “wise man and
the fool” is involved much rather the thesis that the moral
disvalues also would all cling inseparably together. This thesis
is fundamentally false, a purely abstract counter-thesis con-
structed to match the “unity of virtue.” Badnesses, vices,
shortcomings not only do not draw one another after them,
but the many which 'are contrasted in content reciprocally
exclude one another.
Hence, corresponding to the ideal unity of the realm of
values, there would be an ideal oppositionality and disunity of
the realm of disvalues.
( k ) The Question as to the Genuineness of the Valua-
tional Antinomies
Whether this is really a fact is nevertheless doubtful. We do
not know whether the chain of syntheses which leads to the
OPPOSITIONAL RELATION 431
“unity of virtue” subsists in the realm of values in itself or
not. That it can be constructed in thought proves nothing —
after all, what is there which cannot be constructed in thought?
It would need to be discerned, felt.
Valuational feeling looks out undisturbed for syntheses,
where only antinomies are indicated. But this expectant
attention does not prove that syntheses can be found. Nothing
can be found in the realm of values which is not there. And
what is there we cannot know, if inspection as a concrete
fulfilment and confirmation does not follow constructive
thought, or the yearning watchfulness of feeling. If, for in-
stance, every given opposition to the over-arching synthesis
were really certain, and if all antinomic were really transferred
to the disvalues, it would need to follow immediately that no
antinomies among the positive values were genuine. For anti-
nomies which can be resolved are not genuine ; the resolution
of them (their synthesis) proves that their incompatibility was
not originally native to them, that they arose much rather from
some peculiarity in the observer.
There are some instances of antinomy, of which. the genuine-
ness can be detected almost in the feeling itself. Perhaps that
of purity and fulness of life is of tBSs kind. Here even watch-
fulness itself feels its helplessness. It were possible that upon
closer analysis more of such cases would be forthcoming. But
at least with all antinomies it remains questionable whether
their syntheses exist in the realm of values. Now what would
be the consequence if all (or even only some) of the antinomies
of values should be genuine? Would that mean that there is
nothing in their syntheses, and that all anticipation of them
by the sense of values is in vain ?
To assert this would in the end be just as daring. In fact
we still know so little about the laws of the antithetic of values
that we cannot draw such inferences— even hypothetical ones
— either positive or negative. Still it would be in itself con-
ceivable that the antinomies somehow were retained within
the syntheses, that the latter therefore signified no suspension
432
THE REALM f OF ETHICAL VALUES
or dissolution of the oppositions at all, but only an embracing
or bridging over. Then the genuineness of the antinomies
would remain within the syntheses themselves, and in spite
of them. It is not possible to judge here according to the
analogy of the categorial antinomies. Even structurally these
are differently constituted; in them there are no negative
counter-members, to which the opposition could be transferred.
In a certain sense it may hold good of those syntheses of
the Aristotelian virtues which we know and discern concretely,
that in them is retained the opposition of the component values
— for example, spirited boldness and cold-blooded foresight
in bravery, self-esteem and self-criticism in iMeya\oiln>xia. Why
should not the same apply to the higher syntheses, which are
not yet discernible ?
If the synthesis is not really a resolution but only a covering
up of the antithetical elements, one will not be able to deny
the possibility of such an issue, at least on principle. But what
this means, and how the relation, at the same time antinomic
and synthetic, is constituted in the higher values, is a further
question, which here only needed to be touched upon. Whether
there exist ways and means of treating it must for the moment
remain unconsidered.
CHAPTER XXXVII (lxii)
THE COMPLEMENTARY RELATIONSHIP
(a) Values, the Reciprocal Fulfilment of their Meaning
Finally, there is linked to the oppositional relationship a
second one, of a different kind but lying in the same dimension :
the complementary relationship.
We see it in trust and trustworthiness (or sincerity), faith
and fidelity, personality and personal love. But if one pursues
the differentiation of moral values a step further than has been
done in our analysis of them, one finds many more such: for
example, honourableness and bestowing of honour, worthiness
and esteem, right to honour and veneration, merit and joyful
recognition, heroism and admiration, kindness and gratitude,
capacity for happiness and unenvious delight in another’s good
fortune, radiant virtue and generosity in acceptance (the capacity
to appreciate). Indeed even in justice is concealed a comple-
mentary relationship; just conduct is rightly regardful only
towards him who is justly disposed, at least it presupposes the
claim and the credit of such a disposition, in as much as every
objectively just relation is necessarily reciprocal. This is
especially evident in all community of interests and of work,
particularly in every (even personal) form of communal life.
In a lesser degree the same relationship recurs in the types of
love; love is indeed not dependent upon return of love, does
not derive its value therefrom; but yet it arouses a kind of
expectancy of a return of love. And in personal intimacy it
becomes a really strong complementary relationship, that is,
a reciprocal understanding and fulfilment.
In the majority of these cases the relation between the moral
value of the one person and adequate valuational response on
the part of the other is fundamental. What could not be seen
in the earlier discussion of valuational response , 1 here becomes
- Cf. Chapter IV (c), Vol. II.
Ethics — II
434 THE REALM” OF ETHICAL VALUES
plain : In all such response a unique axiological note is present,
and indeed one that is different from the value which is
responded to. In the adequate response there is a note with a
positive value, in the inadequate response the note is a disvalue.
And where these are expressed in the concrete relation toward
the carrier of the fundamental value, moral value and moral
disvalue are immediately present in them.
This moral element in the response goes further than one
might think at first glance. For example, it is met with even in
bravery. Bravery presupposes the pre-eminent value of father-
land, race, State, political freedom, life and the welfare of
neighbour and loved one — that is, of such goods as those for
the sake of which the surrender of life, health and personal
success is worth while. Without this presupposition bravery
is senseless, a gamble with danger. But this means that, when
genuine, it is already a valuational response, a response in action.
In life there are many such responses through action. Wher-
ever anyone commits himself to any cause, the presupposition is
in the same way the sense of the value of that for which the
commitment occurs. But in this extension is seen the comple-
mentary relationship throughout the whole diversity of ethical
situations and values, although it receives .complete expres-
sion in the real equality of both the related values only in
particular cases (as in that of trust and reliability). And there is
always this peculiarity in it, that the one value requires the
other, demands it, has fulfilment of meaning in it — but without
its own worth thereby becoming dependent, that is, without its
losing itself in its complementary value . Thus the trust bestowed
upon one who is unreliable or the fidelity shown to one who is
suspicious is still of moral worth ; it lacks only the axiological
completion of its meaning in the adequate disposition of another.
( b ) Extension of the Relationship to the Lower Values
There is no such reciprocity in the realm of the categories.
There all correlations are a plain, a necessary involution, a
THE COMPLEMENTARY ’RELATIONSHIP 435
permanent co-existence of counterparts. Of this there is nothing
in the realm of values. Only the values themselves involve one
another; but this implication does not extend to the actual
world. It is only an ideal relation of the materials and their
valuationai qualities, only an Ought-relation : where the value
A emerges, there the value B also ought to occur. This comple-
mentary relation therefore is specifically axiological. Where
trust is shown, he to whom it is shown ought to be worthy of
it, and vice versa. But simply on that account it is by no means
so in actual life.
Now, ordinarily, the complementary relation is not limited to
the moral values. It extends farther down to those that con-
dition other values. Indeed it is here still more apparent, more
suggestive; it is simpler, even if less significant. The world of
goods is evidently quite permeated with it. Thus material goods
are complementary to certain biological values, upon which the
capacity of the person to enjoy goods (to appraise them)
depends; for example, physical comfort, health; but comple-
mentary not less to the communal good of legal status, which
renders possible the use and enjoyment of material goods. The
converse holds true in the same degree : the bodily capacity to
enjoy and the pfotection of property have meaning only for
one who is in possession of material goods. This is of great
significance for the common life; the interest of the par-
ticular individual in the legal relation and in public order
is conditioned by a certain grade of material possession A
deficient appreciation of the State and of law on the "part of
a proletarian (that is, of one who has really nothing to lose)
is merely a manifestation of the lack of the complementary
relationship.
In general the whole situation in the sphere of goods is this,
that individual goods, taken by themselves, are well-nigh
meaningless and are scarcely to be called “goods”; that is, in
their strict valuationai quality they suffer damage, and their
value is fulfilled only in their reciprocal supplementation. Not
until a certain degree of many-sided fulfilment is reached do
436 THE REALM "OF ETHICAL VALUES
the separate goods attain their full value. But this means that
their axiological tendency presses peremptorily towards a
universal synthesis of goods-values.
Still more strictly does this apply to the foundational values
which adhere to the subject and which together constitute
personality . 1 Here the case is such that the lower value always
finds its full meaning only in the higher, the value of mere
living in the value of consciousness; this again in activity,
suffering, strength and so on, while the higher has only its
material foundation in the lower. Thus far the complementary
relationship would here be only one-sided. But it also appears
to be two-sided, for example, between activity and strength,
strength and freedom, freedom and foresight, foresight and
purposive action. Activity without strength is impotent, strength
without activity is inert; strength without freedom is mere
naturalistic power, freedom without strength is fruitless yearn-
ing; freedom without foresight is blind arbitrariness, foresight
without freedom is the consciousness of being buffeted by
accident; purposive action without foresight is a dangerous
power in the hand of the gientally blind, foresight with-
out purposive action is unbearable knowledge of the un-
avoidable.
Here again it is evident that only synthesis brings the single
values to fulfilment — in as much as in personality, as such, this
entire group of values forms an inextricable texture. But there
are other syntheses than those of the Aristotelian virtues, and
those in which the sense of values looks out upon a higher
stage. For the values, which in personality constitute a complex
synthesis, stand in no antithetical relation; they form much
rather a rising series, in which simply the higher value always
contains the complex of the lower ones and adds to it a new
valuational factor.
The synthesis here has no inner obstacles to overcome. It
fulfills itself unchecked.
* Cf. Chapter XI, Vol. II.
THE COMPLEMENTARY '•RELATIONSHIP
437
(c) Independent of Stratification and of the
Conditioning Relation
The complementary relationship therefore pertains to the
same concrete manifoldness of values — in its entire extension
— to which the remaining relations pertain. The question thus
arises, in what relation does it stand to these ? As an orderliness
sui generis it is throughout embedded in the remaining order
of the table of values. But how does it fit into the otherwise
determined relations ? _ **
Over against universal stratification the complementary
relationship is evidently independent. As a dimension it even
cuts through the strata. In the higher values, extensions in
content appear, which in the lower ones were not at all in
evidence or were only presupposed. These correlations — for it
is these which are in question — are in the higher values incom-
parably richer and more complex than in the lower. They
therefore do not belong to what reappears and is transformed in
the stratification but to what constitutes the novelty of the
higher. As this complementary relationship permeates all strata,
we have one of die grounds why in general in the realm of
values the novelly of the single values — as also the regional
novelty of whofe* strata — has a decided preponderance over
recurrence . 1
More positive is the connection with the conditioning relation.
This, as we saw, extends through the stratification of the values
like a chasm, by which the moral values are radically divided
from those which are situational. Every moral value presupposes
its conditioning situation. But how is it with two moral values
which stand in compjementary relation to each other ? Are they
conditioned separately by different situations or, in common,
by one and the same ?
This question is easy to .answer. They sCre evidently con-
ditioned in common. Take a ’ relationship like merit and
recognition, or heroism and admiration. Moral merit and
• 1 Cf. Chapter XXXV (d), Vol. II. ' ,
438 THE REALM «OF ETHICAL VALUES
heroism are based upon the value of the situation, perhaps the
commonweal or spiritual goods, for which the commitment of
the person occurs ; but precisely upon this the moral recognition
and admiration are also founded. And indeed here also in the
conditioning relation the complete heterogeneity of the con*
ditioned value is preserved over against that which conditions
it. The latter does not reappear in the former as a valuational
element, nor need it be realized at the same time. As heroism
which fails of its object is still heroism, it deserves the same
admiration as though it had been successful. Likewise the con-
ditioning relation is equally independent of the rank of the
situational value. Kindness and gratitude evidently refer to the
same situation in which the kindness is performed, or at least
attempted; but genuine thaSIfulness does not consider the
greatness of the gift, but only the greatness of the kindness; it
is a response to this, not to the gift. Exactly in the same way
trustfulness and reliability are based upon one and the same
objective value of the situation or goods; truthfulness and faith
in another’s word, on the same value of the knowledge of truth.
Everywhere the two factors iivjjhe complementary relationship
are perfectly independent of the rank and success of the con-
ditioned value.
But here we have a different function of the conditioning
relation from what is found elsewhere. In a certain sense it
may be said that any two complementary values are reciprocally
conditioning and conditioned. In so far as the meaning of the
one is^only fulfilled in the other and without the other would
be floating in the air, this is perfectly clear. In itself, according
to its idea, heroism is something worthy of admiration, kindness
of gratitude, just as fidelity»and truthfulness are worthy of
trust and faith. Conversely, admiration attaches only to heroism,
gratitude to kindness, trust and faith to fidelity and truthfulness.
Here then is a reciprocal conditioning. And this is what con-
stitutes the eminently positive character of the 'complementary
relationship. Jndeed the relation extends even to the disvalues.
Not only does, the unreliable man deserve distrust, but also the
THE COMPLEMENTARY* RELATIONSHIP
439
distrustful man deserves to be deceived. It is just as fair that
the unkind man should win no thanks as that the unthankful
man should receive no kindness. The unheroic man is as little
worthy of being the object of admiration as a man incapable of
admiring (whether because he be envious or generally insensitive
to human greatness) is worthy of being the object of heroic
sacrifice.
In the complementary relationship then there is concealed a
reciprocal conditioning relation ; but the former does not merge
into the latter, and thejiatter is not a $!ry strict conditioning.
There is nothing here like the connection between situational
and moral values, where the latter rest upon the former as
genuine axiological pre-conditions and stand and fall with them
(as the value of honesty stands or falls with that of property).
Moreover, trust remains valuable, even when bestowed upon
someone who is unworthy of it; reliability, although no one
trusts himself to it. Except that without the response there is
not a complete fulfilment or actualization. Here then the con-
ditioning relation is not something constituent in the value,
but only something which carries it out and brings it to com-
pletion. To speakmore exactly, the conditioning does not affect
the moral value itself, but only its subjoined goods-vSIue, 1
Every moral value of a person is at the same time an indirect
goods-value for other persons ; reliability for the one who must
rely upon others; trustfulness for the one who is thrown upon
the good faith of others; kindness for him who receives it;
gratitude for him who deserves it. The fact that virtues are
goods has nothing to do with the conditioning values of goods
and situations, which are the presupposition of moral values.
Goods and situatkjflal values a#e the common condition for
both the values which gre complementary. The goods-value of a
gift does not enter into file attitude of thankfulness towards
kindness, but the goods-vali^ of .kindness conditions the thank-
fulness. For the man who is trusted* the goods-value of trustful-
ness is totally different from the goods-value of vghat is entrusted
- * Cf. Chapter XV (c), Vol. I.
440
THE REALM "OF ETHICAL VALUES
to him; the good, which a friend with his personal love is to
the friend, cannot be at all compared with the goods which the
love may bring.
In the fact that virtues are goods for someone — and they are
the highest kind of goods — is rooted the reciprocal dependence
of the complementary moral values. And just on this account the
moral value as such is unaffected thereby; the complementary
values do not properly condition each other, but each depends
upon the goods-value of the other. What a man’s moral value is
for someone else, we may speak of as the fulfilment of its mean-
ing. All the moral value of a person deserves to be appreciated
and responded to as a good by those to whom it comes as a
good. And if they participate in what is deserved, its fulfilment
is thereby actualized.
»
( d ) Connection with the Oppositional Relation
The connection with the relation of opposites is again different.
The complementary relationship is on the same plane with
it. The connection is therefore closer. The opposites also show
that they are founded upon tjie same situational value, for
example, justice and brotherly love upon the same goods-values,
with which they deal. Except that the correlation itself is
fundamentally different. With justice, discrepancy dominates;
with brotherly love, reciprocal benefit.
But now the question arises : how far in this respect is there
a real difference here? Do not the valuational opposites on
their part also press towards synthesis ? Do not the Aristotelian
virtues ^show that even the opposed values require each other,
and indeed exactly in the sense of completion, of appreciation,
of fulfilment? But is it then not the case/ that the comple-
mentary and the oppositional relation are at bottom one and
the same ?
Is the difference perhaps only ope of degree? It would seem
so, from the fact that in the loWer stages of the Complementary
relationship (as with freedom and foresight, foresight and
purposive activity) exactly the same synthetic structure appears
44i
THE COMPLEMENTARY RELATIONSHIP
as in the lower virtues, that is, in the elements which combine
in them. But against this view stands the fact that in the com-
plementary relationship there are no opposites at all, but only
the correspondence of the one value to the other, and therefore
in the case of the moral values not a demand that the attitude
of one and the same person shall harmonize two values. All
that is demanded is rather this, that to every moral attitude of
the one person shall correspond a given attitude on the part of
the other. This corresponding attitude of the other person is
itself indeed quite differently formed from that o&the first, but
it is in no way in contrast. In the sphere of the moral values
the complementary law is a law of adequate reciprocity in
human behaviour, in so far, namely, as the required reciprocity
signifies neither similarity of disposition nor opposition, but
an organic interpenetration of heterogeneous conduct on the
part of different persons.
(e) The Inter-personal Synthesis of Values
In the lower strata it is more likely that an approximation of the
two relations could be found. But even here any proper contrast
of complementary values is lacking. At least the kind of synthesis
strikingly resemble^ that which we became acquainted with in
the Aristotelian virtues. Similarly goods gain in value through
one another, just as boldness does through foresight, self-esteem
through self-criticism.
It is otherwise in the domain of the moral values. Here we
can no longer speak in this sense of synthesis of the comple-
mentary values, for the opposed values are in another person.
The carriers are not the same. The complementary relationship
here does not consist in the completion of one and the same
complex attitude, but in one person’s moral completion through
the moral value of another. For since moral conduct is conduct
towards persons, every value in it has a claim upon a specifically
reacting attitude of another person, upon an axiologically
adapted reaction, which on this account bears a specific valua-
tional quality. Now if the other person reacts in this way, that
THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
442
is a moral value, but at the same time a fulfilment of one’s own
value. In other words, there is established in the reciprocity of
the two persons an ethically real structure of a higher order,
which as a union of two dispositions bears a unique, a higher
and more complex value, a value which cannot be resolved into
its constituents.
This can be felt most clearly in trust between man and man,
where the trust and the trustworthiness complete each other.
More elementary but not less perceptible is it in two-sided
justice, although here the specific difference fades away. It is
deepest in the relation of love, where the special life and worth
of the mutuality that has been formed are strikingly plastic . 1
Such communion in the inter-personal relation of two human
beings is the categorial form of complementary relationship.
The higher value which appears in it is the specific synthesis
characteristic of these values and is required by them. It is a
synthesis of a new kind, fundamentally different from that
towards which the contrasts tended. It is never fulfilled m
the conduct of one person. It is an inter-personal synthesis
It embraces in its unity not only two values, but also two
carriers of values. And as it forms out of the values one value,
so also it forms out of the carriers one carrier; and as the one
value is the higher, so the one carrier is the more able to carry
the values.
Inter-personal synthesis differs from that of contrasts also
in its simple transparency. Here there is no seeking or struggling
for the synthesis, on the part of the sense of values. The factors
unite without coercion, without obstacle. Indeed to anyone who
is morally unspoiled, it is a matter of course, a necessity, to
react in all conduct within the complementary relationship and
thus directly to establish the inter-personal synthesis. The
sense of values is here in a much more favourable position than
towards valuational contrasts; it is confronted with no conflict
at all, at least not with a moral one, in which value stands against
value. For only a definite kind of conduct is encountered and
1 Cf. Chapter XXXIII (6), Vol. II.
THE COMPLEMENTARY RELATIONSHIP
443
no other comes in question. Conflict, on the other hand, begins
only when a reaction is required against an opposed disposition,
that is, when through the opposition conflict is already present.
If one interprets the complementary relationship from the
point of view of the inter-personal synthesis, one can entertain
no doubt that, as compared with the oppositional relation, it
signifies something entirely new, that in it a fundamental
relation, pressing towards a different synthesis, is in command.
It is throughout a positive relation, to which all discrepancy is
alien, and it is more complex than that of contests; for the
syntheses which inhere in its trend fulfil themselves inde-
pendently of the oppositional syntheses, and they do this in
the pure discernment of values as well as in their actualization
in life.
This latter point is of immeasurable significance in all moral
life. Man’s life moves from moment to moment in reaction,
in reciprocity and within inter-personal situations; if now the
establishment of complementary syntheses depended upon the
establishment of oppositional syntheses — which for the higher
values we not only cannot establish but cannot even conceive
concretely in idea — then human conduct would be in a very
sorry plight indeed. It is the difference and the independence
of the two relationships which give scope within ethical reality
to the complementary relationship, as against the eternally
unfulfilled meaning of oppositional synthesis.
At the same time the former increases in general significance.
As the complementary relation penetrates the whole table of
moral values with its regularity, it forces its way into all the
relations of life; and as it, together with the contrasts but
independently of them and unaffected by the antithetic,
permeates all materials, so its formative and unifying tendency
among men runs through all relations, regardless of conflicts
and their responsible solutions, engendering good by good,
awakening virtue by virtue, through the persuasiveness of
response to values and through its transformation into living
disposition and deed.
CHAPTER XXXVIII (lxhi)
THE GRADE AND THE STRENGTH OF VALUES
(a) Gradation and Stratification
From the beginning of our analysis of values we have had
before us the problem of the order of gradation, and we were
able to follow it through the stages of its development. The
importance of its bearing upon ethics became continually more
evident; but on the whole the prospect of solving the problem
diminished. Not only the general criteria of grade showed them-
selves to be inadequate, as clues to the order of rank, 1 but even
the general view of the table of values, which discloses quite
other refinements of difference in grade, cannot suffice here.®
There still remains the possibility that the co-ordinations of
the table, so far as they are evident, may throw light on the
problems.
Here one naturally thinks at first of the laws of stratification.
For strictly speaking there is in stratification a kind of order of
rank. The only question is whether it is the specific order of
rank which we mean, when we speak of higher and lower values.
Taken in its universality, this question must be answered in the
negative. Stratification only gives the differences in the degree
of complexity in the material, and this is not identical with
valuational height. There are values of the most complex
structure, which in height stand lower than those of simpler
structure. Such, for example, are all the goods-values attaching
to virtues; they not only presuppose but in themselves contain
the virtues as materials; yet in height they are subordinate,
because they are not moral values at all. Within every larger
group, for example, within the moral values, it may hold true
that the height increases with the grade of stratification. But
precisely here the stratification itself breaks up, the novelty
* Cf. Chapter IV (6), Vol. II. * Cf. Chapter XXXIV (b), Vol. II.
THE GRADE AND THE STRENGTH OF VALUES 445
of the single values overbears the recurrence and transformation
in such a way that the perduring elements retreat into the
background. There are also specific cases which contradict the
parallelism of the two relations; thus the value of noble-
mindedness, in spite of its relatively elemental simplicity,
transcends in height most of the more special virtues; and,
conversely, the whole of the narrower group of social virtues
undoubtedly is to be placed in order of rank below the great
swarm of simpler virtues (such as justice, self-control, bravery).
The hope, therefore, of a radical explanation of |he order of
rank by means of the laws of stratification proves delusive.
The conditioning relation, on the other hand, might prove
more adequate as a clue, if it were something that bound all
strata of values together. Here it is evident that a conditioned
value is always the higher. But precisely such conditionality
does not always prevail. Within the wider ethical realm it
characterizes only one stage: the relation of goods and situa-
tions to the moral values. And just at this stage there is no need
of orientation, because the marked difference of rank is given
with the most evident clearness by the sense of value.
( b ) Height and Synthesis
The relation of contrast first brings us a step forward. With the
Aristotelian virtues it became clear that in every antithetic the
synthesis is higher than the factors which are united in it. This
provides a sort of regularity, according to which in general all
synthesis is a valuational advancement. Indeed we may perhaps
add: the more complex the synthesis, the more antinomical
the elements united in it, and the more firm the fusion, so much
the higher does it stand in the order of rank.
This does not contradict what was said concerning stratifica-
tion ; complexity in stratification is not the same as in a synthesis
of opposed elements. Degree of stratification is an unresisted
complexity, while a synthesis of opposites is a conquest over
opposing values. It is the latter, upon which the peculiar valua-
446 THE REALTY OF ETHICAL VALUES
tional element depends, which assists essentially in determining
the order of rank. For a harmonious equipoise of moral qualities
in an ideal situation would naturally be of absolute value.
Here we have a distinguishing mark which is universal and
applies to all moral values. Nor can it be denied that the
valuational sense, with its laws of preference, on the whole
follows this distinctive mark. We discriminate exactly the higher
syntheses of opposites, so far as we can discern them concretely,
as the “higher values,” in which at last the lower values attain
fulfilment.
Indeed, even beyond this limit, the searching watchfulness
of the sense of value for the synthesis which still fails us and is
not yet discernible reveals the like tendency towards an order
of gradation. Of all general marks distinctive of height this is
the most suggestive ; in it at least there is a conceivable relation
of law between the structure and the height of values.
Still, even from it we cannot construct a comprehensive
theory as to height; and not only because the syntheses of
opposites in great part are not given in our discernment, but for
another reason. This reason is contained in the fact that the
order of rank does not simply concern the principle of valuational
height, but involves in itself a second decisive factor : valuational
strength, or weight.
(c) The Fundamental Categorial Law and its Corollaries
If height and strength coincided, our calculation would be a
very simple matter. That this is not the case, we have already
seen in another connection . 1 Our object now is to go to the root
of their relation, so far as this is possible for theoretical
generality.
Here the law of height and of strength proves to be far more
general than one would have surmised from the table of values
—certainly from the ethical table alone. It is a fundamental
categorial law, which prevails ontologically in all ideal and
» Cf. Chapter III («), Vol. II.
THE GRADE AND THE STRENGTH OF VALUES 447
real Being and thence extends over the realm of values; but in
this extension it gains a new meaning. It is therefore necessary
here once more, as it was with the laws of stratification, to look
to the realm of categories, and to ask in how far its law3 recur
in the domain of values and are transformed or replaced by a
new kind of regularity.
There are three laws which here come in question. In content
they link up with the laws of stratification, but unlike these
latter they do not concern the structure of the categorial
edifice, but the dynamic type of dependence. They are lawn of
dependence. The first, that of strength, is the basic law of the
categories. The two others may be regarded as its corollaries,
although in comparison with it they have a content of their own.
They form only the reverse sides of one and the same relation-
ship and therefore can be brought into one single formula.
Both are here cited rather for the sake of clearness and compre-
hensiveness of view. For; they reflect a light upon the basic law.
Upon this more than anything else depends the solution of our
problem. The question concerns its validity for the table of
values.
1. The law of Strength: higher principles are dependent
upon the lower, but the converse is not true. Hence the higher
principle is always the more conditioned, the more dependent
and in this sense the weaker. But the more unconditioned, the
more elementary and in this sense the stronger principle is
always the lower one. In the abstract, the inversion of this
relationship is quite conceivable, but is never to be seen in
the reality of principles.
2. The Law of Material: every lower principle is only raw
material for the higher which is raised upon it. Now since the
lower is the stronger, the dependence of the weaker upon it goes
only so far as the scope of the higher formation is limited by the
definiteness and pecularity of the material.
3. The Law of Freedom: compared with the lower every
higher principle is a new formation which is raised upon it.
As such it has unlimited scope above the lower (the material
THE REALM* OF ETHICAL VALUES
448
and the stronger) fixity. This means that in spite of dependence
upon the lower principle the higher is free, as against the lower.
How these laws can be proved we cannot discuss here. 1 * 3 Their
relation to the laws of stratification is, however, clear. It could
not be simply inferred. But, for anyone who knows in general
the import of categorial dependence, there is here a perfectly
evident relation of reciprocal conditionality between the laws of
stratification and the laws of dependence.
The first of these laws, by virtue of its dominating position,
is the basic law of the categories in general. In our criticism
of universal teleologism and metaphysical personalism we have
already become acquainted with its significance. 1 In another
connection we shall meet with it again, when considering the
problem of freedom.3 Without citing any examples of it, its
content and the content of its consequences are easily noted,
so far as the laws of stratification apply. The more simple
principles reappear in the higher ones, as building stones, as
material. Hence the higher structure cannot, for all its trans-
formation, annul or change the lower; the lower has the wider
range of validity, it continues to be binding even in the higher
combination. And no higher law can avail against its validity,
but can only bring it within the new formation. The novelty in
the latter is its freedom as against the lower order; thus in the
law of freedom the stratification of the new form is found to be
fully established.
• The law of material and the law of freedom together therefore
stand against the law of strength, limiting it. They restrict it.
Their purport is that, in the scale of structures, superior strength
extends only to the sphere of the lower principles as factors
within the more complex forms, that it means only complete
fulfilment and indestructibility of the lower, but not domination.
Hence the autonomy of the higher is not infringed by the
material upon which it depends. The pecularity of the finalistic
1 This is the task of the general doctrine of the categories.
* Cf. Chapter XXI (c) and Chapter XXV (c), Vol. I.
3 Cf. Chapter VI (6) and Chapter VII (c), Vol. III.
THE GRADE AND THE STRENGTH OF VALUES 449
nexus is that it is not at all causal, but presupposes the universal
validity of the law of cause and effect ; upon this it is dependent
as upon a conditio sine qua non, but in its own essence it is
independent. In spite of its dependence the weaker principle
is “free” as regards the stronger. We found the same relation
between the subject and the person ; the latter can subsist only
in a subject, in this sense is dependent upon it, but is itself
nevertheless not a subject but something essentially different.
Wherefore the superior height of the weaker is preserved by
the superior strength of the lower. In the latter it finds its
categorial condition, in the former its freedom.
( d ) The Law of Strength
As in the categorial realm the laws of dependence are linked
to those of stratification, it is clearly evident that they can be
valid in the valuational realm only so far as stratification is
concerned. A second condition of their validity is the identity
of structural complexity and valuational height. Just at this
point stratification is connected with order of rank.
Neither condition is completely fulfilled. The laws of strati-
fication hold among values, but so many more complex
structures are built over them, that they are almost concealed
from view. Yet height of value means something quite different
from structural complexity of materials; and although on the
whole the higher values are the more complex, still this must
not be taken as a universal rule.
Therefore the law of strength does not apply strictly in the
same sense to the table of values. Not only is valuational height
different from categorial height, but valuational strength does
not coincide with categorial strength. In the ontological domain
there is no analogue of these; these are specifically axiological
and cannot even be expressed in existential terminology. The
indirect proportion of height and strength, which prevails
among the categories, is either relaxed or disarranged, as was
to be expected.
Ethics— II
FF
450
THE REALTY OF ETHICAL VALUES
The twofold law of material and freedom is more favourably
placed in the table of values. As the elements retreat into the
background, the freedom of the higher form has greater scope,
but the form has only a material character. And this holds good
not only for the stratification of the materials and their values,
but also for the more complex connections which prevail
among them, for the conditioning, the oppositional and the
complementary relations, ^as well as for the connection of the
two latter with the syntheses which fulfil them. As compared
with the conditioning values, the conditioned are always
axiologically the higher; likewise syntheses as compared with
antithetical and complementary correlates.
But when the corollaries of the basic law of the categories
agree, nothing else is possible than that the law itself should
correspond within certain limits. The only question is, within
what limits? An answer is close at hand: within the limits
within which the laws of stratification hold good. Still, this
restriction is inexact; it would be too wide for the sphere of
the moral values, in as much as recurrence and transformation
retreat here too far, while the relation of height and strength
makes itself very perceptible. The second factor, which in
part determines the transference of the law to the table of values,
is therefore decisive: the new meaning of height and strength
in the realm of values.
What height is must already have been made sufficiently
clear in our analysis of values. But what is the significance of
valuational strength? If the basic law can be said to hold at all
among values, it must inhere in the unconditionality of Ought-
to-Be, in its elementariness, in its fundamental character. But
wherein does one recognize this character? In what form is
strength presented to the sense of values?
A clear answer can be given. If the clue to height is the assent-
ing sense, as it expresses itself in specific responses and predi-
cates (approval, acceptance, respect, admiration, enthusiasm),
so the clue to strength lies in the negative, the rejecting sense,
as it asserts itself wherever values are violated. Strength is
THE GRADE AND THE STRENGTH OF VALUES 451
distinguishable by the corresponding disvalues. The rejecting
sense also has its specific responses and predicates. They are
reactions to disvalues. And these show an independent scale
of intensification (disapproval, contempt, horror, disgust and
the like), which is by no means a simple reflection of the scale
of positive responses. The variability of strength, which is
independent of height, is attached to the independence of
the negative scale.
That this independence is justified, instances of it will
easily convince one. Heroism deserves admiration, but the
absence of it is neither despicable nor horrifying, but is at most
to be bewailed as a human weakness ; conversely, trustworthi-
ness is merely commendable, but breach of trust is despicable,
revolting. The more grievous disvalues do not correspond to
the highest values. The examples lead us to infer the converse.
This fact is proof of the peculiar autonomous character of
strength as compared with height. Evidence of strength is
found in the seriousness of the offence against a value, while
height is known by the meritoriousness of fulfilment (wherein
the merit is to be understood not in any subjective sense, but
purely as taking part in the actualization). Now the basic
categorial law, carried over into the table of values, substantiates
this — and it is the wholly new meaning which it acquires in the
realm of values : — in the fulfilment of a value the merit increases,
not directly in proportion to the grievousness of violating it,
but indirectly. When the higher value is violated, the transgres-
sion is less, not more serious; but when the stronger value is
fulfilled, the meritoriousness is not greater but less. This fact
can be gathered into a formula in which the meaning of the
basic law, when transported into the axiological realm, is clearly
given;
The higher value is always the more conditioned, the
more dependent and in this sense the weaker ; its fulfilment
is conceivable only in so far as it is raised upon the fulfil-
ment of the lower values. But the more unconditioned, the
45 *
THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
more elementary, and in this sense the stronger value is
always the lower ; it is only a base for the moral life, not a
fulfilment of its meaning.
This is equivalent to saying: the most grievous trans-
gressions are those against the lowest values, but the
greatest moral desert attaches to the highest values.
Whether this law holds good throughout the entire table
is questionable. It can be easily shown that it does not pass
beyond the dividing line between goods-values and those of
the virtues. It has no meaning to say that the violation of
goods-values weighs heavier than that of moral values, which,
however, must be so according to the law, since the latter are
evidently higher (just because of the sphere they are in) than
the former. For goods are only valuable “for” someone; with
the goods the person also is affected. One cannot destroy goods
without immediately injuring persons also. It is precisely the
moral values which are built upon goods-values of every kind —
according to the law of the conditioning relation — and these
moral values are concerned with man’s control of goods. Hence
here the higher is plainly injured with the lower value; with
property, for example, justice; with the happiness of one’s
neighbour, brotherly love.
Therefore we cannot properly say that the law does not fit
here. But conversely— because the fate of the higher goods is
involved in that of the lower— it is evident that here the law
becomes empty of content. This is explicable, since exactly in
this point simple gradation (which the law of strength follows) is
abrogated and is replaced by the far more complex relation of
conditioning and conditioned. But we saw that this relation
prevails only at the dividing line between the two domains;
elsewhere scope is granted to stratification. It must therefore
be assumed that within both domains the law of strength can
be valid.
But it must be proved separately for each of the two class es.
THE GRADE AND THE STRENGTH OF VALUES 453
( e ) The Meaning of Superior Strength in the Sphere of
Goods-Values
Now in the sphere of goods-values it is clear that a loss of
material goods is in general a more serious matter than a loss of
spiritual goods. The former are undoubtedly more fundamental,
more essential to life. A threat to life and limb is the gravest
threat; but mere life is not on that account the highest good.
Material possessions weigh more heavily upon one than spiri-
tual; and a violation of them is morally more grievous (it is
dishonest, dishonourable). The destruction of one’s happiness
and pleasure is felt the more keenly, the more elementary its
nature, while the height of the value rises and falls according
to an entirely different standard. Esthetic is far higher than
material pleasure. A happiness in personally harmonious con-
verse is far higher than that of outward social status. And yet
man strives much more for the latter, so long as he does not
have it (or thinks he has not sufficiently attained it), than for
the former.
Just here in the lower sphere of values one sees plainly how
strength takes an independent position by the side of height
and asserts itself, without encroaching upon height as such. The
lower value is not of more worth. Superiority of height signifies
superior value. But the lower value is more fundamental, it is
recognized as more unconditional, because its fulfilment — if
not always in the single case, still in general — is the condition
for the fulfilment of the higher. The fulfilment of the lower
takes precedence, because with its violation the fulfilment of
the higher is endangered. The man who is hungry or suffering
in body loses his sense for spiritual enjoyments. In a community
where the legal order is overthrown spiritual goods also (to
which law does not directly extend) go to ruin. The legal order
and the social security of the individual’s material existence have
an Ought-to-Be which is more unconditional than the more
valuable goods, the achievement of which gives meaning to
4S4
THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
existence and to public order. The more elementary value has
a prior claim.
Here we can at the same time see how with values superiority
and inferiority have a different meaning from that which they
have with the categories. If the degree of complexity and the
stratification were the decisive factors, the lower goods would
need to be contained in the higher as elements. But evidently this
is not the case. The material goods are by no means contained in
the spiritual as constituents. ^Esthetic enjoyment in itself has
nothing to do with outward possessions or with bodily well-
being. It is marked by a detachment which is more than mere
difference. And yet if one disregards the individual case and
surveys the whole, the dependence of the higher upon the lower
cannot be denied. But it is not that the one contains the other,
but that the fulfilment of the one conditions the fulfilment of
the other. Fulfilment, however, is actuality. The question is
not concerning a relation between value and value, but between
one valuational actuality and another. This is an ontological,
in the last resort a categorial relation, which in no way
coincides with the axiological connection among valuational
qualities.
In this secondary, ontological relation stratification recurs.
Here also it is concealed behind the gradation of height which
dominates the sense of values. But since actualization is itself
valuable and destruction is contrary to value, it reacts from its
place in the background upon the valuational relation, and
introduces into the table a second gradation along with that of
height.
It is not the higher value itself which depends upon the
lower, but its actualization which depends upon that of the
lower. It is not the material as an element which is contained
in the material, its quality in the quality of the value, but
rather its actualization as a condition. Thus, concealed behind
the order of rank, stratification with all its laws returns as an
ontological relation of values and sets up strength in opposition
to height.
THE GRADE AND THE STRENGTH OF VALUES 455
( f ) Strength and Height in the Sphere of the Moral
Values
This same double relation recurs among the moral values,
because here every single one is based upon a definite goods-
value (or a group of such values). Indeed the height of the
conditioned value need not be proportionate to that of the one
on which it is based; but a certain proportion subsists between
the strength of the one and the strength of the other. That
murder, theft and all real “crimes” are felt to be the most
grievous moral transgressions, is due to this, that the justice
which they violate is based upon the most elementary of goods-
values (life, property and the like). Justice is the virtue which
protects these goods — the goods which support every actualiza-
tion of values. Hence the unique moral import of justice. This
import, however, does not attach to its height, but to its strength.
If we compare the highest moral values, for instance radiant
virtue or personal love, with justice, the twofold relationship
becomes immediately evident. A neglect of radiant virtue and
love exposes no one to radical danger; a person who is incapable
of them is not on that account a bad man ; his conduct threatens
no one, it merely lacks the higher moral content. Even in the
realm of virtue the lower value is more elemental, basic, and
therefore requires prior and unconditional actualization. Not
until it is fulfilled, is the fulfilment of the higher values rational.
Even here ontological stratification and actualization are dis-
closed to view in the superior strength of the lower values.
In this it can be clearly seen that only the lowest moral
values, as claims imposed upon man, can assume the form of
commandments, at least of reasonable commandments. And it is
doubly characteristic that the more elementary these are, the
more negative they are; they appear as prohibitions (thou shalt
not steal, not murder, not commit adultery, not bear false
witness and so on). This proves that it is not the height of the
values that is involved, but the seriousness of the disvalues of
transgression. Only brotherly love can be commanded, and that
456 THE REALM- OF ETHICAL VALUES
not in the strict sense ; but personal love cannot be commanded
at all.
Equally characteristic is the inner misplacement when a
person, who partakes of a higher moral value, dispenses with
the lower, when, as it were, one who loves is suspicious and is
unworthy of trust, when a wise man lacks self-control, a humble
man is not honourable, a proud man is cruel, an imparter of
spiritual values is cowardly. No one truly believes in the virtue
of this sort of virtuous person, and rightly so. It bears the
stamp of unreality, although it is evident that in itself no
contradiction inheres in such a one-sided moral disposition.
The misplacement is deeper down. The higher virtue is
unreasonable, hollow, not sterling; it has no basis in a lower
value, as it should have even if the materials have nothing to
do with each other. Genuine morality is built from below up.
Its essence is not the ideal self-existence of values, but their
actualization in life. Only upon the actualization of the lower
does the actualization of a higher value rest solidly.
Hence the lower moral value is throughout the “stronger.”
But here also superiority of strength does not mean superiority
of value, but only greater elementariness, priority of condition
as a basis, within the entire realm of actual moral conduct.
The lower value touches a wider circle of values in general;
with its violation much more of the moral order and the moral
life collapses than with the violation of a higher value. Its
commandment is more unconditional, is fraught with greater
import. On the other hand, the higher value has a narrower
field of activity; contains less palpable substance, its existence
for itself is more pronounced. It stands and falls for itself
alone. When it suffers injury it injures little else, only what
stands above it in order of rank. The basis beneath it remains
intact. This becomes most evident in extreme cases, like that
of the dispensing of spiritual value, which is altogether “useless”
and has nothing further dependent upon it. It is similar with
love of the remotest, personal love and all the values of indi-
vidual personality.
THE GRADE AND THE STRENGTH OF VALUES 457
How fax the indirect relation of height and strength prevails
throughout the domain of the moral values, we can see best by
comparing a series of values, which most unmistakably rise in
order of rank, with the attributes of the corresponding disvalues.
To the rising line of valuational grades — for instance, of justice,
truthfulness, brotherly love, blind faith, love of the remotest,
the imparting of spiritual values — corresponds an equally
unmistakably descending line of valuational strengths. Namely,
dishonesty (theft, for instance) is a “crime” (while not stealing
is far from being meritorious); a lie is not a crime, but is
surely a stain upon one’s honour; lovelessness does not affect
one’s honour, but is morally of poor quality; not to be capable
of blind faith cannot even be called poor in quality, at most it
is a moral weakness ; but one who is not capable of great enthu-
siasm for ideas and of sacrifice for the future of mankind cannot
even be said to be morally weak, he simply lacks moral greatness ;
finally, one who is no imparter of spiritual values may, for all
that, still possess moral greatness and moral strength ; all that is
lacking in him is the ultimate height above all great aims, the
glory shed over life, which is seldom attained.
( g ) The Twofold Aspect of Morality
If one glances along any one such line of ascent in height and of
descent in strength, the inference is unavoidable that throughout
the realm of values two equally important orders of gradation
hold sway and that two opposed laws of preference correspond
to them.
It is here proved to be untrue that there exists only one
line of precedence, that of height. There exists a second, that
of strength. It is wholly different from the other; it tends in
the opposite direction. It gives preference not to the higher,
but to the lower values. And for the essence of morality this
preference is just as decisive as that for the higher. It is simply
a preference of a different kind. It refers not to the actualization
of values, but to the avoidance of disvalues. In a certain sense
458 THE REALM- OF ETHICAL VALUES
one may say that the order of rank in values is itself twofold — or
is two-sided and has two meanings. For since ascent in strength is
in the opposite direction to ascent in height, the orderly sequence
as such remains one throughout. But it is bi-polar, and both
poles contend for mastery. But the kind of mastery of the one is
essentially different from that of the other. The lower values have
their unique import in relation to the higher, while these possess
their superiority in the conferring of meaning upon life and in
its fulfilment. For the meaning of the moral life is no more to
be found in the lower values than its foundations are to be
found in the higher. Thus it comes about that two kinds of
mastery can co-exist in one ordered sequence.
Morality, however, does not subsist in values as such.
Values have their ideal self-existence, independently of their
actualization. But morality is their actualization in man, hence
actual man’s relation to them. And this relation, corresponding
to the double meaning of ordered gradation, is twofold with a
twofold Ought, a twofold requirement : not to violate the lower
values and at the same time to actualize the higher. Correspond-
ing to this is the fact, reflected in every system of current
morality, that there always exist lower values which are
actualized in a quite different degree from the higher. To them
adhere the prohibitory demand and its characteristic claim to
priority.
Irrespective of this, however, one can divide all values into
those which exhibit the negative and those which exhibit the
positive requirement. Among those of the first kind purity is
pre-eminent; its whole content is negative . 1 Equally to this
belongs justice with its whole series of “prohibitions”; self-
control also as an inner check and restraint; it is the same
with modesty, reserve, deference, humility. Indeed even in
brotherly love, besides its positively creative tendency, there is
a strain of negation, in so far as it finds its occasion in another’s
need. These virtues predominantly represent the preference for
strength in morality. Preference for height is represented by the
* Cf. Chapter XVII (a), Vol. II, on the avoidance of evil.
459
THE GRADE AND THE STRENGTH OF VALUES
virtues of the second class — they are not only the higher moral
values, but some of them exist in every stratum; of course the
higher in the scale we go, the more abundant we find them. Of
this kind are the general basic values of nobility and fulness of
experience, the former always aiming at the axiologically
highest, the latter exclusively and positively directed towards
attainable values. The same tendency is to be seen in bravery,
wisdom, fidelity, faith (especially when blind) and the higher
types of love.
Morality shows a double face — its symbol is the head of
Janus. In it the Ought sets up a backward-looking claim and
at the same time one that is forward-looking — not temporally
backward and forward, but axiologically. If the elementary
values had an absolutely secure position in life, if a man of
serious mind could always be absolutely certain even of himself
— in the sense, for instance, of perfect self-control, honesty,
modesty — he could be exempted from the watchful glance
backward upon the interests of the lower values and look solely
forwards to the higher values, which lie before him waiting for
fulfilment. But no man is so. With man no claim, however ele-
mentary, ever becomes a law of nature (to use Kant’s expres-
sion) ; in regard to it he always retains the freedom of the For and
Against ; he must always be alert against relapse. Along the entire
line everything of moral value is at every moment exposed to
danger, of course in infinitely varying degrees. This is why the
prohibitive command and with it preference for the strength
of the lower values extend upward to the highest stages of
human morality.
(A) The Antinomy in the Nature of the Good
In this way the meaning of the good shifts. There is no need to
retract anything from what we observed in our analysis of the
good. It still remains the “teleology of the higher value .” 1 But
this is only one-half of its nature, its positive side. It corresponds
* Cf. Chapter XIV Qi), Vol. II.
460 the realm* of ethical values
to the law of preference for the higher. But opposed to that
stands the law of preference for the stronger. This is the reverse
side of the good, which looks to the security of its foundations.
The one order of rank is two-sided, and a special stress falls
at each pole. But since the good is involved in this arrangement
of grade, it is the same with the double law of preference which
prevails in it. It claims validity in two directions. And as these
are opposed to each other, we here encounter a fundamental
antinomy, which is rooted in the essence of the good as the
comprehensive basic value : the unconditional preference for the
higher is restricted by an equally unconditional preference for
the more fundamental values.
As we saw, the more special moral values take cognizance of
this duality. And from here we can survey the dual classification
of current moralities; while some are clearly related to the
stronger values, prefernng the avoidance of the more grievous
transgressions, others are related to the higher, preferring the
actualization of ideals which are richer in content. All morality
of justice, of self-control, of renunciation, of purity, is of the
first type ; all morality of bravery, wisdom, fulness of experience,
of fidelity, love, or moral greatness, is of the second. The one-
sidedness of the one is as humanly finite as that of the other.
Each is only half of morality. Not until the two preferential
trends are joined in a synthesis, could a system be called moral
in the full sense of the word.
The general antinomy of valuational preference between
higher and lower is found in all the antinomies which subsist
preponderantly between values of equal or almost equal rank.
Its dimension intersects them. We could correctly call it the
fundamental ethical antinomy.
( t ) The Synthesis of the Two Trends of Preference, as
an Ideal
Whether finite human perception can ever resolve this antinomy
cannot be known in anticipation. But what can be distinctly
THE GRADE AND THE STRENGTH OF VALUES 461
seen is this, that the sense of value is alert to find a synthesis
of the two preferential trends and distinctly points to it in the
value of the “good,” which, although not concretely discerned
as one, is sought for in its unity. It is here as with the higher
virtues which can be anticipated by the sense of values as
required syntheses, but cannot be directly known in the unity of
a concrete ideal.
On the other hand, it is not difficult to conceive — by having
a formal diagram without the contents filled in — how in general
the synthesis will result. If the preference is not to values but
away from disvalues, one could then say: it is a non-teleology
of the lower disvalues. But in itself this is not really opposed to
a positive teleology of the higher values. Rather does it appear
as a continuation of the same basic trend.
To express it positively, the synthesis between preference for
strength and preference for height proves nothing but this, that
morality in the full and genuine sense has to do always and
at the same time with the entire gradational ladder of moral
values, that the lower ones are never a matter of indifference
from the point of view of the higher, while these can never be
dispensed with for the sake of the more fundamental. If one
remembers how very prone our narrow and humanly finite
consciousness is to one-sidedness on this point, how unstable
our equipoise is at this dividing line, one sees that this require-
ment is eminently practical and positive ; and especially so for
anyone who yearns for the highest ; for with him the rudimentary
foundations are most endangered.
Security against transgression of an elementary kind is never
guaranteed in the fulfilment of higher claims— not more at all
events than the latter is guaranteed in the former. Genuine
morality must build from below up and work incessantly at
the foundation; and this the more strenuously, the higher it
builds; for the foundation has so much the more to carry.
But its meaning can never be exhausted in this work ; its meaning
is in the superstructure.
The synthesis of preferences in the essence of the good has
4 6a THE REALM -OF ETHICAL VALUES
no purport except the demand for solidity, from below up, in
so far as it is the condition of all genuine moral elevation. And
even here again it is clear that the antinomy as well as the
idea of the synthesis refers not to the relation among values
themselves but to their actualization. For the lower values as
such do not antagonize the higher; it is only the preference
for their actualization which clashes with the preference for the
actualization of the higher. Rather does the synthesis attest that
in one aifd the same ethical disposition the fulfilment of the
higher is conditioned by the fulfilment of the lower. Who wills
the height must first will the conditions.
This maybe stated more concretely. A moral life is perverted,
if it is related only to the highest values and neglects the lower,
as if it were possible to actualize the former while they float in
the air and have no foundation. But poverty-stricken is a moral
life, which with all its purposes is imprisoned in the lower values
and spends itself upon them. A morality which culminates in
self-control and justice easily becomes pharisaical; it exhausts
itself in safeguards against crime and the lowest baseness; it
makes even the spiritual freedom which it acquires, empty.
But that morality is dangerous which provides scope only for
personality and fosters it only; it devastates the ground on
which personalities grow. The fulfilment of the meaning of
humanity is never to be found in the foundations of human
life; but the possibility of actualizing that meaning is never
attached to its positive contents alone. Its aims should be
placed so high that man can only just discern them, but
its foundations should be laid as firmly as ever they can
be laid.
Many are the errors and aberrations which miss this synthesis.
The majority of the current moralities and philosophical theories
have not escaped them. The radical one-sidedness of the pre-
ferential trend joins with every one-sidedness that shows itself
in the discerned material. The new morality, which comes
forward with the claim that it is a higher morality, only too
easily throws away the “lower” in the gross— an error which
THE GRADE AND THE STRENGTH OF VALUES 463
will avenge itself, even if the new really be higher. It does
not see that it is demolishing its own foundation.
Thus it befell Nietzsche in regard to Christian morality. He
rightly saw that love of the far distant is the higher moral value.
Yet he was at the same time wrong ; for brotherly love is the
“stronger” value. The mistake of Christianity is the belief that
the fulfilment of the moral life depends upon brotherly love
alone. Nietzsche’s mistake is to suppose that love of the far
distant is possible without a basis in brotherly love, that its
aims are in themselves sufficient. Only in their synthesis is
to be found the reciprocal content of both ideals. But to discern
the synthesis is a task of far greater magnitude than to attach
oneself to the one side and despise the other.
On this point the ethics of early Christianity was wiser in its
attitude towards the ancient morality of justice, which to it
rightly appeared poverty-stricken ; it was wiser in its intention
“not to destroy but to fulfil.” Fulfilment is the meaning of all
progress in the moral life. Destruction of the old undermines
the new at its inception. In fact synthesis is always required.
And it is difficult to discover. Even the narrowness of our vision
of values sets a limit to our discernment of it. That is why the
moral life of man, viewed historically, makes so little progress,
despite all the intensity and all the earnestness of human yearn-
ing and solicitude.
The secret of human progress is that advance must be along
the whole line, and not by fragments, that the trend towards
the highest must be accompanied by a trend towards the most
elementary. Every other progress is only a semblance. It sur-
renders on one side what it wins on the other.
CHAPTER XXXIX (lxiv)
VALUE AND VALUATIONAL INDIFFERENCE
( a ) Various Altitudes of the Scales but the same Zero-
point
In formulating the table of opposites 1 we waived the question of
valuational indifference and its dual relation to value and de-
value. But in so far as every single scale contains a neutral point,
this is evidently involved in the fundamental axiological relation.
And, on the other hand, in as much as neutrality indicates the
attitude of real existence to the whole realm of valuational
gradations, there is a problem here as to the limits of gradation.
Hence our investigation cannot entirely ignore it. It requires a
special exposition. And this becomes so much the more impor-
tant, since, as we indicated when we waived it aside, the
gradation of values stands in a very definite relation to
neutrality.
In addition to all the limitations of our discernment of
values, what makes their gradation so difficult to grasp objec-
tively, is the circumstance that so far as we can see there is no
fixed point of reference in the scale. The same of course holds
true of the ordered rank of disvalues, of the gradation of their
gravity, which marks their downward descent.
But according to their position in “valuational space” their
order of rank falls under the polar dimension of value and dis-
value. Yet in this there is the fixed point to which all that is of
value or contrary to it is related, the indifference-point. It is
the absolute zero of dimensional elevation. To it corresponds —
throughout the whole extent of the realm — a single average level,
at which without distinction of material or qualitative difference
value and disvalue separate.
This level of neutrality therefore is the same for all materially
* Cf. Chapter XXXVI (6), Vol. II.
VALUE AND VALUATIONAL* 1 INDIFFERENCE 465
different scales, that is, for the scales of every single value and
its corresponding disvalue. These scales all cut the indifference-
level. But as they, with their very different ranges, also combine
very different grades one with another, so their position as
regards the indifference-point is also necessarily very different.
But m so far as the position of the neutral point is fixed and
absolute for all, this means that in their “absolute” height they
differ.
There are scales of values, in which the positive pole is only
a little above the indifference-point but in which the negative
pole is far below it; and there are others, in which the positive
pole is raised to a considerable height abo.ve neutrality, while
the negative lies close to it. Of the first kind are manifestly
the scales of the lowest values; of the second, those of the
highest.
Herein is confirmed the axiological law, that the lowest values
are the strongest, while the weakest are the highest. “Strength”
shows itself in the low grade of the anti-value, that is, in the
gravity of a violation against the corresponding value. It is this
relation of height and strength in their almost indirectly pro-
portional position, which finds visible expression in the sche-
matic relation of all scales to the level of the zero point.
( b ) The Relation of the Heights of the Values and the
Depths of the Anti- Values to the Indifference-point
Anyone who turns to the analysis of values without first con-
sidering this fact, naturally expects that in every scale the
indifference-point must lie midway, that value and anti-value
must always stand equidistant from it, that therefore, for
example, the vice of lack of self-control and the virtue of self-
control, or the badness of an unloving heart and the goodness
of loving-kindness, would be axiologically of the same magni-
tude, only on opposite sides of the indifference-point.
This is evidently a mistake. And indeed not only because
magnitude is here only figurative and moreover can be measured
Bttncs— IX GO
466 THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES
only with difficulty, but because the whole conception is wrong.
For either the ranges of all scales are of equal magnitude, or
they are not. Now, in the former case, all values must needs
stand equally high above, but all anti-values equally deep below
the zero-point. In the latter case, however, the correspondingly
deeper-lying anti-value must correspond to the higher-lying
value; this would mean that the higher values would be at the
same time the stronger, and the lower would be the weaker.
Each of these views is evidently false. The first contradicts the
clear differentiation in the sensing of values as to their height
(for example, in the gradation of responses both to values and
anti-values), but the second contradicts the law of strength,
which affirms the exact opposite.
All this is changed, as soon as one surrenders the prejudice
as to the midway point. Indifference is not necessarily midway
in the single scales. Rather is it to be found now nearer to the
value, now to the disvalue, according to the rank of the value.
It may of course lie midway also ; and there is a series of values
of average grade, in the scales of which this applies approxi-
mately (for instance, in those of bravery and cowardice, or of
humility and pride); here the value and disvalue manifest
approximately the same strongly-marked axiological character.
The diversity in the position of the indifference-point in the
various scales by no means indicates a fluctuation of the point
itself. Rather does this remain fixed, as at one level, while the
scales, for their part, assume extremely various heights from
this level — which fact again exactly corresponds with the
diverse grades. Thus it comes about, that precisely the constant
relation of the scale to valuational indifference confirms the
law of strength. According to this law the lower-lying (more
grievous) disvalue must not correspond to the higher value ; but
to the higher value the higher-lying (less grievous) disvalue
Corresponds.
This is what can be very easily understood in the relation
of every scale to the one indifference-point. Indeed one also
understands that, if all scales were also of the same range
VALUE AND VALUATIONAI? INDIFFERENCE 467
between value and disvalue, the indirect proportionality of
height to strength would be quite mathematically exact. That
there are valuational relations where this is not precisely the
case, is easily explained by the diversity in the range between
value and disvalue. This explanation is of the greatest impor-
tance for the understanding of the relation of height to strength,
since from it ensues that, even in the apparent exceptions, the
law of strength is not suspended, but is strictly carried out. It
is, however, involved with another uniformity, the exact
structure of which we do not know, a uniformity which concerns
the variation of the span between value and disvalue in the
different scales.
If at this point one compares the rising group of values
mentioned in the preceding chapter, one sees in the attached
responses an illustration of gradational displacement of the
entire scale. Dishonesty (stealing, for example) is criminal;
honesty, on the other hand, attains only to the height of what is
merely approved, that is, it almost coincides with the indif-
ference-point, rising above it only to the lowest degree. Lying is
dishonourable, but not criminal; but sincerity deserves a far
more positive recognition. An unloving disposition is by no
means dishonourable, still it is morally of no value, while
neighbourly love compels respect. An incapacity to feel implicit
trust is only a certain weakness, but implicit trust is something
worthy of esteem. Indifference to the destiny and future of
mankind can scarcely be called a vice, it is simply evidence of
a lack of moral greatness; universal love, on the other hand,
because of the vastness of the self-subjection involved in it, is
something directly heroic and merits admiration. Finally, the
absence of the virtue which dispenses' spiritual values is mani-
festly no moral delinquency, but its presence influences others
like a kind of moral perfection.
If we compare the last two scales with the first, we clearly
see the extreme positions towards valuational indifference
reversed. With honesty almost the whole scale lies below the
zero-point, the value scarcely rises above it; with universal
468 THE REALlft OF ETHICAL VALUES
love and radiant virtue almost the whole scale lies above
indifference, the corresponding disvalue scarcely below it. The
intermediate values show an evident rise, a progressive advance
of the values themselves as well as of the disvalues. The latter
approach nearer to the level of indifference, the values move
farther from it.
Here one can accordingly reduce the law of strength to a
definite formula: with the height of the value the absolute
grade of the whole scale moves against the indifference-point,
likewise also — and indeed in the same way — the grade of the
disvalue. In the case of the higher values the whole scale lies
more above, in the case of the lower more below the indifference-
point. Hence with the lower values the anti-value is far below it ;
with the higher, the anti-value is near to the indifference-
point. Since the depth of the anti-value is a measure of the
grievousness of transgression, but since in the grievousness of
the transgression is seen the strength of the value, it follows
universally and on principle from this diagram that the lower
values are the stronger, a fact which heretofore could be seen
only inductively from particular values.
( c ) The Absolutely Indifferent and the Absolutely
Valuable
Finally it should be observed that, besides the common zero-
point of the scales, there exists a second manifestation of
valuational indifference, which at the same time is a limiting
phenomenon of the table of values.
A survey of values proves beyond all doubt that increasing
height indicates also an increase of the valuational quality
itself; but a decreasing height shows a diminution of quality.
This is not at all a self-evident fact. The opposite could just as
well be true. Still the lower value is the stronger; and, as such,
it will be felt immediately in the grievousness of the violation
of it. But, for the sense of value, it is significant that the
characteristics of the strongest become less marked, while
VALUE AND VALUATIONAL INDIFFERENCE 469
those of the highest are discriminated with the greatest
sensitiveness.
The most elementary values, where they are actualized, are
taken for granted — thus life, health, welfare, especially whatever
is necessary for daily needs; and even beyond these, ordinary
but not necessary possessions, in so far as one is accustomed
to them as necessities. We first become properly aware of the
value of such goods, when we are in need of them. What we
in this way become aware of is therefore by no means the
height of their value but its strength, that is, the seriousness of
the anti-value, of the lack of the value, of the need, the depriva-
tion, the danger. Indirectly, then, the value of such goods is
felt with painful acuteness. Through anxiety its neutral colour
is changed into a vivid hue. But these colours are not properly
its own. If one only considers whether for the sake of such
goods life would be worth living, their borrowed vividness
fades away. In the realm of positive moral values it is the same
as regards those which are the strongest (such as justice and
self-control).
But everywhere here, with goods as with virtues, the valua-
tional quality, despite its paleness, is nevertheless felt directly.
This is otherwise only when one goes a step further towards
the most elementary factors which we can comprehend, towards
the “most general pairs of valuational opposites .” 1 Here the
immediate sensing of value is at the limit of its power of dis-
crimination; to make any one of these values perceptible there
is need of a complex survey of the axiological situation as a
whole. This became most evident in the case of the modal
contrasts . 2
And yet even these values are not the final ones, not properly
the ultimate elements. They are only the last discernible ones
in this direction. That beyond them exist further elements, can
scarcely be doubted; it is simply that their distinctive quality
can no longer be discriminated ; they approach the indifference-
point. If one further bears in mind that precisely in this direction,
1 Cf. Chapters VI-IX, Vol. II. * Chapter VII, Vol. II.
470
THE REALM* OF ETHICAL VALUES
beyond the elements which are given in irreducible plurality,
man’s valuational vision goes on seeking a first and simple
unity and that such a unity necessarily must lie beyond the
range of our sense of values, the thought naturally arises that
this irrational limiting point of the realm must at the same time
be itself the limit of valuational character, that is, that there
is no value beyond, but that there must be an absolute indif-
ference — a merely categorial unitary termination to all values . 1
As there exists a variety of categorial determinations (laws,
structures and so on) which stretch far into the realm of values,
there is nothing especially daring in this metaphysical inference.
Naturally on this point nothing definite can be said. In the
realm of values (as we see it to-day) nothing is more obscure
than the existence of an elementary unity entrenched behind all
plurality? But it is precisely the total perspective of values in
their diversity, so far as the diversity can be surveyed, which
brings this thought home to one. For the diminution down-
wards of discernible quality is beyond all doubt. Moreover, an
absolute limit to value in this direction — if it exists — must
necessarily itself be the limit of what is of value. But that is the
absolutely indifferent. The ideal “beginning” of the realm of
values lies at the level of the axiological zero.
Thus arises further a new perspective as to the total arrange-
ment of the table of values. If it be granted that its ideal “begin-
ning” is not a value, how is its exfoliation and final consumma-
tion to be understood ? Evidently it must culminate in a value
of which the axiological character constitutes the absolute
counter-pole to its beginning — therefore in something uni-
versally valuable, something absolute in the sense of embracing
all values. That we can concretely discern such a value as
little as we can discern absolute valuational neutrality, has
become sufficiently clear from our analysis of the higher values.
"But at the same time from our analysis it became clear that the
whole diversity of values — both where it shows contrasts and
where it shows complementary relationship — presses urgently
1 Cf. Chapter V (c), Vol. II.
VALUE AND VALUATIONA&" INDIFFERENCE 471
*
towards valuational syntheses, to which the perpetual watching
on the part of the sense of values is itself an eloquent witness.
Thus far the thought of a highest synthesis of all values is no
play of idle fancy. A supreme value, understood in this sense,
would in truth be the exact counterpart to the absolute indif-
ference of the beginning. As in the latter all quality disappears,
so in the absolutely valuable — that is, in the extreme augmenta-
tion of valuational character — all material difference must needs
vanish. For here all valuational materials would be united.
Here would be the maximum in content as in value; there the
minimum.
( i ) The Beginning and End of the Realm of Values
If one draws into this perspective the law of grade in the
scales of values, according to which the higher-lying (the
lesser) disvalue corresponds to the higher value, one sees that
in the “beginning” of valuational diversity, the positive pole
of the scale falls at the indifference-level and the negative
must have lain at the lowest point below; that is, it must have
been the heaviest disvalue, the absolute anti-value, in which
every valuable constituent is annihilated. In the “end” of the
realm of values, however, which is its fulfilment, when the
positive pole of the scale lies at the highest point, the negative
pole must at the same time take the highest position possible
for a disvalue; that is, it must fall at just the same level
of indifference at which in the “beginning” the positive
pole lay.
Thus, then, would of course arise an exact symmetry
throughout the whole arrangement. The positive-negative
scale of the highest value would lie wholly above the indif-
ference-point; that of the lowest, entirely beneath. The dis-
value of the former would, in axiological height, coincide with
the value of the latter. Neither the extreme difference in material
nor the fundamental opposition of value and anti-value would
necessarily be in contradiction to the identity in gradation.
f*
47a THE REALM'* OF ETHICAL VALUES
The disvalue reappears projected into the zero-point. It is
retained in the evanescence of distance.
*iBut between the beginnmg and the end would lie the whole
manifold realm of values^We know neither the lower nor the
higher boundary of the realm, and all speculations concerning
it (even those here suggested) remain conjectural. Even as
regards the variety of materials and their order of gradation
we know only a middle section. But in this section is at least
clearly discernible the displacement of the scales, the extremes
of which must constitute the lower and the upper boundaries.
GLOSSARY OF GREEK TERMS
AND PHRASES
dyaB6v
the good ; goodness
dydirr)
love of one’s neighbour; brotherly love
dydirijacc
affection; friendliness
dypouda
boonshness ; rusticity
dypoiKog
boorish; countrified
dducetv
doing wrong
ddiKeioBai
suffering wrong or injustice
aldijpcov
one who feels ashamed
aldcog
sense of shame
dKoXaata
licentiousness; intemperance
dtcpov , d/cpa
extreme(s)
dKpdrrjg
extreme
dXa£ovela
boasting; imposture; pretence
dXrjBetieiv
sincere demeanour
dvaioBqola
apathy; dullness ; stupidity
dvaLa%vv rog
shameless ; impudent
dva£(o>g
undeservedly
dv$pe£a
manliness ; courage
dveXevBepta
penuriousness ; stinginess
dvBpdnrivov
human
dvcovvptoc
nameless ; without a name
dSiovv iavrdv
self-appreciation
dopyr}ala
lack of passion; incapacity for righteous
anger
direipo/caXta
lack of taste
dpSCKOQ
complaisant; obsequious
dpsxtf
goodness ; excellence ; virtue
Uptatov
the best
dao<f>la
folly; stupidity
daxstov
urbane
dacaxla
squandering; profligacy
afadpKBia
self-sufficiency; independence
dtfuXoxipla
lack of ambition
(iavavcrla
vulgar display; vulgarity
pcofioXoxioL
frivolity; ribaldry
pcofcoXdxos
frivolous; ribald
yhvrjcnc
engendering
dztXla
cowardice ; timidity
duccuoadvf}
justice ; righteousness
SticKoXog
unapproachable; difficult to deal with
474 THE REALTY OF ETHICAL VALDES
iyKpdteia
self-mastery; self-control
slpcovefa
self- depreciation ; dissimulation
iXsvdepidtrjs
liberality
gAAeupig
deficiency; defect; omission
iv
The One
iv ju£aq>
midway; intermediate
ivSeia
lack ; want
££ig t If $tg
habit(s) ; attitude(s)
ivaivelrai
commendable
irraiverdv
praiseworthy
£mde$i6rr)s
cleverness ; pleasing intellectuality
imdvfAla
striving ; desire , yearning
imfiiXeta
diligence ; attention ; care
ImxcLiptKaKia
delight in others’ misfortune; malignity
iiroveldioxov
disgraceful
ipaartfg
lover
ipmg
love ; desire
good
etidaifjiovla
appreciative participation of success ; hap-
piness
sfirpaireMa
urbanity; pleasing liveliness
stirvxta
favourable circumstances or destiny;
success ; prosperity
^jfiaprrjfxevov
defective ; faulty
8avp,aor6v
admirable
Bpaffdrrjg
foolhardiness ; audacity
KdOapaig
purification ; cleansing
Kaida f kclkCcu
evil(s) ; vice(s)
kclk6v
bad
KaXotcdyaOla
nobleness ; steadfast goodness
koA6v
beautiful
#caTcwrA*}f
intimidated
icard rd dpiaxov Kal rd etJ
concerning the best and the good
Kparslv
rulership
Ktiriaig
conception ; pregnancy
xdapog dper&v
a world of excellences
A 6yog
universal reason
pLQKapiaxov
superb
fieya\oirp£7Tsia
magnificence
/AeyaXoipvxla
magnanimity
fieyaAdi/tvxog
magnanimous ; high-minded
475
GLOSSARY OF GREElf TERMS
/jteydXcov iavxdv d%t(bv
df tog &v
deeming oneself worthy of great things
jirjd&v dyav
nothing in excess
fjtipLapdQ
individuation ; division
fzeadrrjg
mean; “golden mean”; medium
psadxrjtes
mean , intermediate
jnsrafidXeia
regret; repentance
fxerdvota
afterthought; backward look
filaapta
defilement ; pollution
fjUKpovpirrsia
meanness ; shabbmess
puKpotftvxla
self-depreciation ; self-disparagement;
mean-spiritedness
puarycdv
hateful
vipLeaiq
justifiable participation in what befalls
others
vsfiearjxiKdg
one who wishes to give everyone his due
SpyiXdxrjg
violent temper; irascibility
ova La
essence; essential quality
irdQog
passive state ; passivity
TTEpi X l
what is concerned
i Tepl r iftdg
concerning honour
irpadxqg
mildness ; equability
irpdvoia
prevision ; foresight
irpdg irepov
concerning others
TTp&XOV KIVOVV
primal agent; “first mover”; source of
activity
aotf>ia
wisdom
cvfirrdOsia
community of feeling
avjxirXoKr)
combination ; mterwovenness , interlacing
oaxfipoodvri
self-control ; moderation
od)<f>pCQV
sane ; prudent
xd KaXd Kal Capita
the ornamental and the unprofitable
ySzify elvat
existence in thought or m idea
rtfiij fAsydXt)
great honour
xtftrjxdv
worthy of honour
xd irapd <j>tiaiv
that which is contrary to Nature
tfrreppoXrj
excess , extravagance
<f>66vog
envy; malice; ill-will
<fnXtj[t6v
lovable ; worthy of love
476 THE
faXoripta
</>6(}oz ddo£(aQ
%avv6xriQ
Xpfaara
ifstKTdv
REALM of ethical values
friendship; “love of a friend”
ambition ; love of honour
fear of contempt
arrogance ; conceit ; vanity
possessions ; material goods
blameworthy
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